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
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DEMOCRACY IN PALESTINE?
AN EVALUATION OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL
1996-1998

BY: ISABELLE DANEELS

**A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY
IN
(MIDDLE EAST POLITICS)**

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THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

OCTOBER 1999

20 MAR 2001

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DEDICATION

*To my late grandfather
As promised...
And
To my son for hope...*

Political scientists want to do good. They want to expand knowledge about political life, but also they wish to use knowledge for political reform. Usually this means desiring to promote “democratisation”. Historically democracy and political science have tended to develop together. In modest ways political science can contribute to the emergence of democracy. Political reform succeeds best if it occurs incrementally, in the spirit of “one soul at a time”.

Samuel P. Huntington

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have often been told that when reading for a Ph.D., the most difficult part is the feeling of isolation and having to do it on your own. Hereby I would like to express my gratitude to some special people who helped me through this Ph.D. and without whose never-ending support I would never have had the strength to complete this degree. I would like to thank the following:

First of all, my supervisor, Professor Tim Niblock. Without him, I would not even have started this degree. Sometimes his eye for detail and his comments on the endless drafts of this Ph.D. drove me to despair. However, his guidance, patience and humanity turned him into a friend to whom I owe much more than this degree.

My husband, Jamil Rabah. Without his love, support and advice I would never have finished this degree. I do not know any husband who would give up his livelihood and job to follow his wife in order for her to complete her Ph.D. Jamil did this and much more. I am very lucky to have him in my life.

My parents, for supporting me in reading this degree and for trusting me enough to let me go to the UK and later to the Middle East. I know I stretched their patience on many occasions, but I hope that their daughter completing this degree will make them happy and proud.

Ghassan Khatib, Director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre. He gave me a great opportunity by giving me a job in the JMCC, which gave me the experience to conduct research for this degree. This would have been impossible without his trust and generosity. Also, I am indebted to the entire staff of the JMCC for their support. Particular gratitude is due to Samar Hawari for her help and assistance in working relentlessly on the layout of this thesis.

Doctor Rosemary Hollis. I will never forget our memorable talk in Jerusalem in which she managed from a very original perspective to convince me more than anybody else not to give up this degree. At a time where I was ready to give up, she took the time to convince me otherwise.

There are many other friends who helped me through this degree by just being there for me, by pointing things out to me or saying the right thing at the right time. They know who they are and I thank all of them from the bottom of my heart.

All the above people made me realise that this Ph.D. is about much more than just this piece of research. The time spent with friends in the UK and Palestine was a learning process far beyond the scope of politics and academia. It broadened my perspectives and taught me about life.

ABSTRACT

Since the signing in Washington of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 between the PLO and Israel, tremendous changes have taken place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These have had a major impact on the Palestinian population and have been carefully monitored by the international community. Although the Declaration of Principles did not specifically hint at the establishment of a Palestinian state, it nonetheless envisaged an entity that has most of the elements required for a sovereign state. The election of the first Palestinian parliament was one of these elements. The election of the first Palestinian Legislative Council was, therefore, considered by many not only as being a major step in the build-up of a Palestinian state, but also as an essential component for the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state.

The main purpose of the thesis is to analyse the democratisation process in the Palestinian autonomous areas and the role of the Legislative Council in this process since the general elections in 1996 until the end of 1998. In order to do so, the researcher essentially concentrated on two necessary prerequisites for democratic development, namely the elections and the first Palestinian Legislative Council. In Part One of the thesis - based on a public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip and a survey within the Legislative Council - the main dimensions of the elections and the performance of the Legislative Council were laid out. Part One, therefore, indicates whether or not the Legislative Council is an effective democratic institution in its foundation and whether or not it is operating in a

manner which reflects democratic values. Part Two of the study examines whether or not the Legislative Council plays an effective role in the Palestinian political arena and discusses the main impediments in the way of the development of a democratic Palestinian regime.

Despite the fact that the elections were an outcome of the Oslo agreements reached between Israel and the PLO - towards which many Palestinians have a negative attitude - the majority of the Palestinians were proud and excited over their chance to participate in the first national elections of January 1996. For the Palestinian electorate, the elections were a first experience not to be missed and an expression of their desire for change. They considered the elections not only as a first step towards national independence, but were hoping that by voting they could help instigate the creation of a democratic, effective and more orderly political system, which could provide them with stability and economic prosperity. There was perhaps an insufficient understanding that democracy does not only consist of elections, but is based on a whole range of democratic prerequisites which have been largely absent in Palestinian society and which take time to develop. As a result, the high expectations in regard to the first elected Legislative Council have made room for disillusion. Neither democracy nor political and economic prosperity have come overnight, and now the Legislative Council is - in part wrongly - blamed for that. The thesis will place what appears to be a fairly bleak evaluation of the Legislative Council in perspective.

The researcher has aimed, thus, to provide a clear picture of the viability of the Legislative Council firstly as a democratic institution, and secondly, as an essential element in the Palestinian democratisation process.

This study will show that the foundation for democracy seems to be strong and both the Council members and the Palestinian public are receptive to the idea of democracy, but that the efforts towards actual democratic transformation are obstructed by severe political circumstances that prevent substantive change.

As a result, it will become clear that the failure of the Legislative Council to function effectively is not a consequence of the Arab or Islamic culture, neither is it due to economic and social conditions. On the contrary, from the thesis it became clear that there are fertile grounds upon which Palestinian democracy could be based. The public is receptive and responsible and their electoral choices proved to be sensible and rational. The Council members seem to be equally responsible and aware of their democratic responsibilities. However, for an institution such as the Legislative Council to function properly, one major component is missing and that is sovereignty. As such, the study concludes that continuous presence of the Israeli occupation authority on Palestinian territory, the control it has over movement and the usage of Palestinian resources, and its interference in and pressure on the Palestinian decision-making establishment, render any attempt for a democratically viable institution meaningless and absurd.

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
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INTRODUCTION:

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Since the signing in Washington of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 between the PLO and Israel, tremendous changes have taken place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These have had a major impact on the Palestinian population and have been carefully monitored by the international community. Although the Declaration of Principles did not specifically hint at the establishment of a Palestinian state, it nonetheless envisaged an entity that has most of the elements required for a sovereign state. The election of the first Palestinian parliament was one of these elements. The election of the first Palestinian Legislative Council was, therefore, considered by many not only as being a major step in the build-up of a Palestinian state, but also as an essential component for the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state.

The main purpose of the thesis is to analyse the democratisation process in the Palestinian autonomous areas and the role of the Legislative Council in this process since the general elections in 1996 until the end of 1998. In order to do so, the researcher will essentially concentrate on two necessary prerequisites for democratic development, namely the elections and the first Palestinian Legislative Council. In Part One of the thesis - based on a public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip and a survey within the Legislative Council - the main dimensions of the elections and the performance of the Legislative Council will be laid out. Part Two of the study intends to examine the main impediments in the way of the development of a democratic



Palestinian regime. The combination of the data found in the two parts of this thesis will indicate that Palestine can be classified as a "partial democracy". Indeed, general and presidential elections have taken place in the Palestinian autonomous areas, there is limited accountability by the government, there is a degree of freedom of expression, there is political opposition and there are independent organisations critical of the state. In this thesis, it will be argued that given the experience of the Legislative Council and the attitudes of the electorate, the potential for further democratisation in Palestine does exist provided that it enjoys full sovereignty in the near future. For now, however, further development in the political institutional structure is hindered by the current political environment and the political realities that render progress in the peace process more important than further enhancement in the democratic nature of the Palestinian political system.

Despite the fact that the elections were an outcome of the Oslo agreements reached between Israel and the PLO - towards which many Palestinians have a negative attitude - the majority of the Palestinians were proud and excited over their chance to participate in the first national elections of January 1996. For the Palestinian electorate, the elections were a first experience not to be missed and an expression of their desire for change. They considered the elections not only as a first step towards national independence, but were hoping that by voting they could help instigate the creation of a democratic, effective and more orderly political system, which could provide them with stability and economic prosperity. There was perhaps an insufficient understanding that democracy does not only consist of elections, but is based on a whole range of democratic prerequisites which have

been largely absent in Palestinian society and which take time to develop. As a result, the high expectations in regard to the first elected Legislative Council have made room for disillusion. Neither democracy nor political and economic prosperity have come overnight, and now the Legislative Council is - in part wrongly - blamed for that. The thesis will place what appears to be a fairly bleak evaluation of the Legislative Council in perspective. It will examine the impediments hindering the proper and effective functioning of the Legislative Council. It will become clear that the transitional nature of the Legislative Council and the political and socio-economic environment of which it is part makes it difficult for the Legislative Council to be an effective controller of the Palestinian democratic process. Throughout the thesis, the researcher will outline the causes for concern vis-à-vis the Legislative Council and its impact on the democratisation process. It will be argued that the transitional nature of the peace process and the limitations this process has on the Legislative Council are major constraints on the ability of the Legislative Council to fulfil its responsibilities in a manner as a parliament would in a fully democratic and sovereign state.

To facilitate the presentation of the thesis, it has been divided into eight principle chapters. Each chapter will provide an overview and analysis based on secondary sources as well as primary sources collected on a study-trip to the Palestinian autonomous areas for the duration of one year and a half.

Before entering into the specifics of the Palestinian democratisation process and its challenges, it is necessary both to clarify the methodology upon which the thesis is built and

to determine which theoretical approach is utilised for the proposed area of this study. Chapter One will include the methodology, the theoretical framework and the literature review for this thesis. In this chapter, it will become clear that none of the main existing theoretical approaches on democratisation are fully applicable to the Palestinian case as those approaches examine the process of democratisation in sovereign states. As such, once Palestine is sovereign, the terms modernist approach, transitional approach or structural approach may become more relevant. In any case, keeping in mind that the thesis examines the process of democratisation under partial sovereignty rather than full sovereignty, the researcher will argue that some elements of the transitional approach help in understanding the Palestinian democratisation process. As will be explained in Chapter One, the emphasis in the transitional approach on the elite and the phasing of the democratic process is valid in the Palestinian case.

Chapter Two will provide an analysis of the elections, and an overview of the election results will explain why the opposition groups did not participate in the elections, and assess the consequences of this boycott. The chapter will also analyse how people voted during the elections, whether they would vote differently in future elections, and what the Council members think about the voting patterns of the population.

Chapter Three will focus on the perceptions of both the electorate and the Council members of the Legislative Council in general. Based upon the survey material, Chapter Three will first examine how the performance of the Legislative Council is evaluated according to some basic tenets of democracy. Also in this chapter, the level of satisfaction or

dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council will be analysed. The hopes or scepticism of both the Council members and the public about the performance of the Legislative Council in the future will bring Chapter Three to a close.

Based upon further results of both the public opinion poll and the survey conducted within the Legislative Council, Chapter Four will explore whether or not the Legislative Council is inherently democratic. In doing so, the extent to which there is an understanding of democratic tenets amongst the Council members and a willingness to act accordingly will be assessed.

Chapter Five is intended as a background chapter, which will help to clarify the arguments in the remaining chapters of this thesis. In it, the structure of the Palestinian Authority and its ambiguities will be discussed. Moreover, a short overview will be provided of various expert perceptions on where the blame falls for the slow progress in Palestinian democratic development.

Chapter Six will examine the degree of the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing its constituents. In doing so, it will become clear whether or not the ineffectiveness of the Council members is due to their inadequate knowledge of the public's needs or whether it is due to the gap in expectations between the public and the Council members about the capabilities of the Legislative Council.

Chapter Seven will assess to what extent the functioning of the Legislative Council is impeded by internal dimensions. In undertaking this assessment, the researcher will concentrate on the relationship between the Legislative Council and both the Executive Authority and Arafat in his capacity of President of the Palestinian Authority as well as Chairman of the PLO.

Finally, Chapter Eight will analyse in how far the Legislative Council is less effective than it could be, given the Israeli policies and the limitations placed on it by the peace agreements.

The conclusion will assimilate the threads of the thesis. The findings of this study will be summarised and a final evaluation of the role of the Legislative Council in the democratisation process in the Palestinian autonomous areas will be provided.

=====

PART ONE:

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN ITS FORMATION AND ITS INTERNAL ORGANISATION

CHAPTER ONE:

METHODOLOGY, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION IN PALESTINE

1.1. PART ONE: METHODOLOGY

The main aim of this study is to find evidence of the potential emergence of a democratic regime in the Palestinian autonomous areas. Part One of this chapter will outline the research methods used by the researcher to generate the necessary information for this thesis.

1.1.1. Research Resources

Before entering into more detail about the specific research tools and resources used for this study, it is useful to briefly sum up what the backbone of this research consists of. The author relied on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are mainly made up of the following components:

1. a major public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip,
2. a survey conducted within the Palestinian Legislative Council, interviews,
3. some official and non-official documents.

4. The secondary sources comprise mostly of books, journals, magazines and newspapers.

1.1.2. Public Opinion Poll

A public opinion poll¹ was conducted from 20 to 22 August 1997, exploring the Palestinian electorate's voting record, their assessment of the Legislative Council, their Council members, and whether their attitudes towards these issues are changing. The survey also includes questions on if and how Palestinians would vote in the future and on what basis. The survey was conducted within a short time frame of three days to increase the probability of finding potential respondents at home and to avoid sudden events which might influence responses or opinions.

1.1.2.1. Sample size

A random sample of 1,195 people over the age of 18 was interviewed face-to-face throughout the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, 756 people were surveyed. In the Gaza Strip, 439 people were surveyed. The sample size has been determined according to the adopted standards of the discipline of statistics.²

According to those standards, when conducting a survey with a sample size of approximately 1,200, the margin of error is reduced to 3% and the level of confidence rates at 95%.

¹ For questionnaire in English, see Annex 1. For questionnaire in Arabic, see Annex 2. For full results, see Annex 5.

A margin of error of 3% means that if on a certain question, 40% of the people answer positively, in actuality the result can vary between 37% and 43%. By a level of confidence of 95% it is understood that if one were to ask the same question 100 times, in 95% of the cases the answer would fall within the margin of error. In this case, 3%.

1.1.2.2. Fieldworkers

In order to be able to conduct a public opinion poll professionally and within a short time-span, the author sought and received co-operation of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (the JMCC). The JMCC is a reputable, independent Palestinian media and research centre that, amongst other things, has been conducting regular opinion polls since 1991. For the purposes of the opinion poll conducted for this research, the JMCC provided skilled interviewers with a strong experience and training in the field.

To reduce the risks of bias from the interviewers, each fieldworker received only twenty questionnaires. Therefore, with a sample size of 1,195, sixty fieldworkers conducted the interviews in sixty different sampling points.³

1.1.2.3. Area and Sampling frame

All 450 population concentrations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip were considered for selection. These concentrations include cities, towns,

² For more information on this issue, see for example: Backstrom, C.H. and Hursh-Cesar, G., Survey Research, (second edition), New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981.

villages, and refugee camps. Hamlets were excluded, as many of their residents also reside in other concentrations. Moreover, only population concentrations with more than 700 residents comprise the sampling frame.

1.1.2.4. Sampling points and their selection

Based on published population estimates provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Health Development Information Project (HDIP),⁴ population concentrations were subdivided into sampling points. The number of sampling points per population is proportionate to the centre's size. In practice, each population concentration was divided by one thousand. In other words, if a certain village has a population of 10,000, then it will be assigned ten sampling points. Since the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip totals 2,4 million, the overall number of potential sampling points is 2,400.

All 2,400 potential sampling points were included in Excel. Sixty of those were randomly selected from the combined West Bank and Gaza Strip population base. Jericho was selected as a sampling point in any case. This was required because, whilst its small

³ For more information on fieldworkers, interviewers and their training, see: Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Survey Research, pp. 237-246.

⁴ Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, Small Area Population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, West Bank: Ramallah, November 1994.

population size makes the probability of its selection small, its political significance makes its selection necessary.⁵

In the West Bank, people from the following areas were surveyed: *Jenin*: Jenin, Jenin & refugee camp, Sanour & Maythaloun, al-Shuhada & 'Arabeh, al-Yamoun & Burqeen, Qabatia & Zababdeh. *Nablus*: Nablus, Nablus & Balata refugee camp, Beit Dajan, 'Asira, Salfit, Bureen- Madama. *Tulkarem*: Tulkarem & refugee camp, Tulkarem-town, Nazlet Issa & Baqa Sharqia, Zeita, Sida. *Qalqilia*: Qalqilia. *Bethlehem*: Bethlehem, Beit Jala & Beit Sahour, Deiheisheh refugee camp. *Hebron*: Hebron (2)⁶, Fawar refugee camp, Beit Ummar, Dura, Bani Na'im, Beit Ula. *Jerusalem*: Old city, A-Ram & Dahyat al-Bareed, Beit Hanina & refugee camp, Silwan & Ras al-Amoud, Sheikh Jarrah & Wadi al-Joz. *Jericho*: Jericho. *Ramallah*: Ramallah, al-Bireh, Jalazoun refugee camp & Jifna, Beitunia, al-Mizra' al-Sharqia.

In the Gaza Strip, people were surveyed from: Khan Younis (3), Rafah, Rafah/Bloc, Maghazi refugee camp, Sabra, Khan Younis refugee camp, Sheikh Radwan, al-Darag al-Tuffah, al-Nasr, Jabalia refugee camp, Shati refugee camp, Breige refugee camp, Beit Lahia & Beit Hanoun, Shaboura refugee camp, al-Rimal, Shoujai'a, Jabalia al-Balad, Deir al-Balah, Tal al-Sultan, Nseirat refugee camp.

⁵ The political significance of Jericho grew as a result of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement between Israel and the PLO, which, at the time, made Jericho the only town in the West Bank that came under the Palestinian self-rule control.

⁶ Due to the size and for interview purposes, cities were divided into neighbourhoods, which were randomly selected and treated in the same way as any other village or town. Therefore, when a number has been added behind a city name, that number indicates the amount of neighbourhoods selected within this city.

In the sample, 56.4% of the respondents were from the West Bank, 6.9% from Jerusalem, and 36.7% from the Gaza Strip.⁷ Of the surveyed people, 31.6% said that they live in villages, 23.9% in refugee camps, and 44.5% in towns or cities.

1.1.2.5. Household selection method

From a randomly selected starting location in each sampling point, households were systematically selected using a predetermined selection interval. Since most population concentrations are not well planned, nor is there a well-defined bloc system, interviewers - particularly in villages and refugee camps - were asked to go to a specific place (mosque, primary school, etc.) to begin their route. They were instructed to start from that place and then take the fourth street on their left. After having determined the street, they were instructed to choose the third house on their right, the following third house on their left, and so on. The number of floors in each house was also taken into consideration, as was the number of streets where the households were selected. In cities, the same method was used, but included the division of the city into neighbourhoods. When the 60 primary sampling points are selected from 2,400 units, a city like Gaza could be expected to be chosen 10 times since it has a population of 250,000. Therefore, due to size and for interview purposes, cities were divided into neighbourhoods, which were also randomly selected and treated in the same way as a village for the selection of households.

1.1.2.6. Selection method within the household

⁷ More people were interviewed in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, because the West Bank has a larger

Respondents within the households were selected using Kish tables.⁸ The Kish table is an objective, internationally accepted selection procedure. It consists of the interviewer asking the two following questions: (1) How many people 18 years and older reside in this household?. (2) How many of those are women? Based on the answer to these questions, the adult to be interviewed is selected according to the table 1 below.

Table 1:

	1 adult	2 adults	3 adults	4 or more adults
No women	Adult 1	Eldest 3	Middle-aged 6	2nd oldest male 10
1 woman	Adult 2	Male or female 4	Youngest male 7	Middle-aged man 11
2 women		Youngest woman 5	Oldest woman 8	Oldest or youngest man 12
3 women			Middle-aged 9	Middle-aged woman 13
4 or more women				2nd youngest woman 14

Usually, three attempts are made to interview the selected household member. If, after three attempts, an interview has not been completed, a replacement household will be randomly selected from the next household block.

1.1.2.7. Validation

population than the Gaza Strip.

⁸ Leslie Kish, "A Procedure of Objective Respondent Selection within the Household", Journal of the American Statistical Association, (44), 1949, pp. 380-387. Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Survey Research, pp. 95-97.

Validation procedures were conducted on 30 percent of the data to ensure accurate selection, recording, coding, and data entry of the completed interviews. If 5 percent or more inaccuracies had been found, validation would have been conducted on the entire sample. This proved to be unnecessary.

At this stage, it is also worth mentioning that throughout the thesis, whenever survey results are used in an argument, the researcher added under each table the *probability of Chi square (p)* and *the degrees of freedom (df)*. This was done to indicate to the reader whether or not the relationship between variables is valid or results from chance alone.

Pearson's Chi square (X^2)⁹ is a test widely used by social scientists¹⁰ to examine the differences between nominal¹¹ and ordinal¹² level variables. Although it does not show the strength of the relationship between variables, it does provide evidence as to whether the relationship between two or more variables is due to chance alone or whether statistical significance exists between the variables concerned.

⁹ The explanation that follows is basic. For more detailed knowledge on the topic, see: Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Survey Research; Norusis, M.J., SPSS/PC+ for the IBM PC/XT/AT, USA: SPSS Inc., 1986; Norusis, M.J., SPSS 6.1: Guide to Data Analysis, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997.

¹⁰ Norusis, SPSS/PC+ for the IBM PC/XT/AT, p. B-97.

¹¹ In an opinion poll, a nominal measurement distinguishes and classifies one person from another. For example: male versus female, Muslim versus Christian. Responses are merely labels and a respondent can only fit into one of either labels or categories. Moreover, the numbers or codes indicate differences that cannot be mathematically compared. For example: "1" = student, "2" = farmer. In this case, "2" is not higher or better than "1". Nominal measurement is the simplest form of measurement. (Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Survey Research, pp. 132-133.)

¹² Ordinal measurement is used when a question is constructed in such manner that the responses or values do not only imply classification, but also ranking and ordering of the data. Accordingly, ordinal data allow a researcher to compare responses or values. Ordinal measurement does not give the researcher the degree of difference between different values. In order to be able to know the degree of difference between values, researchers use interval level questions. Example of ordinal measurement question: "What age group do you

The value of Chi square (X^2) is calculated from the summation of the differences between the observed frequencies¹³ and the expected frequencies¹⁴. In short,

$$X^2 = \sum_i \sum_j \frac{(O_{ij} - E_{ij})^2}{E_{ij}}$$

("O" = observed frequency; "E" = expected frequency)

The higher the summed differences between the observed and the expected frequencies, the higher the Chi square value. It is clear that the Chi square value would also increase according to the number of values and categories being tested. Therefore, when calculating the significance of Chi square (p) in a relationship between variables, it is crucial to take into account the number of categories for the variables, i.e. the number of rows and the number of columns in the table. This is what determines the degrees of freedom (df). Statisticians in testing the relationship between variables consider them vital.¹⁵ The degrees of freedom are calculated as follows: $(\text{row}-1) \times (\text{column}-1)$. The crossed value of Chi square and the degrees of freedom is the significance of Chi square. Usually, the significance of Chi square is set at 5%. This implies that if the value of the significance is higher than 0.05, the relationship between variables results from chance. On the other hand, if the

belong to?". Example of interval level question: "What is your exact age?". (Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Survey Research, pp. 132-133.)

¹³ "Observed frequencies" are the actual frequencies/results obtained from the survey. (Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Survey Research, pp. 363-364.)

¹⁴ "Expected frequencies" are the frequencies that should occur by chance if no relationship exists between the tested variables. (Backstrom and Hursh-Cesar, Survey Research, pp. 363-364.)

¹⁵ For more detailed information on the topic of "degrees of freedom", see: Norusis, SPSS/PC+ for the IBM PC/XT/AT, p. B-98; Norusis, SPSS 6.1: Guide to Data Analysis, p. 330.

value of the significance of Chi square is lower than 0.05, then statistical significance between the variables under study can be assumed.

In this thesis, the researcher did not make all the above calculations in order to know the significance of Chi square. Instead, the researcher employed the computer programme SPSS 6.1¹⁶, which, with the help of some commands, computes Chi square, and its significance and the degrees of freedom. An example of an output of results by SPSS 6.1 can be viewed in figure 1 below.

Figure 1

¹⁶ For more information on SPSS 6.1 see: Norusis, SPSS 6.1: Guide to Data Analysis.

C32 Election expectations by AGE
Age

		AGE					Page
Count		18-25 yr	26-35 yr	36-45 yr	46-55 yr		
		1	2	3	4	5	Total
C32							
	1	68	67	48	27	11	233
met my expectat							19.5
	2	158	144	61	39	11	451
somewhat met my							37.7
	3	100	106	75	22	21	338
didn't meet my							28.3
	4	53	49	19	17	23	173
no answer							14.5
Column		379	366	203	105		66
(Continued)	Total	31.7	30.6	17.0	8.8		5.5
100.0							

C32 Election expectations by AGE
Age

		AGE		Row Total
		Count	Missing	
C32			99	
	1	met my expectat	12	233 19.5
	2	somewhat met my	38	451 37.7
	3	didn't meet my	14	338 28.3
	4	no answer	12	173 14.5
		Column	76	
		Total	6.4	
			100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF
Pearson	55.30263	15
Likelihood Ratio	52.25813	15
Linear-by-Linear Association	.05107	1

Minimum Expected Frequency -
Number of Missing Observations:

0

1.1.2.8. Breakdown

A breakdown of the opinions of the surveyed people according to selected subgroups will be included in the annex of this thesis. The interviewees were divided according to the following subgroups:

1. gender,
2. age,
3. residence,
4. refugee status,
5. education

Only where the breakdown shows a particular phenomenon of use in this study, will it be included in a certain chapter.

In general, 51.2% of the respondents were male, whilst 48.8% were female. Moreover, 59.2% of the surveyed people were married, 28.8% single, 4.9% widowed, 1.4% divorced, whilst 5.7% did not reveal their marital status. The average age of the interviewees was 33 years.

For the purpose of information, below, an overview of the occupation of the respondents has been included:

- Students: 14.6%
- Labourers: 11.3%
- Housewives: 31.9%

- Farmers/fishermen: 1.8%
- Retired: 1.9%
- Businesspeople/Private business: 8.4%
- Employees (e.g., secretaries, municipal employees, teachers, nurses): 19.6%
- Professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers): 2.1%
- Unemployed 4.8%
- No answer: 2.4%

1.1.2.9. Use of additional polls

In order to highlight how public opinion on certain issues has changed or remained the same over time, the researcher of this thesis has sometimes made use of additional polls, which were conducted by the JMCC in the past. The researcher has received permission from the director of the JMCC to do so, and has made sure that proper references have been made.

1.1.3. Survey within the Palestinian Legislative Council

In September 1997, the researcher of this thesis, again in co-operation with the JMCC, conducted a survey¹⁷ within the Legislative Council in order not only to analyse the public's views, but also to take into account the opinions of the Council members themselves. Anonymity was emphasised in the research and the Council members were not obliged to

mention their names on the questionnaires. Some of the questions asked to the Council members were similar to those asked to the Palestinian people in the public opinion poll. This was done in order to check potential discrepancies between the answers of the Council members and the public. Furthermore, the Council members were asked additional questions allowing the researcher to gauge their attitudes and beliefs on such concepts as majority rule and minority rights, due process of law, and many more concepts that could be considered the basis of democratic thought.¹⁸

Prior to the survey within the Legislative Council, the author sought and was given the co-operation of the office of the Speaker of the Legislative Council, Mr. Ahmad Qrei'. The author and a JMCC researcher attended 15 Council sessions, approaching the Council members to fill in the questionnaires. After one month, out of the 88 Council members, 43 filled in their questionnaires.

1.1.4. Interviews

Interviews were mainly used as an additional means of data collection to fill up gaps or to reinforce points in this study. Moreover, given the contemporary nature of the subject of this thesis and, consequently, the scarce availability of secondary resources, interviews proved sometimes the only plausible manner to gather specific information.

¹⁷ For questionnaire in English, see Annex 4. For questionnaire in Arabic, see Annex 5. For full results, see Annex 6.

¹⁸ The reasoning behind the researcher's choice of certain concepts will be explained later in the thesis, when the Council member's opinions about those concepts will be examined.

1.1.4.1. The Sample

Overall, the people interviewed by the researcher can be categorised into six categories. The interviewees were asked predetermined questions: some were consistent with questions asked in the surveys; others were additional questions, depending on the affiliation and position of the interviewee. The six categories were:

1. Legislative Council members: The main aim of the interview with some key Council members was to obtain a more comprehensive answer to some of the questions asked in the survey conducted within the Legislative Council. Moreover, by interviewing some Council members the author attempted to construct a clearer picture of why the interviewees stood in the first general elections, what their experience (achievements, challenges, programmes, suggestions, evaluation) has been like and what their expectations for the future were. Their opinions on contemporary issues such as the impact of Israeli policies, the issue of corruption, the declaration of a Palestinian state, the leadership of Yasser Arafat and so on, were also valued and taken into consideration by the researcher.
2. Members of the Executive Authority: Interviews with Ministers of the Palestinian Authority evolved mainly around the relationship between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council. They were also asked to give suggestions about what (if anything) could or should be changed in the future.

3. **Members of the opposition groups:** Leaders and members of the main secular and religious opposition groups and parties were interviewed mainly about two subjects: Firstly, they were asked why their respective parties had decided to participate or to boycott the first Palestinian general elections, and what their standpoint thereof was. They were also asked about the role of their respective parties nowadays and in the future. Secondly, they were questioned about their views of the political situation and the performance of the Palestinian Authority, including the Legislative Council.
4. **Members of the PLO leadership:** Members of the PLO leadership were especially asked about the role of the PLO nowadays and its relationship with the Palestinian Authority.
5. **Academics & members of the NGO community:** The framework of the interviews with Palestinian academics and members of the NGO community was more loose, rather than specific. Depending on the field and experience of the interviewee, the author attempted through discussions to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the subject, built on the first hand experience and specialisation of the interviewees.
6. **Members of the public:** Interviews with members of the public were mainly conducted with ordinary people such as shopkeepers, students, businessmen, restaurant-holders, and bankers. The main purpose of the interview was to gauge the mood in the street in a face-to-face manner.

1.1.4.2. Procedures of the Interview

Most interviews were conducted between July 1997 and October 1998, and were dependent on the timetable of the interviewees and the presence of the researcher in the Palestinian autonomous areas.

None of the interviewees objected to the recording of the interview. However, to be on the safe side and in order to enhance the understanding of the tapes afterwards, the researcher made a point of always combining tape recording during the interview with note-taking. It is also worth mentioning here, that on some occasions, although the interviewees did not object to the recording, they specifically requested for their names not be mentioned in this script. The researcher will respect their wishes. Also, in some instances, the interviewees specified that some of the information provided was “off the record”, even when the conversation was being recorded. Here again, the author will honour their instructions.

In most instances, the time for the interviews was arranged beforehand and the allotted time-slot was usually one hour. However, on one occasion, a Minister was interviewed spontaneously between two Council sessions, reducing the interview time to fifteen minutes. It should also be noted that interviews with members of the public were not arranged beforehand.

1.1.4.3. Constraints

The researcher faced a number of constraints when attempting to set up or conduct an interview. Following is a list of the main difficulties:

1. Some of the interviewees were difficult to reach. Sometimes, attempts to set up an interview were very time consuming and frustrating, or could only materialise through a number of contacts.
2. Although most interviews went quite smoothly, there was sometimes an impression that the interviewees were reluctant to give some pieces of information, especially given the fact that the researcher is a foreigner.
3. The language barrier proved sometimes difficult, due to the researcher's poor Arabic or the interviewees' poor knowledge of English. On one occasion, the researcher, therefore, had to conduct the interview with the assistance of a native Arabic speaking researcher.

1.1.5. Secondary Sources

Reliance by the author on secondary sources could be considered minimal, mainly due to the contemporary nature of the subject at hand. A literature review on the subject will, however, be included in Part Two of this chapter.

1.2. PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

As more and more countries embraced democracy in the aftermath of the Cold War, interest in the process of democratisation was revived. This renewed interest brought with it new ideas and perspectives about democratisation. Nonetheless, whilst new developments did indeed occur, studies that were published before - during the period of the Cold War - retained some validity. They provided not only various explanations about why and how democracy had developed successfully in some places and not in others, but often continued to serve as a backbone for later studies and analysis on the topic.

In the following pages, the researcher will first provide a historical background to the discipline of democratisation studies. Before giving an overview of the different approaches to the study of democracy and democratisation and before determining which elements of those approaches are relevant for the purpose of this study, some definitions will be given of the main concepts used in the thesis.

In this chapter, the relevant literature on voting behaviour and political culture will also be reviewed. The researcher contends that the literature on voting behaviour and political culture deserves special attention as most scholars – regardless of which theoretical approach they adhere to – recognise the importance of these aspects. Indeed, any examination of democracy and democratisation would be incomplete without taking into account political culture and voting behaviour.

Finally, a literature review of the various ways in which the process of democratisation in the Middle East has been examined will be provided. The literature on democratisation or the lack thereof in the Middle East will be discussed in a separate section in this chapter. In the researcher's view, some important dynamics not relevant to the process of democratisation in other parts of the world, play an important role in the Middle East. Precisely as a result of those dynamics in the region, many scholars were sceptical about the potential of democracy in the Middle East and refrained from examining its possibility. Larry Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, for example, in their work, Democracy in Developing Countries¹⁹, studied democracy in 26 countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. They did not include any Middle Eastern and/or Moslem country in their study and justified this exclusion by arguing that these states "generally lack much previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little prospect of a transition even to semi-democracy".²⁰

In conclusion of this chapter, an explanation of why the study of the process of democratisation in Palestine is relevant will be provided.

1.2.1. Historical Background of Democratisation Studies

The debate about democracy²¹ and democratisation is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, it started around 300 BC with Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle. Whereas Plato

¹⁹ Diamond, L., Linz, J. L., and Lipset, S.M., (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume Two: Africa, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988.

²⁰ Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries, p. xx.

²¹ "Democracy" derives its meaning from two Greek words: demos (people) and kratia (rule or authority).

despised democracy and dismissed it because he did not believe that it could provide for the well-being of its citizens, Aristotle was a vehement defender of democracy.

Since the Greek philosophers, many great minds have attempted to write about what they thought to be the best form of government or what they envisaged democracy should consist of.

As a result of these many endeavours, 'democracy' began to mean something totally different than at the time of Plato and Aristotle, and it became increasingly difficult to agree on a universal definition of the concept, as philosophers began to define it according to their own interpretations and beliefs. John Stuart Mill, for example, feared "false democracy" and "full-fledged democracy"; De Tocqueville was apprehensive about the "tyranny of the majority"; whilst Locke emphasised the notion of "consent". Other thinkers such as Hobbes were apprehensive about democracy and majority-rule. He believed that the only way to protect human property and life was to consolidate the power of the ruler. Rousseau, agreeing with Locke, argued that the best form of government was that where the will of the general was exercised. Whilst philosophising about the potential of democracy, Rousseau also recognised its dangers and difficulties, leading him to conclude that democracy could only be successful for Gods and not for men. He wrote:

*"If there were a people of gods, they would govern themselves democratically. A government so perfect is not suited to men."*²²

Until the turn of this century, most scholars continued to examine democracy from a normative perspective. Very few adopted an empirical or a cross-cultural approach in the study of democracy. In this period, the emphasis continued to be on what was good for human beings or for societies. Very few scholars addressed the issue of how to reach that good state of affairs. The work of Habermas and his colleagues of the Frankfurt School in Germany and Von Hayek of the Austria School were classic examples of the latter trend.

The more elaborate and empirical study of democracy started primarily in the United States. Although the emphasis was on examining and analysing the factors behind why voters in a democratic culture like the US voted in one way or another, these attempts soon became the foundations upon which scholars studying democracy based their methodologies. Scholars such as Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Campbell, Almond and Verba, belonged to this trend and examined American voting behaviour before conducting further research on American democracy. It is from their studies that variables such as voter turn-out, citizenry, party-affiliation, issue voting, and cultural and socio-economic variables were derived and, consequently, used by scholars such as Lipset, V.O. Key, Huntington, Eckstein, Lane, Rustow, or Dahl. Of course, the impact of earlier studies by thinkers such as Weber and Marx, de Tocqueville or Burke upon the work of most scholars mentioned above can not be denied. However, as the empirical approach was the main approach used by the researcher of this thesis, it is important to keep in mind where the origins of the empirical approach in research lie. Indeed, whereas Weber, for example, reached his conclusions normatively, a

²² Quoted from Dahl, R.A., "Further Reflections on the 'Elitist Theory of Democracy'", American Political Science Review, (60), no. 2, June 1966, p. 296.

scholar like Lipset used the empirical approach in reaching his conclusions, albeit substantiated by citations from classical thinkers.

Until the 1950s, most research on democracy was conducted by Western scholars about countries in the West. Perhaps this was because, as Huntington argued, the political science discipline was more developed in the part of the world where democracy was more developed.²³ From the mid-seventies onwards, however, the literature has witnessed more interest in the development of democracy in the Third World. This increased interest can be explained by two main factors:

1. There emerged an increasing demand for democratisation in Third World regions and scholars studying democratisation increasingly considered democracy as a viable alternative for the authoritarian or totalitarian systems in place.
2. The collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened the claim that “Western” political tradition is more viable and its tools are more capable of addressing the political, economic, social, and existential needs. This does not mean that Western political tradition and thought has been adopted by those examining the Third World without qualification. In most instances, Western or local intellectuals examined democracy as it pertained to the Third World cultures and environment. Very few adopted the Western model unconditionally. Those who did, were not received positively by local academia and other circles and were criticised as being by-products of Western cultural imperialism. Especially among “local” intellectuals and politicians the debate whether or

²³ Huntington, S.P., “One Soul at a Time: Political Science and Political Reform”, American Political Science Review, (82), no. 1, March 1988, pp. 3-10.

not to accept the Western model of democracy is ongoing. As Bernard Lewis wrote about one of those regions in his book The Future of the Middle East:

*'The challenge of Western culture has been a major theme in Middle Eastern debate for almost two centuries. ... Middle Eastern rulers, leaders and thinkers have offered and will no doubt continue to offer various responses to this challenge - imitate, adopt, adapt, absorb, or complain, denounce, reject.'*²⁴

The emergence of more literature on democracy in the Third World fits well with the three waves of democratisation described by Samuel Huntington in his book The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century.²⁵ According to Huntington, the first wave started in 1828 and ended in 1942. To him this stage was associated with Pax Britannica. The second wave started in 1943 and ended in 1974-75. In this wave, certain countries like Germany Italy, Japan, and later Brazil and Argentina became democratic. According to Huntington,²⁶ the influence of the United States was instrumental in the democratisation of those countries. The third wave started in 1975 and brought many countries into the democratic world, particularly in Southern Europe and in Latin America. The research by Samuel Huntington will be discussed in greater depth in section 1.2.3.2.1. of this chapter. Huntington's work was only introduced at this stage in order to illustrate that the emergence of literature on democracy and democratisation about regions other than the "West", seems to run parallel with the trend towards democratisation in those regions.

²⁴ Lewis, B., The Future of the Middle East, London: Phoenix, 1997, p. 6.

²⁵ Huntington, S.P., The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

²⁶ Huntington, S.P., "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly, (99), no. 2, Summer 1984, pp. 193-218.

In conclusion, ever since the Greek philosophers the study of democracy and democratisation has been exhausted with attempts at interpreting the ideal of "democracy", and has attempted to solve its riddles. Many studies have tried to determine the necessary prerequisites or requisites for democracy to be established. They analysed why democracy has been successful in some countries and failed in others, and why some variables - whether socio-economic, cultural, religious or class-based - pushed forward the transition towards democracy in some states, whilst the same conditions hindered democracy in others. Some other scholars have concentrated on examining voting behaviour. They have tried to determine, on the one hand, to what extent voting is essential in political development or the process of democratisation, and, on the other hand, what the role of the voter is in bringing to power representatives who act in a manner that reflects the will of the public.

No matter what aspect of democracy scholars were concentrating on, two points stand out:

- (1) The meaning of 'democracy' has evolved over time and has been defined and interpreted differently by different scholars. Thus, the concept of democracy is not static.
- (2) Scholars and thinkers, especially in this century, did not blame the inherent nature of democracy for any problems in establishing democracy. Rather they put the blame for the lack or failure of democracy with inter alia culture, class structure, economic constraints, practical problems facing the state, and the imperfections of the citizens and/or rulers, who may have acted in an irresponsible or irrational manner. All the above stated reasons for the failure of democracy will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter. In the meantime, it is worth noting that the terms "(ir)rational" and "(ir)responsible" will be used by the

researcher throughout this thesis, especially concerning voting behaviour. Therefore, the researcher considered it useful to include some quotes at this stage of the thesis in order to clarify the meaning of these terms. Dahl (1966), explained that not only the citizens should be wise and rational, but also their leaders. He wrote:

*"aware both of their critics and of the real life problems of popular rule, writers sympathetic to democracy have emphasised the need for wisdom, virtue, and-self restraint not only among the general body of citizens but among leaders as well."*²⁷

Prominent scholars such as V.O. Key, for example, argued that voters may vote irrationally and irresponsibly if the information presented to them was misleading. V.O. Key wrote:

*"...voters are not fools. To be sure, many individual voters act in odd ways indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of information available to it."*²⁸

To vote 'correctly', voters must pass through a process of learning on how to vote in a 'responsible' manner. As Fiorina has commented:

*"there is an inertial element in voting behaviour that can not be ignored, but that inertial element has an experiential basis; it is not something learned at mommy's knee and never questioned thereafter."*²⁹

1.2.2. Definitions

In order to prevent confusion and before giving an overview of the main schools of thinking on democracy, it is essential to define some concepts which will be used frequently

²⁷ Dahl, "Further Reflections on...", p. 296.

²⁸ Key, V.O., The Responsible Electorate, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 7.

²⁹ Fiorina, M., Retrospective Voting in America, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, p. 102.

throughout this thesis. The importance of definitions can not be underestimated. As De Tocqueville explained:

‘It is our way of using the words ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic government’ that brings about the greatest confusion. Unless these words are clearly defined and their definition agreed upon, people will live in an inextricable confusion of ideas, much to the advantage of demagogues and despots.’³⁰

The main concepts which will be defined below, are: (1) democracy, (2) democratisation, and (3) semi-democracy.

1.2.2.1. Democracy

As mentioned before, the term democracy is a literal translation of two Greek words, and in its original meaning refers to the “power of the people”. On this literal translation, all scholars agree, but once beyond that point, there is considerable disagreement as to exactly what ‘democracy’ entails. As Giovanni Sartori argued:

‘The term democracy stands for something. The question is not only: What does the word mean. It is also, and concurrently, What is the thing? When we try to answer the latter query, we discover that the thing does not correspond to the word or resembles it inadequately. We discover, that is, that there is little fit between the facts and the name. ... What democracy ‘is’ can not be separated from what democracy ‘should be’. A democracy exists only insofar as its ideals and values bring it into being.’³¹

The researcher of this thesis shares the view described above by Sartori. One could argue that democracy is like God to the believers. It can be conceived but not defined. We know the essence of democracy, but all we can do is to ascribe to it an attributed list, including concepts such as: justice, rule of law, equality, rule of majority, rights of minority, judicial

³⁰ Sartori, G., The Theory of Democracy Revisited, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987, p. 3.

³¹ Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, p. 7.

review, elections, and separation of powers. Nobody really knows how to reach the ideal of 'democracy', but they know that it entails these basic tenets. According to E.P. Thompson, democracy is a "process set in motion without anyone knowing for certain where it is going to end"³². Some have said that there are social, economic, and cultural prerequisites³³ to reach democracy, others, like Tatu Vanhanen³⁴, believed that democracy is part of human evolution. In other words, those scholars who set certain conditions necessary to attain democracy differ among themselves as to whether all these conditions should be reached in parallel or whether one condition has to proceed the other.

Although scholars seem to have been unable to reach a common definition of democracy, and regardless of how it has been defined or how it is culturally perceived, there seems to be a consensus on the importance of democracy. To many Moslem thinkers, *shura* is synonymous with democracy³⁵. According to Huntington, "democracy is a universal system of government"³⁶, and James Bryce noted that "the trend toward democracy now widely visible, is a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress"³⁷. Jeremy Bentham also agreed on the importance of democracy and argued that it was the best tool to arrive at the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.

³² Quoted from Lindberg-Hansen, S.E., Third World Democratisation: a Partly annotated bibliography of Recent Literature, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, Denmark (CDR Library Paper no. 94.3, September 1994).

³³ This will be discussed in more depth in section 1.2.3. of this chapter.

³⁴ Vanhanen, T., Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries, Routledge: London, 1997.

³⁵ Khalid Mohammad Khalid defined 'Shuraa' in Islam as "the democracy that gives people the right to choose their rulers and their deputies and representatives, as well as the right to practise freedom of thought, opinion and opposition". Quoted in Ayubi, N., "Islam and Democracy", in: Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M. and Lewis, P., (eds.) Democratisation, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 349.

³⁶ Huntington, "One Soul at a Time: ...", p. 7.

Having established, above, that the concept of democracy is non-static and always in motion, and despite the different and complex interpretations of democracy, it is necessary to establish a working definition for this thesis. Most scholars agree that democracy involves a certain level of public participation in decision making. As the examination of the first Palestinian general elections in January 1996 and the public perception of the Legislative Council constitute an important part of this thesis, the researcher found it appropriate to select some requirements and definitions which stress the importance of public involvement in democracy. Russell J. Dalton, for example, argued in his article "Democracy and its Citizens: Patterns of Political Change"³⁸:

*"democracy requires an active citizenry, because it is through discussion, popular interest, and involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried out in a democracy. Without public involvement in the process, democracy lacks both its legitimacy and its guiding force."*³⁹

The importance of public participation is also reiterated in Lipset's⁴⁰ definition of democracy "in complex societies". He defined democracy as follows:

*"[It is] a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office."*⁴¹

³⁷ Quoted from Huntington, "Will More Countries ...", p. 194.

³⁸ Dalton, R.J., "Democracy and its Citizens: Patterns of Political Change", <http://www.oac.edu/cgi-bin/zd.cg>.

³⁹ Dalton, R.J., "Democracy and its Citizens: ...", p. 5. In the same article, Dalton also stipulated the following: "A major goal of democratic societies is to expand citizen participation in the political process and thereby increase popular control of political elites." (p. 6)

⁴⁰ Lipset, S.M., "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", American Political Science Review, (53), 1959, p. 71.

⁴¹ Although in the Political Man (1981), Lipset warns against the increasing role of the citizens which could become negative if excessive (pp. 227-229).

More generally, Schumpeter defined democracy as “a set of procedures for constituting government”, leading Mary Ellen Fisher, in whose article Schumpeter was quoted, to conclude the following:

“Democracy involves a set of rules by which representatives are elected, policies are chosen, and laws are made and enforced.”⁴²

For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher will rely on Lipset’s definition of democracy because of its specificity and comprehensiveness.

1.2.2.2. Democratisation

Concerning the term ‘democratisation’, the researcher of this thesis, again, will opt for a broad definition, because as was the case with ‘democracy’, different causes, conditions, requirements, requisites or prerequisites for democratisation have been considered by different scholars, and ‘causes’ for democratisation could vary from one country to another. This does not imply that any confusion exists about the term democratisation itself. It does, however, mean, as Samuel Huntington in his book The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century argued, that “causes of democratisation [could] differ substantially from one place to another”⁴³, and causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a democratisation wave are likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in that wave.⁴⁴ In spite of this, however, Huntington stressed, in general, that “elections, open,

⁴² Fisher, M.E., Establishing Democracies, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, p. 3.

⁴³ Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 38.

⁴⁴ Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 380.

free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non”⁴⁵, and he emphasised that political reform should be gradual and incremental and should be “undertaken by moderate, realistic men and women in the spirit of one-soul-at-a-time”.⁴⁶

Most writers on democracy and democratisation would not refute the stages and the conclusion which Huntington reached in *The Third Wave*. Very few would disagree with the idea that what might work for one country may not for another as the political environment is highly complex and involves many quantifiable and non-quantifiable variables. As Preszewski has noted: democratisation is “a process of institutionalising uncertainty”.⁴⁷ It might, therefore, be more practical to define ‘democratisation’ in general terms, as David Potter did. He kept the definition of ‘democratisation’ very broad when he wrote: “The word ‘democratisation’ refers to political changes moving in a democratic direction.”⁴⁸

The working definition of the term ‘democratisation’ for this thesis, however, will be the one formulated by Rex Brynen, Baghat Korany and Paul Noble. They defined democratisation as follows:

⁴⁵ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ Huntington, “One Soul at a Time: ...”, p. 9. Robert Dahl’s *Polyarchy* also emphasises the need for expanding political institution before the expansion of political participation (pp. 33-40). Similarly, Eric Nordlinger argued that the identification of national identity, then the establishment of effective political institutions and then political participation increases the chances for the non-violent and non-authoritarian systems to develop (Nordlinger, E., “Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change” *World Politics*, (20), 1968, pp. 494-530).

⁴⁷ Quoted in Strom, K., “Democracy as Political Competition” in: Marks, G. and Diamond, L., (eds.), *Re-examining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour Martin Lipset*, Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993, p. 43

*"Political democratisation entails the expansion of political participation in such a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control over public policy."*⁴⁹

At this stage, it is also useful to define the term 'political development', as it will sometimes be used in this thesis. The researcher realises the negative connotations with which the term 'political development' is sometimes associated. As was described in the

Dictionary of Modern Politics:

*"Political development has obvious problems in avoiding a purely ideological bias in which the more nations were seen as more developed, the more they came to resemble Western liberal democracies, or whatever else was taken as the ideal."*⁵⁰

The researcher wishes to assert here that the term 'political development' in this thesis is used without any orientalist connotations. Political development could, thus, be defined as "the institutionalisation of political organisations and procedures".⁵¹ Another appropriate description of political development is found in the Dictionary of Modern Politics. It reads as follows:

*"The basic idea, operating by analogy with economic development, is that there exists a fairly objective path of political progress through which societies move towards further political sophistication."*⁵²

⁴⁸ Potter, D., "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh, and Lewis, (eds.) Democratisation, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Brynen, R., Korany, B. and Noble, P., "Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalisation and Democratisation", in: Brynen, R., Korany, B., and Noble, P., (eds.), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World, Volume 1, Theoretical Perspectives, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p. 3.

⁵⁰ Robertson, D., (ed.), A Dictionary of Modern Politics, London: Europa Publications Limited, 1993, p. 382.

⁵¹ Definition from Samuel Huntington, quoted from: Deegan, H., The Middle East and Problems of Democracy, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, p. 5.

⁵² Robertson, (ed.), A Dictionary of Modern Politics, p. 382.

1.2.2.3. Partial Democracy

When examining democracy and the process of democratisation, it is useful to have a concept which describes regimes which can no longer be described as being authoritarian, but are not yet full-fledged democracies. They are involved in a process of democratisation and can be classified as partial democracies or semi-democracies.⁵³ The Palestinian Authority, for example, which will be scrutinised in this thesis, does not fit in either the category of a democracy or in the category of non-democracies. The introduction of the concept of partial democracy can help to measure how far the Palestinian Authority has progressed in the process of democratisation. As Mary Ellen Fisher explained, the introduction of the term semi-democracy allows for less extreme classifications, as it leaves room between the two extremes of democracy and non-democracy, for regimes that can not be classified under either of those categories. She wrote:

“One question to keep in mind is whether to treat democracies and non-democracies as separate categories or, instead, as points along a continuum ranging from full democracies, on the one hand, to non-democracies, on the other, with space in the middle for semi-democracies (those governments fulfilling some democratic criteria but not all).”⁵⁴

Partial democracy was defined by David Potter as follows:

“Partial democracy is a type of political regime in which the accountability of government to citizens is more or less qualified; military, traditional or other non-elected establishments within the state restrict the effect of elections and compromise the authority of the elected government.”⁵⁵

⁵³ As will be discussed in section 1.2.3.2.1. of this chapter, to Lipset, for example, semi-democracy could result from some economic developments; whilst to Rustow, for example, it could mean a phase prior to the attainment of democracy.

⁵⁴ Fisher, *Establishing Democracies*, p. 5.

⁵⁵ Potter, “Explaining Democratisation” in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), *Democratisation*, p. 5.

According to Potter, partial democracy is constituted by the following characteristics: (1) there is a limited accountability of government to the citizens, (2) there are elections, but they are not necessarily fair and free, (3) citizens enjoy some degree of freedom of expression, (4) there is a political opposition, but it is usually not sufficiently organised to exert real pressure, and (5) there are some independent organisations critical of the state, but they are usually carefully monitored.

The researcher acknowledges that the term 'partial democracy' is only one way to describe a limited form of democracy, and that there are many other concepts which could bridge the gap between democracies and non-democracies, such as controlled democracy, restrictive democracy, de facto one-party democracy, or oligarchal democracy.⁵⁶ For the purpose of this study, however, the introduction of the term 'partial democracy' seemed most appropriate.

1.2.3. Different Theoretical Schools

Over time, many scholars have examined democracy and the process of democratisation. They have attempted to determine the required prerequisites of democratisation or tried to outline the variables vital to sustain democracy. As a result, many schools of thought on democracy and democratisation developed. In the first part of this section, the researcher intends to present different classifications of those schools of thought. Then, in the second

⁵⁶ For a comprehensive overview of the different types of democracy, see: Collier, D. and Levitsy, S., "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation and Comparative Research", World Politics, (49), April 1997, pp. 430-451.

part, the most prominent scholars in each of the selected theoretical approaches or schools will be discussed.

1.2.3.1. Classifications and Different Interpretations of Schools

The complex nature of the study of democracy and democratisation has led to the accumulation of many studies on the topic. Over the years, several attempts were made to classify these studies into categories. Below, some of the attempts of classification will be reviewed, starting with those by Hoffmann and Reisinger, and moving on to Potter and Remmer.

Whilst Erik Hoffman concentrated on classifying studies which dealt with the pre-requisites of democracy, William Reisinger also covered studies of the transition towards democracy. Both Hoffman and Reisinger's classifications were both published recently and their work, therefore, is timely and also covers more recent literature. Potter was included in the overview because his classifications organise theories in a manner that is useful for the purposes of this thesis. The theories, which will be reviewed in the thesis, will, therefore, be mainly based and structured according to Potter's categories. The importance of Remmer lies in her attempt to classify new theorists, who examined the impact of the international political environment since the global changes in the late 1980s and the 1990s upon the internal political or socio-economic conditions of regimes.

The classifications discussed below are only a selection of many attempts to structure the abundant literature on democracy and democratisation. The overview, however, intends to illustrate two main points:

1. The classification of theories can be drawn according to different criteria.
2. By classifying theories, there is a potential danger that some studies do not fall in any category and are, therefore, not mentioned or excluded.

1.2.3.1.1. Erik Hoffman

According to Erik Hoffman⁵⁷, the different theories on democracy and democratisation can be classified into two main categories.

1. The first category consists of studies in which the importance of variables such as the elite-mass consensus, political inclusion, civil liberties, socio-economic equality, citizen activism, and responsive national, regional, and local government bodies, is stressed. These studies can be traced from Aristotle, Rousseau and de Tocqueville to Lipset, Eckstein and Robert Putnam. These studies are usually supported empirically with institutional and cultural data.
2. The second category consists of studies in which the importance of variables such as inter-elite competition, procedural rules, mandates of elected representatives, interest groups politics, an effective civil service bureaucracy, and public acquiescence to national politics, is accentuated. This second category includes, amongst others, studies

⁵⁷ Hoffmann, E.P., "Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics", in: Eckstein, H., Fleron, F.J., Hoffmann, E.P. and Reisinger, W.M., (eds.), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

from Plato, Burke, Weber, Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl and Samuel Huntington. Evidence from these studies indicates that their authors favoured both presidential and parliamentary forms of government.

Hoffman argues that whereas the first approach focuses on the cultural as well as the socio-economic preconditions of democracy, the second contends that “democratic institutions and norms can emerge and receive support as a by-product of intra-elite power struggle, without a democratic populus being in place”.⁵⁸

1.2.3.1.2. William Reisinger

William Reisinger⁵⁹, writing in the same book as Hoffman, was more elaborate than his colleague. Whereas Hoffman’s classification seemed to address only the pre-requisites for democracy, Reisinger’s typology included theories on democratisation that emphasise transition to and sustainability of democracy. He clustered democratisation theories into four types:

1. Those which focus on various societal aspects. This category includes, amongst others, Lipset (1959), who examined the level of economic development, and Almond and Verba (1963) and Inglehart (1990), who examined public attitudes as requisites for democratic development.

⁵⁸ Hoffmann, “Democratic Theories ...”, in: Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffman, and Reisinger, (eds.), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, pp. 106-107.

⁵⁹ Reisinger, W.M., “Survey Research and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russia”, in: Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffman and Reisinger, (eds.), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?.

2. Those which use historical case studies to identify the factors in influencing political change, such as Moore (1966) and Rueschmeyer et al. (1992).
3. Those which focus on the strategies of elites during the struggle over the shape of political life. This group includes scholars such as O'Donnell et al. (1986) and Przeworski (1988).
4. Those which examine the nature of democratic institutions in order to assess whether or not they would survive the challenges they would inevitably face. Scholars belonging to this cluster include: Lijphart (1984) and Linz (1990).

According to Reisinger, the studies belonging to the first two clusters emphasise long-term developments, whilst downplaying the actions made during the process of transitions away from authoritarianism. The opposite is the case for the studies classified in the last two clusters.

1.2.3.1.3. David Potter

David Potter⁶⁰ classified the theoretical approaches to democracy and democratisation into three main types:

1. The Modernisation Approach, to which he ascribed scholars such as Lipset and Diamond. The Modernists, whose work is primarily quantitative, focused on socio-economic development as their central factor in democratisation.

⁶⁰ Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation.

2. The Transition Approach, which includes scholars such as Rustow, O'Donnell & Schmitter, and Shain & Linz. The Transitionalists targeted the political elite as the main focus of their attention when examining democratisation. As will be discussed later, to the transitionalists the path towards democratisation follows a general route.
3. The Structuralist Approach, to which Moore and Rueschmeyer belong. To the Structuralists, the essence of democratisation lies in the structural changes of class, state as well as transnational power. Any historical route to liberal democracy is determined fundamentally by changing structures, not by initiatives and choices of the elite.⁶¹

Potter noted that whilst the three approaches focus on specific factors in their analysis, all of them refer to common "explanatory factors", such as economic development, social divisions, the state and political institutions, political culture and ideas, and transnational and international engagements, including war.⁶² Moreover, according to Potter, scholars belonging to any of his different theoretical classifications have found that the empirical evidence related to democratisation in any country is so complex and multi-faceted that not one single theoretical approach has been able to completely capture the complexity of the democratisation process and explain it in a satisfactory manner.⁶³ Potter, however, quickly made sure to silence any critic who might start to wonder about the usefulness of theory in understanding the dynamics of democratisation. He wrote:

⁶¹ Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, p. 22.

⁶² Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, pp. 24-31.

⁶³ Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, p. 23.

*"to ignore theory and engage only in endless descriptions of a particular set of events can never produce answers to questions about why democracy is here and not there."*⁶⁴

1.2.3.1.4. Karen Remmer

Karen Remmer⁶⁵, in her article "New Perspectives on Democratisation" argued that as a result of the dramatic changes in the global political, economic, and security systems of the early 1990s, the need for theoretical revisions in the field of comparative politics was essential and urgent. As a result of this belief, Remmer attempted to introduce a classification of new approaches to adapt to the realities in the post cold war era. According to Remmer, each of those approaches "takes us beyond pre-existing theoretical contributions and highlights an important facet of the democratisation process".⁶⁶ The new approaches can be classified into four categories: the structuralist approach, the elite compromise approach, the strategic choice model, and the rational choice model. She mentions examples of each model as follows:

1. The Structuralists, including scholars such as Rueschmeyer, and Stephens and Stephens, whose book, Capitalist Development and Democracy, (1992) is a good example of this approach.
2. The Elite Compromise Approach, represented by scholars such as Higley and Gunther, who wrote Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America.

⁶⁴ Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁵ Remmer, K.L., "New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratisation", Comparative Politics, October 1995, pp. 103-122.

⁶⁶ Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on...", p. 104.

3. The Strategic Choice Model. This model is represented by scholars such as Adam Przeworski, with his book Democracy and the Market (1991). Another contribution to this approach is the book Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social Democratic Approach, which was written by Przeworski, Pereira and Maravell. According to Remmer, the crux of the approach of Przeworski, Pereira and Maravell consists of the following:

*"[they] criticise the high transitional costs imposed by neoliberal programmes of economic reform and seek to identify an alternative reformist strategy that will allow for the restoration of economic growth under democratic conditions. Their analysis emphasises the importance of social policy, active state coordination of economic development, and democratic decision-making processes."*⁶⁷

Indeed, according to Przeworski, emerging democracies are threatened by economic decline. Accordingly, he wrote that:

*"[to] evoke compliance and participation, democracy must generate substantive outcomes: it must offer all the relevant political forces real opportunities to improve their material welfare."*⁶⁸

4. The Rational Choice Model, including scholars such as Barbara Geddes, who represented this category in her book, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (1994). Geddes, Remmer argues, places institutional arrangements rather than 'generic regime fragilities at the core of political analysis. By doing so, Geddes provides an explanation for the emergence of bureaucracies, state capabilities, and rational development policies in democracies. According to Remmer, the model used by Geddes advances the understanding of contemporary developments by exploring the consequences of institutional variations among democracies for state sector reform. In

⁶⁷ Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on...", p. 112.

⁶⁸ Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on...", p. 112.

doing so, Geddes sheds new light upon the conditions under which elected governments limit opportunities for distributive politics, strengthen the hands of technocrats, and enhance the prospects for collectively rational politics.⁶⁹ Remmer summarises the core of the Rational Choice Model, used by Geddes, as follows:

*"[According to Geddes], democratic policy reflects the institutionally shaped sets of incentives facing elected officials who are confronted with a collective action problem whose solution depends upon specific sets of democratic institutions."*⁷⁰

Moreover, in Geddes' view, achieving collective rational reforms depends on the number of political parties, party discipline, and parity of power.

1.2.3.2. Different Schools

In the following pages the researcher will try to examine and highlight some of the works on democracy and democratisation. Not everything will be covered: it would be impossible to do so. As the scope of this study allows only for brevity and selection, the researcher has tried to examine the schools and approaches regarded by many as seminal.

Based on David Potter's classification of theories on democracy and democratisation, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter, the researcher will in the following pages concentrate on the studies of the main scholars in those categories. In the view of the researcher, Potter's classification proved to be comprehensive, and covers most of the literature on the subject. His analysis on the 'theoretical convergence' between the various

⁶⁹ Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on...", p. 116.

⁷⁰ Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on...", p. 116.

economic, social, institutional, cultural and international factors that effect the democratisation process provided the researcher with a clearer insight into the subject matter.⁷¹ An additional advantage of Potter's study is that it also covered the post cold war issues identified by Remmer. Nevertheless, some additional studies will also be discussed as they are relevant to the purpose of this thesis.

1.2.3.2.1. The Modernisation Approach

Before examining the theory of Seymour Martin Lipset, who is one of the main protagonists of the Modernisation approach, it is necessary to define the term 'modernisation'.

According to the Dictionary of Modern Thought, 'modernisation' denotes:

"the attempt to amend practices, institutions, laws and customs in order to align them with the modern world, the assumption being that it is they, and not the modern world, that must change".⁷²

Alternatively, Karl Deutsch defined modernisation as follows:

"Modernisation is a complex process of social change which is significantly correlated with major changes in politics."⁷³

To Potter, modernisation implies "socio-economic development", the extent of which is measured quantitatively using indicators or 'requisites'. The value of these indicators does not lie in their potential to explain causation, but rather in their ability to establish

⁷¹ Potter, "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, pp. 22-37.

⁷² Scruton, R., (ed.), A Dictionary of Modern Thought, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 354.

⁷³ Deutsch, K., "Social Mobilisation and Political Development", in: Welch, C. (ed.), Political Modernisation, Belmont: Wadsworth Publishers, 1967, p. 153.

correlations.⁷⁴ In the case of Lipset, those correlations imply universality and linearity of relations between variables: 'universality' in the sense that they are empirically relevant in any country (e.g. number of TV-sets as an indicator for wealth), and 'linearity' in the sense that the relationship between variables is linear (e.g. no education means no democracy, some education means some democracy).

a. Seymour Martin Lipset

To Potter, Lipset's Political Man⁷⁵ is a classic work which explains democratisation using the Modernist approach. While this book was used by Potter in his explanation to the Modernist Approach, the researcher of this thesis relied more on Lipset's earlier work "Some Social Requisites of Democracy"⁷⁶ which was regarded by Larry Diamond and Gary Marks⁷⁷ as the "more seminal and durable" of Lipset's work. In fact, this article was later reprinted as a chapter entitled "Economic Development and Democracy" in Political Man, and it seems to be mainly on this chapter that Potter has based his analysis of Lipset.

The main problem Potter, and other scholars, had with Lipset's work lay in Lipset's belief in the linearity of the relationship between economic development and democracy, as many

⁷⁴ Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, p. 12. Rustow, and many others, criticised Lipset because he merely established 'correlations'. See for example: Rustow, D.A., "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics, April 1970, pp. 337-364.

⁷⁵ Lipset, S.M., Political Man, London: Heinman, 1960.

⁷⁶ Lipset, S.M., "Some Social Requisites of ...".

⁷⁷ Diamond, L. and Marks, G., "Seymour Martin Lipset and the Study of Democracy", in: Diamond and Marks, (eds.), Re-examining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour Martin Lipset.

examples around the world negated this assumption. As Diamond and Marks have noted, this linear relationship has not been as strong as Lipset has professed. In their opinion, "it has been subject to weakening or reversal at middle levels of development".⁷⁸ As a result of this belief, Diamond reformulated Lipset's assumption and introduced the 'human development indicator',⁷⁹ as the single most powerful predictor of the likelihood of democracy. He wrote:

*"The more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favour, achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country."*⁸⁰

Despite the strong criticisms Lipset faced concerning his assumption of the linearity in the relationship between economic development and democracy, his work had a major impact on circles studying democracy and democratisation. In his foreword to the book, Re-examining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour Martin Lipset, Robert Merton, an old professor of Lipset, noted that Lipset is "one of the truly consequential social scientists of our time" and one of the most cited authors of all times.⁸¹ Diamond and Marks also gave a special tribute to Lipset. They wrote:

⁷⁸ Diamond and Marks, "Seymour Martin Lipset and...", in: Diamond and Marks, (eds.), Re-examining Democracy, p. 6.

⁷⁹ "Human development indicator" is an index developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and it represents an unweighted average of three measures: adult literacy, life expectancy, and per capita GDP (Diamond, L., "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered", American Behavioural Scientist, (35), no. 4/5, March/June 1992, p. 458).

⁸⁰ Diamond, "Economic Development and...", p. 468.

⁸¹ Merton, R.K., "Foreword: Notes on the Young Lipset", in: Diamond and Marks, (eds.), Re-examining Democracy: Essays in Honour of Seymour Martin Lipset, p. x-xi.

*"No social scientist or sociologist has contributed more to advancing our thinking about democracy-in all its dimensions, both comparatively and in the United States- than Seymour Martin Lipset."*⁸²

As mentioned above, throughout his studies Lipset focused primarily on the importance of the relationship, or one should perhaps say the 'correlation', between democracy and economic development. He defined this correlation in terms of wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation, education and legitimacy.⁸³ He summarised his conviction that economic development gives rise to a more democratic political culture in the Political Man, by asserting that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy".⁸⁴

According to Lipset, economic development improves the social and economic conditions of the working class, and strengthens the middle class and increases their number. An economically better-off working class, and a large middle class are essential for the development of the political order and for the emergence of democracy. The benefits of economic improvement for the working class, were explained by Lipset as follows:

*"For the lower strata, economic development, which means increased income, greater economic security, and higher education, permit those in this status to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics...Increased wealth and education [of the lower class] also serve democracy by increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross pressures which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to supporting extremists ones."*⁸⁵

⁸² Diamond and Marks, "Seymour Martin Lipset and...", in: Diamond and Marks, (eds.), Re-examining Democracy, p. 1.

⁸³ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 75.

⁸⁴ Lipset, Political Man, p. 31.

⁸⁵ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 103.

In Lipset's opinion, as a result of economic development, the lower classes would no longer be isolated. On the contrary, they would become part of the national culture, with values similar to those of the middle class. As illustrated by Lipset's quote below, the middle class was another class to which Lipset ascribed an important role in the process of democratisation. He stated:

*"[i]ncreased wealth ... also affects the political role of the middle class through changing the stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing middle-class. A large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalise extremist groups."*⁸⁶

The third class, the upper class, is highly distrusted by Lipset as, in his opinion, it is this class which retards political development. Lipset argued that if wealth is concentrated only in the upper class, as is the case in poor countries, then this class will be more inclined to mistreat the majority of the public.

*"The poorer a country is, and the lower the absolute standards of living of the lower classes, the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as beyond the pale of human society..."*⁸⁷

Consequently, in this scenario, the upper classes would not only resist any pressures towards democratic development, but their often arrogant political behaviour would serve to intensify extremist reactions on the part of the lower classes.⁸⁸ It is from this vantage point that Lipset introduced the need for 'political values' for sustaining democracy.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 103.

⁸⁷ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 83.

⁸⁸ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 104.

⁸⁹ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 71.

These political values, according to Lipset, are associated with wealth and can only develop under good economic conditions. In his opinion, better economic conditions produce civil servants that carry with them 'universalistic' norms; whereas poverty produces deficient bureaucrats and nepotism.⁹⁰

In addition to a value system, Lipset emphasised the role of 'intermediary organisations' that are relatively independent from state authority, in sustaining democracy. In Lipset's opinion, the existence of these organisations is also associated with the nation's wealth. These organisations are not only important in enhancing public participation and in communicating with the public, but, according to Lipset, they are essential in acting as sources for countervailing power and inhibiting the state or any single major source of private power from dominating all political resources.⁹¹

According to Lipset, under the conditions mentioned above, including economic development, the role of the lower and middle classes, the presence of a value system, and the role of intermediary organisations, democracy could be viable. Although Lipset argued that these conditions are more relevant to the countries of north-east Europe and the English speaking countries, they are nonetheless also pertinent to the viability of democracy elsewhere. According to Lipset, it is only under such conditions that regimes could be able to attain legitimacy. Lipset defined legitimacy as follows:

⁹⁰ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 84.

⁹¹ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 84. Brzezinski, Z. and Huntington, S.P., Political Power: USA/USSR., Similarities and Contrasts, Convergence or Evolution, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978, made a similar argument. However, they believed that the upper classes tend to be more inclined to participate

"Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society".⁹²

The legitimacy of a democratic regime depends on its ability to resolve conflicts, which Lipset contends, to be prerequisites for democracies.⁹³ Since cleavages are characteristic of all societies, the ability to reconcile those cleavages in a manner that is appropriate to society at large can only be achieved when there is legitimacy.

According to Lipset, good economic conditions and the ability of the West, for example, to resolve its problems and internal social conflicts provided the respective countries with legitimacy and the political culture that are amicable to democracy. According to Lipset, in these countries there is little difference between the democratic left and right, "as the socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare state".⁹⁴ This, Lipset argued, enabled the working class from having their rights of citizenry and political access.

In Lipset's opinion, the situation in the Latin and East European countries was different. The inability, or unwillingness, of these countries to absorb the working-class attempts at integration into the body politic led to alienation from the system. To Lipset, the communists' ability to take over the working class leadership and trade unions prevented the regimes from tolerating the workers and as such suppressed their inclusion into the

in politics. They argued that, unlike the situation in the USSR, civic associations in the USA "are a means through which those of higher socio-economic standing participate in and limit the political system". (p. 104)

⁹² Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 86.

⁹³ A point to which Rustow, whose work will be discussed in section 1.2.3.2.2., has given great attention.

system. This situation, Lipset argued, “precludes an easy prediction that economic development will stabilise democracy in these East European countries”.⁹⁵

As for Asian and African countries, Lipset argued that poverty, low educational levels make it unlikely that many of those governments will become democratic. He wrote:

*“Given the existence of poverty stricken masses, low levels of education, and elongated pyramid class structure, and the ‘premature’ triumph of democratic left, the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia and Africa is bleak”.*⁹⁶

In short, according to Lipset’s argument, the need for a substantial middle class, political values, and economic development are essential for the success of democracy anywhere in the world. These, however, although being basic prerequisites, may not suffice. As Lipset explained:

*“Unfortunately, an increase in wealth, in the size of the middle class, in education, and other related factors will not necessarily mean the spread of democracy or the stabilising of democracy.”*⁹⁷

Citing Weber’s explanation behind Russia’s failure to acquire Western liberties, Lipset accepted Weber’s analysis which stated that European liberty had been born in unique, perhaps unrepeatable, circumstances at a time when the intellectual and material conditions for it were exceptionally propitious.⁹⁸ Despite his acceptance of the idea that the European situation was unique, Lipset refused to read it as a reason for pessimism in the potential of

⁹⁴ Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of...”, p. 100.

⁹⁵ Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of...”, p. 100.

⁹⁶ Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of...”, p. 101.

⁹⁷ Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of...”, p. 103.

democratisation outside Europe. Lipset contended that political democracy exists and has existed in a variety of circumstances. However, the problem for him remained that:

“democracy is not achieved by acts of will alone; but men’s wills, through action, can shape institutions and events in directions that reduce or increase the chance for the development and survival of democracy.”⁹⁹

More than thirty years after Lipset’s article, discussion about it remains as controversial as ever. Despite the gaps in Lipset’s article, as discussed earlier and as will be examined later by other scholars, the impact of Lipset and the importance of socio-economic development have remained essential in any discussion about democratisation. As Larry Diamond argued:

Economic development is not a prerequisite for democracy. In fact Lipset wrote of it as a ‘requisite’, meaning literally something that is essential but does not necessarily have to exist in advance. In a much neglected passage of [Lipset’s] essay, he anticipated a crucial element of democratic experience in the contemporary developing world: ‘a premature democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal literacy, or autonomous private organisations.’¹⁰⁰

Having said that, Diamond was not dogmatic about the modernist approach. Arguing that one could clearly notice positive correlations between development and democracy, and infer causality, he did not deny that other questions needed to be addressed. Such questions included: Why and how does development generate democracy? Under what circumstances does it fail? Therefore Diamond argued as follows:

“We remain highly dependent for the answers to these questions on the evidence from case studies and comparative historical analysis.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of...”, p. 103.

⁹⁹ Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of...”, p. 103.

¹⁰⁰ Diamond, “Economic Development and...”, p. 487.

¹⁰¹ Diamond, “Economic Development and...”, p. 472.

b. Samuel Huntington

Although David Potter did not refer to Huntington as a modernist, his emphasis on the need for political and economic reform as well as on the modernisation of state structures undoubtedly posts him in the modernist school and made him one of its most influential theorists. What distinguishes Huntington, and other influential writers like Dahl, from other modernists like Lipset or Diamond, is that Huntington, like Dahl, did not subscribe nor accept any single factor or theory in explaining democracy. This, to this researcher, makes it understandable why Potter did not classify Huntington or Dahl in any of his classifications.

As mentioned, Huntington put forward a multiplicity of factors (such as cultural, political, economic, social, and external conditions) as prerequisites for democratisation. On some occasions, he emphasised political reform, on other occasions he argued for the importance of economic development or for the need for a culture which valued accommodation over the strife for power. In other instances, he stressed the need for political participation as a prerequisite for democracy and for the rationalisation of authority. What is clear, however, and what will be illustrated below, is that Huntington's pattern of thinking evolved over time.

In his book Political Order in Changing Societies¹⁰², which he wrote in 1968, Huntington emphasised the importance of reform in societies which had low levels of political

¹⁰² Huntington, S.P., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

institutionalisation. He argued that innovative reform was essential in order to avoid revolutions. In Huntington's opinion, this reform included "rationalisation of authority, the differentiation of structures, and the expansion of political participation".¹⁰³ He summed up the essence of reform as follows:

*"Reform means the changing of traditional values and behaviour patterns, the expansion of communications and education, the broadening of loyalties from family, village, and tribe to nation, the secularisation of public life, the rationalisation of authority structures, the promotion of functionally specific organisations, the substitution of achievement criteria for ascriptive ones, and the furthering of a more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources."*¹⁰⁴

In addition, Huntington argued that another essential prerequisite for successful democratisation of societies was the ability of social forces, produced by modernisation, to assimilate successfully into the system in order to be able to achieve a new social consciousness as a result of modernisation.¹⁰⁵

The above themes were also detected in his later writings, particularly in his often cited article "Will More Countries Become Democratic"¹⁰⁶ which he wrote in 1984, and his 1988 article "One Soul at a time: Political Science and Political Reform"¹⁰⁷. One noteworthy difference, however, is that whilst in the sixties Huntington was optimistic about the success of democracy if certain broad conditions were to be met, he became less so in the eighties. Although he still argued in the eighties that certain broad economic, social,

¹⁰³ Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 93.

¹⁰⁴ Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 140.

¹⁰⁵ Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 140.

¹⁰⁶ Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", pp. 193-218.

¹⁰⁷ Huntington, "One Soul at a Time: ...", pp. 3-10.

external, and cultural conditions were necessary for the success of democracy¹⁰⁸, in his opinion the prospects for such changes had become increasingly bleak. Huntington attributed his pessimism to the power of the Soviet Union, the unreceptiveness of certain cultural traditions to democracy, the problem of poverty, and the prevalence of violence in many societies. These realities led Huntington to conclude that “the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached”¹⁰⁹.

According to Huntington, major variables changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. He elaborated upon those changes in his book The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century¹¹⁰, which he wrote immediately after the end of the Cold War. In The Third Wave, Huntington argued that in each of the three waves he analysed, the causes responsible for democratisation in one wave differed from those in the other waves.¹¹¹ In the third wave (starting in 1975), for example, he referred to causal factors such as the declining legitimacy of non-democracies, economic development¹¹², Christianity, the role of political leaders, and the impact of external factors.¹¹³ In addition, according to Huntington, the causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a democratisation wave

¹⁰⁸ Huntington, “Will More Countries Become...”, pp. 198-209.

¹⁰⁹ Huntington, “Will More Countries Become...”, p. 218.

¹¹⁰ Huntington, The Third Wave. The content of this book has already been introduced earlier in this chapter in sections 1.2.1. and 1.2.2.1.

¹¹¹ Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 38.

¹¹² Huntington distinguished between economic development resulting from industrialisation and wealth resulting from oil. He wrote: “In contrast to patterns in the oil states, processes of economic development involving significant industrialisation lead to a new, much more diverse, complex, and interrelated economy, which becomes increasingly difficult for authoritarian regimes to control.” (Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 65.

¹¹³ Vanhanen, Prospects of Democracy, p. 17.

were likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in that wave.¹¹⁴ Lastly, Huntington argued that the causes for democratisation in a certain wave differed from one country to another, and the variables, which brought democracy for one country, varied from that of another country. In the researcher's opinion, the scope of Huntington's Third Wave is very broad, allowing his work to be applicable in explanations of the process of democratisation in many different countries at many different times in the twentieth century. This was viewed by some as a major advantage and by others as a hazard.

In summary, Huntington attributed democracy to a complex web of factors. In his opinion, each country may need a different formula or a different combination of variables in order for democracy to prevail. However, one could sense from Huntington that there are essential conditions, such as gradual political reform and an accommodating culture, that have to be met. Whilst the stress of Huntington on the need for political reform in all its facets - institutionalisation, political participation, etc. - is clear, the researcher noted that culture became increasingly salient in Huntington's writings, instigating a major intellectual debate even prior to the publication of his often mentioned article "The Clash of Civilisations". Already in 1984 Huntington had argued that a political culture which embraced the values of "mutual trust among members of the society" was more favourable to democracy than one which valued "hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to authority".¹¹⁵ This issue is one which deserves close attention when discussing democracy in the Middle East.

¹¹⁴ Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 380.

1.2.3.2.2. The Transitional Approach

a. Rustow

One of the fierce critics of the earlier scholars who emphasised certain causal conditions or pre-requisites to democracy, was Rustow. In his famous article, "Transition to Democracy"¹¹⁶, published in 1970, Rustow rejected the modernist approach. He argued:

*"Economic growth may be one of the circumstances that produces the tensions essential to the preparatory or conflict phase"¹¹⁷, but there are other circumstances that might also serve. Mass education and social welfare services are more likely to be the result of democratisation."*¹¹⁸

Rustow criticised Lipset's work as follows:

*"Lipset's data leave it entirely open, for example, whether affluent and literate citizens make the better democrats; whether democracies provide superior schools and a more bracing climate for economic growth; ..."*¹¹⁹

Democracies such as Sweden, France, and the United States, Rustow argued, developed at periods of a low level of economic development.

Rustow's own approach was based on the "political-historical perspective".¹²⁰ Based on the historical approach, Rustow found that the factors responsible for keeping a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought democracy into existence. He, therefore, stressed

¹¹⁵ Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", p. 209.

¹¹⁶ Rustow, D.A., "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics, April 1970, pp. 337-364.

¹¹⁷ Rustow specified four phases in the process of democratisation. They will be discussed below.

¹¹⁸ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:...", p. 363.

¹¹⁹ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:...", p. 342.

¹²⁰ Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy:...", p. 347.

the need to distinguish between “function and genesis”¹²¹ when explaining democracy.¹²² It is upon this argument that Rustow based his new approach to the study of democratisation, in which he specified four indispensable phases to reach democracy. They were (1) national unity, (2) a serious conflict, (3) a ‘conscious adoption’ of democratic rule, and (4) the ‘habituation’ of both leaders and citizens to those democratic rules.¹²³ This approach would later be referred to, by many such as Potter, as the transitional approach.

To Rustow, ‘national unity’ was the background condition for democratisation as it should precede all the other phases of democratisation. This condition, he argued, could only be reached by a “political community large enough to achieve some considerable degree of modernity in its social and economic life”¹²⁴. According to Rustow, once the stage of national unity has been reached, the process of democratisation itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. This conflict arises as a result of the emergence of a new elite that “arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action”¹²⁵. The commitment of the new elite to democratic transition does not stem from their good will, but rather from their belief that democracy provides the best hope for the resolution of the conflict which arose as a result of industrialisation or other reasons, depending on the society in question. This explains why future democracies can not follow the footsteps of others. Different countries have different struggles and different

¹²¹ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 346.

¹²² One of the main differences between the Modernists and the Transitionalists is that the Modernists attempted to explain the conditions for democratisation (= ‘function’), whilst the transitionalists focused mainly on the question of why a democracy came into being in the first place (= ‘genesis’).

¹²³ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 361.

¹²⁴ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 351.

means and ways to resolve those conflicts. Rustow explained the motives of the new elite and the reason behind the different democratisation experiences of different societies as follows:

*“democracy was not the original or primary aim [of the new elite]; it was sought as a means to some other end or it came as a fortuitous by-product of the struggle. ... a country is likely to attain democracy not by copying the constitutional laws or parliamentary practices of some previous democracy, but rather by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts and by devising or adapting effective procedures for their accommodation.”*¹²⁶

Thus, democracy is acquired by a process of conscious decision-making, at least on the part of the top political leadership, who have a variety of mixed motives. As Rustow argued, “no country ever becomes a democracy in a fit of absentmindedness”¹²⁷, rather democracy results from a series of negotiations followed by compromises.

Once compromises are reached amongst the political elite, it is essential that they are transmitted to the civil servants and the public at large. This is where the ‘habituation phase’ of Rustow’s model comes into effect. In this phase, leaders and electorate alike change from a generation which accepts democracy as a duty to another generation which embraces democracy wholeheartedly as a result of habit.¹²⁸ Thus, the essence of democracy, Rustow concluded in his article, is “the habit of dissension and conciliation over ever

¹²⁵ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 352.

¹²⁶ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 353 & 354.

¹²⁷ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 355.

¹²⁸ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, pp. 358-363.

changing issues amidst ever-changing alignments”¹²⁹. Essential for that, Rustow noted, was the sincere belief in democracy and its values. He explained:

*“Democracy...is by definition a competitive process, and this competition gives an edge to those who can rationalise their commitment to it, and even greater edge to those who sincerely believe in it.”*¹³⁰

In later years, Rustow like many other scholars, became less dogmatic in his analysis, and even recognised the importance of economic factors in democratic transition, something which he denied more than twenty years earlier in his famous article. As noted in Anderson’s article¹³¹, Rustow wrote prior to his death:

*“It certainly remains true that domestic factors provide the crucial setting for the emergence of democracy and that democratisation is a political rather than an economic or psychological process. Nevertheless, a quarter of a century later, I would emphasise the interaction between economic and political factors and also the importance of international relations in ‘making the world safer for democracy’, as Woodrow Wilson put it.”*¹³²

b. O’Donnell et al. and Shain et al.

Whilst Rustow’s analysis of the stages of democratisation employed concepts that were never operationalised¹³³, other transitionalists, most prominent of whom are O’Donnell¹³⁴, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead¹³⁵, and Shain and Linz¹³⁶, shifted the analysis from

¹²⁹ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 363.

¹³⁰ Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 358.

¹³¹ Anderson, L., “Introduction; Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow”, *Comparative Politics*, (29), no. 3, April 1997, pp. 253-261.

¹³² Anderson, L., “Introduction; Transitions to Democracy:...”, p. 261.

¹³³ Vanhanen, *Prospects of Democracy*, p. 21.

¹³⁴ O’Donnell, G., *Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, 1973.

¹³⁵ O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L., (eds.) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, Baltimore: John Hospkins University Press, 1986.

generalising political development to focusing more on the third and fourth stages of Rustow's model. They particularly focused on the role of the elite during the period of transition from authoritarian rule. This period, according to O'Donnell et al., should begin with 'the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime', and could conclude with either the installation of some form of democracy, or the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.¹³⁷

The emphasis on the elite in transitional regimes was already obvious in the book entitled Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, which O'Donnell wrote in 1973. In this book, he focused on the importance of the elite and not on the values and participation of the citizens, as, for example, Almond and Verba¹³⁸ did. Moreover, challenging the economic development model of Lipset, O'Donnell, in this well received study of Latin America, found that the increased economic development of Latin America countries produced 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' regimes rather than democratic ones as Lipset would have stipulated. According to Diamond, O'Donnell argued that this resulted from the emphasis of the economic elite on the production of capital goods rather than consumer goods, because the production of consumer goods became saturated.¹³⁹ For a country to deepen its industrialisation level in order to enable it to produce capital goods required that trade unions and parties with mass appeal be

¹³⁶ Shain, Y. and Linz, J., (eds.), Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

¹³⁷ O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, (eds.) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 6.

¹³⁸ Almond, G. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Boston: Little Brown, 1963.

¹³⁹ Diamond, "Economic Development and...", p. 473.

repressed. As a result of this, military coups took place in various countries. Those coups brought civilian and military leaders (bureaucratic-authoritarian) to power, who were supported primarily by large foreign and domestic capital. In addition, according to Huntington, O'Donnell believed that economic growth which is generated from a concentration on imports was more likely to lead to a stronger form of authoritarian rule.¹⁴⁰

The work of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead developed the initial arguments of O'Donnell (1973) by distinguishing various types of authoritarian regimes and elites. They distinguished between 'democratisation' and 'liberalisation', between 'transition' and 'consolidation', between 'hard-liners' and 'soft-liners', and between 'moderates' and 'opportunists'.

According to O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, the democratic camp within the elite during the period of transition could prevail and the course of democracy could be consolidated, only if this camp was able to (1) neutralise actors who were unconditionally authoritarian, (2) promote preferences and practices compatible with the functioning of democracy, (3) increase the number of democratic actors and (4) agree to subordinate their strategies (including competition among themselves) to the imperative of not facilitating a return to authoritarianism.¹⁴¹ In short, Potter summarised O'Donnell et al's arguments as follows:

¹⁴⁰ Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", p. 200.

¹⁴¹ Potter, "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, p. 17.

*"democratisation is largely contingent on what elites and individuals do, when, where, and how."*¹⁴²

Similar to O'Donnell et al., Yossi Shain and Juan Linz in their book Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions¹⁴³, emphasised the impact of the actions and willingness of the elite in determining the future of democracy during a period of transition. Although their argument did not deviate from O'Donnell et al., they introduced a new typology of transitional regimes, including: (1) the opposition-led provisional government, (2) the power-sharing interim government, (3) the incumbent-led interim government, and (4) the international interim government set up by the United Nations. In general, Shain and Linz described an interim government as follows:

*"The interim government usually operates within a context of volatility and political vulnerability marked by uncertainty, anxiety, and high expectations concerning the future distribution of power and loyalties. The nature and the action of the interim government are of enormous political moment. The degree of boldness and skill with which it makes certain policy decisions, and its willingness and ability to fashion an efficient succession (whether based on continuity or disjunction with the past), can help to determine whether or not the character and conduct of its successors will be democratic."*¹⁴⁴

Whilst types of interim governments differ depending on the circumstances from which they emerged, they are, according to Shain and Linz, all characterised by a crucial role for the elite. Despite the important role of the elite, and especially of the moderate section of the elite, which is essential in order for democracy to succeed in the period of transition, other factors might jeopardise the consolidation of democratic principles. Such factors

¹⁴² Potter, "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, p. 17.

¹⁴³ Shain and Linz, (eds.), Between States.

¹⁴⁴ Shain and Linz, (eds.), Between States, p. 7.

include: corruption, the large powers of the military, increasing social inequalities, and weakening of political participation and representation in the system.¹⁴⁵ In order to evade the influence of those factors which might undermine any effort towards democratic consolidation, mechanisms that regulate the work of the elite should be adopted. As Przeworski put it:

*'The decisive step towards democracy is the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules.'*¹⁴⁶

1.2.3.2.3. The Structural Approach

To the researcher of this thesis, a major shortcoming of the transitional approach lies in the notion that when making decisions, elites are driven by conditions outside their power. As Munck argued, "actors make choices, but not in circumstances of their own choosing".¹⁴⁷

This shortcoming was addressed by such theorists as Moore and Rueschmeyer, regarded by many as the main proponents of the structural approach. According to the structuralists, the actions of the elite can only be explained by the limitations imposed on them by structural impediments. Addressing the issue from a socio-economic angle, Moore and Rueschmeyer also differed with Lipset and other Modernists, who argued that increased wealth produced more democracy. According to the Structuralists, increased wealth could lead to one of three different developments: (1) democracy, (2) authoritarianism or (3) fascism.

¹⁴⁵ Little, W., "Democratisation in Latin America, 1980-1995", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, pp. 183-194.

¹⁴⁶ Przeworski, A., Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 14.

a. Barrington Moore

In 1966, Barrington Moore in his major study Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World¹⁴⁸, emphasised the impact of the socio-economic structure of societies on democratic development. This line of thinking later became a school in its own right. In his study, Moore raised the question as to why some countries took the path of democracy, whilst others became fascist or authoritarian. To Moore, the answer lay in the social and economic structure of the peasantry and the role of the bourgeoisie in forcing the aristocracy to change the way in which it dealt with the peasantry. According to Moore:

*"a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy."*¹⁴⁹

By adopting the case-oriented approach and by focusing on long-term historical change, Moore sketched three routes to modern democracy. The first path is a 'bourgeois revolution', where combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy emerged after a series of revolutions¹⁵⁰, such as the French Revolution or the American civil war. The second route, 'the revolution from above', was also capitalistic, but emerged in the absence of a strong revolutionary culture. This path experienced reactionary political manifestations

¹⁴⁷ Munck (1994) quoted in: Potter, "Explaining Democratisation" in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, p. 23.

¹⁴⁸ Moore, B., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

¹⁴⁹ Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 418.

¹⁵⁰ According to Goldblatt, the term 'bourgeois revolutions' was not clearly applied by Moore. It could refer to three types of change: (1) to radical political change, where the bourgeois is the key revolutionary agent or (2) to a revolution where the bourgeois emerges as the most powerful political class, regardless of who initiated the revolution, or (3) to the process of political change where a state structure is established and public policies are implemented, thus setting the basis for capitalism. Goldblatt, pp. 55-56.

from the bourgeoisie, who exchanged "the right to rule for the right to make money"¹⁵¹. This led to fascism as was the case in Germany and Japan. The third path, 'the revolution from below', was the route to modern democracy where revolutions had their main origin among the peasants. This led to communist regimes as was the case in the Soviet Union and China. According to Moore, India is unique as it does not fall in either of the routes outlined above. It did not become a modern industrial society because it did not experience a bourgeois revolution, nor a conservative revolution from above, nor a communist one from below.¹⁵²

In summary, according to Moore, the path which a country followed to reach modern democracy, depended primarily on the linkage between, on the one hand, economic and class divisions and, on the other hand, the political interests and motives of the peasantry, aristocracy and bourgeoisie. As Moore argued, the relationship between the aristocracy and the peasantry provided the key in a country's development towards fascism, authoritarianism or democracy. If the aristocracy pursued policies that repressed the peasantry, then, the opportunity for democratic change was bleak. If, however, the aristocracy responded positively and adapted to the commercialisation of agriculture in a manner that provided the peasantry with more benefits, then, the chances for democracy were higher. Whatever actions the aristocracy took, depended on the bourgeoisie, since, to Moore, they were the pillars of liberal and democratic ideologies. Moreover, in Moore's

¹⁵¹ Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 437.

¹⁵² Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, pp. 413-414.

opinion, capitalism was not built on hereditary or status values, but rather on the balanced exploitation of economic resources. Thus, in short, "no bourgeois, no democracy."¹⁵³

b. Rueschmeyer et al.

In their book, Capitalist Development and Democracy¹⁵⁴, Rueschmeyer, et al., examined thirty four advanced capitalist countries in Latin and Central America. They analysed the relation between the transformations of society accompanying economic development and the chances for success of democracy. To Rueschmeyer et al. 'the balance of class power' is the primary reason behind the transformations of society. The ability of the subordinate classes to succeed in their struggle against the dominant classes to participate in and be part of the ruling establishment is essential in the process of democratisation. To Rueschmeyer et al., democratisation is brought about by the efforts of the urban working class to attain the expansion of the right to vote, union rights and so on. Therefore, in countries where industrialisation is strong, the strength of the working class grows, whilst the power of the landed class diminishes. Rueschmeyer et al. argued that capitalism and democracy go hand in hand. In other words, capitalist economic development will lead to democracy and freedom. In their opinion, democracy is the characteristic political form of capitalism.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 418. Contrary to Moore, Therbor Goran (1983) argued that democracy had "always and everywhere" been a struggle against the bourgeoisie. (p. 270). But scholars such as Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, argued that the development of capitalism strengthened democracy by shifting the balance of power in society from the land owners to organised workers. However, they differ from Moore in that they identified the subordinate classes, mainly the urban workers, as the primary agents of democratisation (Remmer, p. 108).

¹⁵⁴ Rueschmeyer, D., Stephens, E.H. and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

¹⁵⁵ Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, p. 1.

In their quantitative cross-national comparisons of many countries, Rueschmeyer et al. found a positive correlation between development and democracy.¹⁵⁶ They arrived at this positive correlation by integrating variables such as social class, state, and transnational forces into their theoretical framework.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, the authors argued that it is not capitalism as such that led to democracy. Democracy developed primarily because the change in “the balance of class power in favour of the subordinate interests”.¹⁵⁸ In general, it is possible to conclude that Rueschmeyer et al. were optimistic about the advance of democracy in developing countries.

1.2.3.2.4. Conclusion

In general, it is possible to conclude about Potter's three approaches that, although they studied the issue of democracy and democratisation from different angles, four main elements were of particular relevance to the researcher. They are: (1) The importance of the elite, (2) the stress on development, (3) the relevance of culture, and (4) the role of the middle class and industrialisation.

Having reviewed the major approaches to the study of democracy and democratisation, it is essential to establish which aspects of these approaches are relevant to the purpose of this study.

¹⁵⁶ Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, p. 3. Potter argued that Rueschmeyer et al. departed slightly from Moore as they accepted the statistical association found between modernisation and democracy (Potter p. 23).

¹⁵⁷ Remmer, “New Theoretical Perspectives on...”, p. 108.

1. From the modernists, the researcher will first adopt the quantitative approach by examining voting behaviour and the attitudes of the elite and the representatives. Accordingly, the researcher will draw on Huntington's and Dahl's emphasis on institutional and political reform, and to a lesser extent on Lipset's emphasis on wealth. This is not a testimony to the inappropriateness of Lipset's wealth theme. On the contrary, as will be discussed later in this thesis, the researcher found a high correlation between regime popularity and the economic conditions of the Palestinian people. However, as the Palestinian economy is for a major part negatively influenced by the Israeli occupation,¹⁵⁹ the analysis of Lipset becomes less valid since its focus is on internal development and not on external influences.
2. From the transitional approach, the role of the elite will be examined by looking at the impact of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the elite in determining the path towards democratisation. As will be discussed later in the thesis, one of the most striking additions to the Palestinian political system is the transformation of the Palestinian leadership from one that was operating in an environment that was "revolutionary", spontaneous and less structured, to another that is limited by a new set of rules established by a reality, which brought with it responsibilities emanating from signing the agreements with Israel, obligations to the international community in return for funds, and expectations of the Palestinian public. This new political elite that is part and parcel of the peace process, agreed to hold the first elections for the Legislative Council because it was required to do so by the Oslo and Interim agreements and not

¹⁵⁸ Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, p. 302.

¹⁵⁹ According to Sarah Roy, Palestinian society witnessed 'de-development' as a result of occupation. (Roy, S., The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development, Washington DC, 1995.)

because it upheld a high belief in democracy. In this regard, the transitionalist approach provides further insight in the Palestinian democratisation process as it argues that at some stage in the democratisation process, the elite will consciously adopt democratic rule by necessity rather than by conviction or belief. As will be argued and exemplified in the thesis, democracy under the Palestinian Authority rule is still partial and its progress to Rustow's "habituation phase" in democratic development may, on the one hand, be enhanced by the Legislative Council, but may, on the other hand, be in jeopardy due to the lack of sovereignty and the elements of self-interest and/or corruption motivating part of the current elite.

3. From the structural approach, the researcher will focus on the impact of external influences as described by Rueschmeyer et al. Although the emphasis in the study of Rueschmeyer et. al rested on class, they did also focus on the importance of transnational power on the class struggle. Furthermore, referring to Moore's typology of revolutions, the Palestinian revolutionary movement will be briefly examined.

In addition to the relevant elements of the three approaches discussed above, and as the crux of this thesis evolves around the examination of democratisation in Palestine, including the role of the Legislative Council, and the impact of the public in voting for the Council members, the researcher thought it essential to discuss the relevant literature on voting behaviour and political culture. This will be done in section 1.2.4. below. In addition, the researcher believed it necessary to give attention to scholars who have written on the issue of democratisation specifically in the Middle East as they have taken into account factors which are characteristic of the region. These factors include: (1) Islam and

political culture, (2) the Arab-Israeli conflict, and (3) oil. The importance of those factors will be discussed in section 1.2.5. below.

1.2.4. Literature on Voting Behaviour and Political Culture

1.2.4.1. Literature on Voting Behaviour

Literature on voting behaviour is abundant and varied. Schumpeter was one of the pioneers who assessed voter behaviour. He believed that the significance of voting was that it brought into office a group of politicians who administered the political and legislative aspects of government. Beyond this point, the electorate had no role. Schumpeter wrote:

*“democracy does not mean and can not mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms ‘people’ and ‘rule’. Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.”*¹⁶⁰

Thus, in Schumpeter’s opinion, besides voting politicians into office, there is not much voters can do. The electorate is inherently emotional and unequipped to make any other decisions, leading Schumpeter to conclude that “democracy is the rule of the politician”.¹⁶¹

Thus, democracy entails in the first place competition amongst candidates for the votes of the citizens.

The assessment of Schumpeter, above, was largely normative. It was not until survey research studies were introduced that the political science discipline, and consequently the study of voting behaviour, became more focused. As Gabriel Almond has argued:

¹⁶⁰ Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Allen and Unwin, 1976, p. 284.

*"The development of survey research brought to bear on politics a set of precision tools enabling us to move from relatively loose and speculative inferences regarding psychological properties from the element of communications, from clinical materials, and from behavioural tendencies."*¹⁶²

Empirically based behaviouralist¹⁶³ studies of voters started with Paul Lazarsfeld in 1940.

The study of Lazarsfeld et al.¹⁶⁴ of Erie County, Ohio is regarded by many as the cornerstone of voting behaviour studies as it was the first serious study that adopted the scientific methodology in survey research. In 1948, Lazarsfeld, along with Bernard Berelson and William McPhee of Columbia University, conducted another study in Elmira, New York and their work culminated in the publication of their book, Voting,¹⁶⁵ published in 1954. In this study, Berelson and his colleagues argued that voting by all people, including the less informed or less involved voters, was advisable. They wrote:

*"if the voting decision were left to the deeply concerned, well-integrated, consistently-principled ideal citizens, the political system might easily prove too rigid to adapt to changing domestic and international conditions."*¹⁶⁶

In 1952, another group from the University of Michigan started to analyse voting behaviour in the presidential elections. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller's analysis

¹⁶¹ Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 285.

¹⁶² Almond, G.A., "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept", in: Almond, G.A. and Verba, S., (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, London: Sage Publications, 1980, p. 16.

¹⁶³ According to the behaviouralists, political studies should be concentrated with research of facts, i.e. what is rather than what ought to be. The behaviouralist approach contrasts with the 'legal' and 'institutional' and 'philosophical' approaches to political phenomena. According to Jeffrey Stanyer (1984), behaviouralism emphasises elite and mass behaviour and examines the relationship between *politics* the subject, and *politics* the activity. (Stanyer, J., "The Quest for Science of Politics: Comparative Politics", in: Englefield, D. and Drewry, G., (eds.), Information Sources in Politics and Political Science: A Survey World-wide, London: Butterworths, 1984, p. 60.

¹⁶⁴ Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H., The People's Choice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1944.

¹⁶⁵ Berelson, B., Lazarsfeld, P. and McPhee, W., Voting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

¹⁶⁶ Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, Voting, p. 316.

of the 1952 Presidential elections in their book, The Voter Decides¹⁶⁷, was regarded as a landmark in political science research as it examined the impact of party allegiance, and image and issues of candidates on the electorate. Their later work, The American Voter¹⁶⁸, was considered by many to be their masterpiece. In this work, Campbell et al. argued that the electorate was ideologically unaware and that issue preferences were not related to party identification.

The selection of voting behaviour studies discussed above, provided many scholars with the tools necessary to examine whether voters determined democracy, whether parties shaped voting behaviour, or whether voting behaviour was an outcome of certain cultural or specific socio-economic conditions.

1.2.4.2. Democracy and Political Culture

Over time, numerous studies have been conducted about the impact of culture on voting behaviour. De Tocqueville's Democracy in America¹⁶⁹ is regarded by many as the most important book ever written on political culture and democracy. Most notable of recent

¹⁶⁷ Campbell, A., Gurin, G. and Miller, W., The Voter Decides, Evanston: Row Peterson and Company, 1954.

¹⁶⁸ Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes, D., The American Voter, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960.

¹⁶⁹ De Tocqueville, A., Democracy in America, (2 volumes), London: Fontana, 1968.

studies are two books written by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba: The Civic Culture¹⁷⁰, published in 1963, and The Civic Culture Revisited¹⁷¹.

In The Civic Culture, the authors argued that stable democracies emerged as a result of a 'civic culture' which implied plurality and the non-monopoly of power. Of the five countries they examined, Almond and Verba, found that Britain was the most democratic, followed by the USA. According to them, in both countries the trust in the government was high and the role of the citizen was perceived as making a difference. To the authors, therefore, a country's political culture largely influences the social and political behaviour of its citizens. Where civic culture is strong, democracy is strong. According to Gabriel Almond in The Civic Culture Revisited, the Civic Culture study was based on the "rationalist-activist model" of democratic citizenship. He defined this model as follows:

It is the model of a successful democracy that required that all citizens be involved and active in politics, and that their participation be informed, analytical, and rational."¹⁷²

Almond did not believe that the rationalist-activist model was the only component of civic culture. In his opinion, it was essential to combine it with "its opposites of passivity, trust, and deference to authority and competence".¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Almond, G.A. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Boston: Little Brown, 1963.

¹⁷¹ Almond and Verba, (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited.

¹⁷² Almond, "The Intellectual History of...", in: Almond and Verba, (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, p. 16.

¹⁷³ Almond, "The Intellectual History of...", in: Almond and Verba, (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, p. 16.

Other studies also focused on the importance of political culture and political socialisation, but did not necessarily follow the same model as Almond and Verba. Harry Eckstein, for example, studied political culture and its role in the process of democratisation, by using the “congruence theory”, which is sometimes also called the “authority-culture” model. The “authority-culture” approach of Eckstein, argued that stable democracies required the social, economic, business, and religious institutions to be democratic, and their power relations to be similar to that of the state. As he explained:

*“Governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other units of society.”*¹⁷⁴

Thus, Eckstein focused on a specific type of relationship amongst individual members of society, rather than on collective societal value systems. Therefore, as Dalton argued, Eckstein’s work is “especially relevant to present concerns because it discusses the dynamic aspects of culture and culture’s role in processes of political change”.¹⁷⁵

In general, it is possible to conclude that some scholars, such as Schmitter et al.¹⁷⁶ and Di Palma¹⁷⁷ were sceptical about the role of political culture in democratisation. This scepticism was illustrated by a quote from Max Kaase when he wrote that political culture was similar to “trying to nail jelly to the wall”.¹⁷⁸ Many other scholars, such as Arend

¹⁷⁴ Eckstein, H., “Congruence Theory Explained”, in: Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffmann and Reisinger, (eds.), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, p. 4.

¹⁷⁵ Dalton, “Democracy and its Citizens:...”, p. 2.

¹⁷⁶ Schmitter, P., Whitehead, L. and O’Donnell, G., (eds.), Transitions to Democracy: Latin America and Southern Europe, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986.

¹⁷⁷ Di Palma, G., To Craft Democracies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

¹⁷⁸ Dalton, “Democracy and its Citizens:...”, p. 2.

Lijphart¹⁷⁹ and Robert Putnam¹⁸⁰, strongly supported the use of the notion of political culture. Putnam, for example, argued that the differences between the north and the south of Italy were a result of their different civic traditions.¹⁸¹ The strong beliefs by some scholars in the importance of political culture becomes even more clear when reading Dalton's comments on Putnam's study. He wrote:

*"Putnam's study showed that cultural factors were more influential than economic differences between regions, and that cultural patterns reflected historical patterns of civic association."*¹⁸²

It is also the opinion of the researcher of this thesis that the notion of political culture has become increasingly important, especially in view of the recent democratisation efforts and/or democratic consolidation experiences in areas which do not share the western cultural tradition. Moreover, the researcher agrees with Dalton who argued that because the world is in flux, it is increasingly possible to use the cultural theory as a predictive tool, as it helps to determine how the congruence between culture and institutions develops.¹⁸³ Also, as Diamond has argued, the study of political culture is essential because, "political culture may be a crucial link between economic development and democracy".¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁹ Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California press, 1968.

¹⁸⁰ Putnam, R., Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

¹⁸¹ To Putnam, civic tradition was "like neighbourhood associations, choral societies, co-operatives, sports clubs, mass-based parties and the like". (Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 173.)

¹⁸² Dalton, "Democracy and its Citizens:...", p. 3.

¹⁸³ Dalton, "Democracy and its Citizens:...", p. 4.

¹⁸⁴ Diamond, L., "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy", in: Diamond, L., (ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 2.

From the above, it is clear that it is important to also take into account political culture when examining the process of democratisation in Palestine. In the literature on Palestine and other parts of the Arab world, the cultural dimension has been frequently used as a factor enhancing or impeding the democratic process. Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus summarised the debate on political culture as follows:

*"Some see in Arab and Islamic political culture obstacles to the democratisation process. Islam, it is argued, emphasises sacred as opposed to secular sources of authority, and divine as opposed to popular sovereignty. It is also claimed that Islam stresses values of law and order rather than those of rebellion against tyranny; that it institutionalises inequality with regard to religious minorities and women; that it does not embrace the principle of freedom of expression and belief. Others see as an obstacle to democratisation Arab culture's traditional emphasis on narrow loyalties to family, tribe, and ethnic community, or postulate Arab and Islamic lack of tolerance or opposition and defectors."*¹⁸⁵

Shikaki does recognise the impact of political culture, which according to him, changes according to the level of democratic development. He wrote:

*"When regimes change, attitudes and behaviour change; cultures become adaptable to democracy."*¹⁸⁶

The importance of political culture in the Arab world and especially in Palestine will be discussed in greater depth in section 1.2.5.1 of this chapter and in Chapter Five of this thesis.

¹⁸⁵ Shikaki, K., "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (25), no. 2, Winter 1996, pp. 11-12.

¹⁸⁶ Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National...", p. 12.

1.2.5. The Middle East and Literature on Democracy

In general, compared to literature written about other parts of the world, it is safe to say that, at least in English, very little has been written about democracy in the Middle East.¹⁸⁷

Sven Erik Lindberg-Hansen, in his bibliography on democratisation in the Third World, cited about 600 studies on Africa south of the Sahara, 286 studies on democratisation in Asia and the Pacific, about 400 on Latin and Central America, whilst only 60 on the Middle East. Of those 60 studies on democratisation in the Middle East, 6 were written on Tunisia, 33 on Algeria, 3 on Iran, 4 on Morocco, and 11 on Egypt. Hansen did not find any major studies on democratisation concerning Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, Libya, or Palestine.¹⁸⁸

In addition, most of the literature written on the Middle East consulted by the researcher of this thesis lacked quantitative analysis; very few relied on survey research. Exceptions include, for example, Lipset who referred to a survey of six Middle Eastern countries conducted by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research in 1950-51.¹⁸⁹

Mark Tessler, from the University of Wisconsin also examined some political issues pertaining to North Africa. Besides the above examples, almost all the literature has examined Middle East democracy from either of three perspectives: (1) from the juncture of Islam and Arab culture, (2) from the perspective of oil-generated wealth, or (3) from the

¹⁸⁷ Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds.), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World, p. 4.

¹⁸⁸ Lindberg-Hansen, Third World Democratisation: a Partly annotated bibliography of Recent Literature.

¹⁸⁹ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", pp. 80-81.

context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other scholars, such as Gause III¹⁹⁰, preferred to combine the impact of the three perspectives. He noted:

*"Three specific regional factors in the Arab world present disincentives to rational leaders considering liberalisation of their political systems - the prevalence of international conflict in the Middle East, the power of transnational ideological platforms based on Arabism and Islam, and the centrality of exogenous rents in the fiscal profile of the state. Taken together they can contribute to an explanation of the relative lack of liberal regimes in the Arab world."*¹⁹¹

Examples of literature on democracy and the process of democratisation in the Middle East from the above mentioned perspectives will be provided below.

1.2.5.1. Arab Culture and Islam

In his article "Will More Countries Become Democratic?"¹⁹², Samuel Huntington pointed explicitly to Islam to explain why, in his opinion, prospects for political development in Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East, were low.¹⁹³ To Huntington, it is not Arab culture, but rather the Islamic religion which has been the main hindrance to economic development, and thus democracy. In his opinion, "Islam...has not been hospitable to democracy"¹⁹⁴. This, according to Huntington, was exemplified in the case of

¹⁹⁰ Gause III, G., "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalisation in the Arab World", in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds.), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World.

¹⁹¹ Gause III, "Regional Influences on...", in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds.), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World, p. 302.

¹⁹² Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", pp. 193-218.

¹⁹³ Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", p. 216.

¹⁹⁴ Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", p. 208.

Lebanon, the only Arab country with large Christian population. Of all Arab countries, only Lebanon, he argued, sustained democracy and its democratic institutions only started to collapse after the Moslem majority began to assert itself in the 1970s.¹⁹⁵ Huntington blamed the 'consummatory nature' of Islamic culture where no distinction existed between religion and politics, nor between the spiritual and the secular, and where political participation was historically 'an alien concept'.¹⁹⁶

Not dissimilar from Huntington were Kedourie¹⁹⁷ and Lewis¹⁹⁸, who also attributed the authoritarian nature of the Moslem world to the Islamic religion. Kedourie argued that challenges to state power were absent from the Middle East as a consequence of the region's Islamic tradition. According to him, whereas in the West, citizens organised themselves according to their various social, economic, and political activities into a multiplicity of groups and associations, no such traditions existed in the Arab world. He noted:

"There is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world - which are the political traditions of Islam - which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the organising ideas of constitutional and representative government. The notion of the state..., the notion of popular sovereignty..., the idea of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly,...of society being composed of a multitude of self-

¹⁹⁵ Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", p. 208. Although not referring to Islam, Lipset (1959) also argued that of all Arab countries, Lebanon was the only one that had strong prospects for democracy. However, whilst Huntington linked Lebanon's democracy to religion, Lipset emphasised the socio-economic and literacy aspects of the Lebanese society. (Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of...", p. 81.)

¹⁹⁶ Huntington, "Will More Countries Become...", p. 208.

¹⁹⁷ Kedourie, E., Democracy and Arab Political Culture, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992.

¹⁹⁸ Lewis, B., The Shaping of the Modern Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

activating, autonomous groups and associations - all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition."¹⁹⁹

The lack of representative bodies in Islamic political tradition was also stressed by Bernard Lewis in his book The Shaping of the Modern Middle East. According to Lewis,

*"Islamic history shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, nor any other kind of elected or representative assembly. ...There was no point, since the need for a procedure of co-operate, collective decision never arose."*²⁰⁰

It should be noted, however, that whilst Lewis, in his book in 1994 blamed the limited possibilities for democracy in the Middle East on Islam, he acknowledged in a later work entitled The Future of the Middle East²⁰¹, that there were additional impediments to the development of democracy in the Middle East. These included fundamentalist tendencies, corrupt regimes, the suppression of women, and an unjustifiable fear of Western culture. However, according to Lewis, the main challenge for political development in the Middle East remained the relationship between those elements carrying the banner of Islam and those carrying the banner of liberal democracy. Whilst the fundamentalists, Lewis argued, were fortunate in having mosques as a means to spread their views, the liberal democrats were often seen as upholding the same principles of the corrupt regimes, and, as a result, a "loan-word like *dimuqrattiyya* lacks the resonance of *shari'a*".²⁰² Lewis summarised this argument as follows:

"In the struggle between democracy and fundamentalism for power in Muslim lands, the democrats suffer from a very serious disadvantage. As democrats, they are obliged to allow the fundamentalists equal opportunity to conduct propaganda and to contend for power. If they fail, they are violating the very essence of their

¹⁹⁹ Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture, pp. 5-6.

²⁰⁰ Lewis, The Shaping of the Modern Middle East, pp. 45-46.

²⁰¹ Lewis, The Future of the Middle East.

²⁰² Lewis, The Future of the Middle East, p. 8.

*own democratic creed. Paradoxically it is the Western concern for democratic freedom, even at the cost of Western values and freedom itself, that sometimes prevents the Muslim secularists from dealing with this problem in the traditional way. The fundamentalists are under no such disability."*²⁰³

In the researcher's opinion, the debate around culture and Islam is very much central in the study about democracy in the Arab World. The researcher wishes in no manner to imply that Islam and Arab culture are incompatible with democracy. However, it is the researcher's view that Islam and Arab culture could influence the possibility and the extent of the democratic process and that because of three main reasons:

1. The influences of the ulama are significant and certainly restrict secular tendencies either on a governmental level or within Arab society itself. Some examples include: Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Hamas in Palestine.
2. Some premises of the religious establishments and the cultural impediments present within Arab society do seem to clash with the tenets of democracy. The researcher often wondered how democracy could become a reality in societies with clear imbalances in personal freedom. In societies where, for example, only men are allowed to file for a divorce, where the inheritance laws clearly favour males, or where Islamic jurisprudence has yet to agree on whether women are allowed to work or hold office. In the researcher's opinion, therefore, the extent to which Islam influences daily life, law and politics in Arab societies has to be considered when examining the possibility of democratisation in those countries.

²⁰³ Lewis, The Future of the Middle East, p. 11.

3. There is a continuing failure of the various Islamic religious movements to arrive at common interpretations of issues that are relevant to democracy. For example, to date there is no agreement on how to choose leaders, or whether or not shura is synonymous with democracy. It is, therefore, the researcher's contention that before these issues are settled, the tendency to consider Islam and Arab culture as impediments to the development of democracy will remain and will continue to be emphasised in all venues on democracy and the Arab world.

1.2.5.2. The Arab-Israeli Conflict

A number of scholars have blamed the impact of the regional environment, and more specifically of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for the failure to foster democracy in the Middle East. As Salwa Ismail noted in her article "Democracy in Contemporary Arab Intellectual Discourse"²⁰⁴:

*"The immediate context for the rise of the discourse of azmat al-dimuqratiyya (the crisis of democracy) is woven by critical events: the 1967 defeat, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the Gulf War of 1991 - the same events that unleashed a flood of self-criticism, debates, and conferences devoted to the study of the general crisis. What does democracy have to do with those junctures? In diagnosing the disease as azmat al-dimuqratiyya, some symptoms exhibited by the Arab masses are explained, mainly apathy and a refusal to get involved. These symptoms were noted in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion and again during the Gulf War. From the diagnosis, an analysis of the features and causes of the azma unfolds. A multitude of causes including dependency, unequal social relations, social and cultural retardation, illiteracy, and the relation between contemporaneity and authenticity constitute the background of the azma, whose main features are limited participation and repressive practices by the state."*²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ Ismail, S., "Democracy in Contemporary Arab Intellectual Discourse", in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds.), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World.

²⁰⁵ Ismail, "Democracy in Contemporary...", in: Brynen, Korany and Noble, (eds.), Political Liberalisation and Democratisation in the Arab World, p. 95.

Therborn Goran²⁰⁶ also identified the detrimental impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on democratisation in the Middle East. In his article, "Beyond Civil Society: Democratic experiences and their Relevance to the Middle East", he wrote:

*"...the external situation of Middle Eastern societies has been strongly unfavourable to democratisation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has destabilised the whole Mashreq, again and again putting arms and foreign policy in the foreground. To the strong US interests in the region, i.e. in the Israeli state and in Arab oil, democracy and human rights are off focus. Peace in Palestine would change the international situation fundamentally, in a direction strongly favourable to the democratisation of the region."*²⁰⁷

The impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict has had considerable impact on the possibility of democratisation in the Arab world. Nowhere is this as evident as in people's distrust of the United States and to a lesser extent of Europe. To many in the Arab world, the countries that champion democracy are the countries that supported Israel politically, economically and militarily. This does not imply that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be interpreted as the main obstacle to democratisation in the region. The researcher of this thesis accepts the external impediments to democracy, but contends that internal factors equally contribute to the lack of democratic development.

²⁰⁶ Goran, T., "Beyond Civil Society: Democratic Experiences and their Relevance to the Middle East", in: Ozdalga, E. and Person, S., (eds.), Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, Istanbul: Numune Matbassi, 1997.

²⁰⁷ Goran, "Beyond Civil Society:...", in: Ozdalga and Person, (eds.), Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World, pp. 52-53.

1.2.5.3. Oil

Luciani is one of the scholars who described the negative impact of oil on the democratisation process in the Arab World. In his book The Arab State, Luciani²⁰⁸, argued that democracy is largely absent from the region as a result of the presence of oil, which turned the regimes into “rentier states”. In his opinion, these states, “display little tendency to evolve towards democratic institutions”²⁰⁹ because their wealth was not derived from internal sources such as taxation, necessary for political development and reform, but rather from oil. Thus, their economic development was not due to industrialisation or sound economic policies, rather it resulted from the presence of oil. This view was also shared by Huntington. He argued that:

*“in contrast to patterns in the oil states, processes of economic development involving significant industrialisation lead to a new, much more diverse, complex and interrelated economy, which becomes increasingly difficult for authoritarian regimes to control.”*²¹⁰

In conclusion of this selected literature review on democratisation in the Middle East, the researcher’s view on the matter can be summarised in three main points:

1. Few scholars tackled the issue of democracy and democratisation in the region quantitatively. Most studies concentrated on culture and Islam.
2. Those who did study the topic, did so mostly in a normative manner. Efforts by local research centres such as the JMCC in Jerusalem or the University of Jordan in

²⁰⁸ Luciani, G., (ed.), The Arab State, London: Routledge, 1990.

²⁰⁹ Luciani, (ed.), The Arab State, p. xxiv.

Amman, to provide empirical data through conducting polls about many issues pertaining to the Middle East, including democracy, are often unknown or ignored by scholars.

3. Most scholars examining the region are sceptical about the prospects for democratisation. They disagree amongst each other about the reasons for their gloomy evaluations: some blamed the lack of democracy in the Arab world on the characteristics of Islam or on Arab culture; others put the blame on the Arab-Israeli conflict or on the presence of oil in the region. Still others preferred to explain the lack of democratisation by a combination of the above perspectives.

1.2.6. Democracy and Palestine

It is the researcher's contention that researching the process of democratisation in Palestine is in many ways unique. Ironically, at the same time, it has the potential of providing an excellent "lab" for determining the possibility for democratisation or explaining the lack thereof in other countries in the Middle East.

The first reason why the study of democratisation in Palestine is unique, is because, unlike studies on democratisation in other countries in the world, this research is concerned with assessing the level of democratisation in an "entity", which is not yet a state. Indeed, the Palestinian Authority merely enjoys the status of an interim self-government on a piece of land of which the final borders have yet to be determined. This unique situation, of course,

²¹⁰ Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 65.

resulted from the decades of Israeli occupation and the consequent peace process, which led to a partial and uncompleted Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Clearly the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major factor influencing the process of democratisation under the Palestinian Authority. In the last chapter of this thesis, the researcher will discuss to what extent the Israeli occupation and the Arab-Israeli conflict form impediments on the road to Palestinian democracy. If the researcher's findings are that despite the Israeli factor there still is a transition towards democracy under the Palestinian Authority rule, then the excuse of the Arab-Israeli conflict used by many scholars to explain the lack of democratisation in other countries of the Middle East deserves reconsidering.

The second reason why the study of democratisation in Palestine deserves attention, lies in the fact that the Palestinian Authority is one of the few regimes in the Arab world which has held presidential and parliamentary elections that were viewed by most observers as being fair and free. This again puts a question-mark behind another explanation many scholars adhered to in order to explain the lack of democracy in the Middle East. As discussed in section 1.2.5. above, many scholars stipulated that the political culture of the Arab world and the religion of Islam are incompatible with the development of democracy. However, the Palestinian electorate, who is for the majority Muslim, cast its vote in the January 1996 elections and, by doing so, gave legitimate power to its Council members and its president. A closer look at this first Palestinian election experience might, therefore, indicate that the political culture of the Muslim world is not that incompatible with the transition towards

democracy. Perhaps the findings in the thesis of this researcher will exemplify the beliefs of Esposito and Piscatori, who wrote:

*"It is difficult to ascertain or to predict whether the evolution of Muslim thinking about democracy will lead them to convert their views into action and what particular form democratisation might take in diverse Muslim cultures. It is clear, however, that in the new Muslim world order, Muslim political traditions and institutions are evolving, just as social conditions and class structures are changing. Both are important for the future of democracy in the Middle East."*²¹¹

Finally, the study of democratisation in Palestine is both unique and an excellent "lab" for studies on this topic in other Arab countries, as to the researcher's best knowledge, only in Palestine public opinion polls and quantitative research can be carried out freely and without interference. The availability of reliable quantitative data and the possibility to conduct surveys freely may allow for a deeper insight into the various dimensions of the issue of democratisation, which might also be useful for studies on this topic in other Arab states.

²¹¹ Esposito, J. and Piscatori, J., "Democratisation and Islam", Middle East Journal, (45), no. 3, 1991, p. 440.

CHAPTER TWO:

ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PALESTINIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS

Elections, being one of the principal pillars of democracy, will be the topic of this chapter. When examining Palestinian political development and the potential contribution of the Legislative Council to a more democratic environment, it is necessary to first examine how people voted and what factors moved them to vote for certain candidates, whilst rejecting others. The composition of parliaments is, after all, not only a result of the type or political affiliation of the candidates that ran or did not participate in the elections, but is also dependent upon the voting behaviour of the electorate. For the past two years, the performance of the Legislative Council has come under scrutiny and criticism by the Palestinian public. However, it is the belief of the researcher that an elected parliament can not be solely held responsible for its good or bad performance, or for its contribution or lack thereof to democratic state-building. Not only can the effectiveness of a parliament be impeded or enhanced by the political conditions in the country, but its democratic performance can also be affected by the electorate as it is their responsibility to elect representatives who respect democratic principles. As Mishler and Rose argued:

“Legislatures may contribute to public support for democratic regimes, but the existence of a legislature – even a representative and responsible one – is not sufficient to guarantee either the establishment or persistence of democracy.”²¹²

²¹² Mishler, W. and Rose, R., “Support for Parliaments and Regimes in the Transition toward Democracy in Eastern Europe”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, (19), no. 1, February 1994, p. 7.

Based on survey results, an attempt will be made in this chapter to draw a clear picture of the level of maturity of the Palestinian electorate in their first voting experience in the general elections of January 1996. Some light will also be shed on whether or not to expect changes in voting behaviour in future elections. The main questions to be answered in this chapter, therefore, will be: Did the Palestinian electorate vote in a mature manner and for representatives who represent democratic principles? What were the main factors determining the vote or non-vote of the Palestinian electorate? Was there a significant difference in voting behaviour between Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and Palestinians from the West Bank? Were gender, education, age, or even refugee status important factors influencing voting behaviour? And will voting behaviour change in future elections?

This chapter has been divided into three main parts. Part One will place the first Palestinian general elections into its historical context and will provide a general overview of the preparation for and the course of the elections. Part One, based on survey results, will also analyse the level of maturity of the Palestinian electorate during the elections. Part Two, also based on survey material, will describe how the Legislative Council members view the way people cast their votes. Lastly, Part Three of the chapter raises some perspectives about likely Palestinian voting behaviour in any future elections.

It is also important to keep in mind that in this chapter, the researcher will not only concentrate on the role of the elite in the democratisation process as a transitionalist such as O'Donnell would do. It is true that elections would not have taken place if the Palestinian elite did not agree to them. It is also correct that the decision to hold elections placed the

Palestinian Authority in what the transitionalist Rustow referred to as the third phase on the path to democracy. Indeed, as will be discussed in this chapter, the Palestinian elite made a conscious decision to hold elections because this is what was agreed upon in the peace agreements with Israel, not because of a deep conviction that democracy is the best form of government. However, the findings of this chapter, the methodology used, and the emphasis on examining voting behaviour and the attitudes of the public's representatives based on survey results is more of an approach used widely by Modernists. Also, unlike the transitionalists, the researcher of the thesis believes that when examining democratisation, the role of voting behaviour and the importance of citizen participation cannot be ignored.

2.1. PART ONE: THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1996 AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE ELECTORATE

2.1.1. Historical Background

On 20 January 1996, Palestinians living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem went to the polls for the first time in their history to elect their President and the representatives to the Legislative Council. Although numerous political, geo-political and technical constraints surrounded the elections, the elections were valued as a democratic step, furthering progress on the path towards reaching a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.²¹³

Prior to the first Palestinian national elections, the Palestinian people were already represented. For years, Palestinians, whether living under occupation or in the Diaspora, have looked to the Palestinian National Council (PNC) as the body that legitimately represents them in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). This was recognised *de facto* by Palestinians, Arabs and the international community long before the PLO was recognised *de jure* as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat Arab Summit of October 1974.²¹⁴

The PNC contained an average of 600 members representing various political factions, women's organisations, labour unions, student organisations, political factions (including parties which were in opposition to Chairman Arafat or mainstream Fatah and upheld different strategies about the Palestinian struggle), refugees, minorities, Palestinians in the Diaspora and Palestinians living in the homeland. Although this body was not elected, the PNC was regarded by most²¹⁵ as a body representing all sectors of Palestinian society. Its members were appointed by the PLO's Executive Committee according to a specific quota, approved by the PNC. It was the PNC - in its nineteenth session held in Algiers in 1988²¹⁶ - which called for the two-state solution and the recognition of Israel and it was through the PNC that the Palestinian people opted for the peace process which was officially initiated in Madrid in 1991.

²¹³ Andoni, L., "The Palestinian Elections: Moving Toward Democracy or One-Party Rule?", Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 3, Spring 1996, p. 16.

²¹⁴ The Rabat Resolution, 28 October 1974.

²¹⁵ "Most", because the Islamists were not included in the PNC.

Thus, the tradition of popular representation has been part of Palestine's political history and - as will be examined later in this chapter - it may partially explain the success of the recent elections.

The end of the cold war and the political reality that surfaced in the aftermath of the Gulf war, brought about renewed interest and new challenges in the Middle East. On the one hand, the Palestinian leadership was faced with intense pressures: the lack of a common stand and fragmentation in the Arab world, the influx of Palestinians into Jordan - creating a new wave of refugees - and the marginalisation of the leadership in Tunis.

On the other hand, the other governments of the region, similar to the Palestinian leadership, were faced with a single superpower whose agenda, "the New World Order", focused on settling regional disputes and increasing globalisation. The time was ripe for starting negotiations to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Madrid Conference paved the way for negotiations between the various Arab parties and Israel.²¹⁷ It created the environment which ultimately brought about the secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians that culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Washington on 13 September 1993.²¹⁸ Article 1 of the DoP stated that:

"the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority and an elected Council (the "Council") for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding

²¹⁶ Political Communiqué of the 19th Session of the Palestine National Council, 12-15 November 1988.

²¹⁷ Ashrawi, H., This Side of Peace: A Personal Account, London: Simon & Schuster, 1995, pp. 10-11.

²¹⁸ Butt, G., "The Deal that Could Change the Middle East", Middle East International (MEI), no. 458, 10 October 1993.

*five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.*²¹⁹

Article III of the DoP²²⁰ was dedicated to the elections. It stated that:

1. *"In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.*
2. *An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.*
3. *These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realisation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."*

Article IV of the DoP²²¹ established the jurisdiction of the Council, specifying that it "will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations".

²¹⁹ The Interim agreement and the Declaration of Principles have been published in full by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC). References to these documents in this thesis are taken from the texts as published by the JMCC, and page references, therefore, refer to that publication. See: JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip & Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Jerusalem: Occasional Document Series, August 1996, p. 249.

²²⁰ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 249.

²²¹ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 249.

2.1.2. Preparations for the Elections

The elections for the Council and the President were perceived amongst Palestinians as an interim preparatory step towards the fulfilment of the Palestinian national right for an independent Palestinian state. As such, these elections were embraced by the Palestinian leadership and extensive efforts were invested to ensure a free, fair, and democratic process to pave the way for future institution building. As As'ad Ghanem wrote in an article in the Middle East Journal:

*"Most Palestinians supported the elections of 1996, which they viewed as preparing the ground for a transitional period during which the final status of the Occupied Territories would be determined. Elections were considered the most fitting means of choosing the participants for the final status negotiations with Israel, and as the way to set up a democratic political system that would be different from the systems in the surrounding Arab countries."*²²²

The preparations for the elections and the elections themselves were regulated by the Election Law, which was promulgated by Arafat on 7 December 1995.²²³ The election Law had been drafted by the Legislation Department of the Palestinian Authority (Diwan al-Fatwa wa al-Tashrei') and was a result of two previous drafts: one written by Birzeit University; the other written by Dr. Anis al-Qassem, head of the Legal Committee of the PNC. As becomes clear from the introduction of the Election Law quoted below, Arafat promulgated the Election Law based on several laws and the approval of various institutions:

²²² Ghanem, A., "Founding Elections in a Transitional Period: The First Palestinian General Elections", Middle East Journal, (50), no. 4, Autumn 1996, p. 514.

²²³ Palestinian Election Law, Gaza: Central Elections Commission (CEC), 7 December 1995.

*'The President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation,
President of the Palestinian National Authority,*

*Having seen the basic law of the Palestine Liberation Organisation;
having seen the law no. 5 of 1995, referring to the Transfer of Powers and Competencies;
having seen the Electoral Law for the Council of Representatives no. 24 of 1960, and the laws amending it;
having seen the Resolution no. 32 of 1960, of the Administrative Governor General, regarding elections in Gaza;
having the approval of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, with the participation of the presidency of the Palestinian National Council;
having the approval of the Council of the Palestinian national Authority; and
based upon the powers bestowed in me, I hereby declare the following Law: '224*


According to Article Five in the Palestinian Election Law for the year 1995, the elections were to be based on a majority electoral system, multi-member constituencies and freedom of choice lists²²⁵.²²⁶ As shown in figure 1 below, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, were divided into 16 electoral constituencies - according to population distribution - for the Legislative Council elections. However, these areas were considered as one constituency for the election of the president of the Palestinian National Authority. It is worth noting that, according to the Interim agreements, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were divided in zones A, B and C²²⁷ and that the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council varied accordingly. As for the Jerusalem constituency, it does not fall within these

²²⁴ CEC, Palestinian Election Law, p. 1.

²²⁵ Definition of 'freedom of choice list': The voter may switch freely both within and between lists. Voters have several votes and each may compose 'his' list from the proposals submitted by the parties. (Nohlen, D., Elections and Electoral Systems, Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, 1996, p. 62.)


²²⁶ Dajani, M., Democracy in Palestine: Palestinian Elections for the Presidency of the PNA and the Members of the Legislative Council (Al-Democratya fi Falastin), Al-Ram: CEC, 1997, p. 155.

²²⁷ Further details and a map outlining the zones A, B and C are included under section 2.1.3. of this chapter.



zones as it remains under total Israeli jurisdiction. Similarly, the Hebron constituency was treated as a special case during the elections pending an agreement.

Figure 1:²²⁸



Source: CEC, July 1997.

2.1.2.1 Registration

The pre-election process started with a media-campaign, organised by the Palestinian Authority, urging Palestinians living in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip to register for the elections. The campaign included the distribution of stickers, frequent broadcasts on the Palestinian radio and various articles and announcements in the daily and weekly press.²²⁹ Seven thousand teachers were trained to conduct the registration process, going door-to-door to register all Palestinians over the age of 17. The process of registration started on 12 November 1995 and ended on 2 December 1995, after which the election register was announced and the public was allowed to submit objections to it.

2.1.2.2. The Central Elections Commission

²²⁸ The data illustrated in figure 1 were compiled from information in: Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 55.

The election process for the first Palestinian Legislative Council and the Presidency of the Palestinian Authority was administered by the Central Elections Commission (CEC). The CEC was established in pursuance of Presidential Decree Number (3), issued on 21 December 1995. This decree stated that “the Commission shall function pursuant to the provisions of the Election Law and/or any other legislation related to elections in Palestine”, and “...shall issue the regulations and pamphlets necessary for the fulfilment of its duties”.²³⁰ According to Article 22.1 of the Palestinian Election Law, the CEC was to be the highest body responsible for the administration and supervision of the elections.²³¹

2.1.2.3. Election Observers

International and local observers monitored the electoral process to ensure that it was conducted in accordance with international standards and with the Election Law. Their task was to observe whether the elections were fair and free. According to Gregory Mahler from the University of Mississippi, the standard of election observation was very high. In an article in *Electoral Studies*, he commented:

*“The Palestinian election of January 1996, the first free and democratic election ever held for the Palestinian people, may have been the most carefully observed and conscientiously scrutinised election in modern times.”*²³²

²²⁹ Dickie, P., “Elections on Course; Hamas Refuses to Run”, The Jerusalem Times, 17 November 1995.

²³⁰ Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 222.

²³¹ CEC, Palestinian Election Law, p. 11.

²³² Mahler, G., “The Palestinian Election of 1996”, Electoral Studies, (15), no. 5, p. 414.

During the elections, the international observers were allowed to observe all stages of the election process. These stages included: voter registration, the candidates' election campaign, the actual voting, vote counting in each polling station, and evaluation (including the resolution and evaluation of claims made by candidates or their representatives) at district and national levels.

In accordance with Article 5.3 of Annex 2 of the Interim agreement, election observers were invited from all parts of the world: the European Union, the United Nations, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Canada, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Norway, South Africa, the Non-Aligned Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the Islamic Conference Organisation. Delegations from other governments or intergovernmental organisations were also present.²³³ In total, 519 international observers participated in the process. In addition to the international observers, the Local Palestinian Observers Committee recruited also more than 2,000 volunteers.

2.1.2.4. Problems

As will be illustrated below, in general, the Palestinian general elections were evaluated and viewed as being fair by those who observed them, even after taking into account the numerous signs of mismanagement and confusion which occurred both before and during the elections.²³⁴

²³³ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 84.

It is also the researcher's opinion that, the problems and interference which did occur, did not significantly affect the election process, and this mainly because - as a result of the Israeli withdrawal from several major West Bank cities only weeks earlier - the popularity of both Arafat and Fatah at the time of the elections could not be challenged, with or without interference. This, however, should not undermine the importance of the fact that interference and attempts at confusing both the candidates and the electorate did occur.

A series of announcements by Chairman Yasser Arafat caused confusion only days before the election campaign was about to start. Although Israel had agreed the addition of five Council seats two weeks earlier, Yasser Arafat left it until 26 December 1995 to announce in Presidential Decree Number (5) that four seats would be added, one in the constituency of Gaza city, one in Khan Younis, one in Hebron, and one in Jerusalem, bringing the total amount of Council seats up to 88.²³⁵ Furthermore, although Arafat initially announced that nominations would re-open, for one day, only in the constituencies where new seats were added, he later overturned this decision and announced a two-day period for nominations in all constituencies. As suggested below, many election observers at the time suspected Yasser Arafat of alternative motives for his decisions.²³⁶ One suggestion was that Arafat wanted to ensure that Fatah had the dominant number of candidates in each area. Another was that Arafat wanted to give Hamas supporters a final chance to nominate themselves as candidates.²³⁷

²³⁴ Barghouti, M., "Posteuforia in Palestine", Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 4, Summer 1996, p. 94.

²³⁵ Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 224-225.

²³⁶ Arafat's motives for interference will be discussed in further depth in section 2.1.4. of this chapter.

²³⁷ "Arafat Causes Chaos as Campaigning Starts", Palestine Report, 5 January 1996.

Arafat's interference did not end with the above, but was extended to the election campaign. Article 55 of the Election Law stipulated that all candidates were free to exercise their right to campaign within a 22 days period prior to the polling day.²³⁸

However, on 30 December 1996, Arafat announced that the campaign period had been shortened to two weeks, and would not open until 5 January 1996. This last interference caused Carl Lidbom, Head of the International Observer Team, to make a highly publicised statement, in which he stated his doubts over Yasser Arafat's actions. The statement commented as follows on Arafat's shortening of the election campaign:

*"...an already very short official election campaign of 22 days has now been arbitrarily shortened to 14 days without any explanation being given for this shortening, which breaches the Election Law and adds to the difficulties of the independent candidates and the opposition parties. ... The events of the past few days have created confusion and uncertainty, and give the impression of the arbitrary use of power to redesign the electoral architecture."*²³⁹

In response of Carl Lidbom's statement, the Central Elections Commission extended the campaign period, which eventually started on the compromise date of 2 January 1996.

An additional problem arose concerning the candidates' access to the media. According to Article 57.1 of the Election Law, all candidates - for the presidency and for the Council - were to be provided with equal time by the public-run media to present their platforms.²⁴⁰

However, it soon became clear that the 20 day campaign period for the 672 candidates was

²³⁸ CEC, Palestinian Election Law, p. 23.

²³⁹ "Enough is Enough", Statement by Carl Lidbom, head of the European Union Electoral Unit, 1 January 1996.

²⁴⁰ CEC, Palestinian Election Law, p. 24.

not sufficient for this goal to be attained.²⁴¹ Consequently, a tendency emerged whereby the major Fatah candidates, the candidates backed by Yasser Arafat and the candidates who were already members of the Palestinian Authority attained superior media access compared to other candidates. As As'ad Ghanem described in his article on the elections:

*'The law barred the PNA from being involved in electoral publicity or trying to convince persons to vote for any specific candidate; but it assigned the PNA the responsibility to publish declarations stressing the importance of participating in voting. The rule was openly broken: even during the period of the election campaign candidates continued to serve as ministers in the PNA, and thus enjoyed a clear advantage over all other candidates because of their access to the media and the use of their official titles in public election meetings. There was also extensive press coverage of the members of Fatah and the PNA, and their associates, including Arafat himself.'*²⁴²

Despite the above mentioned problems, on 21 January 1996, the international observers, headed by Mr. Carl Lidbom, relayed their observations about the course of the elections at a press conference held in Ramallah. Mr. Lidbom confirmed that the first Palestinian national elections took place in accordance with international standards and declared them fair and free.²⁴³

2.1.3. Voter Turnout

On 20 January 1996 the Palestinian electorate turned up *en masse* to vote not only to express their support for the democratic principle behind the elections, but also - indirectly - in support of the peace process. The total number of Palestinians who registered to vote


²⁴¹ Usher, G., "West Bank Towns under Arafat's Control", MEI, no. 516, 5 January 1996.

²⁴² Ghanem, "Founding Elections in a Transitional Period:...", pp. 521-522.

²⁴³ "Will of the People Expressed", Palestine Report, 24 January 1996.

was 1,028,280. 672,755 people registered to vote in the West Bank and 355,525 in the Gaza Strip.²⁴⁴ Eventually, an average of 75.86% of the registered voters turned up and voted. As shown in figure 2 below, voter turn-out in general was lower in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. Whereas voter turnout in the West Bank reached 70.13%, the percentage in the Gaza Strip reached 87.18%.

Figure 2:²⁴⁵



The difference in voter turnout between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, the lower average voter turn-out in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip can be attributed to the low turnout in Jerusalem of 42.47%. Due to a successful Israeli intimidation policy and the significant presence of Israeli military forces around the polling stations, many Palestinians felt intimidated. Indeed, five days before the


²⁴⁴ Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 49.

²⁴⁵ The data illustrated in figure 1 were compiled from information in: Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 49.

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Voter Turnout in the First Palestinian Elections



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²⁴⁴ Dajani, *Democracy in Palestine*, p. 49.

²⁴⁵ The data illustrated in figure 1 were compiled from information in: Dajani, *Democracy in Palestine*, p. 49.

election day, posters - signed by the Israeli Likud party - were plastered all over East Jerusalem, reading as follows:

*'Warning and Caution to the Honourable Resident: This Saturday, 20 January, 1996, elections for the National Authority will be held in Jerusalem. Any resident of Jerusalem who votes in the Authority elections might lose his Israeli ID card. We beg you to think and think again before voting. You have to decide between voting for the Authority or keeping your Israeli ID card.'*²⁴⁶

Furthermore, the Israeli delay in redeploying from Hebron also caused a sense of frustration among Westbankers, particularly in Hebron, where the turnout was only 66.4%.

Secondly, higher voter participation in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank might be explained by the fact that, at the time of the elections, Gazans felt the presence of the Palestinian Authority far more than residents in the West Bank. Israeli troops redeployed from the major West Bank cities barely a month before the national elections, and most areas around these cities still remained under Israeli control. The redeployment map below (figure 3) shows the subdivision of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as stipulated in Article 11.3 of the interim agreement, into areas A, B and C.²⁴⁷ Area A consists of less than 3% of the West Bank and is the only area which falls under total Palestinian jurisdiction. In area B, the Palestinian police assume responsibility for public order for the Palestinians and are deployed to accommodate Palestinian needs and requirements. However, in area B, Israel continues to have the overriding responsibility for security. This area consists of approximately 22% of the West Bank. Area C, 75% of the West Bank continues to fall under full Israeli jurisdiction.

Figure 3:

²⁴⁶ "Jerusalem: Voters and Candidates Warned Off", Palestine Report, 19 January 1996.

²⁴⁷ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 16.


Oslo II Map Outlining Areas A, B, and C



Moving on to the survey results concerning the elections, one notices that they reflect the trends found above. Analysing the elections based on a popular survey has distinctive advantages. As will be found out below, the survey results do not only confirm the official results, indicating that the survey sample utilised is representative, but also allow for deeper analysis in so far as, by using survey material, specifics and information on voter behaviour can be deduced, which can not be obtained by examining the official results. Whereas in the survey sample views are classified separately according to gender, area, education and age, this is not possible with the official election data.

In general, out of 1,195 people surveyed, 64.6% said that they voted in the elections of January 1996, whilst 34.4% answered they did not vote.²⁴⁸ Also, as shown in figure 4 below, voter participation was comparatively higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. In the sample, 72.7% of the interviewees in the Gaza Strip confirmed that they voted in the 1996 elections, compared to only 59.9% in the West Bank.

Figure 4:



²⁴⁸ For full results of the public opinion poll, see Annex 5.

Whilst no striking differences were found between men and women, refugees or non-refugees, or according to area or education in deciding whether to vote or not, the variable of age proved to be an important factor. Table 1 below, indicates that the older people tended to vote less than the younger generation. Indeed, whereas 63.6% of the surveyed respondents between the age of 18 and 25 said that they voted in the January 1996 elections, only 45.5% of the interviewees over 55 years old said so.

It is worth bringing to the attention that, although the results in table 1 indicate that voting did not increase throughout age, it did overall, allowing the researcher to conclude that the relationship between the variables of age and voting are statistically significant. At this stage, it is also worth reminding that under each table illustrating the results of the survey conducted by the researcher, the value of Chi Square is given. If the value of Chi Square is equal or smaller than 0.05, the relationship between the variables illustrated in a respective table is statistically significant, i.e. the relationship between the variables is not a coincidence or resulting from mere chance.

Table 1: Did you vote in the January 1996 elections?

	Age				
	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	63.6%	64.2%	71.4%	69.5%	45.5%
No	35.6%	35.5%	28.1%	28.6%	50.0%
No answer	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%	1.9%	4.5%
<i>df</i>	10				
<i>Chi square</i>	.0019				

The survey also questioned the reasons behind the decision of the survey respondents not to vote in the January 1996 elections. In this instance, the level of education of the respondents proved to have an important influence upon the reasons given not to vote. As

shown in table 2 below, the three most important reasons given by survey respondents for not voting were:

1. *I did not find candidates for whom I wanted to cast my vote:* Especially more educated interviewees cited this reason. This reason is the most rational motive for not voting. Most likely, the higher educated people were able to digest the election information more critically, and then decided that they did not find a candidate of their liking to vote for. Campbell et al. in "The American voter" reached similar conclusions on the impact of education upon voting behaviour. According to them:

*"The greater an individual's education, the more likely he is to attend to sources of political information and hence to know 'what is going on'. His view of political objects and events will be more specific and more highly differentiated. ... The educated person is distinct from the less educated not only in the number of facts about politics at his command, but also in the sophistication of the concepts he employs to maintain a sense of order and meaning amid the flood of information. In fact, it is psychologically sound to presume that the two phenomena go hand in hand."*²⁴⁹

It is the researcher's contention that respondents who answered that they did not vote because they did not find a candidate for whom they wanted to cast their vote, decided not to vote out of rejection rather than apathy. Educated respondents were more critical, and hence more sceptical than interviewees who received less education. They looked at the candidates' qualifications, and perhaps also found that the political groups they supported did not take part in the elections. They were less compromising. By not voting, they were sending a message.

2. I did not register on time: This reason was given more often by the least educated people. Only 8.3% of the respondents who received college and above education replied that they did not vote because they did not register on time, compared to 23.9% of the interviewees who only went to elementary school.

3. I did not believe that it would make a difference: This reason was given nearly twice as often by the least educated people than by the most educated people. As indicated in table 2, below, 15.2% of the respondents who received up to elementary schooling replied that they did not vote because they did not believe that it would have made a difference, compared to only 8.3% of the interviewees who went to college and above gave that reason.

It is the researcher's belief that the second and third reasons are more a result of indifference and apathy rather than of rational thinking.

Table 2 also indicates that a significant proportion of the respondents (31.6%) answered "other reasons" for not taking part in the elections. These 31.6% comprise mostly people who (1) were sick on the day of elections; (2) are 18 years old now, but were not at the time of the elections; (3) are returnees who did not receive their identity card on time for the elections.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Cambell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes, D., The American Voter, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960, p. 476.

Table 2: Why did you not vote?

	Total	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=411	N=46	N=77	N=132	N=104	N=36
I did not register on time	17.0%	23.9%	14.3%	16.7%	20.2%	8.3%
I did not believe that it would make a difference	13.4%	15.2%	13.0%	13.6%	14.4%	8.3%
I did not find candidates for whom I wanted to cast my vote	21.9%	10.9%	26.0%	22.7%	21.2%	27.8%
I am in opposition/against Oslo	1.2%	-	-	-	4.8%	-
Not convinced	2.7%	-	2.6%	3.8%	3.8%	-
I was out of the country	5.1%	2.2%	1.3%	4.5%	7.7%	13.9%
Others	31.6%	45.7%	33.8%	30.3%	21.2%	36.1%
No answer	7.1%	2.2%	9.1%	8.3%	6.7%	5.6%
<i>df</i>		35				
<i>Chi square</i>		.0582				

2.1.4 Voting according to Political Affiliation.

When analysing voting behaviour according to political affiliation, it is necessary to point out that not all political factions participated in the January 1996 elections. The most prominent parties and factions such as Hamas, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) all decided to boycott the elections. Some members of these boycotting parties did run in the elections as independents, but not under the banner of their respective parties. In most cases, the electorate realised the party affiliation of these candidates and voted for or against them on the basis of this knowledge.

The main reason given by the opposition parties for boycotting the elections was that participation would have legitimised the Oslo agreements, which - they felt - did not

²⁵⁰ The researcher has this information, because whenever an interviewee responded that he/she had "other

sufficiently take into account fundamental Palestinian national rights and were considered to constitute an American-Israeli imposition of ideas. As Qais Abdul Karim, the leader of the DFLP in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, stated to the researcher of this thesis:

*"The Legislative powers of the Council are restricted according to the Oslo agreements. We were keen to make clear to the Palestinian public that they would not be electing a parliament with the least degree of sovereignty or power to solve any of the main problems facing the Palestinian community. We wanted to make clear that the Council that was going to be elected was a consultative body rather than a legislative body. The actual objective of the elections was to legitimise the Oslo agreements rather than to elect a body that represents the people."*²⁵¹

Hassan Youssef, believed to be one of the top Hamas leaders in the Nablus area, clarified his movement's perception of the elections as follows in a press conference held on 16 November 1995 in Ramallah:

*"We confirm that we have nothing against the principle of holding Palestinian elections, but they should only be held once certain preconditions have been met, including the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territory, the removal of all settlers and the dismantling of the settlements. There are many reasons for our refusal to participate, but broadly these lie in our dissatisfaction with the terms of the Oslo Agreement and the inadequacy of the election law."*²⁵²

The decision taken by the opposition parties to boycott the elections was not an easy one. The question of whether or not to participate in the first Palestinian elections sparked intense debates and led to the formation of pro- and anti- participation camps within the different factions. The rift which emerged within the PFLP before the elections forms one example. Riad Malki was the most prominent member of the PFLP who wanted his organisation to participate in the elections. He explained his argument and why he felt the PFLP made a mistake by not entering the elections to the researcher as follows:

reasons" for not voting, this interviewee was requested to specify the reason.

²⁵¹ The interview with Qais Abdul Karim was conducted in Ramallah on Tuesday 29 July 1997.

*"Their arguments were very convincing, but you can not take them out of context and speak about them in the abstract. You need to see the whole picture and be more realistic in terms of assessing and understanding the situation. Then, you can not accept these arguments, you have to look for other arguments... I was saying that to protect the future of my political organisation, it was very important to enter the elections, because they will create new realities and historical changes. They will bring new faces, new realities, and a new status-quo. And people who live in the past will be ignored and forgotten. I said that we can not just say 'no' all the time, simply because it is the easiest way. The most difficult thing is to say 'yes' and to see how this yes could be translated into a position, whereby you become more flexible in terms of how to adjust to new realities without losing your own identity and principles."*²⁵³

Nabil Shaath, Council member and Palestinian Authority Minister of Planning and International Co-operation, gave his own view of why the opposition was boycotting the elections. In his opinion put to the researcher of this thesis, there were two reasons why the opposition parties did not take part in the elections: one was official, the other the real reason.

*"Their official reason, which in my mind is rubbish, is that if they participated, it would have been an indirect approval of the Oslo accords. But, they said, had this been municipal council elections, we wouldn't have minded! That was their stated reason. The real reason was that they felt at the time of the elections that their chances of electing a decent contingent to the Council were so slim that they would really be scarred for a long time to come."*²⁵⁴

Indeed, realities at the time in the region were in favour of the political factions and figures supporting Oslo. The elections took place on the eve of Israeli redeployment from the major West Bank cities and Palestinian flags were flying everywhere. Israeli flags were lowered and the Palestinian soldiers marching into West Bank cities were received with

²⁵² Dickie, P., "Elections on Course; Hamas Refuses to Run", The Jerusalem Times, 17 November 1995.

²⁵³ The interview with Riad Malki was conducted in Ramallah on 18 August 1997.

²⁵⁴ The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in Al-Ram on 21 August 1997.

great joy. At that time, people supported Oslo and wanted peace, because they were finally given hope. Political factions in support of Oslo benefited from this euphoric mood. Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, wrote in a commentary:

‘The public came out in force behind Arafat/the PA/Fatah, in what can only be considered a vast display of support for the current political process. The results of the elections should not come as a surprise to anybody, in light of the fact that the Palestinian elections were held directly after the Israeli army finished its withdrawal from major Palestinian population centres.’²⁵⁵

Table 3²⁵⁶, below, identifies each political party which took part the elections in January 1996, the number of candidates and winners from each participant party, and the percentage of votes each political party received.

Table 3:

Affiliation	# of Candidates	# of Winners	Percentage of votes
Independent	503	35	57.51%
Fatah	77	50	30.90%
Palestinian People’s Party	26	0	2.93%
Popular Struggle Front	12	0	0.74%
FIDA	11	1	2.04%
NDC	5	1	2.25%
Arab Liberation Front	8	0	0.65%
Liberty & Independence Bloc	5	1	1.64%
Palestinian Liberation Front	4	0	0.11%
Islamic Jihad Movement (al-aqsa Brigade) ²⁵⁷	4	0	0.24%
Future Bloc	4	0	0.19%
National Democratic Movement	3	0	0.19%
Islamic Struggle Movement	2	0	0.35%
Progressive National Bloc	2	0	0.05%
National Movement for Change	2	0	0.08%
Baath Party	1	0	0.06%
Palestinian National Coalition	3	0	0.08%
Total	672	88	100%

²⁵⁵ Khatib, G., “The Value of the Vote”, Palestine Report, 2 February 1996.

²⁵⁶ Dajani, Democracy in Palestine, p. 100.

²⁵⁷ “Islamic Jihad Movement/al-aqsa Brigade”, should not be confused with the Islamic Jihad Movement, which opposed the elections and did not take part in the elections.

When taking a closer look at table 3 above, the most remarkable fact is that only 77 candidates of 672 ran on the Fatah list. This relatively small number can be explained by examining the carefully balanced strategy by PLO Chairman and Fatah head Yasser Arafat, whereby he wished, on the one hand, to encourage some degree of pluralism, whilst, on the other hand, attempting to create a Fatah list which transcended the mere inclusion of the well-known, bona fide Fatah supporters to include representatives of the large families from inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the representatives who returned from abroad.

There were only 88 seats available in the Legislative Council. Arafat did not allow for more than 77 Fatah supporters to be on the Fatah list, because he did not want the elections to turn out into an internal Fatah election. The reasoning behind this strategy, can be found in the level of support Fatah enjoys amongst the public. Results in an opinion poll conducted by the JMCC can help clarify the point of why Arafat was in need of some degree of pluralism in the elections and attempted to prevent a single party election. When 1199 interviewees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were asked in a public opinion poll in January 1996, which political or religious factions they trusted most, only 38.9% of the interviewees responded that Fatah was their most trusted faction.²⁵⁸ Although Fatah was by far the faction that enjoyed most support amongst the public, its support base was insufficient for Arafat's goals. He needed a parliament with members who, on the one hand, drew their support from different sections of Palestinian society, but, who would, on the other hand, strongly support his policies in the peace process. Therefore, Arafat worked

²⁵⁸ JMCC, Public Opinion Polls on Palestinian Attitudes towards Politics, (Jerusalem: JMCC, 1996), January 1996 poll.

towards not only attracting Fatah supporters to the Council elections, but attempted to broaden the scope beyond Fatah.²⁵⁹ As a result of this strategy, a candidate such as Imad Falouji (North Gaza), who was a known member of Hamas until the elections, was included on the Fatah list. Other examples include: Faraj al-Sarraf, a Christian from Gaza city and a reputed independent, and Azmi Shuaibi, a FIDA supporter from Ramallah.

Arafat was also peculiar in accepting or refusing permission for many Fatah supporters to run on the party list. A closer look at events prior to the elections revealed that Arafat was seeking the inclusion of a larger proportion of representatives of the large, traditional families in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and returnees at the expense of well-known Fatah supporters and some popular Intifadah leaders. Indeed, Arafat refused permission for many Fatah leaders to run on the party list, even when those candidates had been successful in the Fatah primaries, which were held before the national elections. Abdel Fatah Hamayel, for example, who was known to be a hard-core Fatah supporter, came out first in the Ramallah constituency during the Fatah primaries. Nevertheless, he was not allowed to run as a Fatah candidate in the January 1996 elections, and consequently ran and won as an independent candidate. Other examples are people like Qadoura Faris, also from the Ramallah area, Salah Tamari (Bethlehem), and Zyad Abu Zayad (Jerusalem). In total, more than 200 Fatah members ran as independent candidates in the elections. In early January 1996, the Fatah Higher Council tried to prevent this trend by issuing a decree prohibiting Fatah members from running as independents and by using Palestinian security forces to

²⁵⁹ Andoni, "The Palestinian Elections:...", p. 7.

intimidate would-be candidates.²⁶⁰ All Fatah members who nominated themselves as independents were ordered to withdraw their candidacy or they would be suspended.²⁶¹

According to Ali Jarbawi, an associate professor at Birzeit University, the tension within Fatah during the run-up to the elections, had serious implications for the movement ever since. In an article in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, he wrote:

*“The fact that a number of Fatah members ran against the movement’s official list, ignoring the party leadership’s calls to pull out of the race (some won stunning victories), proves that Fatah’s electoral success came at the expense of its coherence. Indeed, the elections saw the final division of the movement into different centres of power.”*²⁶²

Some well-known, popular Fatah intifadah²⁶³ leaders were also refused permission to run on the Fatah ticket. In this way, Arafat tried to avoid militant Fatah people winning the elections. A classic example is Hussam Khader, who ran and won in Nablus. He was a young, outspoken Fatah activist during the Intifadah, from Balata camp near Nablus, and had been jailed as such by the Israelis. After being refused permission to run on the Fatah list, he joined the Liberty and Independence Bloc and became their only successful candidate.

As became clear from the illustrations above, instead of the young, popular Intifadah activists and the well-known hard-core Fatah leaders, Arafat opted for and ensured the

²⁶⁰ Benda, S., Johnson, K. and Melia, T., A Report on the first months of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Jerusalem: The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, May 1996.

²⁶¹ “Abbas Defends Commission”, Palestine Report, 12 January 1996.

²⁶² Jarbawi, A., “Palestinian Politics at Crossroads”, Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 4, Summer 1996, p. 35.

²⁶³ The word “Intifadah” is the Arabic term for “uprising. The Palestinian uprising broke out early in December 1987.

enlistment of representatives of the traditional, large families such as Ali Qawameh (Hebron) and Maher al-Masri (Nablus). In addition, he included some returnees on the Fatah list, such as Hassan Asfour (Khan Younis), who is also closely affiliated with the Palestinian People's Party, and Umm Jihad (Gaza city).

Arafat has been largely successful in his attempt to expand the boundaries of the Fatah list. However, after the elections, a growing tendency surfaced. Within the Legislative Council, the Fatah supporters who ran outside the Fatah list proved to be more independent and more vocal than those who had run on a Fatah ticket. Candidates who ran as individuals were chosen for their own qualities and this became their strength, whilst some of the winners who ran on the Fatah list owe a lot of their success to Fatah. They are less outspoken and their main loyalty is to Fatah. Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, agrees. In an interview with the researcher of this thesis, he affirmed:

*"Because a sizeable number of Fatah candidates who made it to the Legislative Council did not owe their success to Arafat, but rather to their grassroots support, they were able to become more critical and outspoken on various policy issues, which, in many instances, contravened with Arafat's wishes. The relative democratic features of the Council can partially be attributed to the often independent positions of those Fatah members."*²⁶⁴

Table 3 above, also shows that 50 of the 77 Fatah candidates running for the Council elections were successful, and that they received 30.90% of the votes. At first, this seems strange, when we note in figure 5, below, that 63.1% of the voters in the survey conducted by the researcher claimed that they voted for Fatah. Critics might suggest that there is a


²⁶⁴ The interview with Ghassan Khatib was conducted in Durham on 18 June 1998.

discrepancy between the survey result of 63.1% who voted for Fatah and the official number of 30.9%. However, one should keep in mind that the official number reflects only the percentage of people who actually voted for the 77 registered Fatah candidates. The percentage in the survey is higher because it includes both respondents who voted for the 77 official Fatah candidates and those who voted for members of Fatah who ran as independent candidates, but were known for their Fatah affiliation. Jamil Rabah, a Palestinian political analyst and highly respected pollster, agreed in an interview with the researcher of this thesis. He explained:

‘While Fatah officially harvested 30.90% of the vote in the January 1996 elections, in practical terms, Fatah gained many more votes. I am not surprised to see that in your opinion poll 63.1% said that they voted for Fatah. The discrepancy can be explained by the fact that a large number of Fatah members ran as independent candidates or under a non-Fatah list. To most people, those candidates are Fatah, and they were identified by the public as such, irrespective of whether they ran as Fatah or not.’²⁶⁵

Figure 5:

Voting According to Political Faction




²⁶⁵ The interview with Jamil Rabah was conducted in Durham on 20 June 1998.

Table 4 below, indicates that most educated youth tended to vote more for Hamas than

According to the results illustrated in figure 5 above, 2.6% of the respondents who voted, said that they voted for Hamas. Again, this result might seem strange, when considering that Hamas was one of the factions which officially boycotted the elections. Some of the candidates and winners in the elections, however, had strong Hamas affiliations, most of those stood in the Gaza Strip. Examples of such winners include the following Council members: Imad Falouji (North Gaza), Musa Za'bout (Gaza city), Yaghi Wajieh (Gaza city), Suleiman al-Roumi (Rafah), and Muawya Masri (Nablus).²⁶⁶

Not only were there more candidates with close Hamas affiliations standing in the elections in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, the results of the survey show that Gazans also voted more often for those candidates than Westbankers. As illustrated in figure 6 below, in the West Bank 1.5% of the surveyed respondents voted for candidates perceived to be Hamas, compared to 4.1% in the Gaza Strip, which is more than three times higher.

Figure 6:



²⁶⁶ JMCC, The Palestinian Council, (Second Edition), Jerusalem: JMCC, January 1998, pp. 179-222.

Table 4 below, indicates that most educated youth tended to vote more for Hamas than older, less educated people. These findings correspond with those of Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, he wrote that although the Islamists of Hamas and Islamic Jihad do not have a consistent demographic characteristic, “disproportionately more support for them is found among illiterates and the most educated youth.”²⁶⁷

Table 4: Voting for Hamas by education and age:

Education (N=750)		Age (N=724)	
Up to elementary school	2.9%	18-25	3.3%
Up to preparatory school	2.8%	26-35	2.6%
Up to secondary school	2.7%	36-45	2.1%
Some college	2.0%	46-55	2.7%
College and above	3.8%	55+	-

2.1.5. Agenda and Campaign Slogans

Part of the electorate’s success in voting according to acceptable democratic standards can be associated with its knowledge of the campaign slogans and the agendas of the election candidates.²⁶⁸ In this section, the researcher will analyse which demographic subgroups of Palestinian society had superior knowledge of the agendas of the election candidates and which subgroups found campaigning more important than others.


Of the surveyed people who were actual voters, male voters were more familiar with the campaign slogans than female voters. As illustrated in figure 7 below, not only did 81.3%

²⁶⁷ Shikaki, K., “Peace Now or Hamas Later”, *Foreign Affairs*, (77), no. 4, p. 32.
²⁶⁸ Lodge, M., Steenbergen, M. and Brau, S., “The Responsive voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation”, *American Political Science Review*, (89), no. 2, June 1995, p. 321.

of male voters respond that they knew the agendas of the candidates, compared to only 66.0% of female voters; nearly twice the amount of female voters, 27.7%, said that they were not familiar with the campaign slogans, compared to only 14.8% of male voters.

Figure 7:

Knowledge by the Electorate of the slogans/campaign slogans of the Candidates
According to Gender



This does not necessarily mean that male voters were more responsible voters. The fact that women were less familiar with campaign slogans than men is partly a result of women not being able or not being allowed to attend campaign rallies or meetings. When the JMCC asked in an opinion poll, conducted in February 1996,²⁶⁹ whether people had participated in any campaign rallies or meetings, only 29.0% of the interviewees replied positively. As illustrated in figure 8 below, 41.3% of these were men and only 18.1% were women.

²⁶⁹ JMCC, Public Opinion Polls, February 1996 poll.

Figure 8:²⁷⁰





Figure 8, above, also indicates that, in total, 68.7% of the surveyed people did not participate in any campaign rallies or meeting. Of those, again, women responded more frequently than men that they did not participate in campaign rallies. Of the interviewed men, 56.3% responded that they did not participate in any campaign meetings, whereas 79.6% of the women admitted that they did not take part in any rallies or meetings. Figure 9 below, explains more about the reasons for not participating in such rallies.²⁷¹ As illustrated, women replied three times more frequently than men that they did not take part in any campaign activities because they were not allowed to participate in mixed meetings. Moreover, 55.3% of those men who did not participate in campaign rallies referred to disinterest in such activities, compared to only 40.0% of women. With those results in mind, it seems fair to conclude that the superior knowledge by men of campaign slogans, as illustrated in figure 7 above, was not resulting from a greater disinterest in the campaign by

²⁷⁰ The data illustrated in figure 8 were compiled from information in: JMCC, Public Opinion Polls, February 1996 poll.

women, but rather was the result of social constraints, which made it much harder for women than men to participate in campaign activities, and, therefore, to acquire information about the content of the candidates' campaigns.

Figure 9:



Source: JMCC, February 1996

Table 5 below, illustrates a repetition of a trend found in some of the tables on voter turnout in previous sections of this thesis, in that, again, the more educated youth seemed to have a greater knowledge of the campaign slogans of the candidates than older and less educated people.

Table 5: When voting, did you know the agenda/campaign slogans of the candidates?

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=70	Up to Prep. N=142	Up to Sec. N=255	Some College N=205	College & above N=78	18-25 N=241	26-35 N=235	36-45 N=145	46-55 N=73	55+ N=30
Yes	54.3%	61.3%	74.5%	84.9%	87.2%	78.8%	72.8%	78.6%	64.4%	53.3%
No	42.9%	29.6%	20.4%	11.7%	10.3%	16.2%	23.0%	20.7%	30.1%	30.0%
No answer	2.9%	9.2%	5.1%	3.4%	2.6%	5.0%	4.3%	0.7%	5.5%	16.7%
df	15					15				
Chi square	.0000					.0000				

²⁷¹ JMCC, *Public Opinion Polls*, February 1996 poll.

The results in table 5 above, help to strengthen arguments made by the researcher earlier in section 1.1.3. of this thesis. More younger than older respondents knew the campaign slogans, and were, therefore, more inclined and better equipped to vote responsibly. Furthermore, table 5 reveals that more interviewees with higher education knew the candidates' agenda than lower educated respondents. In the researcher's view, these results are again compatible with those found in section 1.1.3., where the researcher ascertained that the more educated people who chose not to vote, did so mainly because they did not find a candidate for whom they were prepared to cast their vote. Higher educated respondents were more familiar with the agenda of the election candidates, leading them to become more critical of those candidates than less educated respondents, and making them less inclined to vote for any of the candidates running.

Table 6 below, further reinforces the argument about the influence of education upon voting behaviour and campaigning, in that, again, the higher educated Palestinian attached more importance to campaigning in the run up to the January 1996 elections than the less educated interviewees.

Table 6: How important was the campaign, when you cast your vote?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=772	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	37.2%	32.9%	29.6%	37.3%	42.4%	43.6%
Important	32.3%	20.0%	35.2%	35.3%	34.6%	25.6%
Somewhat important	14.0%	12.9%	18.3%	13.7%	10.2%	17.9%
Not important	13.2%	21.4%	15.5%	12.5%	8.8%	10.3%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%	0.4%	3.4%	-
No answer	1.9%	11.4%	-	0.8%	0.5%	2.6%
df		25				
Chi square		.0000				

2.1.6. Important Factors when Voting

The survey respondents who voted in the January 1996 Palestinian elections were asked to determine the importance or influence of 13 factors on their voting behaviour. Below, figure 10 ranks the factors according to their importance. The indicated percentage is the sum of the answers of interviewees who said that a certain characteristic of candidates was “very important” or “important” in influencing their voting behaviour.

Figure 10:
Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections
According to the General Public

	Important
Education	92.8%
Reputation	91.5%
Struggle history	89.5%
Democratic values	88.3%
Political affiliation	70.4%
Campaign	69.5%
Religion	64.7%
Religious values	60.8%
Socio-economic status	45.9%
Family relations	43.4%
Residence	43.3%
Gender	32.7%
Age	30.6%

The 13 factors above in figure 10, portray the results of the total sample of the survey. As is the case with other questions in the popular survey conducted by the researcher, the answers by the interviewees have, in addition, also been classified according to gender, area, refugee status, education and age.²⁷² Below, the researcher will clarify for each of the

²⁷² For full results of the popular survey, see Annex 5 of this thesis.

13 factors summarised in figure 10 above, whether or not they were of greater or lesser importance for certain demographic subgroups.

Before going into further detail below, it is worth noting that there was a general agreement amongst the surveyed people concerning the degree of importance of (1) education, (2) reputation, (3) struggle history, (4) political affiliation and (5) socio-economic status, no matter what demographic subgroup they belong to. The importance of these findings lies in the fact that the surveyed people who voted, agreed on the importance of the three highest ranked factors, namely the education, reputation, and struggle history of the candidates. On some other factors, opinions were more divided, whether it was according to age, area, education, gender or refugee status.


2.1.6.1. Education

As indicated above in figure 10, education was the most important factor influencing voting behaviour in the 1996 elections. The educational background of the candidates in the elections was of high importance for all categories of voters. As a result of the great importance accorded by people to the level of education of the election candidates, the majority of the Council members are highly educated. Figure 11, below, shows that, thirteen of the 88 Council members carry Ph.D.s, eight have a Masters degree, one has a Diploma, whilst 54 Council members completed Bachelor's degrees.²⁷³ In other words, 76 out of the 88 Council members have at least one university degree.

²⁷³ JMCC, The Palestinian Council, p. 223.

Figure 11:

Educational Background of the Council Members



2.1.6.2. Democratic Values

The importance of adherence to democratic values by a candidate was far more important for the more educated people than for those with less education. This is again an indicator of the apparent trend that the more educated people were more responsible voters, in the sense that their choice of candidates was based on the intrinsic values of the candidates rather than on more traditional values.

Table 7: How important were democratic values when you cast your vote?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=772	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	59.8%	41.4%	51.4%	60.8%	66.8%	74.4%
Important	28.5%	32.9%	39.4%	27.1%	24.9%	15.5%
Somewhat important	6.7%	10.0%	4.9%	8.2%	4.4%	7.7%
Not important	2.2%	7.1%	1.4%	2.0%	2.4%	-
Absolutely not important	0.8%	-	1.4%	0.8%	1.0%	-
No answer	1.9%	8.6%	1.4%	1.2%	0.5%	2.6%
df		25				
Chi square		.0000				

2.1.6.3. Religion and Religious Values

Before going into detail about the influence of religion and religious values of candidates on voting behaviour, it is necessary to clarify the distinction between those two terms. By asking about the importance of “religion” of the candidates, the researcher aimed to verify how important the knowledge was for the surveyed voters that certain candidates were Christian or Muslim. With the term “religious values”, the researcher aimed to check the importance for the interviewed voters of knowing that the election candidates adhered to the religious practices of their specific religion. In this manner, the researcher attempted to verify, for example, whether or not voters would cast their votes for Muslim candidates who drank alcohol, and thus, did not strictly adhere to the teachings of their religion.

Whilst it became clear above in section 2.6.6.1. that with regard to education there was a clear trend and general agreement amongst various sectors of the sample concerning its importance, no similar consistencies appeared concerning the issues of religion and religious values. As tables 8 and 9, below, indicate, religion and religious values were more important for women than for men, and they were more important for refugees than non-refugees. Moreover, in the Gaza Strip, the importance of religious values and religion prevailed more than in the West Bank. These findings are consistent with those discussed earlier concerning voting behaviour in the Gaza Strip. As was indicated in section 1.1.4, respondents in the Gaza Strip voted more often for Hamas than their counterparts in the West Bank, which corresponds to the greater adherence to religion and religious values found in the Gaza Strip.

Table 8: How important was religion when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
	N=772	Male N=391	Female N=376	West Bank N=453	Gaza N=319	Non-refugee N=397	Refugee N=355
Very important	39.4%	32.0%	46.8%	29.4%	53.6%	33.2%	47.3%
Important	25.3%	27.4%	23.4%	23.8%	27.3%	26.2%	24.2%
Somewhat important	11.9%	14.3%	9.3%	14.6%	8.2%	13.9%	9.0%
Not important	19.3%	22.0%	16.5%	26.3%	9.4%	22.2%	16.1%
Absolutely not important	2.5%	2.8%	2.1%	4.0%	0.3%	2.8%	1.7%
No answer	1.7%	1.5%	1.9%	2.0%	1.3%	1.8%	1.7%
<i>df</i>		10		5		10	
<i>Chi square</i>		.0164		.0000		.0018	

Table 9: How important were religious values when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
	N=772	Male N=391	Female N=376	West Bank N=453	Gaza N=319	Non-refugee N=397	Refugee N=355
Very important	34.2%	29.9%	38.6%	25.2%	47.0%	28.7%	41.1%
Important	26.6%	24.3%	29.0%	23.6%	30.7%	27.7%	26.2%
Somewhat important	16.3%	17.1%	15.4%	20.3%	10.7%	17.6%	14.4%
Not important	18.1%	22.8%	13.3%	24.1%	9.7%	19.9%	15.5%
Absolutely not important	2.3%	3.3%	1.3%	4.0%	-	2.8%	1.4%
No answer	2.5%	2.6%	2.4%	2.9%	1.9%	3.3%	1.4%
<i>df</i>		10		5		10	
<i>Chi square</i>		.0365		.0000		.0021	

2.1.6.4. Residence (locality)

Before entering into specifics about the influence of residence upon voting behaviour, it is essential to briefly outline what is meant by this factor. By asking the surveyed voter about the importance of residence of the election candidates, the researcher aimed to measure whether or not the locality where candidates lived, was important in determining voting behaviour. More specifically, the researcher attempted to check whether or not it was an issue for voters that candidates were, for example, city dwellers or camp residents, locals or returnees.

Although, in general, the factor of residence did not have a very significant influence on voting behaviour²⁷⁴, it is important to indicate the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the influence of residence on voting behaviour and the demographic subgroups of gender and refugee status. As shown in table 10 below, the factor of residence remained more important amongst refugees than amongst non-refugees. Also, surveyed women attached greater value to residence than men.

Table 10: How important was residence when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Refugee or Not	
	N=772	Male N=391	Female N=376	Non-refugee N=397	Refugee N=355
Very important	19.7%	17.1%	22.6%	15.1%	25.4%
Important	23.6%	21.2%	26.3%	24.2%	22.8%
Somewhat important	19.4%	19.9%	18.9%	23.2%	15.8%
Not important	32.5%	36.1%	28.5%	33.0%	31.3%
Absolutely not important	2.6%	3.3%	1.6%	2.3%	2.8%
No answer	2.2%	2.3%	2.1%	2.3%	2.0%
<i>df</i>		10		10	
<i>Chi square</i>		.0280		.0294	

The results in table 10 above can be explained as follows. It is the researcher's belief that the greater importance attached by women to the residence of the candidates they voted for is a result of the often persistent traditional beliefs in Palestinian society and the social constraints placed upon women. It was, for example, shown earlier in section 1.1.5., that women knew less about the campaign slogans of the candidates because they were not allowed to participate in mixed campaign meetings. Also, in many cases, the women's role remained centred around the family and home life. It is, therefore, understandable that, when voting, more women than men relied on the one thing which they did know and could verify, namely whether or not the candidate lived and was respected in their locality.

²⁷⁴ As became clear from figure 10 above.

It is also not surprising that the factor of residence of the election candidates remained more important for refugees than non-refugees. Refugee camps remained a much closer community than the Palestinian towns and cities. Camp residents know each other better and have one main factor in common: their living conditions are much lower than those of non-refugees and they feel deprived compared to non-refugees. For refugees, therefore, it was much more important than for non-refugees to know the residence of the election candidates. It was crucial for them to know whether or not the election candidates shared their locality as they felt that one of their own could understand and represent their needs better than an "outsider".


2.1.6.5. Gender

The importance attached to the gender of election candidates varied in Palestinian society, depending on whether the respondents resided in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. As becomes clear from figure 12, below, the gender of the election candidates was more of an issue in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. This may be explained by the more traditional nature of Gazan society. Gazan residents continued to see the role of men as the main breadwinners and that of women primarily as homemakers rather than successful Council members.

Figure 12:

Importance of Gender of Candidates in January 1996 Elections

According to Area



At this stage, it is worth noting the success-story of Palestinian female candidates in the first national elections. Five women out of a total of 88 Council members were elected to the Legislative Council, taking about 5.7% of the Council seats. This is a relatively high success rate for women when compared to the number of women in parliaments in other countries in the region. In the 1996 elections in Jordan, for example, not one single woman managed to win a seat. Council member Marwan Bargouthi, who is also the secretary-general of Fatah in the West Bank, has stressed the significance of this aspect as follows to the researcher:

"...a very important group of Palestinians respect women and are ready to elect women. They are different from the people in other Arab societies. Most of the Arab parliaments don't have women. For the first time in Jordan, they elected one woman, four years ago. But, amongst Palestinians five women were elected. In the Israeli Knesset, they have nine women out of 120 (Knesset members). So, if you


compare the number of 5 to 88, to 9 to 120 in Israel, I think it is a positive point for the Palestinians. ²⁷⁵

As figure 13, below, illustrates, the success rate of female candidates in the 1996 elections was comparatively higher than the success rate of male candidates. About 19.2% of female candidates were successful, compared to only 12.8% of the male candidates. Moreover, out of the five female Council members, two also became ministers. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi (Jerusalem) became Minister of Higher Education, and Intisar al-Wazir (Gaza city) was appointed Minister of Social Affairs.

Figure 13:

Comparison Between the Number of Candidates and Winners

According to Gender



Finally, it is necessary to note that three out of the five female winners were from the Gaza Strip, which might seem surprising given what the researcher mentioned above about Gazans remaining more traditional in their thinking. It is, therefore, essential to point out that the three female winners in the Gaza Strip had two important advantages in common:

²⁷⁵ The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on 19 September 1997.

(1) all three women ran on the Fatah list, and (2) all three female winners owed a major share of their good reputation to the respect of the Gazan electorate for members of their families. More specifically: (1) Rawya Shawwa (Gaza city) was the daughter of the former mayor of Gaza city, and was the wife of the current mayor; (2) Intisar al-Wazir's (Gaza city) late husband was Abu Jihad, one of the most respected Palestinian leaders; and (3) Jamileh Saydam's (Deir al-Balah) late husband was martyred.

2.1.6.6. Age

According to the survey results, the factor of age of the election candidates was the least important factor influencing the Palestinian voter. In general, all demographic subgroups attached similar low value to this factor. What is noteworthy, however, is that the more educated respondents gave even less importance to the age factor than less educated Palestinians. This again fits in the pattern which emerged from the previous tables, in that the more educated people thought and voted more rationally²⁷⁶ and less according to a more traditional set of beliefs than the less educated people.

Table 11: How important was age when you cast your vote?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=772	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	11.7%	14.3%	8.5%	13.7%	12.2%	9.0%
Important	18.9%	12.9%	16.9%	25.1%	18.0%	11.5%
Somewhat important	19.6%	11.4%	26.1%	17.3%	20.5%	21.8%
Not important	43.9%	42.9%	45.8%	41.2%	42.9%	51.3%
Absolutely not important	3.8%	8.6%	1.4%	2.0%	4.9%	3.8%
No answer	2.2%	10.0%	1.4%	0.8%	1.5%	2.6%
df		25				
Chi Square		.0001				

²⁷⁶ The term 'rational' was defined for the purpose of the thesis in Chapter One.

The assessment that age was not a very important factor and that people did not necessarily vote for older people, who are traditionally considered as being wiser, is also reflected in the relative youth of the Council members. The average age of the Council members is about 50, which is young considering that in traditional societies, older people hold the leadership.

2.1.7. Satisfaction with the Legislative Council

The people who voted in the first national elections were asked about their level of satisfaction with those candidates who made it to the Legislative Council, and for whom they themselves had voted. As indicated in table 12, below, a trend appeared, whereby interviewees with less education were more satisfied with those they voted into the Council than interviewees with a higher level of education. One can thus deduce that the higher educated respondents were more critical of the performance of the Council members than less educated Palestinians. Further details on the satisfaction of the Palestinian electorate with the Legislative Council will be provided in Chapter Three of this thesis.

Table 12: Of those who made it to the Council and whom you yourself have voted for, are you satisfied, somewhat satisfied or dissatisfied with them?

	Total	Education				
		Up to	Up to	Up to	Some	College &
	N=772	Elem.	Prep.	Sec.	College	above
		N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Satisfied	15.9%	31.4%	16.2%	17.3%	9.8%	11.5%
Somewhat satisfied	45.6%	32.9%	40.1%	45.1%	53.2%	48.7%
Dissatisfied	27.7%	22.9%	34.5%	26.7%	25.9%	30.8%
None made it to the PLC	7.9%	4.3%	7.7%	9.0%	7.8%	9.0%
No answer	2.8%	8.6%	1.4%	2.0%	3.4%	-
df		20				
Chi Square		.0010				

2.1.8. Expectations

Asking people whether the election results met their expectations is another way of measuring their level of satisfaction with the Legislative Council. The answers to this question seem at first inconsistent with the trends which started to appear above. Higher educated people answered far more often that the election results met or somewhat met their expectations than less educated Palestinians. Moreover, nearly twice as many young respondents answered that the election results met or somewhat met their expectations than respondents aged 55 and older. Keeping in mind the findings earlier in this Chapter, such as the scepticism of the more educated voters, their higher efficacy when casting their vote, and their higher dissatisfaction with the candidates who made it to the Legislative Council, the answers to the current question seem only logical when one acknowledges that the fulfilment of expectations is not necessarily positive, but could also imply negativity. In other words, the high percentage of more educated and younger Palestinians answering positively to the question of whether the election results met their expectations, should be interpreted as an expression of their scepticism and disappointment with the current situation. As Ghassan Khattib, political analyst and Director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre commented on these results:

'The higher percentage of educated and young people who said that the election results met their expectations should be put into context. Hereby, it is necessary to establish a link between evaluation and expectations. Even prior the elections, the higher educated in Palestinian society were more sceptical in their expectations about the elections, leading them to be more critical in their evaluation of the election results. As a result of their critical evaluation the election results did meet their expectations. The sceptical viewpoints of the young and educated before the elections corresponded with the election results and, therefore, met

*their expectations. The results on this question point to a complex argument expected from educated people.*²⁷⁷

Table 13a: Did the election results meet your expectations?

	Total	Age				
	N=1195	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Met my expectations	19.5%	17.9%	18.3%	23.6%	25.7%	16.7%
Somewhat met my expectations	37.7%	41.7%	39.3%	30.0%	37.1%	16.7%
Did not meet my expectations	28.3%	26.4%	29.0%	36.9%	21.0%	31.8%
No answer	14.5%	14.0%	13.4%	9.4%	16.2%	34.8%
df		15				
Chi Square		.0000				

Table 13b: Did the election results meet your expectations?

	Education				
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115
Met my expectations	18.5%	16.7%	19.8%	20.1%	25.2%
Somewhat met my expectations	22.7%	29.0%	37.6%	47.8%	43.5%
Did not meet my expectations	29.4%	37.1%	31.2%	22.0%	20.9%
No answer	29.4%	17.2%	11.3%	10.2%	10.4%
df	15				
Chi Square	.0000				

In short, the results of tables 13a and 13b above can be explained as follows. In general, in spite of the public's understanding of the restrictions²⁷⁸ imposed on the Legislative Council, they were disappointed with it and evaluated it rather harshly. There are various reasons behind this harsh evaluation:

1. There is a tendency of electorates to criticise newly established legislatures because of their dissatisfaction with the regime itself. As Mishler and Rose argued:

*"Although popular support may contribute to the support for the democratic regime, it is equally plausible that generalised support for the regime influences the popular standing of the legislature."*²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ The interview with Ghassan Khatib was conducted in Jerusalem on 7 July 1999.

²⁷⁸ The restrictions imposed on the good performance of the Legislative Council will be discussed in detail in some of the following chapters.

²⁷⁹ Mishler and Rose, "Support for Parliaments and Regimes...", p. 7.

2. Possibly, the electorate felt that the Council members carry a responsibility towards them as it was the public who brought them to power. As a result of the high voter turnout in the elections, the Palestinian electorate felt that the composition and popular legitimacy of the Legislative Council stems from their vote. The electorate, therefore, felt that it has the right to criticise the relative ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council, more so than the mismanagement and inefficiency of other Palestinian Authority institutions.
3. The Legislative Council encompasses a large number of members of the Executive Authority and also a large number (33%) of returnees. The fact that a lot of members of the Executive Authority are also members of the Legislative Council has been subject to heavy criticism from the Palestinian public. One of the tasks of the Legislative Council is to scrutinise the policies of the Executive Authority. The presence in the Legislative Council of such a large number of members of the Executive Authority makes this task very difficult and this does not escape the public eye. Moreover, there exists an increasing dislike amongst the public for returnees. According to an opinion poll conducted by JMCC in May 1997, 46.8% of the respondents said that the return of the returnees was worse than they expected. Only 9.5% said that their return was better than they expected.
4. The relative transparency of the Legislative Council compared to the Executive Authority and other official institutions, renders it more susceptible to criticism.
5. The restrictions imposed on the Legislative Council by not only the Executive Authority, but also the Oslo agreements and the Israeli government leaves the public

increasingly sceptical as to whether the Legislative Council has sufficient room to manoeuvre in order to fulfil the expectations of the electorate.

The points briefly touched on, above, will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapters of this thesis.

2.1.9. Perceptions of the Level of Rationality and Responsibility in Voting

According to Jeffery Mondak, an electoral system that operates with an eye toward quality is an electoral system guided by a collective sense of rationality.²⁸⁰ As discussed before in Chapter One, this view of rationality and responsibility has been utilised extensively by scholars, both by those emphasising the empirical approach and those adhering to the behavioural approach. Many argued that the level of rationality of voters influences the legislative process. As Austen-Smith and Banks wrote:

*“Rational voters will take into account the subsequent legislative game in making their decisions at the electoral stage of the process. In turn, rational candidates will take account of such deliberations in selecting their electoral strategy and subsequent legislative behaviour conditional on electoral success.”*²⁸¹

When examining the first Palestinian elections in this section based upon the results of a public opinion poll, we found that the major differences in voting behaviour between the different subgroups depended on variables such as gender, area, refugee status or age. The most striking differences, however, appeared when examining voting behaviour of less

²⁸⁰ Mondak, J.J., “Competence, Integrity, and the Electoral Success of Congressional Incumbents”, The Journal of Politics, (57), No. 4, November 1995, p. 1066.

educated Palestinians and those with a higher level of education. We assumed that rationality in voting behaviour increased parallel to education. The data below affirm this assumption. When we asked people whether they thought people in general voted rationally and responsibly, the less educated Palestinian thought so more than the higher educated Palestinian. This seems to indicate that the higher educated respondents were more critical when casting their votes and better understood the responsibility of the electorate when voting representatives into office. They follow up and evaluate the Legislative Council, and are prepared not to only put the blame with the Council members or the Palestinian Authority for their average performance, but also the electorate who was responsible for electing these representatives into the Legislative Council.

Table 14: Do you think people voted rationally or irrationally?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Rationally	44.6%	53.8%	45.7%	46.1%	40.4%	39.1%
Irrationally	43.8%	34.5%	38.5%	44.3%	49.0%	48.7%
No answer	11.6%	11.8%	15.8%	9.5%	10.5%	12.2%
df		10				
Chi Square		.0774				
		282				

Table 15: Do you think people voted responsibly or irresponsibly?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Responsible	55.6%	57.1%	63.3%	59.0%	47.5%	47.5%
Irresponsibly	33.2%	30.3%	25.8%	31.7%	37.6%	45.2%
No answer	11.2%	12.6%	10.9%	9.3%	15.0%	7.0%
df		10				
Chi Square		.0025				

²⁸¹ Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J., "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes", American Political Science Review, (82), No. 2, June 1988, p. 405.

²⁸² This result is statistically significant at 90% rather than at 95%, as Chi Square is higher than '.05'.

2.2. PART TWO: THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1996 AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS

According to Lucian Pye (1964), the central cause of political instability in transitional societies is the lack of an effective relation between the ruling elite and their peoples. It is the contention of the researcher that an essential part of establishing or maintaining 'an effective relationship' between the elite and the population consists of the elite's ability to gather and take into account information about the needs and behaviour of its constituents. It is for this reason that the researcher deemed it necessary to put before the Council members some of the same questions asked to the electorate about the Palestinian elections of 1996. Besides allowing for a more complete picture of the first Palestinian national elections, Part Two of this chapter will, in addition, allow for an assessment of where, if any, disparities exist between the Palestinian public and its representatives.

The following questions were put before the Council members: What do Council members think were important factors influencing people to vote for a certain candidate or not? How do Council members evaluate the Palestinian electorate? Do they feel that Palestinian voter behaviour was rational or irrational? Was it responsible or irresponsible? To what extent do Council members feel that they have lived up to their promises? How does their estimation correspond with the public's evaluation of this issue?

It should be noted that in none of the studies consulted by the researcher both the public and the parliamentarians were systematically and simultaneously polled as is the case in this

research. As such, comparison is very difficult and the use of literature as a reference is not applicable.

2.2.1. Important Factors in Voting

The Council members were asked to determine the influence of 13 factors upon the voting behaviour of the electorate. The 13 factors are the same factors as those used in the public opinion poll to evaluate the importance of certain influences upon the voting behaviour of the electorate. The percentage in figure 14 labelled “total”, is the sum of the answers of Council members who responded that a certain factor was “very important” or “important”. Figure 15 is a duplicate of figure 9 in section 2.1.6. It is reprinted here to clarify the differences in opinions between the general public and Council members concerning the importance of certain factors that influenced people when casting their votes in the January 1996 elections.

Figure 14:
Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections
According to the Council Members

	Total	Very important	Important
Struggle history	88.4%	55.8%	32.6%
Reputation	83.7%	62.8%	20.9%
Education	74.5%	23.3%	51.2%
Religious values	65.1%	16.3%	48.8%
Political affiliation	60.5%	25.6%	34.9%
Democratic values	55.8%	30.2%	25.6%
Campaign	51.2%	16.3%	34.9%
Family relations	51.2%	18.6%	32.6%
Gender	48.9%	14.0%	34.9%
Socio-economic status	41.9%	9.3%	32.6%
Religion	37.3%	14.0%	23.3%
Residence	34.9%	2.3%	32.6%
Age	25.6%	2.3%	23.3%

Figure 15: Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections
 According to the General Public

	Important	
Education	92.8%	
Reputation	91.5%	
Struggle history	89.5%	
Democratic values	88.3%	
Political affiliation	70.4%	
Campaign	69.5%	
Religion	64.7%	
Religious values	60.8%	
Socio-economic status	45.9%	
Family relations	43.4%	
Residence	43.3%	
Gender	32.7%	
Age	30.6%	

In general, the Council members know how people cast their votes in the last elections. The general public ranked education, reputation and struggle history as the three most important factors influencing their voting behaviour, and so did the Council members, albeit in a different order. The Council members ranked struggle history as the most important factor influencing the popular vote, whilst ranking education as the third most important factor.

In some instances, Council members did not realise how important some factors were for the Palestinian electorate when voting. For, example, the electorate ranks “democratic values” fourth, with 88.3%, whilst the Council members only placed it sixth in importance, with 55.8%. Moreover, whilst Council members overestimated the importance of religious values in influencing Palestinian voters, they underestimated the importance of religion. Council members also thought gender was more of an issue for the public. 48.9% of the

Council members believed gender was an important factor influencing the popular vote, compared with only 32.7% of the electorate.

It is possible to conclude that in general and on the most important factors influencing the vote in the 1996 elections, the Council members and the general public agreed. On other issues, however, some discrepancies were found in what the general public said were important factors influencing their vote, and what the Council members thought were important factors when the electorate cast its vote.

2.2.2. Perceptions of the Level of Rationality and Responsibility of the Palestinian Electorate in Voting

In order to provide an explanation of the results shown in tables 16 and 17, below, on the level of rationality and responsibility of the Palestinian voter, in the opinion of the Council members, some calculations are in order.

Table 16: *On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very rational and 10 being very irrational, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?*

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	5	11.6%
3	14	32.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	12	27.9%
6	-	-
7	3	7.0%
8	-	-
9	-	-
10	-	-

Table 17: On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very responsible and 10 being very irresponsible, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	7	16.3%
3	10	23.3%
4	9	20.9%
5	4	9.3%
6	2	4.7%
7	6	14.0%
8	1	2.3%
9	-	-
10	-	-

The material in tables 16 and 17, above, needs to be presented in a manner where direct comparison is possible between the perceptions of the Council members and the electorate. This will be done by multiplying the value labels (see tables 16 and 17) by the frequency of the responses to each. The value labels were ranked 1 to 10, with 1 representing the most positive evaluation. The total of the value labels multiplied by the response frequencies will then be divided by the number of respondents, so as to attain an average.

It may be suggested that the value labels can be given the description illustrated in table 18, below.

Table 18:

#	Codes
1 & 2	very responsible/ very rational
3 & 4	moderately responsible/ moderately rational
5 & 6	neither
7 & 8	moderately irresponsible/moderately irrational
9 & 10	very irresponsible/very irrational

Perceptions concerning the level of rationality (table 16), on this basis, may be presented as

follows:

- ◆ $(1 \times 4) + (2 \times 5) + (3 \times 14) + (4 \times 5) + (5 \times 12) + (7 \times 3)$
- ◆ $= 4 + 10 + 42 + 20 + 60 + 21$
- ◆ $= 157$
- ◆ $157 : (N=43) = 3.65$
- ◆ Result: The Council members evaluate the Palestinian voter during the last elections positively at the rate of 3.65, which can be translated as moderately rational.
- ◆ Perceptions concerning the level of responsibility (table 17) may be presented as follows:
 - ◆ $(1 \times 4) + (2 \times 7) + (3 \times 10) + (4 \times 9) + (5 \times 4) + (6 \times 2) + (7 \times 6) + (8 \times 1)$
 - ◆ $= 4 + 14 + 30 + 36 + 20 + 12 + 42 + 8$
 - ◆ $= 166$
 - ◆ $166 : (N=43) = 3.86$
 - ◆ Result: The Council members evaluate the Palestinian voter during the last elections positively at the rate of 3.86, which can be translated as moderately responsible.

As shown above, in the minds of the Council members, the Palestinian voter passed the test on rational and responsible voter behaviour rather well. When compared with the results of the public opinion poll on the level of rationality and responsibility in voting²⁸³, we can deduce that the Council members rated the rationality and responsibility of the voter higher

²⁸³ See tables 14 and 15 in section 2.1.9 in Part One of this Chapter.

than the public itself did. It will be recalled that only 44.6% of the respondents in the public survey thought that people voted rationally, whilst 55.6% of the respondents thought that the electorate voted responsibly.

In order to perform a further check on the opinions of the general public and the Council members concerning the level of rationality and responsibility of the Palestinian electorate, both the electorate and the Council members were asked whether, in their opinion, people 'knew how to vote for the right candidate'.


Table 19 shows that the responses of the interviewees in the general survey were rather harsh. Only 23.5% of the respondents felt that people knew how to vote for the right candidate. Moreover, trends similar to those detected earlier in Part One of this Chapter, re-appear. Again, higher educated respondents were more sceptical than the less educated respondents. Whereas 35.3% of the interviewees who received up to elementary schooling answered that, in general, people knew how to vote for the right candidate, only 17.4% of the interviewees who went to college and above did.

Table 19: Do you think, in general, people know how to vote for the right candidate?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Yes	23.5%	35.3%	27.6%	22.4%	18.8%	17.4%
Some	51.8%	44.5%	48.4%	54.1%	54.5%	54.8%
No	20.0%	13.4%	20.4%	20.1%	21.0%	24.3%
No answer	4.7%	6.7%	3.6%	3.4%	5.7%	3.5%
<i>df</i>		15				
<i>Chi Square</i>		.00527				

Figure 16 below indicates that, in general, Council members have a better opinion of the people's ability to vote for the right candidate than the electorate itself does. Amongst the public, only 23.5% felt positively about the people's knowledge of how to vote for the right candidate, compared to 32.6% of the Council members. Moreover, 20% of the interviewees in the public opinion poll answered that people do not know how to vote for the right candidate; only 2.3% of the Council members did so.

Figure 16:



It may be suggested that part of the reason why the Council members evaluated the electorate's ability to vote for the right candidate more positively than the public itself, is because the Council members are in office as a result of this vote. A more positive result from the Council members on this question was, therefore, to be expected.

2.2.3. Promises and Campaign Slogans

This section is concerned with the promises and campaign slogans of the Council members during the 1996 elections. Based on the information gathered by the researcher of this study in a public opinion poll and a survey conducted within the Legislative Council, the issue of campaign promises will be addressed by examining the results of the following evaluations.

- (1) An evaluation by the Council members on whether or not Council members, in general, lived up to the promises made during their campaigns.
- (2) An evaluation by the Council members on whether or not they themselves, as individuals, lived up to their campaign slogans.
- (3) A public evaluation of whether or not the Council members lived up to their promises.

Before concentrating on the three evaluations introduced above, the researcher considered it useful to provide a summary of the campaign promises made by successful candidates. The information provided in table 22, below, is a summary of a survey conducted by the JMCC in October 1996²⁸⁴, whereby Council members were asked to list their five priorities or campaign promises. It should be noted, however, that out of the 88 Council members, 26 members failed to provide a list with their priorities. The purpose of the summary provided in table 22, therefore, is to give a general idea of the Council members' promises as a

²⁸⁴ JMCC, The Palestinian Council.

source of information. It does, however, not fully represent the promises of all successful candidates.

Table 20:

Promises & campaign slogans	#
1. Establishing and uniform laws, encouraging social justice, rule of law, separation of powers, and good administration; activate the Legislative Council; consolidate parliamentary life; issue Council by-laws	32
2. Social and economic development; independent national economy; investment encouragement	31
3. Democracy	23
4. Upgrading education	22
5. Women's rights, equality	17
6. Health care; health insurance	16
7. Fight corruption; curtail favouritism	15
8. Human rights	14
9. Institution-building	13
10. National unity; national integration; conciliation between political forces & Authority	12
11. Improved infrastructure	10
12. Reduce unemployment; create job opportunities	10
13. Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; strengthen Palestinian presence in Jerusalem	7
14. Freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of press	7
15. Rural development; opportunities in agricultural & border areas	7
16. Continue process of national independence and the implementation of the agreements with Israel; achieve a better future and state	6
17. Environment	6
18. Development of cultural dimensions	6
19. Continue and follow-up with the peace process and the final status negotiations	5
20. Solve the housing problem; improve living conditions; provide secured accommodation for all; reduce high prices of renting & housing	5
21. End settlements and by-pass roads	5
22. Strengthen regional & international relations	5
23. Release prisoners & detainees	5
24. Solve the refugee problem	4
25. Monitor the PA	4
26. Youth & development	4
27. Independent judiciary	3
28. Co-ordination between the different security apparatuses	3
29. Water	3
30. Development for poor, martyrs' families, and wounded	3
31. Increase of wages	3
32. Care for needs of childhood	2
33. Development of tax systems	2
34. National programs to link the West Bank with the Gaza Strip; safe passage	2
35. Create independent sources of energy	2
36. Upgrade the performance of the negotiators	2
37. Establish free industrial zones	2
38. Create an environment of security & stability	2
39. Others (Establish Ministry of Prisoners, Martyrs & Wounded; encourage co-operative & non-governmental activities; remove settlers inside Hebron; passports for the Diaspora Palestinians; compliance with Islam; include Samaritan community; end Israeli occupation; establish a multi-party system; role of the mosques in society, etc.)	14

When Council members were asked if, in general, Council members had lived up to their promises, only 14.0% answered positively, compared to 23.3% who gave negative answers. However, when Council members were asked whether they themselves, as individuals, thought they had lived up to their campaign slogans, 41.9% answered positively compared to only 7.0% negatively. Therefore, it seems safe to say that the Council members consider their own individual performance in this more favourably than that of their colleagues. Significantly, though, the ranking of the Council members' own performance is also relatively low.

Figure 17:




Figure 17, above, shows that a high number of Council members felt that the Council in general and even they themselves personally, had only lived up to their campaign slogans to “some extent”. Perhaps one of the reasons causing so many Council members to feel that they only lived up to their campaign slogans to a certain extent could be interpreted in an

apologetic manner. Council members might in some cases have wanted to live up to their promises, but might have found obstacles on their way.²⁸⁵ Dr. Nabil Shaath, Council member and Minister of Planning and International Trade, explained to the researcher what happened to him in his constituency of Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip:

*"I remember, I was in the unique position of being the Minister of Planning and International Co-operation when I ran for the elections. ... I signed the contract [for the building of the harbour] and President Chirac came to inaugurate the port which is only about 10 kilometres to the north of Khan Younis. I knew it was going to employ 3,000 people. So, I told them [his Khan Younis constituency] that I was sure that out of these 3,000 people at least 2,000 will come from your community. So, not only will you be building a port that will open up your roads to freedom, but you will be employed for the next two years building it. Where is the port? I was not able to achieve it. Where is the harbour? Not even one stone has been put to build it. ... Is it because I failed as a Minister or as a member of the Parliament? ... Before the Council's first meeting, the bombs started ticking and two months later, Netanyahu came ticking, so the entire Authority has not delivered anything. In fact, we have nothing but retracts, we are going back all the time. The sieges are worse, the closures are more horrible, Israel's settlement policies are expanding ten-fold. So, if you want to relate this to the failure of the Council, it has failed miserably! It was not able to achieve anything! This is what they call spurious correlation. I mean, when you correlate, let's say, over ten years the price of whiskey in New York and the salary of clergymen in Cuba. They will correlate, but they have nothing to do with each other."*²⁸⁶


The popular evaluation of whether or not the Council members lived up to their campaign promises was negative. As illustrated in figure 16 below, overall, the Palestinian electorate did not think very highly of Council members with regard to the latter living up to their promises. Only 12.9% of the interviewees responded that the Council members had kept their promises compared to 62.2% who answered that the Council members did not adhere to their promises. It should be mentioned, however, that the interviewees in the public

²⁸⁵ Further evidence of the difficulties the Council members are facing and the reasons behind the lack of optimal performance of the Legislative Council will be provided and discussed in greater depth in the following chapters of this thesis.

²⁸⁶ The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997.

opinion poll were not given the option of answering that the Council members had lived up to their promises “only to a certain extent”. This was done intentionally in order to push the interviewees to give a clear positive or negative answer.

Figure 18:



Concerning the issue of Council members living up to their promises, there were no significant differences in people’s opinions across the variables of gender, area, age or education. However, as figure 18 above indicates, a higher proportion of refugees than non-refugees responded that the Council members did not live up to their promises. This may be explained by the fact that the expectations of refugees were higher than those of non-refugees. Due to their living conditions and status, refugees are the subgroup of Palestinian society that has been seeing the least benefits from the peace process. In January 1996, they - more than any other demographic subgroup - saw the election of a Legislative Council as a first step on the road to an independent Palestinian state. Instead, the peace negotiations have been stalled for most of the past two years, the Palestinian Authority has been confronted with an intransigent Netanyahu government, and frustration

and unemployment has been growing due to the worsening economic conditions and the continuing closure on

the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The refugees were not only the people expecting most from the Legislative Council, but they were also the ones hardest hit by the deteriorating political and economic situation. Moreover, they may have felt that their expectations were misplaced as it seems that the policy of the Palestinian leadership is to postpone doing anything about the refugee problem until this issue is addressed in the final status negotiations with Israel.


2.3. PART THREE: PROSPECTS FOR VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN FUTURE ELECTIONS BASED ON THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND THOSE OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS

Part One and Two above, examined the voting behaviour in the first Palestinian national elections in January 1996, both from the general public's point of view and from the perspective of the Council members. Part Three will address voting behaviour in any future elections and ask similar questions as in the previous parts, shedding some light on how the general public may vote in future elections. Following questions will be answered: Will the Palestinian electorate voting turnout remain as high as it was in the last elections? Will the people vote according to the same criteria? If not, which factors will gain in importance in future voting and which factors will have less influence? If people decide not to vote in future elections, what are their motives?

2.3.1. Would People Vote in Future Elections?

In general, people remained enthusiastic about participating in any future elections. Out of the 1195 people surveyed, 67.5% said that they would vote again in the next elections, compared to 64.6% who said that they participated in the last elections. Compared to the results on the question whether or not interviewees voted in the last elections, about 9% less respondents answered that they would not vote in the next elections. Indeed, whereas 34.4% of the respondents answered that they did not vote in the January 1996 elections, only 25.8% answered that they do not intend to vote in the next elections. It is the contention of the researcher that the difference in the results between the question concerning voter turnout in the last elections and the question on voter turnout in any future election results from the fact that the answers on voter turnout in the last elections were based on 'reality', whilst the answers on the question of voter turnout in the next elections were based on the 'intentions' of the respondents. This line of thinking is reinforced when comparing the number of respondents who answered 'no answer'. Whereas concerning the 1996 elections, only 1% of the interviewees did not answer the question on whether or not they voted, concerning the next elections, 6.7% did not answer the question. In any case, the important message from the results on this question is that - based on the intentions of the respondents - voter turnout will remain high in the next elections.

Figure 19:



As shown in figure 19 above, Gazans remained more enthusiastic than Westbankers about participating in the next elections. Whilst 72.4% of the interviewees in Gaza replied that they would participate in the next elections, only 64.7% of the surveyed people in the West Bank responded positively. Moreover, about 5% more people in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip stated that they would not vote in the next elections. However, although there remains a gap between the levels of enthusiasm for participating in elections between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the results of the survey indicate that it has become less pronounced. Indeed, concerning the last elections it was assumed that people in the Gaza Strip voted more than people in the West Bank because they felt the presence of the Palestinian Authority more. The gap between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has decreased - with more people in the West Bank saying that they will vote in future elections

- and can be explained by the fact that people in the West Bank also increasingly began to feel the presence of the Palestinian Authority, and thus might feel a greater desire or national obligation to participate in the next elections.

Table 21 below, indicates that Palestinians with a higher education replied more often that they would participate in the next elections than less educated people. Compared to the results on the question on voter participation during the last elections (see Part One, section 2.1.3), the gap between the less educated and more educated people concerning participation in elections increased further. About 73.0% of the people who had a college education or higher confirmed that they would vote in the next elections, compared to only 59.7% of the interviewees who had up to elementary schooling. In addition, whereas 30.3% of the surveyed people who received only up to elementary schooling said that they would not participate in the next elections, only 20.9% of the people who went to college and above said so.

Also noteworthy is that, younger people remain more enthusiastic about participating in future elections than the older generation, although to a lesser extent than in the 1996 elections. Indeed, the results in table 21 indicate that, concerning the relation between voting in the next elections and the age factor, the value of Chi square is higher than .05, reducing the statistical significance of this relation from 95% to 90%.

Table 21: Would you say that you would vote again in the next elections?

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Yes	59.7%	62.0%	70.4%	69.4%	73.0%	70.4%	63.7%	68.0%	74.3%	54.5%
No	30.3%	31.7%	25.3%	22.9%	20.9%	23.2%	29.5%	25.1%	18.1%	33.3%
No answer	10.1%	6.3%	4.4%	7.6%	6.1%	6.3%	6.8%	6.9%	7.6%	12.1%
<i>df</i>	10					10				
<i>Chi Square</i>	.0287					.0704				


Those people who answered that they were going to vote in the next elections were then asked whether or not they would vote according to the same criteria²⁸⁷. In general, out of the 807 people who said that they would vote in the next elections, only 23.8% replied that they would vote according to the same criteria; 27.9% answered that they would not vote in quite the same way; and 27.6% said that they would vote in a totally different way. About 17.2% said that they could not compare their voting behaviour in the last elections with that in the next elections, because they did not participate in the last elections. As illustrated in figure 20 below, it is clear that the majority of the interviewees wish to change their voting behaviour in one way or another. This trend is hardly surprising. It seems logical that dissatisfaction²⁸⁸ with the Legislative Council would be translated into a resolution to vote differently in the next elections in order to attempt to vote - in respondents' eyes - more capable representatives into the Legislative Council.

²⁸⁷ With the term "according to the same criteria" in the question, the researcher attempted to find out, in general, whether or not respondents thought that similar factors as in the 1996 elections such as the level of education of the candidates, democratic values, religion of the candidates etc. would move them to vote for a certain candidate in the next elections and not for another.

²⁸⁸ The dissatisfaction of the Palestinian electorate with the Legislative Council, the reasons behind it and the extent of it, will be discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.

Figure 20:

Voting Behaviour of the Electorate in the Next Elections
According to the General Public




Legislative Council members were also asked to state their opinion on whether or not the electorate in the next elections would vote according to the same criteria or not quite. Significantly, only 7.0% of the Council members thought that people would vote according to the same criteria. The majority of the Council members, 69.8%, said that people would not quite vote in the same way in the next elections, whilst 20.9% responded that the electorate would vote in a totally different way.

The importance of the responses of the Council members lies in the fact that few Council members thought that people would vote according to the same criteria used in the January 1996 elections. This might indicate that Council members knew that people were not very satisfied with their elected representatives, and, therefore, are bound to adapt their criteria when casting their vote in the next elections. Moreover, the results imply an implicit

acknowledgement by the Council members that something in the performance of the Legislative Council is not quite right.

Figure 21:




2.3.2. Reasons for Not Voting in Future Elections.

As was the case regarding the January 1996 elections, the researcher questioned the reasons behind the decision of the survey respondents not to vote in future elections. The sample of this question consists of the 25.8% of the surveyed people (308 interviewees) who responded that they would not vote in the next elections. As illustrated in figure 22 below, 44.5% of the respondents answered that they would not vote in the next elections because they ‘do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people’. The second reason, given by 26.0% of the respondents, is that voting would not make a

difference. Both reasons are very negative and indicate mistrust in the current Legislative Council, albeit that the former is more specific and the latter is more general.

Figure 22:



As was the case with regard to the last elections, a higher proportion of better educated respondents said that they would not vote in the next elections because they ‘do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people’ than those who enjoyed less education. Indeed, in the sample, only 19.4% of the people who received up to elementary education replied that they would not vote in the next elections because they ‘do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people’, compared to 54.2% of the surveyed people who went to college and above. In addition, whilst only 20.8% of the people who went to college and above responded that they would not vote because it would not make a difference, 25.0% of the people who went only up to elementary school cited this reason. Again, this could be explained by the fact that more educated people tend to be better informed about political developments and about the lack of achievements by the Legislative Council, and therefore, tend to be more critical. For this

reason, more educated people are more inclined to give a specific reason for their refusal to vote in the next elections, such as that they do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people. Similarly, the more general reason for not voting in the next elections because it would not make a difference, was cited more by people who had less education, possibly because they are less informed, and thus less critical.

Table 22a: Why would you not vote again?

	Education				
	Up to Elem. N=36	Up to Prep. N=70	Up to Sec. N=98	Some College N=72	College & above N=24
It would not make any difference	25.0%	31.4%	24.5%	23.6%	20.8%
I do not believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	19.4%	42.9%	49.0%	51.4%	54.2%
Other reasons	47.2%	18.6%	15.3%	19.4%	25.0%
Do not believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfil their promises	-	1.4%	2.0%	-	-
No answer	8.3%	5.7%	9.2%	5.6%	-
<i>df</i>	20				
<i>Chi Square</i>	.0433				

The researcher detected a statistically significant relation between the question on the reasons behind the respondents' decision not to vote in the next elections and the demographic subgroup of age. This relation was not present concerning the January 1996 elections. As indicated in table 22b, below, a similar trend as with the variable of education (discussed above) is apparent in regard to the age variable. The younger generation - more critical and militant - gave the more specific reason for not voting in the next election of 'I do not believe the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people' more than five times as frequently than the older generation of people over 55 years old.

Table 22b: Why would you not vote again?

	Age				
	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=88	N=108	N=51	N=19	N=22
It would not make any difference	23.9%	26.9%	23.5%	15.8%	27.3%
I do not believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	56.8%	42.6%	45.1%	42.1%	9.1%
Other reasons	13.6%	17.6%	25.5%	42.1%	50.0%
Do not believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfil their promises	1.1%	1.9%	-	-	-
No answer	4.5%	11.1%	5.9%	-	13.6%
<i>df</i>	20				
<i>Chi Square</i>	.0069				

In conclusion, the results on the question of why survey respondents would not vote in the next elections revealed two important points:

1. Of those respondents who decided not to vote, most opted to give the specific answer that they 'do not believe the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people', rather than a more general reason not to vote. It will be most difficult for the Council members to convince this specific group that they do represent the interests of the people as this group is only likely to change its opinion after seeing real results from the Legislative Council.
2. A larger proportion of the respondents who received higher education and who belong to the younger generation than those with less education and from the older generation, responded that they 'do not believe the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people'. Again, those two subgroups of Palestinian society seem most critical and will need to see real improvement from the Legislative Council in order to change their minds.

2.3.3. Important Factors when Voting in Future Elections.

In order to be able to measure the influence of certain characteristics of candidates on voting behaviour in future elections, those surveyed were asked to determine the importance of the same set of pre-selected factors, also used in Part One of this chapter with regard to the assessment of voting behaviour during the last elections. Figure 23 below, ranks the selection of thirteen factors according to their relevance, when respondents will decide to vote for a certain candidate in future elections. As in Part One of this Chapter, the indicated percentages in figure 23 are the sum of the answers of the interviewees who said that a certain characteristic in candidates will be “very important” or “important” in influencing their vote.

Figure 23:
Importance of Factors when Voting in Future Elections
According to the General Public

	Important
Education	92.6%
Democratic values	92.4%
Reputation	90.4%
Struggle history	88.4%
Campaign	75.0%
Political affiliation	67.5%
Religious values	61.1%
Religion	60.8%
Socio-economic status	48.6%
Residence	43.7%
Family relations	41.1%
Age	35.7%
Gender	33.9%

The 13 factors in figure 23, above, portray the results of the total sample of the survey. As is the case with other questions in the popular survey conducted by the researcher, the answers by the interviewees have, in addition, also been classified according to gender,

area, refugee status, education and age.²⁸⁹ Below, the researcher will clarify for each of the 13 factors summarised in figure 23, whether or not they are likely to have greater or lesser importance for certain demographic subgroups.

Before going into further detail below, it is worth noting that there was general agreement amongst the surveyed people concerning the degree of importance of the following characteristics of candidates: (1) reputation, (2) political affiliation, (3) socio-economic status, (4) residence, (5) family relations, and (6) age. On some other factors, opinions remained more divided, whether by the subgroups of gender, area, refugee-status or education. In comparison with voting behaviour of the surveyed people during the last elections, it is clear that some gaps between these subgroups increased, whilst others decreased.

For the purpose of comparison, figure 24, ranking the influence of the pre-selected characteristics of candidates on voting behaviour during the last elections, was added below. In general, a comparison between the results of figures 23 and 24, indicates that in the next elections the importance of education will remain the same. Moreover, the influence of the adherence of candidates to democratic values will gain importance when voting in the next elections, prevailing slightly over the importance of reputation and struggle history in evaluating a potential Council member. In addition, the results indicate that in the next elections more attention will be given by the electorate to the candidates' campaigns. In fact, there could be a trend where the content and quality of the campaigns

²⁸⁹ For full results of the public opinion poll conducted by the researcher, see Annex 5 of this thesis.

will become more important than the actual political affiliation of the candidates. The remaining factors, such as religious values, religion, socio-economic status, residence, family relations, age, and gender fluctuate a little in importance, but not sufficiently to produce major changes in the way people are likely to cast their votes in the next elections.

Figure 24:
Importance of Factors when People cast their Votes in the Last Elections
 According to the General Public

	Important	
Education	92.8%	
Reputation	91.5%	
Struggle history	89.5%	
Democratic values	88.3%	
Political affiliation	70.4%	
Campaign	69.5%	
Religion	64.7%	
Religious values	60.8%	
Socio-economic status	45.9%	
Family relations	43.4%	
Residence	43.3%	
Gender	32.7%	
Age	30.6%	

2.3.3.1. Education

According to the results of the survey, education was the most important factor influencing the electorate’s voting behaviour during the last elections, and will continue to be the most important factor moving the public to vote for a certain candidate in the next elections. In general, an overwhelming majority of 92.8% of the surveyed people responded that the factor of education was either very important or important. However, although no gaps in opinions according to the level of education were found about the importance of education in the results of the last elections, a trend emerged in this instance whereby the higher

educated respondents found the educational background of a candidate to become even more important in future elections. Indeed, concerning future elections, only 83.1% of the people who received up to elementary schooling considered the level of education to be an important (very important or important) characteristic of a candidates when voting in the coming elections, compared to 95.2% of the people who went to college and above.

Table 23: How important will education be when you vote in the coming election?

	Total	Area		Education				
		West Bank	Gaza	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=807	N=489	N=318	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	58.6%	54.6%	64.8%	57.7%	52.6%	59.0%	57.8%	69.0%
Important	34.0%	37.6%	28.3%	25.4%	40.1%	34.1%	36.7%	26.2%
Somewhat important	4.5%	5.3%	3.1%	7.0%	5.8%	5.5%	2.8%	2.4%
Not important	1.1%	1.2%	0.9%	5.6%	0.7%	1.1%	0.5%	-
Absolutely not important	0.1%	-	0.3%	-	-	-	-	-
No answer	1.7%	1.2%	2.5%	4.2%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	2.4%
<i>df</i>		25		25				
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0025		.0000				

2.3.3.2. Democratic Values

As indicated in table 24 below, 92.4% of the surveyed people found adherence to democratic principles by a candidate in the election either important or very important in deciding whether or not to vote for that candidate in the next elections. Only 1.3% of the people thought that adherence by a candidate to democratic principles was irrelevant in their decision to vote for him/her in the next elections. Although the results give a very encouraging picture about the voters' developing sense of democratic awareness, there remains a gap between the more educated and less educated people in regard to this factor in any future elections. The divergence in opinions between the respondents who enjoyed

higher education and those who received less education that already existed in the January 1996 elections, will - according to the survey results - persist in the next elections. Whereas 84.5% of the surveyed people who received up to elementary education thought that adherence to democratic values by a candidate will be important (very important and important) when voting in the next elections, 91.6% of the people who went to college and above thought so.

Table 24: How important are democratic values when you will vote in the coming election?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=807	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	65.1%	53.5%	51.8%	68.9%	72.5%	70.2%
Important	27.3%	31.0%	41.6%	26.0%	20.2%	21.4%
Somewhat important	3.7%	5.6%	5.8%	3.3%	3.2%	2.4%
Not important	1.2%	2.8%	-	1.1%	0.5%	1.2%
Absolutely not important	0.1%	-	-	-	0.5%	-
No answer	2.6%	7.0%	0.7%	0.7%	3.2%	4.8%
<i>df</i>		25				
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0000				

2.3.3.3. Religion and Religious Values

The factors of religion and religious values are discussed together because the results of the survey indicate many similar trends between these two factors. The importance of the factors of religion and religious values lies in the level of division which appears between the different subgroups of those surveyed, where these values are concerned. All the gaps in opinion found between the different subgroups in regard to the influence of religion and religious values when examining voting behaviour during the last elections, remained consistent.

Religion and religious values remained more important for women than for men. Whereas 54.7% of the surveyed men said that religion was important (very important or important), 67.3% of the women found this factor important. Similarly, whereas respect for religious values by a candidate was important (very important or important) for 56.6% of the male interviewees, it was important for 66.0% of the women.

Religion and religious values remained also more important in the Gaza Strip and amongst refugees than in the West Bank and amongst non-refugees. Only 53.0% of the Westbankers thought that religion is going to be an important (very important or important) factor influencing their vote in the next elections, compared to 73.0% of the Gazans who thought so. Moreover, whereas 56.4% of the non-refugees felt that religion is going to play a role in their vote in the next elections, 67.9% of the refugees think that religion is going to be an important factor influencing their selection of candidates. Similarly, 49.2% of the people surveyed in the West Bank felt that religious values were going to have impact on their voting behaviour, compared to 79.3% of people in the Gaza Strip who said so. In addition, 56.6% of the non-refugees interviewed answered that religious values will be an important factor when casting their vote in the next elections, compared to 68.7% of the refugees.

Table 25: How important will religion be when you vote in the coming election?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
	N=807	Male N=413	Female N=388	West Bank N=489	Gaza N=318	Non-refugee N=431	Refugee N=348
Very important	36.4%	30.0%	42.8%	29.7%	46.9%	32.0%	44.0%
Important	24.4%	24.7%	24.5%	23.3%	26.1%	24.4%	23.9%
Somewhat important	16.0%	17.7%	14.2%	18.2%	12.6%	18.1%	12.6%
Not important	18.2%	21.5%	14.7%	23.5%	10.1%	21.1%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.7%	3.9%	1.5%	3.5%	1.6%	2.6%	2.6%
No answer	2.2%	2.2%	2.3%	1.8%	2.8%	1.9%	2.6%
<i>df</i>		10		10		10	
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0109		.0000		.00	

Table 26: How important will religious values be when you vote in the coming election?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	34.3%	30.0%	38.7%	24.5%	49.4%	28.1%	44.0%
Important	26.8%	26.6%	27.3%	24.7%	29.9%	28.5%	24.7%
Somewhat important	14.7%	15.5%	13.9%	17.6%	10.4%	16.5%	12.1%
Not important	19.0%	23.0%	14.4%	26.8%	6.9%	21.8%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.6%	2.7%	2.6%	4.1%	0.3%	3.0%	1.7%
No answer	2.6%	2.2%	3.1%	2.2%	3.1%	2.1%	3.2%
<i>df</i>		8		8		8	
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0541		.0000		.0000	

In short, from the results in tables 25 and 26 above, it became clear that the divergence in opinions between Westbankers and Gazans, refugees and non-refugees, and between male and female respondents, which existed in the January 1996 elections concerning the importance of candidates' respect for religion and religious values, is likely to persist in the coming elections.

2.3.3.4. Gender

In general, the issue of the gender of candidates is the least important factor from the set of factors, which is likely to influence the electorate's voting behaviour in the next elections. In total, only 33.9% of the respondents said that the gender of the candidates' was going to be an important (very important or important) factor influencing their vote in the next elections, which is not significantly different from the survey results on the importance of gender in the January 1996 elections.

As was the case in the last elections, the gender of the candidates when considering for whom to vote in the next elections, remained more important for Gazan respondents than Westbankers.

Different from the survey results on the importance of gender as an influence upon voting behaviour in the January 1996 elections, is that concerning the future elections, a higher proportion of women than men responded that the gender of the candidates will affect their vote in the next elections. The researcher of this thesis was unable to retract a conclusive interpretation of these findings as they can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, the results could mean, that in the next elections, it will become more important for women to vote for female candidates. On the other hand, the opposite could be the case, in that women would not opt to vote for female candidates in the next elections, and would prefer to give male candidates their vote.

Table 27: How important will gender be when you vote in the coming election?


	Total	Gender		Area	
	N=807	Male N=413	Female N=388	West Bank N=489	Gaza N=318
Very important	12.6%	11.9%	13.7%	10.4%	16.0%
Important	21.3%	18.4%	24.5%	19.6%	23.9%
Somewhat important	14.9%	16.0%	13.7%	14.3%	15.7%
Not important	44.0%	45.5%	42.5%	49.1%	36.2%
Absolutely not important	4.8%	6.1%	3.1%	4.5%	5.3%
No answer	2.4%	2.2%	2.6%	2.0%	2.8%
<i>df</i>		10		10	
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0276		.0010	

2.3.3.5. Age

Age is another factor that is not likely to influence many voters in the next elections. In general, only 30.6% of the interviewees thought that the factor of age might play a role in

their decision whether or not to vote for a certain candidate in the next elections, compared to 35.7% of the respondents who still thought so concerning the January 1996 elections. It is also worth noting that the gap in opinions between less educated people and higher educated people concerning the importance of age, seen in the last elections, has disappeared. Indeed, all subgroups seem to agree on the importance of age or the lack thereof in regard to the next elections.

Figure 25:



2.3.3.6. The Campaign

The campaign has gained in importance in people’s minds since the last elections. Whereas, in general, during the last elections 69.5% of the people thought that a candidate’s campaign was an important factor in their decision to vote for him/her, 75.0% of the surveyed people said that the campaign of the candidates in future elections will play an important role (very important or important). The findings concerning the importance of the campaign in future elections are significant, because they indicate a trend whereby the

electorate is increasingly likely to cast its votes based on political considerations rather than traditional ones.

Concerning the last elections, higher educated respondents tended to find the campaign of election candidates more important than those with less education. According to the results in table 29 below, this trend is likely to persist in the next elections.

Table 28: How important is the campaign when you will vote in the coming election?

	Total	Education				
		Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=807	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	37.8%	29.6%	34.3%	38.1%	42.2%	40.5%
Important	37.2%	40.8%	43.1%	37.0%	34.9%	33.3%
Somewhat important	13.3%	8.5%	10.9%	13.9%	15.1%	13.1%
Not important	9.2%	14.1%	10.9%	10.6%	4.1%	8.3%
Absolutely not important	0.6%	1.4%	-	-	1.4%	1.2%
No answer	2.0%	5.6%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	3.6%
<i>df</i>		25				
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0249				

3.3.3.7. Struggle History

In general, the influence of a candidate's struggle history remained an important factor in people's decision whether or not to vote for a certain candidate. However, a trend is appearing whereby the higher educated people are, the less important the factor of struggle history becomes. Indeed, whereas 84.5% of the people who received up to elementary schooling continued to see a candidate's struggle history as an important factor (very important or important), only 79.8% of the people who went to college and above thought so. Also, twice as many interviewees who went to college and above than those with only up to elementary education, replied that a candidate's struggle history would not be important when voting in the next elections.

This trend might be an indication that better educated people are becoming less impressed with what a candidate did in the past, and are increasingly interested in a candidate's ability to improve their lives in the future. Credentials of the past are becoming less relevant.

Table 29: How important will struggle history be when you vote in the coming election?

	Total	Education				
		Up to	Up to	Up to	Some	College &
	N=807	Elem.	Prep.	Sec.	College	above
		N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	55.6%	54.9%	46.0%	61.2%	61.0%	41.7%
Important	32.8%	29.6%	40.9%	31.1%	28.4%	38.1%
Somewhat important	5.2%	5.6%	6.6%	4.0%	5.0%	7.1%
Not important	3.7%	5.6%	4.4%	1.8%	2.8%	10.7%
Absolutely not important	0.4%	-	-	0.4%	0.9%	-
No answer	2.2%	4.2%	2.2%	1.5%	1.8%	2.4%
<i>df</i>		25				
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0272				

2.4. CONCLUSION

In general, it is possible to conclude from the analysis in Chapter Two that the Palestinian electorate is passing through a period of transition. Indeed, whereas, generally, the Palestinian electorate voted in a relatively responsible and mature manner in their first general election experience on 20 January 1996, some subgroups continued to consider more traditional considerations. However, when voting, political and rational considerations such as the educational background of the candidates, their reputation and struggle history, their respect for democratic values, their political affiliation, and the content of the campaigns, prevailed over the more traditional considerations such as religion, masculine gender, old age or family relations of the candidates.

A closer look at the opinions of some important subgroups within Palestinian society revealed that there is still an underlying split between the more traditional way of thinking - and voting - and the more modern way, which is not uncommon for societies in full political transition and development. In part One of this chapter, based upon the survey results, two main statistically significant trends appeared.

Firstly, the young and higher educated interviewees were not only more critical and sceptical than the older and less educated, but also seemed more democratically aware and attached more importance to political considerations when voting. The findings of the researcher corresponded with some of those found by scholars such as Lipset, and Almond and Verba. As will be recalled, Lipset (1959) argued that educated people are more committed to democracy and participation. Moreover, according to Lipset, they are more tolerant of opposition. Almond and Verba (1963) in their study argued that the more educated are more politically informed and more active in organisations.

Secondly, in Part One of this chapter, a trend appeared whereby the respondents from the Gaza Strip (and refugees), when voting, accorded greater value to the more traditional values such as family relations, residence, religion and masculine gender than survey respondents from the West Bank (and non-refugees). Scholars such as Huntington, Lipset and Dahl noted that this emphasis on family relations, residence, religion, and male gender

is detrimental to democratic development. As will be recalled, their studies showed that the movement away from traditional values is a step forward towards democracy.²⁹⁰

In short, the analysis of Part One of this chapter clearly indicated that the Palestinian electorate showed signs of democratic maturity, albeit certain voting patterns such as the emphasis on family relations and other traditional values, are inconsistent with the movement towards further political development. Nevertheless, it is clear that the process of democratisation has started in Palestine.

From the Council members' evaluation of the first Palestinian elections, in Part Two, it became clear that, in general, they know which factors influenced the electorate when casting their votes. The main flaws in the Council members' evaluation were, however, the underestimation of the importance of democratic values as an influence on the electorate's voting behaviour, and the overestimation of more traditional influences such as religion and gender.

A second point worth remembering from Part Two was the Council members' acknowledgement of their partial failure to live up to their campaign promises and responsibilities. This indicates to recognition on their part that the performance of the Legislative Council is not as optimal as it should be.

²⁹⁰ Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; Lipset, S. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", American Political Science Review, (53), 1959.

Part Three of this chapter suggested that the democratic awareness in the voting behaviour of the Palestinian public is likely to expand in future elections. The importance of the campaign should increase in the future, whilst the influence of the more traditional values should decrease. The analysis in Part Three of this chapter, indicated that if elections under the Palestinian Authority were to become a regular phenomenon, the electorate would become increasingly sophisticated and rational as its electoral choices would be more influenced by the competence and the integrity of their representatives and less so by traditional influences. Under this scenario, as Mondak has argued, the electorate would retain incumbents if they are competent and effective, and would punish those who are not.²⁹¹

In general, it is possible to conclude from the analysis in Chapter Two that the role and behaviour of the Palestinian public in the first general elections was of high standard, particularly when compared to elections and voting behaviour in Arab states surrounding the Palestinian autonomous areas and other developing countries. Therefore, the Palestinian January 1996 elections, being one of the prerequisites for democratic development, can be considered a success. They moved Palestine one step further on the continuum towards democracy, increasingly enabling one to describe it as a partial democracy rather than a non-democracy. Moreover, increasing democratic awareness of the Palestinian electorate in future elections is likely, creating an environment in which institution building and effective governance becomes more viable.

²⁹¹ Mondak, J.J., "Competence, Integrity, and ...".

CHAPTER THREE:

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Before analysing how the existence of the Legislative Council influenced political development in the Palestinian autonomous areas, it is necessary to include some general perceptions on the Legislative Council, both by the general public and the Council members. In the previous chapter, it became clear that the Palestinian Authority fulfilled one of Potter's five characteristics of a partial democracy, as elections were held. The findings in this chapter will indicate in how far the situation in the Palestinian autonomous areas correspond with a second characteristic of a partial democracy. Indeed, they will show whether or not the effect of the elections and the authority of the elected government is restricted and compromised by other non-elected establishments.

This chapter measures the level of satisfaction with the Legislative Council amongst both the Palestinian electorate and Council members, according to some fundamental factors required for any parliament to operate democratically and effectively.

Furthermore, an overview will be provided of the main reasons provided by both the general public and the Council members for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council.

Lastly, this chapter looks at some prospects for the Legislative Council in the future.

Questions raised include: Do the Palestinian people expect the performance of the

Legislative Council to improve in the future? What is the Council members' vision of the future performance of the Legislative Council? Are they optimistic or pessimistic?

The overview of the general perceptions of both the electorate and Council members provided in this chapter will help to pinpoint on which issues the public and their representatives agree and on which issues their opinions differ. It should be noted that the researcher in this chapter opted to only provide a general overview of the perceptions of the public and the Council members. The findings of this chapter will be worked out in greater detail in the following chapters of this thesis.

3.1. PART ONE: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ELECTORATE ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

3.1.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council according to Five Different Factors

After reviewing the literature, the interviewees in the public opinion poll were asked to evaluate the Legislative Council according to five common variables. These variables were deemed essential as they constitute the basis for democracy. They can be labeled as follows: democracy, effectiveness, responsiveness, independence from the Executive Authority, and pluralism. By examining the public's evaluation of these variables, it becomes easier to form an idea of the performance of the Legislative Council. Indeed, the higher any parliament scores on these five factors, the higher its performance is viewed, as these factors make up the characteristics and goals of a well-functioning parliament.

The researcher realises that other variables, such as economic development, due process of law, political culture, or the peace process could equally be important for the purpose of evaluation of the performance of the Legislative Council. However, they were not considered useful as too many influences outside the capacity of the Legislative Council could impact these variables. For example, the Legislative Council's role in economic development is marginal because, on the one hand, economic policies remain highly contingent on Israeli measures, and, on the other hand, economic international aid remains solely in the hands of the Executive Authority and Arafat. Also, evaluating the legislative Council on the basis of due process of law is hard as to this date a Palestinian Constitution does not exist. The Legislative Council cannot be held responsible for that fact. On the contrary, conflict with Arafat regarding the Basic Law has been very intense. Lastly, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, it is difficult to evaluate the Legislative Council on its accomplishments in the peace process as negotiations are the mandate of the Executive Authority. Consequently, the only variables that could be measured and operationalised are the ones specified below.

The variables used for a general evaluation of the performance of the Legislative Council were examined by almost all the academics and scholars consulted in this thesis. As discussed in Chapter One, democracy is the means to, on the one hand, contain and channel conflicts in society and, on the other hand, to absorb the threats associated with such conflicts. It is, therefore, in the opinion of this researcher, highly important to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council on democracy.

Also discussed in Chapter One, was the notion of effectiveness. Lipset argued that effectiveness is the other pillar alongside economic development required for democratic development. Also, in his book with Diamond and Linz, Democracy in Developing Countries, Lipset stressed the “importance of effective and democratically committed leadership” for the stability of democracies.²⁹¹ Similarly and more directly focussed to legislatures, Mondak argued for the importance of effectiveness in sustaining democracy.

The notion of responsiveness is an equally important feature of democratic legislatures and constitutes one of the most important tenets of democracy. Burke defined the relationship between the representative and the public as follows:

*“Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect.”*²⁹²

Mill wrote the following with regard to the notion of responsiveness:

*“The rulers should identify with the people; their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation.”*²⁹³

The notion of separation of power and, in particular, the level of independence of the Legislative Council from the Executive Authority, is of particular importance to the Palestinian case. The researcher’s attendance of several Council sessions and interviews with many Council members led to the importance of this variable. Moreover, many critics of the Palestinian political system accuse Arafat and the Executive Authority for

²⁹¹ Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries, p. 49.

²⁹² Milton, C. Cummings Jr., and Wise, D., Democracy under Pressure: An Introduction to the American Political System, Fifth Edition, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985, p. 484.

insufficiently acknowledging the Legislative Council. Such critics include: Edward Said, Ghassan Khatib, Haidar Abdel Shafi, Ahmed Khalidi, Ali Jarbawi, Iyad Sarraj. More universally, De Tocqueville in his famous study, Democracy in America, gave paramount attention to the notion of separation of powers. Furthermore, not a single theorist on democracy argued that all powers should be concentrated in one institution. Also, in practice, all democratic states in the world are characterised by at least a minimum level of separation of power.

As for pluralism, it is a sine qua none for democracy. Philippe Schmitter (1986), for example, argued that pluralism is a precondition of democracy. He noted:

*"Such participation is accomplished in large part consensually through political parties which compete to win electoral majorities, ally with others in dominant coalitions, or enter into consociational arrangements."*²⁹⁴

Before going into the results of the survey, it is important to note that the Palestinian public is quite familiar with the terms used in the survey for the evaluation of the Legislative Council. These terms are used extensively by the Legislative Council, human rights organisations and the media as well as the opposition. Moreover, they were debated frequently in civic education workshops conducted nation-wide by local and international organisations such as the Friedrich Iebert Stiftung, IFES (International Foundation of Electoral Systems), Conrad Adenour Foundation, the British Council, the Centre for Democracy, and so on. In any case, in order to avoid confusion, the definition was

²⁹³ Mill, J.S., On Liberty, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1981, p. 61.

²⁹⁴ Schmitter, P.C., "An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey", in: O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, p. 6.

explained to the interviewers. They were also instructed to explain interviewees what these concepts meant, if so requested.

Table 30, below, indicates that the respondents rated the performance of their parliament highest in terms of democracy, with 62.9% judging it to be democratic. Results concerning all other factors, however, are negative. Only 42.0% of the interviewees considered the Legislative Council responsive; only 39% thought that it is effective; only 37.0% saw it as a pluralistic institution; and only 27.5% of the electorate regarded it as being independent of the Executive Authority.

Table 30: How do you evaluate the Legislative Council with regard to the following:


	Value Label	The Electorate
Democracy	Democratic	62.9%
	Undemocratic	34.6%
Effectiveness	Effective	39.0%
	Ineffective	5.9%
Responsiveness	Responsive	42.0%
	Unresponsive	55.2%
Independence from the EA	Independent	27.5%
	Dependent	68.3%
Pluralism	Pluralistic	37.0%
	Unpluralistic	58.1%

3.1.1.1. Democracy

'Democracy' is the most general of the five selected factors. To some extent, one could even argue that democracy encompasses effectiveness, responsiveness, independence of the legislature from the Executive Authority, and pluralism. The Legislative Council was only evaluated positively by the Palestinian electorate in terms of democracy, whilst on specifics their assessment was harsher.

Figure 26:

Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of Democracy
Views of the General Public



In general, it is possible to conclude that the Palestinian public found its representative body to be democratic; an opinion that is believed to be largely absent in other neighbouring Arab countries. The significance and the explanation behind this positive evaluation on the democratic nature of the Legislative Council will be illustrated and discussed in greater depth in the following chapters of this thesis.


3.1.1.2. Effectiveness

In total, 39.0% of the interviewees considered the Legislative Council effective (very effective or effective) compared to a majority of 58.9% who thought that the Council was ineffective (ineffective or very ineffective). Figure 27, below, indicates that women were less harsh in their evaluation of the Council's effectiveness than men.

Figure 27:

Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of Effectiveness

Views of the General Public



In Chapter Two, the researcher argued that in a still traditional society, women tend to be less concerned with voting or less involved with politics. At this stage, an additional explanation will be provided of why women - in this case - evaluated the Legislative Council more positively than men. This will be done by examining some results from a public opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre in May 1995.²⁹⁵

In the May 1995 public opinion poll conducted by JMCC, with a sample of 1069 people, the following two questions were asked:

- (1) Which in your opinion is/are the best source/s of information about policies?
- (2) Are you willing to put more effort into finding more information on the political situation?

²⁹⁵ JMCC, Public Opinion Polls on Palestinian Attitudes towards Politics, Jerusalem: JMCC, 1996, May 1995 poll.

As becomes clear from figure 28 below, most information was obtained by people through the means of radio and television. It is also apparent that women relied more on radio and television as a source of information than men did. Only 30.5% of men found radio and television the best source of information about policies compared to 49.0% of women. Men seemed to rely more on less centrally organised sources of information such as political leaflets, religious sermons and publications, and meetings and conferences. Therefore, men were more exposed to more pluralistic forms of information, whilst women who identified radio and television as their main source of information, were exposed to the official sources of information, which are less critical or even censored. As such, women might well have developed a less critical view of the political events taking place within Palestinian society.

Figure 28:





Figure 29 below, illustrates the results of the second question asked in the May 1995 poll, conducted by the JMCC. Concerning the question of whether or not the interviewees were willing to put more effort into finding more information on the political situation, the results in figure 29 below, reveal that women were less willing to do so than men. Only 70.4% of the female interviewees responded that they were willing to put more effort into finding more information on the political situation, compared to 80.2% of the men.

Figure 29:

Willingness to Put More Effort into Finding Information on the Political Situation

According to Gender



Source: JMCC, May 1995

In conclusion, the results illustrated in figures 28 and 29 above, indicated that women's main source of information about the political situation was radio and television, and that women were less inclined to find out more information about the political situation. These findings provide an additional explanation for women's more optimistic or positive view of political events and institutions, including the Legislative Council.

It is worth mentioning that the different attitudes of women to those of men concerning political events and political institutions, are not always as clear as in this section concerning the effectiveness of the Legislative Council. However, the explanation concerning women's differing attitudes to men was given in this section by the researcher, because there was a clear statistically significant relation ($\chi^2 = .0026$) between the answers concerning the evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of effectiveness, and the gender of the respondents (see figure 27 above).

3.1.1.3. Responsiveness


The notion of responsiveness has not only been used because, as discussed earlier, it is an essential element of democracy, but also because opinion polls conducted over time showed a relatively negative attitude of the public towards the Legislative Council. In the researcher's opinion, part of this negative opinion could be a result of the public's perception of a lack of responsiveness on the part of the Legislative Council. Hence, the necessity of measuring the public's attitude towards the responsiveness of their parliament.

In general, the majority of the respondents in the survey saw the Legislative Council as unresponsive. Only 42.0% of the interviewees considered the Council responsive (very responsive or responsive) compared to 55.2% who responded that the Council is unresponsive (unresponsive or very unresponsive). There were no major differences across any of the subgroups, whether according to gender, area, refugee status, education, or age.

People across all lines agreed on the negative evaluation (and its degree) of the Legislative Council in terms of responsiveness.

Figure 30:

Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of Responsiveness



3.1.1.4. Independence from the Executive Authority


The Legislative Council is evaluated most negatively in terms of its level of independence from the Executive Authority. Only 27.5% of the people surveyed thought that the Council is very independent or independent. An overwhelming majority of 68.3% regarded the Council as either dependent or very dependent on the Executive Authority. The negative evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of its level of independence of the Executive Authority might seem quite surprising in view of the often harsh criticism expressed within the Legislative Council against the Executive Authority. The reasons behind the public's negative opinion in this respect will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7 of this thesis.

Figure 31, below, also indicates a large gap in attitudes between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip towards the Council's level of independence from the Executive Authority. Whilst in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the evaluation of the Council in terms of its independence of the Executive Authority is in any case quite negative, people in the Gaza Strip were less harsh in their opinions than in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, 32.8% of the interviewees responded that the Council was either very independent or independent from the Executive Authority, compared to only 24.5% in the West Bank. Moreover, in the Gaza Strip, 60.6% of the people surveyed considered the Council dependent or very dependent on the Executive Authority, compared to about 12% more people sharing this opinion in the West Bank, namely 72.4%.

Figure 31:

Evaluation of the Legislative Council in terms of its Independence from the Executive Authority


Views of the General Public



This divergence in opinions between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank could be explained by a number of different factors. First, however, the general context of the attitudes towards the peace process should be taken into consideration. In the Gaza Strip, even given

the closure, the political fruits of peace are more obvious, which is why Gazans are usually more supportive about the peace process than the West Bankers are. Figure 32 illustrates this trend over a period of one year, from August 1996 to July 1997.²⁹⁶

Figure 32:




Despite, greater support in Gaza than in the West Bank for the peace process, Gazan opinion has been consistently more critical of the Palestinian Authority than West Bank opinion. The reason for this is that the Authority has a strong presence in Gaza, and Gazans are, therefore, very aware of its mismanagement. Figure 33 gives the results of public opinion on corruption in the Palestinian Authority in August 1997²⁹⁷. Although

²⁹⁶ The data in figure 32 are deduced from a number of surveys conducted by JMCC on the subject.

²⁹⁷ Results in figure 33 are part of a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in August 1997.

respondents in the West Bank are highly critical about the corruption issue, those in the Gaza Strip are even more so.

Figure 33:



At first sight, therefore, the results of figure 31 are surprising and inconsistent with those in figures 32 and 33: Gazans were less critical than West Bankers of the Council and its relation with the Executive Authority. The explanation for this may be that the question here is not exclusively concerned with the Palestinian Authority, but more specifically with the relation between the Executive Authority and the Council. The dependency of the Legislative Council on the Executive Authority might be less obvious in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank for several reasons.

One explanation could be related with the distribution of Council seats in the 1996 elections. During those elections, 57 Council seats were available in the West Bank to

represent a population of approximately 1.5 million.²⁹⁸ This means that on average in the West Bank each Council member represents about 29,395 people. In the Gaza Strip, this number is much lower. In the Gaza Strip, 37 seats were reserved for Council members to represent a population of 750,700, resulting in each Council member representing on average about 20,485 people. These numbers clearly illustrate that people in the Gaza Strip are better represented than in the West Bank. As such, Gazans might - more than West Bankers - feel that their representatives are effective in dealing with their constituents' needs and requirements. This could be the first explanation of why Gazans were less negative in the survey about the dependency of the Legislative Council on the Executive Authority.

Another reason of why the dependency of the Legislative Council on the Executive Authority might be less clear in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank might have a geographic origin. The Gaza Strip is more geographically concentrated than the West Bank. Indeed, whereas the Gaza Strip can be compared to one large island, the West Bank consists of several small islands and is, therefore, often described as being cantonised. The ability for Gaza constituents to meet or know their representatives, therefore, is much higher. This again, could lead Gazans to perceive their representatives to be less dependent on the Executive Authority.

In short, the combination of higher representation and a better possibility for interaction with Council members might cause Gazans to perceive a greater degree of independence


²⁹⁸ The population numbers are based on data from the Health Development Information Program.

among their Council members than people in the West Bank. However, one should keep in mind that, in general, both Gazans and West Bankers consider the Legislative Council to be highly dependent on the Executive Authority.

3.1.1.5. Pluralism

The second lowest rating given to the Legislative Council concerned its perceived pluralistic composition. Only 37.0% of the interviewees found the Council pluralistic (very pluralistic or pluralistic) compared to 58.1% who replied that the Council was unpluralistic (unpluralistic or very unpluralistic). This low score for the Legislative Council on pluralism does not come as a surprise, when one considers the actual composition of the Council. As figure 34 illustrates, 61% of the Council is composed of Fatah members. In addition 14% more Fatah members ran as independents and won seats in the Legislative Council. Thus, in total, 75% of the Council members (66, in number) belong to the same political affiliation. The remaining 22 Council members ran as independents, but some of them are known to be close to Hamas, PFLP, or Fida. Also, as discussed in Chapter Two, groups such as the DFLP, PFLP, Hamas and Islamic Jihad boycotted the elections, even further reducing the chances for a pluralistic parliament.

Figure 34:



Source: JMCC, The Palestinian Council, 1997.

3.1.2. Level of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council

In light of the respondents' negative evaluation (as discussed in section 3.1.1) of most of the aspects of the functioning of the Legislative Council, the electorate's lower degree of satisfaction with the Council's performance than its level of dissatisfaction is predictable.

In general, only 38.3% of the people are satisfied (very satisfied or satisfied) with the performance of the Legislative Council, compared to 55.8% who are dissatisfied (dissatisfied or very dissatisfied) with its performance. Females are more positive than males for the same reasons discussed earlier in section 3.1.1.2.

Refugees are less satisfied with the performance of the Council than non-refugees. As indicated in the previous chapter, this phenomenon can easily be explained by the fact that refugees had higher and perhaps misplaced expectations of Council members than non-refugees, and are therefore more disappointed with the Council's performance. Therefore, even if Council members have not lived up to their campaign promises or do not perform as they should, they can not totally be blamed for the greater disappointment with the Council amongst refugees compared to the Palestinian electorate in general.

Lastly, the trend that appeared in Chapter Two where the more educated Palestinians tended to be more critical than the less educated Palestinians, also applies here. As becomes clear from a comparative look at education in table 31b, 42% of the respondents who received up to elementary education were satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council compared to only 35.7% of the interviewees who received college education and above. Also, whereas 45.4% of the first group were dissatisfied with the performance of the Council, 62.6% of the latter group were.

Table 31a: Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council was elected, what is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

	Total	Gender		Refugee or Not	
	N=1195	Male N=608	Female N=580	Non-refugee N=642	Refugee N=515
Very satisfied	5.2%	5.6%	4.8%	4.5%	5.8%
Satisfied	33.1%	30.3%	36.2%	35.0%	30.5%
Dissatisfied	38.7%	41.9%	35.7%	37.7%	40.6%
Very dissatisfied	17.1%	18.4%	15.3%	16.7%	17.9%
No answer	5.9%	3.8%	7.9%	6.1%	5.2%
<i>df</i>		8		8	
<i>Chi Square</i>		.0050		.5389	

Table 31b: Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council was elected, what is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

	Education				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Very satisfied	10.1%	4.1%	4.6%	3.5%	6.1%
Satisfied	31.9%	33.9%	33.5%	33.8%	29.6%
Dissatisfied	30.3%	37.1%	38.1%	41.4%	49.6%
Very dissatisfied	15.1%	15.4%	20.6%	16.9%	13.0%
No answer	12.6%	9.5%	3.1%	4.5%	1.7%
df	20				
Chi Square	.0000				

3.1.3. Reasons behind Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council


Having established that more people are dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council than satisfied, it was deemed important to know the reasons behind the general public’s positive or negative evaluation of the Legislative Council. In this section, the researcher will examine whether the general public agrees on the reasons behind their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council or whether the different opinions between the various subgroups of Palestinian society, discussed earlier, are being reinforced.

3.1.3.1. Reasons for Satisfaction

In general, out of 38.3% of the surveyed people who said they were satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, 41.7% cited democracy as the most important reason for their satisfaction. Courage on the part of the Council members was given as the

second most important reason with 13.3%. The respondents listed responsiveness as the third reason for their satisfaction with the Legislative Council.


Figure 35:



There are some remarkable differences across the different subgroups in terms of how much importance they attach to the three most frequently stated reasons for satisfaction with the Legislative Council. With regard to attitudes towards the Council members' responsiveness, the results in figure 35 reinforce the findings of section 3.1.1.4 above, where it was shown that the respondents of the Gaza Strip have a less harsh assessment of the Council's dependent position vis-à-vis the Executive Authority than the West Bank respondents. As figure 36 shows, nearly twice as many Gazans than West Bankers gave responsiveness as their reason for satisfaction. Again, the explanation could be that people in Gaza enjoy a higher representation by Council members per population size, whilst living in a more geographically concentrated area. Therefore, interaction and personal contact with their Council members may be easier for Gazans than for West Bankers,

leading them to cite the Council’s responsiveness more frequently than West Bankers as a reason for satisfaction.

Figure 36:



Although a Chi square test on the relationship between the variable of education, on the one hand, and the reasons for satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council, on the other hand, showed no statistical significance, some distinct differences appear, when examining these variables. As indicated in table 34 below, more educated respondents cited democracy as the reason for their satisfaction with the Council much more frequently than less educated interviewees. About 41.5% of the respondents who went to college and above said that democracy was the most important reason for their satisfaction with the Council, compared to less than half of those who received up to elementary schooling, at 18.0%. As will be recalled from section 3.1.2, in general, the more educated respondents

were less satisfied with the Legislative Council than the less educated ones. From the above, however, it became clear that the educated interviewees who were satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, were more positive in their assessment of the Council's democratic character than the less educated respondents.

Also noteworthy is that whereas higher educated Palestinians chose democracy as their reason for satisfaction with the Council much more often than less educated people, the opposite was the case concerning courage and responsiveness. About 22.0% of the respondents who only went up to elementary school cited courage as the most important reason for their satisfaction, compared to only 12.2% of the interviewees who went to college and above. Similarly, only 9.8% of the interviewees who went to college and above were primarily satisfied with the Council because of its responsiveness, compared to 20.0% of the respondents who only received up to elementary education. This pattern might mean that the more educated people cited democracy more frequently as their reason for satisfaction with the Council, because they support and respect the principle of democracy upon which the Legislative Council is based and which the Council members adhere to. However, when it comes to the reasons of courage and responsiveness for satisfaction with the Legislative Council, the more educated become more negative, because they expected more from the Legislative Council. Although the more educated appreciate the Council for the democratic principles it embodies, they do not think this is enough. Their more negative stance concerning courage and responsiveness could, therefore, be interpreted as a message to the Council members. The more educated Palestinians realise the intrinsic potential of the Council based upon the principles of democracy, but they expect more than

good intentions in the field of courage and responsiveness. They were more refined in their expectations of the Legislative Council and more critical in their evaluation than the less educated respondents.


Table 32: Which of the following is the most important reason for your satisfaction?

	Education				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=50	N=84	N=148	N=117	N=41
Responsiveness	20.0%	8.3%	12.8%	10.3%	9.8%
Democracy	18.0%	42.9%	43.9%	47.0%	41.5%
Effectiveness	6.0%	9.5%	6.8%	6.8%	9.8%
Independence	4.0%	9.5%	8.1%	8.5%	4.9%
Courage	22.0%	9.5%	14.2%	12.8%	12.2%
Accessibility	12.0%	8.3%	3.4%	6.0%	7.3%
New experience	-	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	2.4%
Other reasons	10.0%	3.6%	4.7%	6.8%	7.3%
No answer	8.0%	7.1%	5.4%	0.9%	4.9%

3.1.3.2. Reasons for Dissatisfaction

In general, out of the 55.8% who said that they were dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, 42.1% gave its lack of effectiveness as the most important reason for their dissatisfaction. As illustrated in figure 37 below, lack of independence on the part of the Council was given as the second most important reason for dissatisfaction with the performance of the Council. The respondents listed the lack of responsiveness by the Council as the third reason for their dissatisfaction.

Figure 37:




People’s dissatisfaction with the Council’s performance may be caused in part by the circumstances under which the Legislative Council has been operating. Besides the lack of legitimacy the Legislative Council enjoys from its constituencies due to its short existence, Council members are facing major challenges from different origins, such as (1) their lack of experience, (2) the continued Palestinian-Israeli friction, leaving the Council members often powerless, and (3) not least, the power struggle within the Palestinian structures, leading to attempts to limit the influence of the Legislative Council and thus affecting its effectiveness.²⁹⁹

The public’s dissatisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council does not necessarily translate into the public blaming their representatives for the malfunctioning of the Council. The results in figure 38, below, clearly illustrate that the general public is

²⁹⁹ Further details about the obstacles facing the Legislative Council will be discussed in the following chapters.

aware of the difficulties facing the Legislative Council. When the general public was asked in previous JMCC opinion polls whether they thought that the Legislative Council represents the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the majority of the interviewees responded that they felt the Legislative Council does represent the people, but to no effect.

Figure 38:




The results in figure 38 seem to indicate that the Palestinian electorate does not view the Legislative Council categorically negative. Indeed, whilst recognising that the Legislative Council does represent the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the general public also acutely feels the limitations the Legislative Council is facing.

3.1.4. Level of Optimism about the Legislative Council in the Future

Despite the somewhat critical evaluation by the public of the Legislative Council, there is still place for some optimism. Although surveyed people rated the Legislative Council mainly negative in its performance during the first two years since it was elected, they were more optimistic about its performance in the future. As illustrated in figure 39 below, 59.1% of the interviewees said that they were optimistic (very optimistic or optimistic) about the future performance of the Legislative Council, compared to 36.7% who were pessimistic (pessimistic or very pessimistic).

Figure 39:

Level of Optimism or Pessimism About the Future Performance of the Elected Legislative Council
According to the General Public



It is also noteworthy that the respondents' answers to the question about their optimism or pessimism about the future performance of the Legislative Council, confirm and summarise many of the opinion patterns examined earlier in this chapter. The results in table 33 reinforce, for example, the trend noticed before that women tend to be more positive than men in their evaluation of the Legislative Council and the political situation. Also, Gazans were more optimistic than West Bankers about the future of the Legislative Council, which is also consistent with what was found before.

Table 33: *In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future performance of the elected Legislative Council?*

	Gender		Area	
	Male N=608	Female N=580	West Bank N=756	Gaza N=439
Very optimistic	10.2%	12.8%	9.4%	14.8%
Optimistic	44.2%	51.0%	44.2%	53.8%
Very pessimistic	13.8%	9.5%	12.8%	10.0%
Pessimistic	28.0%	21.9%	29.4%	17.1%
No answer	3.8%	4.8%	4.2%	4.3%
<i>df</i>	8		8	
<i>Chi Square</i>	.0110		.0000	

As will be recalled, the better educated, although believing in the principles the Legislative Council embodies, were seen as highly critical of it. Table 34 shows that in the minds of the more educated Palestinians hope for improvement in the future outbalanced their criticisms. Whereas 56.3% of the interviewees who received up to elementary schooling were optimistic about the future performance of the Legislative Council, 62.6% of the respondents who went to college and above shared this opinion. Similarly, whereas 37.0% of the former group were pessimistic about the future performance of the Council, only 33.9% of the latter group were. The same pattern appears when comparing the levels of optimism and pessimism between the younger and older generations. Whereas, at times the younger generation evaluated the Legislative Council more negatively than the older

generation, they continued to be more hopeful about the Council’s future performance. However, one should keep in mind that the strong element of hope, which appears to be influencing the young and higher educated Palestinians to be more optimistic about the future performance of the Legislative Council, may have a down side if their expectations are not met. In such a scenario, the strongest force of opposition could be expected to come from within this group.

Table 34: In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future performance of the elected Legislative Council?

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Very optimistic	21.0%	12.2%	8.8%	8.6%	11.3%	10.0%	7.9%	13.8%	19.0%	16.7%
Optimistic	35.3%	43.9%	51.8%	48.7%	51.3%	53.3%	48.4%	45.3%	41.9%	34.8%
Very pessimistic	11.8%	13.1%	11.1%	12.7%	8.7%	8.2%	14.2%	16.7%	6.7%	10.6%
Pessimistic	25.2%	26.2%	24.7%	26.4%	25.2%	24.0%	25.7%	20.2%	29.5%	27.3%
No answer	6.7%	4.5%	3.6%	3.5%	3.5%	4.5%	3.8%	3.9%	2.9%	10.6%
<i>df</i>	20					20				
<i>Chi Square</i>	.0015					.0021				

3.2. PART TWO: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

3.2.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council according to Five Different Factors

The Council members were asked to evaluate the Legislative Council according to the same five factors the general public was asked. By comparing the differences in the answers of the public and those of the Council members, it is possible to form a better idea of where the gaps in thinking between the two groups lie. In general, however, one can deduce that Council members evaluate the Legislative Council far more positively than the general public.

Table 35, below, indicates that 88.4% of the Council members considered the Legislative Council democratic. Thus, concerning the variable of democracy Council members and the public agreed in their positive evaluation of the Legislative Council. Both groups gave democracy their highest score, albeit that the Council members rated the Legislative Council higher than the public did. This is rather logical as it could be expected that the Council members would be less critical about their institution than any other external group.

Table 35 also shows that Council members' opinion on the selected criteria was positive, except on pluralism, which is also the single concept which the Council members evaluated more negatively than the general public. Whereas 37.0% of the public saw the Legislative Council as a pluralistic institution, only 23.3% of the Council members did so. This is not surprising as, indeed, the majority of the Legislative Council consists of Fatah members. Moreover, as mentioned before in Chapter Two, many members of the Legislative Council ran as Independents during the elections, but do, in fact, belong to Fatah. Genuine non-Fatah Council members are a minority in the Legislative Council. The Council members rated their institution more negatively in terms of pluralism than the public because they are better informed of the actual political affiliations of their colleagues.

Concerning the remaining three factors, the opinion of the Council members and the public differed not only on the degree of importance given to these factors, but also on their ranking. About 81.4% of Council members considered the Legislative Council responsive,

compared to only 42.0% of the electorate. Moreover, whereas 74.4% of the Council members said that the Legislative Council is independent from the Executive Authority, only 27.5% of the public thought so. As such, the general public evaluated the Legislative Council most negatively in terms of its level of independence from the Executive Authority. Finally, whereas 72.1% of Council members regarded the Council as effective, only 39.0% of the public agreed. The disparity in opinions between the public and the Council members with respect to these variables may be explained by the following reasons:

1. As mentioned above, it could be expected that the Council members would evaluate themselves higher than the public would.
2. The Legislative Council is more transparent than other Palestinian institutions and is, as such, more likely to receive criticisms.
3. As will be discussed in greater depth later in the thesis, the Legislative Council is attempting to do its job, but to date its efforts did not produce many tangible results. As anywhere in the world, the general public cares about the results and not only the efforts. The Council members, from their side, perceive themselves as attempting to do as much as they can and, therefore evaluate their performance more positively than the public.

Table 35: How do you evaluate the Legislative Council with regard to the following:


	Value Label	Council Members	Electorate
Democracy	Democratic	88.4%	62.9%
	Undemocratic	7.0%	34.6%
Effectiveness	Effective	72.1%	39.0%
	Ineffective	25.6%	58.9%
Responsiveness	Responsive	81.4%	42.0%
	Unresponsive	11.6%	55.2%
Independence from the EA	Independent	74.4%	27.5%
	Dependent	23.3%	68.3%
Pluralism	Pluralistic	23.3%	37.0%
	Unpluralistic	72.1%	58.1%

3.2.2. Level of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council

Council from the Executive Authority and the political situation, the Council members lack

Figure 40 below, shows that Council members were far more satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council than the general public. Indeed, 67.4% of the Council members were very satisfied or satisfied with the Council’s performance, compared to less than 50.0% of the general public, namely 38.3%. Similarly, only 32.6% of the Council members were very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with the Council’s performance, compared to 55.8% of the general public.

Figure 40:



The results in figure 40 are significant for mainly two reasons:

satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council. The Council members were

Firstly, a relatively large number of Council members (1/3rd) who took part in the survey were dissatisfied with the performance of their own institution. This seems to point to an acknowledgement on the part of the Council members that their performance has not been

The survey with Council member Hassan Dargouth was conducted on Friday 13 September 1997

what it should. Hereby, one should consider that besides the restrictions on the Legislative Council from the Executive Authority and the political situation, the Council members lack legislative experience, which is bound to affect their performance. As Marwan Bargouthi put it to the researcher, the Council members are in a learning process and need to work hard to understand of what the job of a parliamentarian consists, and then implement their newly acquired knowledge.³⁰⁰

Secondly, there is a large gap in opinions between the Council members and the general public. It is the researcher's contention that this can be attributed to two factors. On the one hand, the people were perhaps somewhat unrealistic in their hopes for the Legislative Council, which could partly explain their negative evaluation of its performance today. On the other hand, Council members are likely to deem themselves successful and were, in replying to this question, perhaps overestimating their success.

3.2.3. Reasons for Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council

3.2.3.1. Reasons for Satisfaction


The Council members were asked, as the general public was, to select reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council. The Council members were allowed to give two reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction from a predetermined

³⁰⁰ The interview with Council member Marwan Bargouthi was conducted on Friday 19 September 1997.

list of choices put to them. Figures 41 and 42, below, indicate the average results of the two reasons given by Council members who took part in the survey.

Out of the 67.4% of surveyed Council members satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, an average of 31.0% listed democracy as the main reason for their satisfaction. Independence was given as the second most important reason for Council members' satisfaction. The Council members listed their responsiveness as the third reason for their satisfaction with their performance.

Figure 41:



Like the general public, the Council members considered democracy as the most important element influencing their satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council. However, whereas the Council members cited independence as the second reason for their satisfaction, the general public listed courage. It is possible that the independence cited by


Council members is perceived by the general public as courage.³⁰¹ The general public thinks that the Legislative Council is courageous in some of the positions it has taken over the last two years. However, for the public, this courage does not necessarily imply independence on behalf of the Council, because it does not see the sometimes courageous Council resolutions translated into actual legislation. The best example to illustrate this divergence in opinion between the Council members and the general public is the courageous stance taken by the Legislative Council during the corruption scandal in the summer of 1997.³⁰² The corruption episode exemplified the courage of the Council members, but also highlighted the persistent dependence of their institution and its inability to reach results. In the public's opinion, the Legislative Council will have to have more concrete outputs, before it will be considered independent rather than courageous. Furthermore, it is logical for the Council members to prefer associating the Legislative Council with independence rather than courage, as the latter does not necessarily bring tangible results, whilst the former – once established – would be a fait accompli. Concerning the third reason for satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council, namely responsiveness, the Council members and the public again agree on its importance. In short, it is possible to conclude that the Council members and the general public agree to a large extent on the reasons for their satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council. The extent to which they agree is apparent in figure 42 below.

³⁰¹ This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

³⁰² The corruption scandal will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

Figure 42:


Comparison between the Reasons of Satisfaction of the Council Members and the General Public with the Performance of the Council



3.2.3.2. Reasons for Dissatisfaction

Of the 32.6% of Council members who are dissatisfied with the Council's performance, 35.7% cited ineffectiveness as the main reason for their dissatisfaction. Lack of independence was cited as the second most important reason for their dissatisfaction. The Council members who took part in the survey listed the fact that they were too busy with personal issues as the third reason. The last reason was not included in the original list, but some dissatisfied Council members thought it should be included. Also, a large number of Council members preferred not to give any reason for their dissatisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council. Hence, the large percentage of "no answer" in figure 43, below.


Figure 43:



Both dissatisfied Council members and members of the general public who are dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, agreed on the first two cited reasons for their dissatisfaction, namely ineffectiveness and lack of independence. However, whereas the Council members cited preoccupation with personal issues as the third main impediment to the satisfactory performance of the Legislative Council, the general public listed the lack of responsiveness by the Council. It could, of course, be that there is a causal link, i.e. that because Council members are too involved in their personal business, they fail to be sufficiently responsive to the needs of the public.

Figure 44:

Comparison between the Reasons of Dissatisfaction of the Council Members and the General Public with the Performance of the Council



3.2.4. Level of Optimism about the Legislative Council in the Future

As discussed in section 3.1.4, the general public remained optimistic about the future performance of the Legislative Council. Council members themselves were even more so.

No less than 86.0% of the surveyed Council members said that they were optimistic about the Legislative Council in the future, compared to only 11.6% who said that they were pessimistic. So, according to these results, the will and spirit amongst the majority of the Council members to continue to improve their legislative performance in the future is still

strong. Ahmed Qrei' (Abu 'Ala), Speaker of the Legislative Council, projected these feelings of optimism in his speech at the opening of the third term of the Legislative Council on 7 March 1998 as follows:

*"Palestinian legislators, today, have more confidence in the future after they have passed, by their unity, steadfastness of attitude and support of their people, the test of hard beginnings, the test of transforming theory into ambition, determination and will, in the context of the nation's ambition to end the occupation, to achieve national independence, and build Palestinian democratic civil society, on the basis of justice, equality and the rule of law."*³⁰³

However, this is not the case for all Council members. In October 1997, one of the most trusted, but critical Council members, Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi decided otherwise, and handed in his resignation. In an article he published in the local press explaining his action, 'Abdel Shafi wrote:

*"The people placed their trust in the president of the National Authority just as it placed its trust in the members of the Legislative Council. For this reason, it is obligatory that the relationship of the Council with the president and his executive apparatus be one of co-ordination and co-operation on a constitutional basis, according to a Basic Law. We are still awaiting its ratification... The national unity, which is required to confront the present challenges, will not be achieved except through response to these considerations... We have a long, hard road ahead, which demands honesty, patience and strengthening of our unity...to see us through. This is what I had hoped for when I sought membership in the Legislative Council. However, and unfortunately, none of this was achieved. Therefore, I cannot fool myself or my fellow citizens in continuing to be a member of this Council."*³⁰⁴

'Abdel Shafi did note, however, that:

*In the final analysis...we must remember that this Council is unique due to its special situation. That is, it is a Legislative Council for a national liberation movement and its affairs cannot be measured by what takes place in the Councils of independent countries."*³⁰⁵


³⁰³ "Abu 'Ala: PLC Speaker for the Third Time", Palestine Report, 13 March 1998.

³⁰⁴ Abdel Shafi, H., "In the Name of Duty and Honesty", Palestine Report, 2 January 1998. (Translation by Joharah Baker of an article published in the Al-Quds newspaper on 18 December 1997.)

³⁰⁵ Abdel Shafi, H., "In the Name of Duty and Honesty", Palestine Report, 2 January 1998. (Translation by Joharah Baker of an article published in the Al-Quds newspaper on 18 December 1997.)

Figure 45:

Level of Optimism amongst Council Members about the Performance of the Legislative Council in the Future




As shown in figure 46 below, 18.6% of the Council members were very optimistic, whilst 69.8% of them were cautiously optimistic. The large number of Council members who replied that they were ‘cautiously optimistic’ seems to indicate that they tried to remain realistic in their expectations and optimism. About 9.3% of the Council members were cautiously pessimistic about the Legislative Council in the future, and a minority of 2.3% was very pessimistic.

Figure 46:

Level of Optimism and Pessimism about the Performance of the Legislative Council in the Future

According to the Council Members



3.3. CONCLUSION

From the above, it became clear that the public evaluated the performance of the Legislative Council much more negatively than the Council members did. In fact, the public only evaluated the Legislative Council positively in terms of democracy, and evaluated the Legislative Council negative in terms of responsiveness, effectiveness, its pluralistic composition and its independence from the Executive Authority. The Council members, on their part, only evaluated the performance of their institution negatively in terms of pluralism.

The minority of the Palestinian public who was satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, said this was the case mainly because of the democratic nature of the Legislative Council, the courage demonstrated by the Council members and their responsiveness. The 2/3rd of the Council members who were satisfied with the Legislative Council, were so mainly because of its democratic nature, its independence from the Executive Authority and its responsiveness.

The dissatisfied section of Palestinian public opinion stated that the lack of effectiveness, the lack of independence and the lack of responsiveness were their main reasons for their dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council. Amongst the Council members, 1/3rd was dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council and they stated its lack of effectiveness, its lack of independence from the Executive Authority and the fact that many Council members are too busy with personal issues as their main reasons of dissatisfaction.

The above findings clearly indicate that the performance of the Legislative Council is less than optimal. This is not a result of its undemocratic nature, but rather because its ability to both represent its constituents effectively and to be responsive to their needs, is restricted by its lack of independence from the Executive Authority. As such, it is clear that Potter's characteristic of partial democracies whereby the effect of the elections and the authority of the parliament is undermined by non-elected establishments is valid in the Palestinian case. As will be discussed in more detail in chapters Five and Seven of the thesis, the effectiveness of the Legislative Council is not only restricted by its lack of independence from the Executive Authority, but is equally impeded by the structure of dual leadership that exists between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO. In this web of institutional confusion, the leverage of the Council members is insufficient and, as such, they are unable – as the transitionists Shain and Linz, or O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead would argue – to neutralise authoritarian actors or convince them to subordinate their strategies in order to enhance further democratic development. In other words, for now, the process of democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas has not yet reached Rustow's habituation phase as the moderate section of the elite, i.e. the Legislative Council, is still a minority and is unable to convince the remainder of the Palestinian elite to adhere to democratic principles and rules out of habit rather than duty.

CHAPTER FOUR:

PERCEPTIONS OF WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IS DEMOCRATIC

A prerequisite for any parliament to function as a democratic institution is for its parliamentarians to believe in and adhere to certain basic democratic principles. In this regard, the researcher strongly agrees with the transitionists, in general, and Rustow, in particular, in that the last phase towards democracy cannot be attained without a belief in democratic principles by the ruling establishment. This chapter will attempt to examine the democratic awareness of the Council members and will determine whether or not the Legislative Council has the democratic basis necessary to further the process of democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas. In order to do so, three types of questions were presented to the Council members.

The first set of questions concentrated on assessing the extent to which Council members agree on what defines democracy by asking them to evaluate selected countries according to the extent of their democracy.

The second set of questions were intended to check the level of the Council members' belief in such democratic basics as separation of power, rule of law, and the constitution. In this regard, the researcher presented the Council members with questions pertaining to the relations between the parliament, the executive branch and the constitutionality of laws.

The third set of questions involved asking Council members a number of questions that exemplify their adherence or non-adherence to the principles of democracy elaborated upon in the second set of questions. In short, the objective of the third set of questions is to evaluate the extent to which Council members are ready to adhere to the basic democratic principles, even if in some cases the content of the questions put to them does not conform with their own personal beliefs.

The results of the three sets of questions will give answers to the following three questions:

1. Do the Council members have a common understanding of democracy?
2. Do the Council members have a common understanding of the basic democratic principles?
3. Are the Council members willing to act according to those principles?

As a result, a comprehensive understanding of the democratic awareness of the Council members will be attained.


4.1. RANKING OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THEIR LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY

One way to examine the level of understanding of democracy amongst Council members is by asking them to rank selected countries according to their level of democracy and to see how they perceive other countries in terms of their adherence to democracy. The researcher selected a group of countries consisting of Egypt, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, Yemen, and Sweden. The researcher chose these countries as

they represent various cultures, regions, religions, and systems of government. The selection includes Arab countries, Islamic non-Arab states, European countries and the United States. With the selection the researcher also took into consideration Western countries perceived by the Palestinians either as hostile or fair to their cause.

As illustrated in figure 47 below, in general, the majority of the surveyed Council members thought that Sweden was the most democratic country, followed by France. The United States was put in third place. Whereas none of the Council members who filled in their questionnaires, viewed Sweden and France to be undemocratic, 7.0% considered the United States to be undemocratic (undemocratic or very undemocratic). The fact that the United States was only ranked as the third most democratic Western country, might be a result of the US's negative connotations amongst Palestinians. Many perceive the involvement of the US government in the peace process as unbalanced in favour of Israel.


Figure 47:
Council Members' Perceptions of the Level of Democracy in Selected Countries



It was thought useful to split figure 47 into two adjacent figures: one ranking the Arab countries, and a second one ranking the Western countries. Looking at figure 48, below, it becomes clear that the Council members considered Western countries as being much more democratic than Arab countries. Vanhanen reached similar conclusions. Of the 12 countries regarded in Vanhanen's methodology as 'deviating non-democracies' in North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East, seven of those deviating non-democracies are Middle Eastern countries and four are North African. According to Vanhanen: "It is remarkable that they are all Arab."³⁰⁶

It is also noteworthy that none of the Arab countries were evaluated positively as being democratic by a majority of the respondents. Indeed, none of the Council members considered any of the Arab countries included in the selection to be very democratic. Amongst the selected Arab countries, the interviewed Council members considered Tunisia to be the most democratic, with 37.2% saying so. Egypt was second with 25.6%, and Yemen came third with 18.6%. Jordan came only in fourth place, whilst none of the Council members considered Saudi Arabia to be democratic.

Figure 48:



³⁰⁶ Vanhanen, *Prospects of Democracy*: ..., p. 121.

The evaluation of the Council members of the level of democracy in the selected countries corresponds strongly with the classifications of David Potter.³⁰⁷ The countries that the Council members rated highly (France, Sweden and the United States) are classified by Potter as liberal democracies. Similarly, Potter classified countries such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia that were given a low rate by the Council members in terms of democracy, as authoritarian regimes. Whereas the Council members evaluated Turkey negatively in terms of its democratic record, Potter classified Turkey as a liberal democracy. It should be noted, however, that Potter did so with some reservation given the Turkish regime's policies of repression in part of the country. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Council members evaluated Turkey negatively. Especially, when taking into consideration that the Council members were surveyed at the time when the conflict between the Turkish military and the Islamic Salvation Party erupted in Turkey.

In general, one can deduce from the results in figures 47 and 48 that the Council members do seem to be equipped with sufficient knowledge about the features and characteristics of democratic or undemocratic countries around the globe to be able to rank them according to their level of democracy. In the researcher's opinion, the Council members were generally realistic in their ranking, although, in certain instances, they might have been slightly swayed by their emotions or by the events taking place at the time.

³⁰⁷ Potter, D., "Explaining Democratisation", in: Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis, (eds.), Democratisation, pp. 37-38.

4.2. LEVEL OF DEMOCRATIC AWARENESS AMONGST THE COUNCIL MEMBERS

In the survey of the Council members, the researcher included questions on voting behaviour, constitutional amendments, accountability, and sources of interpretation of the law in order to measure the level of democratic awareness and sense of responsibility on the part of the Council members. Moreover, the questions attempt to assess the importance of the rule of law and the judicial process, the significance of separation of powers, and the level of the Council members' willingness to abide by some or all of these principles.


The question on whether or not a representative would vote on a bill that is popular, yet undemocratic aims to examine whether the Council members understand and accept the principle of due process of law. The question on constitutional amendments will indicate the extent to which Council members abide by Constitution and respect its paramount significance. The question concerning the accountability of the Cabinet and the President will indicate the Council members' understanding of the principle of separation of powers. As for the question on which should be the highest source of interpretation of the law and the constitution, it gives information on the importance of the role of the judiciary in the political process.

For each question in this section, the Council members were provided with examples or explanations in case they needed any clarifications. In general, however, the Council members' understanding of the questions was very good.

4.2.1. Voting behaviour

Council members were asked how they would vote on a bill that was popular, but regarded as being undemocratic according to democratic tenets. The majority of Council members, 58.1%, answered that they would vote against the bill, whilst 20.9% of the Council members said that they would abstain from voting. About 16.3% of the Council members replied that they would still vote for the bill.

Figure 49:




From this question, it becomes clear that the majority of the interviewed Council members would vote responsibly as they are willing to sacrifice popular sentiments in favour of their democratic principles.

4.2.2. Constitutional amendments

When the Council members were asked how the Constitution should be amended, 67.4% responded that it should be amended by a two-third majority vote in the Legislative Council. Only 4.7% of the interviewed Council members answered that a simple parliamentary majority should amend the Constitution. In fact, the Council members preferred a referendum amongst the people to a simple parliamentary majority. It is also significant that none of the Council members thought that the President should be able to amend the Constitution unilaterally.

Figure 50:



The majority of the Council members replying that the Constitution should only be amended by a two-third majority, indicates their understanding of the draft Palestinian Basic Law and their seriousness where the Constitution is concerned. This is reinforced by the large number of Council members who opted for a constitutional amendment through a referendum amongst the people rather than through a simple parliamentary majority. These

answers testify to the commitment that the Council members feel to uphold and protect the future Palestinian Constitution.


It is important to keep in mind that, until this day, there is still no Constitution to set out the rules in the Palestinian autonomous areas. The draft Basic Law, which is the transitional Constitution for the duration of the interim period, has gone through three readings in the Legislative Council. Since September 1997, the approved version of the Basic Law by the Legislative Council has been with President Arafat, who is supposed to ratify the law before it can be enacted. Proposed legislation usually becomes law automatically, if it has not been ratified by the President one month after it has been handed to him. However, although this month has long passed, the Basic Law can still not be enacted, because before it becomes legal, it has to be published in the Official Gazette. Permission for publication in the Official Gazette can only be given by President Arafat. On 28 December 1998, Arafat - after being pressured by the members of the Legislative Council, by various NGOs and by members of his own Fatah group - promised the Legislative Council that he would ratify the Basic Law, but not in the form it was presented to him. He requested the Council members to divide the Basic Law into various separate laws and for it not to be called or seen as the "Basic Law". This might indicate that president Arafat is not against the content of the Basic Law, but wants to avoid the ratification of a Constitution in this interim phase by a Palestinian government whose powers are limited by the interim peace agreements with Israel.

4.2.3. Accountability

4.2.3.1. Accountability of the President

The Council members were asked to whom, in their opinion, the President should be accountable. As illustrated in figure 51 below, an overwhelming majority of the Council members, 90.5%, answered that the President should be accountable to the Legislative Council. When responding to this question, the Council members were allowed to choose more than one option.³⁰⁸ In this case, their second choice was that the President should be accountable to the people: 32.6% of the Council members stated this view. The fact that the Council members' first option was the Legislative Council, and their second choice was the people, indicates that Council members take their responsibility as representatives of the people seriously. Indeed, they did not give the Cabinet or the Courts of Law as a second option as to whom the president should be accountable. The Council members chose the people.


Figure 51:



³⁰⁸ More detailed results can be consulted in Annex 4 of the thesis.

A similar question was asked in an opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in May 1995. As figure 52 indicates, the popular response is very different from that of the Council members. Although the surveyed people at that time agreed with the Council members that the Parliament should hold the President accountable, they did so to a much lesser extent. This is not surprising in as far that it is natural that the Council members would defend the role of their own institution. Only 36.9% of the interviewees thought that the parliament should hold the president accountable, whilst 32.9% said that the Courts of Law should do so. Moreover, only 5.1% of the interviewees responded that the people should hold the President accountable, which is slightly less than the number of interviewees who replied that the President is above accountability. It should be noted, however, that the public might have changed its views on the subject since May 1995 as, at that time, the general elections had not yet taken place and the Legislative Council was not yet established.

Figure 52:




Source: JMCC, May 1995

4.2.3.2. Accountability of the Cabinet

The Council members were also asked to whom they thought the Cabinet should be accountable. As indicated in figure 53 below, a surprisingly small number of Council members responded that the Cabinet should be accountable to the Legislative Council. The majority of the surveyed Council members, 47.6%, said as stipulated in the draft Basic Law, that the Cabinet should be accountable to the President. However, as with the previous question, the Council members were, here also, allowed to choose more than one option.³⁰⁹

In this case, the majority of the Council members, 65.1%, opted for a second choice that the Cabinet should be accountable to the Legislative Council.

Figure 53:



With regard to this question, the Council members were clearly divided over whether the Cabinet should be accountable to the Parliament or to the President. Some Council members seemed to prefer a system similar to the British one, where the Cabinet is


³⁰⁹ More detailed results can be consulted in Annex 6 of the thesis.

accountable to the Parliament. Others felt that the American system, where the Cabinet is accountable to the President, is preferable. In either case, the supreme power remains with the Parliament as most Council members, as stated earlier, pointed out that the President is accountable to the Parliament.

4.2.4. Highest source of interpretation

When asked, which, in their opinion, should be the highest source of interpretation of the law and the Constitution, 46.5% of the Council members who filled up the questionnaire, responded that the High Court should be the highest source of interpretation. As is clear from figure 54 below, significantly, none of the Council members thought that the President or the religious institutions should be the highest source of interpretation.

Figure 54:



The replies of the Council members indicate their respect for the principle of separation of powers and show that they have a clear idea of the responsibilities of each institution under this principle.


In general, one can conclude from these results that, according to the selected criteria, Council members do have a high sense of democratic awareness, whilst at the same time they acknowledge the limits of their institution. Indeed, although they believe that the president is ultimately accountable to the Legislative Council, the results of the survey also indicated that in two instances they believe in the principle of separation of powers. Firstly, they stated that the High Court should interpret the law and the Constitution. Secondly, the Council members gave the President the authority over the Cabinet.

4.2.5. Level of adherence by Council members to other basic democratic principles

The results in figure 55 below, illustrate a very strong belief amongst Council members about some other basic democratic rights and principles than those discussed above. When Council members were asked about the principle of separation between state and religion, 59.5% said that they believed in this principle, whilst 30.9% of the Council members said they did not. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the Council members, 93.0%, said they believed in individual rights, whilst none of the Council members replied that they did not believe in individual rights. Furthermore, 93.0% of the Council members believed in the rule of the majority, whilst 88.4% believed in respecting the rights of minorities. About 97.6% of the Council members believed in judicial review, compared to only 2.4% who did

not. Nearly all Council members, 97.6%, believed in freedom of assembly, whilst 90.7% of the Council members acknowledged the rights of opposition. Lastly, 95.4% of the interviewed Council members believed in the freedom of press, whilst only 2.3% did not. About 2.3% remained undecided on the issue.

Figure 55:



Similar questions on some of the democratic rights discussed above were put before the general public in a survey conducted by the JMCC in May 1995. From the results presented in table 37 below, it becomes clear that the Council members have a much higher democratic awareness than the public does. When asked about the right of the government to intervene in some democratic freedoms and rights, only 39.7% of the surveyed people replied that the government should not intervene with people’s freedom of expression. Only 26.2% of the people said that the government should not intervene in freedom of

assembly. Only 29.2% of the interviewees said that the government has no right to interfere with the opposition, but 53.8% answered that the government should not interfere with their individual rights. In short, on average between 10% to 15% of the surveyed people said that the government always has the right to interfere with the rights and freedoms selected in table 36.

Table 36: Does the government have the right to intervene in:

	All the time	Sometimes	No intervention	No opinion/NA
Freedom of expression	11.7%	44.8%	39.7%	3.8%
Freedom of assembly	17.5%	50.5%	26.2%	5.8%
Individual rights	10.0%	28.0%	53.8%	8.2%
Opposition	15.0%	38.4%	29.2%	17.4%

N=1069

Unlike with the public, the results on the questions put before the Council members presented in figure 55 above speak for themselves. In conclusion, based on the survey results, there is no doubt that a huge majority of the Council members not only know the selected democratic principles, but also believe in these principles and rights. This leads the author to conclude that whatever criticisms are expressed about the Legislative Council and whatever causes a less than perfect performance of the Legislative Council, it is not resulting from a lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of democracy or democratic values on the part of the Council members.

4.3. WILLINGNESS OF COUNCIL MEMBERS TO ACT ACCORDING TO BASIC DEMOCRATIC TENETS

Whilst, in general, people accept certain principles such as justice, equality or rule of law, they often act differently when confronted with specific incidents or situations. In this section, the researcher will attempt to assess the extent to which Council members are

willing to act and vote on specific issues. In this regard, a number of questions were put to the Council members. These questions were designed in a manner that the answers will reflect whether the Council members act according to the principles of democracy.

Before analysing the level of agreement amongst Council members on various issues, it is necessary to outline how the questions were presented to Council members and how their responses were measured. The Council members were presented with a variety of statements, and were asked to express their level of agreement or disagreement with these statements on a scale of 1 to 5, whereby "1" stands for "strongly agree", and "5" for "strongly disagree". For the purpose of this study, "1" and "2" were interpreted as "agree", whereas "4" and "5" were interpreted as "disagree". If Council members ticked number 3 on a certain question, it was understood as "neither" or "middle", i.e. the Council member in question was undecided or hesitant on the topic, and could neither agree or disagree with the statement.

It is also necessary to point out that the percentages presented in figures 57, 58, 59 and 61, are so-called "valid percentages". This means that the Council members who filled in a questionnaire, but did not give their opinion about the statements in these figures, are not included in the results. In other words, the value of "missing" or "no answer" has been excluded.

4.3.1. Adherence to the Constitution and reliance on religious interpretation

As becomes clear from figure 56, Council members answered very differently on the questions of whether the ideal Council member should adhere to the constitution, and whether he/she should rely on religious interpretation.

About 93.0% of the Council members who filled in the questionnaires, agreed that the ideal Council member should adhere to the Constitution, but, in fact, 100% of the Council members who actually answered this question agreed that the ideal Council member should adhere to the Constitution. This result indicates that Council members, in general, are very democratically aware.


On the question of whether Council members should rely on religious interpretation, opinion was much more divided. Whereas the majority of the Council members who answered this question disagreed with the proposition, 9.3% of those who answered said that they did think that the ideal Council member should rely on religious interpretation. About 11.6% of the Council members were undecided on the topic, and could neither agree nor disagree. Significant, however, is that 51.2% of the Council members interviewed refused to answer the question. It is the researcher's contention that the refusal of most Council members to answer this question is a reflection of their disapproval with relying on religious interpretation. It also implies that Council members realise the sensitivities involved in the role of religion and, as such, they refused to be portrayed as opponents to

religious interpretation. One should, indeed, bear in mind, that in general, religion remains an

important factor in Palestinian society. Nevertheless, despite these religious influences, the majority of Council members who answered the question disagreed with the statement that the ideal Council member should rely on religious interpretation, and opted for a more pragmatic approach.

Figure 56:

The Ideal Council Member Should:




4.3.2. Breaking the law to protect national security

The statement in figure 57 below says that there are some situations in which the PA is justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security. A majority of 58.5% of the Council members who responded to this statement disagreed, whilst 29.2% agreed. About 12.2% were unsure whether to agree or not.

Figure 57:

There are Some Situations in which the PA is Justified in Breaking Laws in order to Protect National Security

Level of Agreement amongst Council members



In any case, the significance of there being a majority who did not think that the Authority is justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security becomes even more significant when considered in its context. Indeed, even given the situation of uncertainty in the political developments, the majority of the Council members did not agree that there are some situations in which the PA is justified in breaking laws. In saying so, the Council members were much more “responsible” than the people they represent. In a public opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in May 1995, 1069 people from the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip were asked the same question. About 75.5% of the people surveyed said that in some situations the PA should be allowed to break the law. Only 19.3% of the interviewees responded that they did not think that there were any situations in which the PA would be justified in breaking laws, whilst 5.0% of the surveyed people did not express an opinion.

4.3.3. Impeachment of the President

The statement presented in figure 58 is concerned with the principle of impeachment of the President if he acts against the Constitution. Whilst 19.0% of the Council members disagreed that the president should be impeached if he acted against the Constitution, 47.6% agreed. Abdul Jawad Saleh, Minister of Agriculture at the time of the interview and a member of the Legislative Council, was one of the Council members clearly in favour of the principle of impeachment and expressed this to the researcher as follows:

*"I promoted the idea of impeachment of the President. ... I think that no person, whatever his status, should be exempted from questioning and interrogating, or should be exempted from such a democratic procedure."*³¹⁰


Meanwhile, a large number of Council members remained undecided on this issue, with 33.3% of Council members saying that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. When Jamil Rabah, a pollster and political analyst was asked about the reasons behind the high number of hesitant Council members on this issue, he explained to the researcher:

*"The issue of impeachment against President Arafat was brought up by several Council members in the aftermath of the release of the corruption report. Most of the Council members at the time refused the principle of impeachment because of the political ramifications of such a decision. Your question on impeachment came at a time when the issue was still very much in the minds of the Council members. That is why many were hesitant to state their position in your questionnaire."*³¹¹

³¹⁰ The interview with Abdul Jawad Saleh was conducted in Ramallah on Saturday 23 August 1997.

³¹¹ The interview with Jamil Rabah was conducted in Ramallah on 9 November 1998.

Figure 58: *Views in the Legislative Council*




The people seemed to be more outspoken about the issue of impeachment of the President than the Council members. Perhaps this could be explained by the absence of the issue of impeachment, which, as discussed earlier was a “hot” issue in the Legislative Council at the time of the survey of the Council members. The general public, when answering the question on impeachment was not pressured by a political event, as was the case in the Legislative Council. As a result, in the same public opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in May 1995, 68.8% of the people said that they favoured the principle of impeachment of the President by the Parliament. About 22.9% of the people surveyed disagreed with the principle of impeachment, whilst 8.3% did not answer the question.

4.3.4. Women in the Legislative Council

The statement in figure 59 is concerned with the importance of having women in the Legislative Council. An overwhelming majority of 87.8% of the Council members agree that it is important to have women in the Legislative Council. Only 7.3% of the Council members think that it is not important to have women in the Legislative Council, whilst 4.9% of the Council members remain unsure about the issue.

Figure 59:



It is certain from the answers on the above question that the Council members do believe in the rights of women to participate in the Legislative Council and, thus, to hold positions. However, this does not necessarily mean that initiatives or laws concerning women issues pass easily in the Legislative Council. The suggestion to establish a Women Affairs

Committee is one example of an initiative which to this date did not pass the vote. As Marwan Bargouthi explained to the researcher:


"You know that during the discussions four months ago, I suggested in the Legislative Council to establish a Women Affairs Committee. And there were hot discussions in the Council, but unfortunately my suggestion was rejected by voting. We got 20 votes with, and 18 against. So, we have the majority. But to change, we need 51 persons present in the Council. So, it failed. But we will repeat that and I don't think that the majority of the Council doesn't support the women. Part of the Council is very conservative and very religious, but we have a group who is absolutely with the women's' rights. We are the group of the women!"³¹²

Albeit the resolution to establish a Women Affairs Committee did not materialise, it is the researcher's belief that this is by no means an indication of a rejection or disapproval by Council members of women rights. The failure to pass such a resolution is perhaps indicative to the apathy Council members have concerning social issues. Many Council members indicated to the researcher that, in their opinion, political considerations are not only more important, but paramount.

As illustrated in figure 60, the general public also feels strongly - albeit less than the Council members - about the importance of having women in the Legislative Council. Indeed, 71.4% of the interviewees responded that it was important to have women in the Legislative Council, compared to 22.4% who said that it is not important to have women in the Legislative Council. Also, worth mentioning is the gap in opinions between men and women on this issue. As could be expected, a far larger number of female respondents stated that it was important to have women in the Council.

³¹² The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on Friday 19 September 1997.


Figure 60:



4.3.5. Alcohol drinking as a personal choice

The statement in figure 61 below attempts to look at Council members' opinion on personal liberties through the question of whether or not drinking alcohol is a personal choice. The statement on drinking alcohol was chosen on purpose as it was deemed an extreme example of personal freedom in Muslim countries. Nevertheless, a surprising 56.4% of the Council members said that drinking alcohol was a personal choice and should not be treated as a crime. About 30.8% of the Council members did not agree that drinking was a personal choice and were of the opinion that it should be treated as a crime, whilst 12.8% were undecided on the topic and could neither agree nor disagree with the statement.

Figure 61: A majority of the Council members have a tolerant attitude towards alcohol drinking



The results in figure 61, above, indicate that the Council members, even in an entity where the majority of the people are Muslim and are - according to the Koran - not supposed to drink alcohol, have a liberal and tolerant attitude. Moreover, the results show that the majority of the Council members do not merely accept the principle of personal freedoms as a concept, but believe in it as a basic tenet of democracy. This extreme example illustrates the willingness of the Council members to act on the principles they believe in, even in a case that is presumably inconsistent with their own behaviour and preferences.

4.4. CONCLUSION

In general, the researcher, based upon the survey results in this chapter, reached four main conclusions.

Firstly, the majority of the Council members have a common understanding of what democracy refers to. Not only was there a consensus amongst most of the surveyed Council members that Western countries are more democratic than Arab countries, in most cases, their answers also paralleled the classification of countries by respected scholars in democracy.

Secondly, the majority of Council members clearly show a positive attitude towards the agreed upon principles commonly regarded as tenets of democracy.

Thirdly, the responses of the Council members to questions on specific cases reflect their willingness to act upon the principles of democracy in practice.

Fourthly, Council members show a grasp and belief in democracy that extends to a level beyond that of the public. They are more democratically aware and their answers indicate that their priority as Council members is to uphold the principles of democracy and not merely to represent the public irrespective of what democracy entails.

The knowledge, belief and adherence by the Council members in basic tenets of democracy lead the researcher to conclude that when the Legislative Council and its members are assessed in isolation from other actors such as the Executive Authority, the PLO and Israel, the potential to evolve from a partial democracy to a full-fledged democracy does exist in the Palestinian autonomous areas.

PART TWO:

**DOES THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PLAY AN
EFFECTIVE ROLE IN THE SYSTEM?**

ABSTRACT

Having established in Part One of this thesis that the first Palestinian Legislative Council is an effective democratic institution in its formation and is operating in a way which reflects democratic values, Part Two will examine whether this Legislative institution plays an effective role in the Palestinian political arena. The means used in this assessment are, again, primarily those of testing perceptions.

In the following chapters, the researcher will analyse the relationships between the Legislative Council and different institutions within Palestinian society, including its relationship with the Executive Authority, with president Yasser Arafat, and with the PLO. In addition, the impact of Israeli policies and practices upon the performance of the Legislative Council and the process of democratisation in the autonomous areas will be examined.

A closer look at the interaction between the various actors mentioned above will point to two conclusions. Firstly, although the Legislative Council can be considered to be internally democratic, its effectiveness as a legislative body in the Palestinian autonomous areas is restricted. Secondly, the slow progress on the Palestinian democratisation track is caused both by the nature of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli measures and policies. Over the following chapters, the author intends to pursue the theme that a fundamental change in Israeli policies, accompanied by a swift improvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, are paramount prerequisites for effective democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas and, more specifically, for the Legislative Council to play a more effective role.

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND PERCEPTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter attention will be focused on outlining the structure of the Palestinian government as it is prone to many ambiguities. In addition, an overview will be provided of the various schools of thinking concerning political development in the Palestinian autonomous areas. In short, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary background information on both the structure of the Palestinian Authority and the way it is viewed, in order for the researcher to be able to build up the argument more clearly in the following chapters.

5.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

Before providing details of the structure of the Palestinian Authority, it was thought useful to give a short background of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and this for mainly three reasons:

1. The Palestinian Authority was established as a result of the negotiations between the PLO and Israel.
2. To this date the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people and its jurisdiction is higher than that of the Palestinian Authority.

3. As will be discussed in section 5.1.2.2. of this chapter, there is no clear dividing line between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.

5.1.1. The Palestine Liberation Organisation

5.1.1.1. Background

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded by a group of Palestinian figures upon a decision by the Arab League in 1964 in Jerusalem to act as a body to address Palestinian concerns and aspirations. Various institutions were created to coordinate, decide and implement the goals of the PLO. One of those institutions was the Palestinian National Council (PNC) or the Palestinians' quasi-parliament.

The PNC was set up to form the legislative body of the PLO. Its members were not elected, but mainly appointed by the PLO's Executive Committee. The appointments always took into consideration the representation of Palestinians world-wide. After Arafat became the chairman of the PLO in 1969, the Palestinian military factions were also included in the PNC.

The Executive Committee is the Executive branch of the PLO. Its powers are wide and it has operational control over the PLO's sub-organisations and the budget. The eighteen members of the Executive Committee are elected by the PNC.

5.1.1.2. The political development of the PLO

The June 1967 war, which led to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, had a major impact on the PLO. At that time, the rhetoric of the PLO leadership was not perceived by the Palestinians as effective in dealing with the new realities and the Israeli occupation of the remaining part of Palestine. In the meantime, the successful military activities against Israel by such Palestinian military movements as Fatah (headed by Yasser Arafat) and the PFLP (headed by George Habash) provided those factions with more clout within the Palestinian circles. As a result, by 1969, Arafat took over the chairmanship of the PLO and the main activities of the organisation began to revolve around fighting the Israeli occupation. The impact of Arafat's take-over was large. According to Hussam Mohamad, adjunct professor at Northern Kentucky University, in the Palestine-Israel Journal:

*'The take-over of the PLO in 1969 by Fatah under the chairmanship of Yasser Arafat was a watershed in the history of the Palestinian movement, raising the hopes of Palestinians everywhere.'*³¹³

In 1974, the PLO was recognised by both the United Nations and the Arab League as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Since then, the PLO emerged as a strong body with effective control over many Palestinians, especially those Palestinians in the refugee camps located in many of the Arab countries. This control included responsibilities over the health, education, social affairs and security of the residents in those refugee camps. Whilst the PLO's control was limited in some countries such as

Syria, for example, it was extremely wide for some time in countries such as Jordan and Lebanon.

The PLO's military involvement first in Jordan and later in Lebanon produced major developments that culminated in the forced deportation of the PLO leadership from Lebanon to Tunis in 1982. This development reduced the military posture of the PLO to an almost negligible level and left the PLO leadership no other alternative but to follow a more diplomatic and political course.

With the eruption of the Intifadah in late 1987, the PLO gained a new momentum. The strength of the Intifadah and the gains it generated led the Palestinian leadership in Tunis to capitalise on this success and to start establishing new bases of support in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The success of the Intifadah and the absence of a relatively effective military posture bordering the Occupied Territories further transformed the PLO's strategy which was based on armed struggle to a more realistic one, represented by the willingness to proceed with a political process to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, in November 1988, the PLO in its 18th session of the PNC in Algiers accepted United Nations Security Resolutions 242 and 338, which implied a recognition of the state of Israel. In this session, the PLO declared

³¹³ Mohamad, H., "The Changing Meaning of Statehood in PLO Ideology and Practice", Palestine-Israel Journal, (6), no. 2, 1999, p. 10.

Palestinian independence. In this declaration, the Palestinian leadership expressed its vision of the state of Palestine:

"a. The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be. The state is for them to enjoy in it their collective national and cultural identity, theirs to pursue in it a complete equality of rights. In it will be safeguarded their political and religious convictions and their human dignity by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance, itself based on freedom of expression and the freedom to form parties. The rights of the minorities will duly be respected by the majority, as minorities must abide by decisions of the majority. Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, religion, colour or sex, and the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Thus shall these principles allow no departure from Palestine's age-old spiritual and civilisational heritage of tolerance and religious coexistence.

*b. The State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It proclaims its commitment as well to the principles and policies of the Non-Aligned Movement.*³¹⁴

The diplomatic and political efforts of the PLO were soon damaged by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 when the PLO's position vis-à-vis the war was not clearly in favour of the Kuwaitis. The conclusion of the war, nonetheless, introduced another momentum. This time, the international community launched an initiative in an attempt to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and to proceed with the vision of a "New World Order", outlined by President George Bush in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, on 30 October 1991 the Madrid Conference convened and the Palestinian side was represented by a non-PLO joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.

³¹⁴ <http://www.Miftah.org/documents/dependence//.html>.

The aftermath of the conference saw a number of bilateral and multilateral meetings. However, whilst these negotiations were taking place, secret meetings between Israel and the PLO were underway in Oslo. These meetings led to the conclusion of an agreement between the PLO and Israel, called the Declaration of Principles (DOP). The signing of this agreement on 13 September 1993 set the cornerstone of the peace process and provided the basis upon which the Palestinian Authority was established.

5.1.2. The Palestinian Authority

In this section, the structure of the Palestinian Authority as agreed upon in the peace agreements between Israel and the PLO will be outlined. In addition, the ambiguities that the establishment of the Palestinian Authority brought with it will be overviewed.

5.1.2.1. Structure of the Palestinian Authority

The structure of the Palestinian Authority was first outlined in the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington between the PLO and Israel on 13 September 1993. The details of the structure and the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority were later specified in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip signed between the parties in Washington on 28 September 1995.

The Palestinian Authority consists of two main branches: on the one hand, the Executive Authority, headed by Ra'ees³¹⁵ Yasser Arafat, and, on the other hand, the Legislative Council. Indeed, as stipulated in Article 3 of the Interim agreement:

“Both the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority and the Palestinian Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority which will be elected by the Palestinian people.”³¹⁶

According to Article 3.7³¹⁷ of the Interim agreement, the organisation, structure and functioning of the Council³¹⁸ should be in accordance with the Interim Agreement. All meetings of the Council and its committees, with the exception of the Executive Authority should be open.

The Council, according to article 3³¹⁹ of the Interim agreement, is granted the Legislative and Executive powers. According to Article 18³²⁰, the legislative powers of the Council imply primary and secondary legislation, including a Basic Law and other laws and regulations. The Basic Law or any other law should not contravene with the Agreement. However, article 18 also grants the president of the Executive Authority the power to initiate or propose legislation to the Council and to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council. Moreover, the President is empowered to issue secondary legislation and

³¹⁵ Hereinafter the researcher will use “President” instead of “Ra’ees”.

³¹⁶ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 12.

³¹⁷ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 12.

³¹⁸ When in the Interim agreement reference is made to “the Council”, it actually refers to “the Palestinian Authority”. This is one of the ambiguities resulting from the peace accords. This ambiguity in terminology will be discussed in greater detail in section 5.1.2.2 of this chapter.

³¹⁹ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 12.

regulations “relating to any matters specified and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the Council.”³²¹

Article 18.4.a states that any legislation that is inconsistent with the Declaration of principles, the interim agreement or any other agreement between Israel and the PLO is void.

“a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other Agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ad initio.

b. The Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provision of this paragraph.”³²²

According to article 5³²³ of the Interim agreement, all executive powers granted to the Council under this agreement “shall be bestowed with the Executive Authority” of the Council and will be executed on behalf of the Council. All decision-making processes and internal procedures shall be determined by the Executive Authority. The president shall be a member of the Executive Authority by virtue of his position.

³²⁰ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 20.

³²¹ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 20.

³²² JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 20.

³²³ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 12-13.

5.1.2.2. Ambiguities and difficulties caused by the structure of the PA

The limitations imposed on the Palestinian Authority by the agreements with Israel created a climate full of contradictions and prone to many interpretations. As a result, three ambiguities or difficulties that affect the less than optimal performance of the Palestinian Authority, were identified by the researcher:

1. The functioning of the Palestinian Authority is affected by the internal disputes between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council because of the ambiguous terminology used in the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements.
2. The performance of the Palestinian Authority is affected by the dual power structure between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority as a result of the lack of a proper legal framework determining the relationship between both.
3. The functioning of the Palestinian Authority is not optimal as a result of the limitations Israel put on this institution in the peace agreements.

It is the researcher's belief that the performance or functioning of the Palestinian Authority might be affected by a combination of the above stated difficulties. They will be shortly outlined below, and will be discussed in detail in chapters seven and eight of this thesis.

5.1.2.2.1. The Executive Authority and the Legislative Council

In examining the first view, part of the strained relationship between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council could be explained by the ambiguous description of

the tasks of the different branches of the Palestinian Authority in the peace agreements. Indeed, the name 'Palestinian Authority' is only mentioned in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; in the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Authority is referred to as 'the Council'. It may be suggested that part of the confusion amongst the general public about the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council, and the antagonism³²⁴ between the Legislative Council and the Executive branch, can be explained by the language used in the agreements. Many are confused because, in the Interim Agreement, the 'Council' does not only imply the parliament, but the whole Palestinian Authority, whereas, in reality, the term 'Council' is only used to refer to the Legislative Council, which is part of the Palestinian Authority. Nabil Shaath affirmed these findings in an interview with the researcher:

"There is no PNA in the Interim Agreement. PNA only exists in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. When we came to the Interim Agreement, which Abu 'Ala³²⁵ negotiated, they already carved a role for the Council that is really a mix up, because the word 'Council' mentioned in the agreement is really a synonym for the Palestine National Authority. If you go to the agreement, there is no PNA. It is always the Council, the authority of the Council, the work of the Council, association between Israel and the Council. That gave me a lot of trouble with donors when this Interim Agreement was signed. Some donors wanted to change all the agreements and turn them from the Palestinian Authority to the Council. I said: not the Council, it is a misnomer now. The Council now is not a unique Council, it is now a parliamentary Council, separated from the branch of the Executive Authority."³²⁶

The difficult relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

³²⁴ See Chapter Seven of this thesis.

³²⁵ Abu 'Ala is Ahmed Qrei', the Speaker of the Legislative Council.

5.1.2.2.2. *The Palestinian Authority and the PLO*

The ambiguous relationship and the duality of authority between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO created confusion. The main cause of this confusion stems from the fact that the source of powers and limitations of both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority are different. As becomes clear from figure 62, below, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority have separate legal frameworks and there is no legal framework that determines the relationship between both. As a result, many perceive the Palestinian Authority as a permanent structure replacing the PLO. This is clearly not the case. The structures of the Palestinian Authority are a result of the Oslo agreements and their mandate is limited in time to the interim agreement. As article III.4 of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington on 28 September 1995, reads:


“The Council and the Ra’ees [president] of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be elected for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994.”³²⁷

Moreover, there is confusion, for example, over whether the Executive Authority or the Executive Committee should be the executive institution making decisions on behalf of the Palestinian people. Also, the Legislative Council members are automatically members of the Palestinian National Council, leading many to wonder whether or not the Legislative Council forms a part of the PNC structure.

³²⁶ The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997.

³²⁷ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 12.

Figure 62:



Source: Jamil Rabah

In the absence of a legal framework determining the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, the researcher finds the confusion hardly surprising. As Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki wrote:

*"The absence of a basic law or other constitutional document has led to continuing legal ambiguity about the precise powers and responsibilities of each branch of the Palestinian government. ... The confusion of mandates and overlap of authority between PLO and PA institutions has impeded transparency, accountability, the rule of law, and other elements of good governance."*³²⁸

The ambiguous relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority will be further analysed in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

³²⁸ Sayigh, Y. and Shikaki, K., (Principal Authors) Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions, United States of America: The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1999, pp. 34-35.

5.1.2.2.3. Israel

The demands set by Israel in the agreements further add to the confusion and paralyse the proper functioning of the Palestinian Authority. This is evident in many of the articles of the agreement. To this researcher, the most stringent demands are those pertaining to the fulfillment of the Palestinian Authority of its responsibilities according to this agreement to prevent any actions that Israel considers harmful to its state or Israeli citizens. The other major restriction in the view of this researcher is article 18.4.a, referred to in section 5.1.2.1 of this chapter, which stipulates that the President of the Executive Authority should prevent the promulgation of a law that passed the Legislative Council if this law is determined by Israel to be in contravention with the Interim Agreement. To many observers, Israel's wide interpretations in this regard placed the Palestinian Authority under great pressure.

The Israeli demands and restrictions, described above, can be directly observed. Other difficulties in the Palestinian Authority were an outcome of Israeli measures and practices. Indeed, the continuous building of Jewish settlements, the isolation of Jerusalem, the restrictions on movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip led to an increase in criticisms of the Palestinian Authority. In other words, Israeli violations reflected negatively on the Palestinian Authority.


In Chapter Eight of this thesis, the researcher will assess in greater detail the impact of the demands, restrictions and violations on the functioning of the Palestinian Authority as well as on its democratic and human rights record.

5.2. PERCEPTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN AUTONOMOUS AREAS

5.2.1. Public perceptions

There is a general sense amongst public opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that democratic development in these areas is negligible and that the democratisation record of the Palestinian Authority has not been good. When asked in a survey conducted in December 1997³²⁹ about the perception of the democratic situation under the Palestinian Authority, 41.2% of the 1147 people surveyed said that the democratic situation under the PA is either bad or very bad, compared to only 28.1% who said that it was either good or very good. About 30.8% of the interviewees considered the democratic situation under the Palestinian Authority nor good nor bad.


Figure 63:



³²⁹ Rabah, J., *Palestinian Public Opinion Since the Peace Process*, Jerusalem: The Arab Thought Forum, July 1998.

The surveyed people were also asked to specify what, in their opinion, caused the Palestinian Authority to act undemocratically. As shown in figure 64, below, only 12.3% of the respondents said that the nature of the Palestinian Authority is the cause of its undemocratic practices.³³⁰ Of the interviewees, 40.5% said that the nature of the PA and the Israeli measures combined are the cause of the undemocratic measures of the PA, whilst another 42.9% said that the Israeli practices and measures are the only reason why the PA acts undemocratically.

Figure 64:



As becomes clear from figure 64, above, the respondents were not given the option to respond that the nature of Arab society or Arab culture is responsible for the undemocratic measures taken by the Palestinian Authority. This may seem surprising as many academics

³³⁰ Rabah, J., Palestinian Public Opinion Since the Peace Process, ...

stressed the importance of culture as an influence on democracy in many societies.³³¹ When Jamil Rabah, political analyst and the person in charge of asking the survey question in figure 64, was asked why Arab culture was not included as an option, he explained to the researcher:

*“In 1995, we worked on a survey within Palestinian society to examine and assess the level of people’s awareness of democracy and the values it embodies. The results of this study led us to the conclusion that people are democratic and that their knowledge, understanding and belief in democratic principles is strong. As a result, it became our belief that neither the influence of culture nor religious and traditional influences formed an impediment on the respondents’ understanding of democracy. It was on the basis of this study in 1995 that we decided in our later polls not to include cultural variables as they proved to be insignificant. It is the public’s perception that the main obstacles to democracy emanate from political factors such as the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian political practices.”*³³²

In conclusion, the results of the survey are significant in that they provide evidence of two realities:

1. Many Palestinians consider the Palestinian Authority to be undemocratic.
2. Although a large percentage of Palestinians do not discard the impact of the nature of the Palestinian Authority upon the poor level of democracy in the autonomous areas, most think that the Israeli practices negatively influence the chances of democracy under the PA.

The above findings are also echoed in the writings of Palestinian academics and human rights activists. They are outlined below.

³³¹ For more information, see Chapter One of this thesis and section 5.2.2.1. of this chapter.

³³² The interview with Jamil Rabah was conducted in Ramallah on 9 November 1998.

5.2.2. Expert perceptions

After reviewing the Palestinian literature on democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas, the researcher identified three main lines of thinking. The first school follows the line that the Palestinian Authority can not be democratic due to the nature of Arab society. The second school blames the lack of democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas solely on the nature of the Palestinian Authority. The third school puts the blame for the lack of democratic development on the nature of Israeli policies and measures.

5.2.2.1. Culture and Arab Society

As discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, a strong school of thought emphasised the role of culture in the democratic development of societies. As will be recalled, experts such as Almond and Verba, Putnam, and Lijphart examined culture in various societies and concluded that its impact on democratisation is strong. Experts such as Schmitter and Di Palma, however, were not in favour of including the role of culture in their studies of democratisation. Lipset, Huntington, Kedouri, and Lewis, in their studies on democratisation in the Islamic world, and particularly in the Arab world, stressed the impact of religion on democracy. Piscatori, on the other hand, dismissed the impact of Islam on the democratisation process in the Muslim world.

Dr. Ahmed Khalidi, a former negotiator in the Arab-Israeli multilateral peace talks, believes that the undemocratic measures of the Palestinian leadership are not surprising, given the

nature of Arab society which breeds undemocratic regimes. In an article in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, he explained:

*"In the gap between what is acceptable democratic practice in the West and what the limits of reality and history have imposed on the Palestinians, some have seen cause for shock and despair. But to expect otherwise is either naive or ill informed. No matter what image the Palestinians have of themselves - in particular the carefully cultivated self-image of the large and vociferous Palestinian intelligentsia - the truth is that Palestinian society in its basic structure and orientation is fundamentally no different from the Arab societies that surround it. Even a fervent belief in the justice and morality of the Palestinian cause should not blind us to the realities of Palestinian social and political conditions and to the fact that the kind of regime that will initially emerge from these conditions will in many ways replicate other regimes that have sprung from similar conditions. To expect a full-blown democracy is a historical exercise in wishful thinking and in a peculiar sense is both patronising and discriminatory."*³³³

Although the researcher does not wish to dismiss the influence of culture upon democratic development, its impact on the democratic process under the Palestinian Authority will not be emphasised in this thesis and this for mainly two reasons:

1. Scientific data and survey results on the impact of culture on the level of Palestinian democratic development are scarce.
2. It is the researcher's belief that Arab culture has undoubtedly some impact on the Palestinian democratic process, but its impact is negligible compared to the impact of both the nature of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli practices.

³³³ Khalidi, A., "The Palestinians' First Excursion into Democracy", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (25), no. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 20-28.

5.2.2.2. Nature of the Palestinian Authority

Whereas Khalidi blames Arab culture, Dr. Iyad Sarraj³³⁴, an outspoken critic of the Palestinian Authority, puts the blame for dissatisfactory democratic development on the nature of the Palestinian Authority itself, and does so in a two-fold manner. On the one hand, he blames the dictatorial tendencies of President Arafat's leadership. He writes:

*"Arafat truly believes that he can control the Palestinian people and dictate what is right and wrong. He does not believe that everyone else could understand the situation or know what to do...He thinks he is the only one who comprehends the great conspiracy against the Palestinian people, therefore he works as if by divine inspiration in defence of the people's rights. Anyone who opposes him is considered the enemy, either directly or indirectly. The problem is that people around Arafat don't help him in changing his views. On the contrary, they reinforce them."*³³⁵

Sarraj also condemns the Palestinian leadership collectively, in particular those returning from exile after the peace agreements with Israel. He believes that their influence forms an additional reason for the lack of democratic development and describes this phenomenon as follows:

"After the PA entered the area, there was a clashing of cultures. The culture of the PA is the culture of the gun. We, inside the occupied territories, who did not deal with guns affirmed this because we always considered them as heroes and symbols of the revolution. ... So these people came and they had their own problems and they had their dreams and aspirations as a people and as individuals. They came into a culture which was very aware, not ignorant people who knew nothing about what was going on around them. We were not Yemen or Sudan; we had our sense of nationalism and our hopes. We were able to accommodate, however; ironically, we

³³⁴ Dr. Iyad Sarraj is the director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme. His constant criticism of the PA led to his arrest three times between December 1995 and June 1996. Currently, he heads the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights.

³³⁵ Sarraj, I., "The Conspiracy of Silence", Palestine Report, 29 August 1997.

*learned during the years of the [Israeli] occupation about democracy, human rights and freedom of expression; we saw the Israeli soldiers on television speak their mind, whatever that might be. But the newcomer came with a deep sense of insecurity. They were afraid of Hamas and of the Israelis and they were afraid of themselves, that there wasn't enough money; they were afraid of the people and of America. The Palestinians [from inside] had a lot of constructive criticism [to offer] which posed a threat to the PA because they were not used to criticism, since they had lived in an Arab state where the citizen has no value.*³³⁶

The impact of the nature of the Palestinian Authority on the democratisation process in the Palestinian autonomous areas will be further discussed in chapter seven of this thesis.

5.2.2.3. The Israeli impact

The third and last line of thought found by the researcher in readings on democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas holds the view that the Palestinian Authority is pressured to act undemocratically due to the imbalance in the peace process, whereby the Palestinian Authority is often forced to act forcefully to satisfy Israel's security needs. Accordingly, undemocratic measures and failure to uphold the rule of law are justified by the Palestinian Authority in the name of salvaging the peace process. This view is perhaps best described by Khalil Shikaki, a Palestinian political analyst and Director of the Centre for Palestine Studies and Research in Nablus:

"...the peace process and the PA it engendered also had negative repercussions on the transition to democracy. Holding to the view that the requirements of democracy may contradict those of national reconstruction, and that in the early stages of state building it is more important to assert the state's right to monopolise power and eliminate competitors for the people's loyalty than to democratise the political system, the PA adopted undemocratic policies aimed at 'protecting' the peace process and the process of national reconstruction. Meanwhile, the donor community's emphasis on building the capacity of the PA, rather than supporting

³³⁶ Sarraj, I., "The Conspiracy of Silence", Palestine Report, 29 August 1997.

*institutions of civil society, reveals a similar belief that the success of the peace process requires political stability achievable only through the creation of a strong central authority.*³³⁷

It is the belief of the researcher that the slow democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas can not be blamed on any of the three reasons taken by themselves, but is more likely to be a result of a combination of these factors. The researcher will contend, however, that the Israeli pressures constitute the most important factor leading the Palestinian Authority not to support democratic development to a greater extent. It is the assumption of the researcher that given a fair outcome of the peace process and a reduction of Israeli pressures, democratic development in Palestine will expand. In order to reinforce the researcher's assumption, Chapter Seven will concentrate on how influences and relationships within the Palestinian autonomous areas affect the level of democratic development, whilst Chapter Eight will focus upon the impact of Israeli measures, pressures and policies. By doing so, a more comprehensive picture will be obtained of how much of the lack of democratisation in Palestinian society can be attributed to the intrinsic undemocratic nature of the Palestinian Authority and the efforts of its leadership to contain and suppress pluralism and due process of law, and how much of this lack is related to Israeli measures. First, however, in Chapter Six, the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing its constituents will be examined and how this effects the relationship between the Council members and the people they represent.

³³⁷ Shikaki, Khalil, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine", Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 2, Winter 1996, p. 9.

CHAPTER SIX:

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN REPRESENTING ITS CONSTITUENTS


Before entering into a discussion of the factors influencing democratic development within the Palestinian autonomous areas, it is important to examine how effective the Legislative Council is in representing its constituents, in the views of both the Council members themselves and the general public. In the view of the researcher, this knowledge is crucial as the role of the Legislative Council in furthering the democratic process may be weakened by its incapability to represent its constituents and their expectations effectively. As transitionalists such as Shain and Linz argued, the role of the moderate section of the elite in moving democratisation forward might be jeopardised by, amongst others, a weakening of political participation and representation in the system.

The information in this chapter will indicate that the relationship between the Legislative Council and the general public is not optimal. It is the aim of the researcher - based on results of public opinion polls and a survey conducted within the Legislative Council - to enlighten the reader on whether or not this mediocre relationship is a result of too high expectations on the part of the public, an inadequate knowledge by the Council members of the needs of the constituencies they represent or the Council members' incompetence.

6.1. Evaluation of the Relationship between the Legislative Council and the Public: in view of Public Opinion

In order to get a better idea of public opinion on the performance of the Legislative Council, the researcher asked in an opinion poll whether or not the people felt that the Legislative Council represents their views or concerns. As shown in figure 65, below, only 13.2% of the surveyed people replied that the elected Council members represent their views or concerns, whilst 54.3% answered that the Council members represent people’s concerns to some extent. About 27.2% of the interviewees replied negatively. When compared to the public attitude on other topics, the results in figure 65 imply negativity and scepticism on the part of the public towards the Legislative Council.

Figure 65:
Do the Council Members Represent the Views/Concerns of the People?
According to the General Public



When looking at the different subgroups included in the opinion poll, interestingly, similar trends as in Part One of this thesis re-appear. As shown in table 37, the more educated interviewees were more negative in their opinion. Only 11.3% of the surveyed people who went to college and above thought that the elected Council members represent the views and concerns of the people, compared to 23.5% of the people who received up to

elementary schooling. Also consistent with earlier trends, younger people thought that the Council members did not represent the people's concerns more frequently than older people. Indeed, whereas 25.6% of the people between 18 and 25 years old responded that they did not think that the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people, only 16.7% of the people above 55 thought so.

Table 37: Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people?

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Yes	23.5%	12.2%	13.4%	10.2%	11.3%	13.5%	12.3%	14.8%	15.2%	13.6%
To a certain extent	50.4%	52.0%	53.9%	57.0%	57.4%	56.2%	49.5%	55.2%	57.1%	57.6%
No	19.3%	26.2%	30.9%	27.7%	27.0%	25.6%	33.3%	24.6%	22.9%	16.7%
No answer	6.7%	9.5%	1.8%	5.1%	4.3%	4.7%	4.9%	5.4%	4.8%	12.1%

One could argue that the rather negative opinion of the Palestinian public stems from the lack of familiarity with the new institution of the Legislative Council. A comparative look at the results of a similar question asked in an opinion poll conducted by the JMCC shortly after the January 1996 elections, however, reveals that the general public's belief in the Council members' ability to represent their points of views, has declined over time.


As illustrated in figure 66, below, in February 1996, 23.6% of the surveyed people responded that the elected members represented their points of view, compared to only 13.2% who continue to think so in August 1997. Compared to August 1997, less people in February 1996 seemed to feel that the Council members represented their views only to a certain extent. Indeed, it seems that people who were absolutely positive back in February 1996 that the Council members represented their points of view, increasingly think that the elected members only represent their views and concerns to a certain extent. One can,

therefore, deduct that the relatively negative evaluation of the Legislative Council is not a result of the lack of familiarity by the Palestinian public with its workings. On the contrary, at the time of the researcher's survey, looking back at the record of the workings of the Legislative Council over a time-frame of more than two years, the general public was less convinced of the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing their views or concerns.

Figure 66:

Given the Election Results, To what Extent Would You Say that the Elected Members represent Your Point of View?

According to the General Public



Source: JMCC, February 1996


The results in figure 67, below, support the trend described above. Indeed, similarly, the electorate was also critical of the Legislative Council, when asked if they thought that the Council members know what people need. Only 29.3% of the surveyed people answered that the Council members knew the needs of the people sufficiently. The majority evaluated the Council members negatively, with 50.5% of the interviewees saying that the

Council members do not know enough about the needs of the people, and 16.2% replying that the Council members do not know at all what the people need.

Figure 67:

To What Extent Do Council Members Know What People Want/Need?

According to the General Public




In conclusion, the results gathered from figures 65/66/67 taken together, reinforce each others' significance and give a clear message that the Palestinian public does not think highly of the Council members as far as their knowledge of the views or the needs of their constituents is concerned. In other words, in general, people do not consider the Legislative Council to be an effective institution. This may be the case, but is the Legislative Council ineffective simply because the Council members do not know the needs of the people? Or could it be that the Council members know the needs of their constituencies, but are ineffective in translating this knowledge into policies due to restrictions imposed on their institution by other forces?

6.2. EVALUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE PUBLIC ACCORDING TO THE COUNCIL MEMBERS

6.2.1. In general

In general, Council members are positive about their relationship with their constituents. As shown in figure 68 below, when asked about the level of communication between the Legislative Council and the people, 60.5% of the Council members considered it to be good, and 34.9% thought that the level of communication is average.


Figure 68:



The Council members were also asked to evaluate the manner in which the public affects the functioning of the Legislative Council. This question was asked in order to find out whether or not the Council members thought that their constituents provide them with positive indicators on how to perform their duties as legislators. In other words, this question attempts to assess whether or not, in the opinion of the Council members, the people effectively and know their needs will be provided. From the results in

relationship between the Council members and the electorate who voted for them is positive. As shown in figure 69 below, an overwhelming majority of the Council members, namely 86.0%, said that the people affect the work of the Legislative Council positively.

Figure 69:



When comparing the replies of the Council members in figures 68 and 69 above, it appears that the Council members were very positive about the effect people have on the functioning and work of the Legislative Council. This positive evaluation is not surprising as the Legislative Council and its legislators are able to function as a result of the public's vote. However, the Council members remained relatively cautious in their assessment of the level of communication with the people. Perhaps, this caution can be explained as an acknowledgement by the surveyed Council members of a degree of ineffectiveness in reaching their constituents and a realisation on their part of how much room for improvement there is in this respect.


6.2.2. Effectiveness in representing views and needs of the population

In this section, the opinions of the Council members on whether or not they represent the views of the people effectively and know their needs will be provided. From the results in

figures 70 to 73 below, two main points will appear: (1) the Council members feel that they know the needs of the public better than the public thinks, and, (2) the Council members feel that they represent their constituents better than the public thinks.

The results in figure 70 indicate that 41.9% of the elected members said that they represent the views and concerns of the people well. Although this percentage is much higher than the percentage of the public perception with respect to the Council members' representation of their concerns, one should keep in mind that less than 50% of the surveyed Council members answered the question positively. Indeed, the majority of the Council members, namely 51.2%, replied more modestly and stated that they only represent the views and concerns of the people to a certain extent. Only 2.3% of the Council members thought that they did not represent the concerns of the people at all compared to 27.2% of the general public.

Figure 70:




As shown in figure 71, below, the Council members were also modest about the extent of their knowledge about the people's needs. Although 55.8% of the Council members replied that they know sufficiently about the needs of the people, 34.9% of them said that they do not know sufficiently about what people want. None of the Council members replied that the Council members do not know at all what the needs of the people are.

Figure 71:

To What Extent do the Council Members Know What People Want/Need?

According to the Council Members




Whereas the previous figure showed what the Council members thought they - as a group of representatives - knew about the people's needs, figure 72 is concerned with the question of whether they themselves, as individuals, think that they know what people want. It is clear that Council members value themselves, as individuals, higher than their colleagues. As shown in figure 72, a majority of 67.4% of the Council members think that they personally know the needs of their constituents. Only 27.9% of the Council members agreed that they did not know a lot about the needs of the people. Again, none of the Council members who answered this question said that they personally did not know at all what the needs of the people are.

Figure 72:

Do You Yourself Know What People Want/Need?

According to the Council Members




Finally, figure 73 provides a summary of the differences in opinions between the general public, the Council members in general, and the Council members as individuals on the question of whether the Council members know the needs of the people.

Figure 73:

Level of Knowledge of the Needs of the Public

Comparison between the Views of the General Public, the Council in General, and the Individual Member



From the above, it is clear that the Council members evaluate their performance much more positive than the general public, both in terms of their knowledge of the needs of the people and their capability of representing the people well. This may seem natural, but the Council members do seem to have answered the questions realistically. On the one hand, their answers were only moderately positive; on the other hand, the results seem to indicate that the Council members - although stating that they have a fair knowledge of the needs of the people - do acknowledge that they do not represent their constituencies optimally.


6.2.3. About the knowledge by Council members of the needs of the people

In this section, the researcher will examine in how far the negative views of the general public about the Council members' knowledge of the public's needs were justified or not. In this section it will become clear that the Council members, generally, are aware of the needs of the Palestinian people and that there are other factors which influence the less than optimal representation by the Council members.

In order to find out whether or not Council members really know their constituents' needs, they were asked to make two choices from a predetermined list of problems facing Palestinian society, which - in their opinion - are the most pressing problems. The results presented in figure 74 below are cumulative results of the two answers given by each Council member who filled in their questionnaire.

As illustrated in figure 74, 25.1% of the Council members considered the economic situation the most important problem facing Palestinian society today. The political situation came out as the second most pressing problem facing Palestinian society, with 17.5% of the surveyed Council members saying so.


Figure 74:



The general public was also asked in an opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in April 1996 to identify the most important problem facing Palestinian society. Although the public opinion poll dates from a different time, the results in figure 75, below, show that the problems in Palestinian society identified by the public are remarkably similar to those perceived by the Council members. Indeed, 39.8% of the interviewees answered that the most important issue facing Palestinian society was the improvement of the economy. Moreover, as shown in figure 75 below, 23.1% of the surveyed people thought the completion of the negotiations with Israel was the most important issue, whilst 11.8% thought it was the achievement of democracy and freedom of expression.

Figure 75:

The Single Most Important Issue Facing Palestinian Society
According to the General Public




Out of the information gathered from figures 74 and 75, it is safe to say that the Council members and the general public think similarly about the main problems facing Palestinian society. Both the Council members and the public agree that the economic situation is the most pressing problem. Similarly, the Council members and the general public also seem to agree on the gravity of the political situation as a serious problem facing Palestinian society.

Judging by the findings above, it would appear that Council members are aware of the concerns of the people. As such, the Palestinian electorate's evaluation of the Legislative Council might have been too harsh on the question of whether or not the Council members know what the people need.

To test the above assumption even further, Council members were also asked to identify, in their opinion, the three most important needs of the people from a pre-determined list.

Again, the results in figure 76, below, are cumulative results of the three answers given by each surveyed Council member.

Figure 76:



As shown in figure 76, above, the people’s most important need, according to the Council members, is the need for democracy, law and justice. This choice is closely followed - in the Council members’ minds - by the people’s need to see an improvement in the economy. Indeed, some 21.7% of Council members said that democracy, law and justice are important needs of the people; 20.9% felt an improvement in the economy was an important need for the people. It is also noteworthy that 14.7% of the Council members mentioned unemployment as an issue which the people need to see resolved, which reinforces the point that the Council members do realise that an improvement in the Palestinian economy is of utmost importance to their constituents.

6.3. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be said that the less than optimal relationship between the Palestinian people and their representatives is not a result of unreasonably high expectations by the public nor is it due to the inadequate knowledge by the Council members of the needs of the constituencies they represent.

In general, the Council members are aware of the needs of their constituents, but the latter do not realise this fact, because they do not see this knowledge translated into policies. Hence, the popular disappointment with the performance of the Council members and their dissatisfaction with the level of effectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing their concerns.

As established above, the Council members' failure to effectively represent their constituents' concerns, can not be blamed on their lack of knowledge of the most pressing problems facing Palestinian society or on their incompetence. Indeed, there are other factors at work, influencing the performance of the Legislative Council and restricting its effectiveness. If those influences are dealt with or disappear, and based on the findings in this chapter, the potential of the Legislative Council representing its constituents effectively becomes real. The influences detrimental in the ability of the Legislative Council to represent its constituents effectively will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis.

CHAPTER SEVEN:
IMPACT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ON
PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

In order to provide a better understanding of the extent to which democratic development within the Palestinian autonomous areas is influenced or even impeded by internal dimensions, this chapter will concentrate on the relationship between the Legislative Council and various Palestinian political actors and institutions.

By concentrating on the Palestinian elite and by examining the degree to which inter-elite competition strains further democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas, the analysis in this chapter clearly follows the transitionalist approach. As will be recalled from Chapter One of the thesis, transitionalist scholars such as O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, and Shain and Linz, differentiated between different types of elites and stressed that the transition to democracy can only be consolidated if the moderate section of the elite is able to increase in number and promote democratic practices, whilst attempting to neutralise the less democratic members of the elite. Furthermore, these scholars emphasised that the potential for further democratisation in a period of transition is largely dependent on the willingness of the elite to continue on the path of democracy.

The findings in Chapter Seven will also clearly indicate that the form of government in the Palestinian autonomous areas is a partial democracy. Indeed, on the one hand, what follows will show that the authority of the Legislative Council is compromised by the interference of other non-elected establishments within the Palestinian "entity", which diminishes the degree of accountability of the government to the people. On the other hand, Palestinian citizens enjoy some degree of freedom of expression and political opposition does exist, although it is too weak to exert real pressure.

Chapter Seven is divided into two main parts. In the first part of the chapter, the researcher will focus on the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. In the second part of the chapter, effort will be concentrated on clarifying the relationship between the Legislative Council and President Yasser Arafat. The arguments made by the researcher in this chapter will be supported by the researcher's public opinion poll, by the survey conducted within the Legislative Council and by numerous interviews.

The election of the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 1996 marked a transformation of the Palestinian political system. As Ali Jarbawi, a Palestinian political analyst and professor at Birzeit University, argues, this transformation shifted the "centre of Palestinian political life from the "outside" to the "inside"" - that is, from abroad to Palestine itself. The Palestinian institutions generated by the peace process, notably the Palestinian Authority (PA), consisting of the Executive Authority and the Legislative

Council, are both “inside”.³³⁷ In the following pages, the researcher will examine the scope of the transformation of the Palestinian political system. In this regard, two issues will be assessed. First, in this chapter the extent to which the shift of the centre of Palestinian political life led to the legitimisation of the “inside” at the expense of the “outside” will be examined. Secondly, the issue of to which extent - amongst the inside institutions - the Executive Authority not the Legislative Council gained power as a result of the rapid transformation of the Palestinian political system will be tackled.

7.1. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

7.1.1. The nature of the relationship between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council

One of the main causes for strain in the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, bringing to the surface deficiencies and mismanagement in the structure and workings of the Palestinian Authority stems, as indicated in Chapter Four, from the phrasing of the Oslo agreements. The specific mandates of both the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council are unclear, leaving the specifics of the workings of the Authority up to different interpretations according to the parties concerned.

On the one hand, members of the Legislative Council feel ignored by the Executive Authority and charge the Executive Authority, headed by Arafat, for not respecting the

³³⁷ Jarbawi, A., “Palestinian Politics at a Crossroads”, Journal of Palestine Studies, (25), no. 4, Summer 1996,

legislative role of the Council, and for not ratifying laws passed by the Legislative Council, in particular the Basic Law. Failure to ratify the Basic Law, many Council members argue, has left the Palestinian autonomous areas without any legal framework; instead, they are simply controlled by the rule of Yasser Arafat and his Executive Authority. Members of the Executive Authority, on the other hand, think that the Legislative Council is interfering and often acting outside its jurisdiction. Complicating the situation further, is the fact that some Council members are also members of the Executive Authority and have divided loyalties, leading to further paralysis in the Legislative Council. Interviews which the researcher conducted with members of either or both the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council provide evidence of these divisions.

Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi, a Council member until he resigned in October 1997 and head of the Red Crescent Society in Gaza, expressed the frustration of many Council members with the Executive Authority to the researcher as follows:

*"I think, initially, the elected members expressed an attitude of seriousness towards their task as the representatives of the community, and, indeed, responded very well to whatever they were faced with. They adopted resolutions, but, regrettably, the Executive Authority took a very negative attitude towards the PLC, and that, of course, was very frustrating for the Council members... I didn't at all expect that being a Council member would be as bad as this. I thought that the challenges which we are facing required a strong co-ordination and co-operation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. I was hoping that a good Executive Authority performance would substitute for the negative aspects of Oslo, but the contrary happened."*³³⁸

Dr. Nabil Shaath, who is both a Council member and a member of the Executive Authority, was very critical of the Legislative Council and represented the view of the members of the

pp. 29-39.

³³⁸ The interview with Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi was conducted in Ramallah on Tuesday 29 July 1997.

political leadership who thought that the Legislative Council was, on many occasions acting outside its jurisdiction. He told the researcher:

*"I think this PLC or this Council is trying to test the limits of its Authority. So, it has acted sometimes as a court and made judgements and verdicts, even before asking anybody questions about the verdict. In the last months, it acted like a kangaroo court. No due process, no rights to the accused, it just acted by typical medieval edict. It acted sometimes as it was the Executive Authority and made edicts to ministers about what to do with this and what not to do with that. Not that the ministers listen all the time, but they, in many cases acted as the Executive Authority, as the Judiciary Authority as well as the Parliamentary Authority. In fact, if you want to be more specific, in their first year they did absolutely no legislation. They were doing nothing but political edicts, executive edicts and court judgements about corruption."*³³⁹

Moreover, Nabil Shaath clearly identified more with the Executive Authority than with the Legislative Council. He said in his interview with the researcher:

*"I am a member of the Council, but I am also part of the Executive Authority. Therefore, in my conflict of inner identification, I do not identify with the Council. I mean, if I were to choose, I can not identify with the Council. I did not find in the Council a real expression either of the democracy I thought was necessary to build our society, or of the parliamentary authority that was supposed to be a real control of the democracy, due process of law, and the rights of people... My idea was that this was the conference that was going to set the rule of law and the right of man in Palestine. And that it was going to put the modern legislation that will create in Palestine institutions that are different and much better than all those in the countries around us. And I found great disappointment. Maybe it was a stupid expectation."*³⁴⁰

Hanan Ashrawi, also both a Council member and a member of the Executive Authority until she resigned on 5 August 1998, represents a view on the other side of the spectrum than that of Nabil Shaath. Although at the time of the interview she was a member of the Executive

³³⁹ The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in Al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997. It should be mentioned that this was at the time when the corruption report was being debated in the Legislative Council. Amongst the ministries singled out was the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation. The inquiry and the corruption report will be discussed later in this chapter.

³⁴⁰ The interview with Dr. Nabil Shaath was conducted in Al-Ram on Thursday 21 August 1997.

Authority, she explained to the researcher that she identified herself more with the Legislative Council:


"Having these two positions in a sense is rather strange, because I feel and identify with the people and I feel that the cabinet members and the Executive Authority should be entirely accountable before the Council. I would like to empower the Council, so that it can do its job, in terms of monitoring, accountability as well as legislation. I take the Council seriously... I have certain jobs in the Cabinet, certain tasks and responsibilities which I try to fulfil professionally and honestly, and I try to be part of formulating the political discourse. But, at the same time, I feel that if we lose touch with the people, if we lose touch with the system of representation, then, there are no political decisions that are worth anything, because politics and political decisions are not made in a vacuum. And we can not have a rift between what people feel, want and believe and between the decision-making process. I sometimes certainly feel that there is this rift and it is not conducive to confidence or to the decision-making process."

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In addition to the interviews, the author also asked the Council members about the relation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority through the distributed questionnaires. In the results, the tension between the two branches of the Authority was clear. As illustrated in figure 77 below, Council members viewed the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority very negatively. About 27.9% of the Council members stated that the Legislative Council is very restricted by the Executive Authority, and 58.1% said that the Executive Authority exerts some restrictive pressure on the Council. Only 14.0% of the Council members thought that the Legislative Council is not restricted at all by the Executive Authority.

³⁴¹ The interview with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi was conducted in Ramallah on Tuesday 16 September 1997.

Figure 77:



In the survey conducted by the researcher, the Palestinian public was also asked about the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority as it is important to know how they perceive this relationship and its effect on the democratic process.

In general, the public was even harsher than the Council members in their evaluation of the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. This could be explained by two main reasons:


1. A large number of Council members are also members of the Executive Authority and, as such, were bound to be less critical of the restrictive effects of the Executive Authority on the Legislative Council.
2. The public perceives the Executive Authority as dominating the Legislative Council. This perception affects the democratic legitimacy of these institutions.

As illustrated in figure 78 below, 35.7% of the surveyed people thought that the Legislative Council was very restricted by the Executive Authority. However, more Council members

than people thought that there were some restrictions by the Executive Authority upon the Legislative Council.

Figure 78:

Perceived Restrictions of the Executive Authority on the Council
Comparison Between the Council Members and the General Public




Source: JMCC, Jerusalem, January 1998.

Below, additional results from the survey conducted within the Legislative Council, further illustrate the difficult relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority.

When the Council members were asked to describe their level of communication with the Executive Authority, only 14.0% of the respondents said that it was good. About 46.5% of the Council members described their level of communication as average, whilst 37.2% considered it to be bad.

Figure 79:


Evaluation by the Council Members of the Level of Communication with the Executive Authority



Moreover, as indicated by figure 80, below, only 4.7% of the Council members who participated in the survey said that the Executive Authority had a positive affect on the functioning of the Council. In addition, the majority of the Council members, 79.1%, said that the Executive Authority had a negative impact on the performance of the Legislative Council. About 9.3% did not think that the Executive Authority had any effect at all on the functioning of the Legislative Council.


Figure 80:

Evaluation by the Council Members of How the Executive Authority Affects the Functioning of the Legislative Council



The Council members' negative answers to the two aforementioned questions could perhaps be explained by their feeling of frustration regarding the marginalisation of their institution and its resolutions by the Executive Authority. When asked why the Executive Authority often ignored the resolutions of the Legislative Council, 37.2% of the Council members answered that it was due to the attitude of the Executive Authority, whilst 20.9% blamed the Executive Authority's inefficiency. About 32.6% cited the combination of the attitude and inefficiency of the Executive Authority as the main reason for the resolutions of the Legislative Council not being implemented.

Figure 81:



7.1.2. Case study of the relationship between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council

Both the interview material and the survey results, above, indicate a clear perception that the Executive Authority, headed by President Yasser Arafat, has captured the prevalent role, at the expense of the Legislative Authority. Dr. Ziad Abu Amr, a Council member from the Gaza Strip and a professor of political science, has expressed this perception in an article in the Journal of Palestine Studies, when he wrote:

“It is natural for an executive power to try to expand its influence to protect itself and its interests; competition between the executive and legislative branches of government is appropriate as long as it is democratic, legal, and peaceful. In the Palestinian case, however, the EA is seeking to marginalise the legislature, which is entrusted with enacting legislation and with monitoring the conduct of the executive itself. In this attempt, the executive is not observing democratic rules.”³⁴²

That being said, some argue that whilst certain violations were committed by the PA, it is incorrect to portray the Palestinian leadership as dictatorial and intrinsically disrespectful of democratic principles. Indeed, whilst it is true that the restrictions imposed by the Executive Authority on the Legislative Council are evident, the Legislative Council has, nonetheless, been free to criticise the Executive Authority harshly. At no time was this more evident than in August 1997 when the Palestinian Authority itself appointed an inquiry to investigate corruption in certain ministries and government agencies.

³⁴² Abu Amr, Z., “The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Critical Assessment”, Journal of Palestine Studies, (26), no. 4, Summer 1997, pp. 90-97.

This inquiry, which fell short from criticising Arafat, submitted a report to Arafat, that was later forwarded to a special committee of the Legislative Council. This committee further examined the report and, subsequently, submitted recommendations to the Legislative Council. One of these recommendations was that the Cabinet should resign in response to the proofs they had accumulated regarding widespread mismanagement of public funds. After the ministers in question were questioned in the Legislative Council, sixteen of the twenty Cabinet ministers submitted their resignation to President Arafat.

The corruption episode and the demand by the Legislative Council for the resignation of the Cabinet did, indeed, seem to indicate a level of democratic practice in the Palestinian autonomous areas that should not be discounted. However, to what effect? At the time of the corruption report, President Arafat did not accept the resignation of his Cabinet. Eventually, the persistent delaying tactics or the outright ignoring of the Legislative Council's resolutions and recommendations by Arafat and the Executive Authority, and the fact that Arafat did not accept the resignation of his Cabinet, led in mid-December 1997 to a decision by the Council members to suspend all the Council sessions until the end of December. Moreover, the Legislative Council threatened to hold a no confidence vote if Arafat and the Executive Authority did not act upon the Council's recommendations. As Abbas Zaki, a leading Fatah Legislative Council member, said in an interview at that time with the newspaper Al-Ayyam:

*"If the Executive Authority does not respond positively to our demands, we will cast a vote of no confidence against the government by 30 December 1997, so that we do not set foot into the new year with protests that confirm the incapacity of the Palestinian institutions."*³⁴³

³⁴³ Al-Ayyam, Wednesday 24 December 1997.

Arafat then responded by promising (1) to accept the two-month-old resignation of his ministers; (2) to reshuffle the Cabinet within six weeks; and (3) to ratify certain laws, provided certain amendments were made. The Cabinet, however, was not reshuffled within this time-frame and the Legislative Council did not act upon its threat of a no confidence vote until 30 May 1998, when the Council members voted to hold an extraordinary session on 15 June 1998 to bring the no confidence vote back to the agenda.³⁴⁴

At the end of May 1998, tension between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority had reached another peak because the latter had not responded to comments submitted by the Legislative Council on the budget that had been presented to them. At the heart of the Legislative Council's reservations about the budget was the discovery that significant government expenses incurred by the president's office were not included in the budget, whilst a significant share of income to the Palestinian Authority was also excluded.³⁴⁵ In short, the dispute over the budget summed up the complaints voiced by the Legislative Council since August 1997 about the problem of corruption and mismanagement within the Palestinian Authority and the Executive Authority's persistent disregard for resolutions and legislation adopted by the Legislative Council.

Three days before the Legislative Council was due to hold its extraordinary meeting on a no confidence vote in the Executive Authority, on 12 June 1998, Arafat requested the postponement of the Council session for 10 days in order to give him time to hold

³⁴⁴ This was stated in al-Quds, 31 May 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summary, 31 May 1998.

³⁴⁵ Khatib, G., "Reshuffle Turns up Jokers?", Palestine Report, 19 June 1998.

consultations with various Palestinian parties, forces and parliamentary blocs to prepare a new ministerial list to be presented to the Legislative Council.³⁴⁶ The Legislative Council from its side agreed to postpone the vote of confidence until 25 June 1998; the opposition parties, from their side, agreed to participate in the consultations with Arafat, but refused Arafat's invitation to join the new ministerial formation.³⁴⁷ In the meantime, various Council members voiced their high expectations for the need of a proper Cabinet reshuffle rather than cosmetic changes in the Cabinet. Council member Hikmat Zeid from Jenin stated in an interview with al-Hayat al-Jadida:

*"Slight changes or additions are not acceptable; the ministers who were proved to be involved in the poor performance must be renewed; the corruption file must be opened and taken seriously."*³⁴⁸

On 23 June 1998, Council member Ziad Abu Amr, a representative of Gaza city, commented:

*"We are in need for reforms since we are observing the constructing process and meanwhile facing a tough confrontation with Israel. The change which is demanded by our people urges us to search for efficiency, experience and specialisation of the persons who will occupy leading positions in the society. The change should not include changing persons only, but it should include policies and patterns."*³⁴⁹

On 24 June 1998, Arafat requested a further two week postponement of the no confidence vote. After criticism by some Council members that no by-laws existed to postpone a no

³⁴⁶ This was stated in al-Ayyam, 12 June 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summary, 12 June 1998.

³⁴⁷ This was stated in al-Ayyam, 15 June 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summary, 15 June 1998.

³⁴⁸ This was stated in al-Hayat al-Jadida, 14 June 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summary, 14 June 1998.

³⁴⁹ JMCC Daily Press Summary, 23 June 1998.

confidence vote, Arafat officially declared the resignation of the ministerial Cabinet in a letter he sent to the Legislative Council.³⁵⁰ In doing so, he managed to solve the problem of postponement of the no confidence vote by the Legislative Council, as a parliament can not issue a no confidence vote in a government which no longer exists.³⁵¹ After this latest move, many started losing hope of ever seeing any serious Cabinet reshuffle and dismissed Arafat's actions as another stalling tactic.³⁵² Disappointment was not limited to the Council members, but frustration became also increasingly clear on the Palestinian streets. Iyad Sarraj summarised popular discontent and complaints as follows in a commentary in al-Quds newspaper:

*'The complaints have become widespread - about poor services, the excess of bureaucracy and delay within ministries, the multiplying of salaries, expansion of the administrative system, conflicts of interests, the intensification of power struggles, the absence of planning and sometimes the absence of the minister himself to carry out other duties which take him far from his ministry; the arbitrary appointments which are not based on qualification as much as on personal or tribal loyalty, and a policy of suffocating the people for their daily bread.'*³⁵³

Finally, on 5 August 1998, Arafat announced his long-awaited new Cabinet, thereby giving rise to what Ahmed Qrei', Speaker of the Legislative Council, described as "one of the most important sessions of the Legislative Council since its establishment".³⁵⁴

³⁵⁰ This was stated in al-Ayyam, 25 June 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summary, 25 June 1998.

³⁵¹ 'Abdelsalam, N., "Here We Go...Again", Palestine Report, 26 June 1998.

³⁵² Seitz, C., "Rumblings of an Alternative", Palestine Report, 19 July 1998.

³⁵³ Sarraj, I., "If I Were a Minister", al-Quds, 17 June 1998. Translated for Palestine Report, 24 July 1998 by Joharah Baker.

³⁵⁴ JMCC Daily Press Summary, 10 August 1998.

As becomes clear from table 38³⁵⁵ below, which gives details of the new Cabinet, Arafat kept most of the old Cabinet in place, and simply enlarged it by adding some new ministers of state.

Table 38:

Name	Position	Affiliation	Other details
Mohammed Nashashibi	Min. of Finance	Independent	kept same portfolio
Yasser Abed Rabbo	Min. of Information and Culture	FIDA	kept same portfolio
Nabil Sha'ath	Min. of Planning and International Cooperation	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM ³⁵⁶
Munther Salah	Min. of Higher Education	Independent	new member of cabinet; was head of al-Najah university; replaces Hanan Ashrawi who resigned
Intisar al-Wazir	Min. of Social Affairs	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Mitri Abu 'Eita	Min. of Tourism and Antiquities	Independent	new member of cabinet; replaces Elias Freij who died; CM
Freih abu Medein	Min. of Justice	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Sa'eb Erekat	Min. of Local Governance	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Abdul Rahman Hamad	Min. of Housing	Fatah	kept same portfolio
Maher al-Masri	Min. of Economy and Commerce	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Abdul Aziz Shahin	Min. of Supplies	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Riyad al-Za'noun	Min. of Health	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Ali al-Qawasmi	Min. of Transportation	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Imad al-Falouji	Min. of Communication & Postal Services	Close to Hamas	kept same portfolio; CM
Hikmat Zeid	Min. of Agriculture	Fatah-independent	new member of cabinet; replaces Abdel Jawad Saleh who resigned; CM
Jamil Tarifi	Min. of Civil Affairs	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Sa'edi al-Krunz	Min. of Industry	Fatah	new member of cabinet; replaces Bashir Bargouthi; CM
Nabil Qassis	Min. in charge of "Bethlehem 2000"	Independent	was negotiator in the Washington talks
Azzam al-Ahmad	Min. of Public Works	Fatah	kept same portfolio; CM
Nabil 'Amr	Min. of Parliament Affairs	Fatah	new member of cabinet; CM
Rafiq al-Natsheh	Min. of Labour	Fatah	new member of cabinet; CM
Bashir Bargouthi	Min. without Portfolio	PPP	lost portfolio as Min. of Industry
Yousef abu Safieh	Min. of State	Fatah	new member of cabinet; CM
Hassan Asfour	Min. of State	Independent	new member of cabinet; CM
Hisham Abdul Raziq	Min. of State	Fatah	new member of cabinet; CM
Salah al-Ta'mari	Min. of State	Fatah	new member of cabinet; CM

³⁵⁵ Table 38 was compiled by the researcher using information from several sources. Mainly: The Palestinian Council, JMCC, Jerusalem, January 1998, 2nd edition; JMCC website (www.jmcc.org/new/ncabinet).

³⁵⁶ "CM" stands for "Council member".

Ziad abu Zayad	Min. of State	Fatah	new member of cabinet; CM
Talal Sidr	Min. of State	Close to Hamas	lost portfolio as Min. of Youth and Sports
Vacant portfolios: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Ministry of Interior.			

A closer look at table 38, above, reveals that the most obvious feature of the new Cabinet reshuffle is that it does not at all respond to the underlying reasons for the Legislative Council's calls for ministerial changes. Arafat kept in place the two ministers who were most referred to in the corruption report, namely Minister of Civil Affairs Jamil Tarifi, and Minister of Planning and International Co-operation Nabil Sha'ath. Moreover, he reassigned two ministers, Abdel Jawad Saleh and Hanan Ashrawi, who were both known for their integrity and outspokenness. Abdel Jawad Saleh, who was Minister of Agriculture in the previous government, was appointed as Minister of State. Hanan Ashrawi, who used to be Minister of Higher Education, received the Tourism and Antiquities portfolio in the new Cabinet. As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, both ministers refused their positions in the new Cabinet and resigned. Another move by Arafat was to keep former Minister of Industry, Bashir Bargouthi (PPP) on the Cabinet team as Minister without Portfolio, despite the fact that Bargouthi has been seriously ill for the past year and was unable to communicate, and despite three letters from his party to Arafat, on his behalf, requesting his resignation.

Another striking feature is that the new names included in the Cabinet seemed to include some of the most critical Council members. This led Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, to comment as follows in his weekly editorial:

*"The old game of neutralising critics through absorption continues: Rafiq Natsheh, Hikmat Zeid, and Nabil Amr, all critical and sometimes outspoken Fatah LC members, are examples of this strategy, which is aimed at reducing the criticisms in the Council and the Council pressure on the Executive Authority."*³⁵⁷

As mentioned above, both Abdel Jawad Saleh and Hanan Ashrawi declined their new appointments. They explained their reasons behind their decisions on 6 August 1998 in their respective press conferences. Abdel Jawad Saleh, who was also a Council member from the Ramallah district and received the highest number of votes during the elections in 1996, stated:

*"I was familiar through eight years in the PLO Executive Committee with Mr. Arafat's work, his personal problems and his political attitudes. I thought when I was in the PLO that it was useless to work under him for the benefit of the Palestinian people. When I came back to Palestine after twenty years of exile, I thought that in Palestine where our people exist, we could make a difference. I tried, being a minister in the Cabinet, to enhance the role of the people to enhance and create a democratic environment for the Palestinian society, but, in fact, all my attempts have failed. When I fought corruption inside my ministry, I referred some of the high-ranking officials to the Attorney General. The Chairman himself interfered in stopping a legal procedure against them. I came to a feeling that I should, even as a minister, be unequivocally against what is going on. ... Arafat's reshuffle was a slap in the face of democracy."*³⁵⁸

Hanan Ashrawi, who remained a Council member representing the Jerusalem constituency, clarified her position and her refusal to remain a minister as follows:

"I have had a very long and candid discussion with president Arafat...I respectfully declined from this appointment because I feel that the whole issue of comprehensive and pervasive reform that is needed, is not being met by this new Cabinet... The real issue is whether we can ensure internal empowerment to face external challenges. I have thought very long about this decision and I am convinced that this new formation does not respond to the public demand and to the genuine need for this type of reform... We have to send a message to the Palestinian people and to the world at large that we are building a contemporary state with full rule of law and accountability, with professionalism and responsibility, to ensure also the rights

³⁵⁷ Khatib, G., "New Cabinet?", Palestine Report, 7 August 1998.

³⁵⁸ Reuters, printed press, 6 August 1998.

*and freedoms of the Palestinian people and to face the external challenges that we are currently facing. Particularly in view of the current Israeli government and the policies that specifically seek to destroy the peace process...*³⁵⁹

Abdel Jawad Saleh and Hanan Ashrawi in their press conferences set the tone for very intense and heated debates within the Legislative Council, on 7, 8 and 9 August 1998, concerning whether or not the new Cabinet should be granted a vote of confidence. The contradicting positions and hesitation amongst Council members worried President Arafat sufficiently for him to convene a meeting of the Fatah Council members on the evening of 7 August 1998, in order to try and convince them to grant the new Cabinet their vote of confidence.³⁶⁰

The diverging opinions amongst Council members which became obvious during the Legislative Council debates, were explained by some Council members to the researcher, who was present in Ramallah at the time of the confidence vote on 8 and 9 August 1998. Ziad Abu Zayyad, a Fatah-affiliated Council member of Jerusalem and a newly appointed Minister of State, summarised his decision to give the new Cabinet his vote of confidence to the researcher. In the researcher's opinion, his explanation exemplified the success of Arafat's tactic to neutralise critics within the Legislative Council by including them in the Cabinet. Abu Zayyad stated:

"I want the Legislative Council to accept the new government...But, I still have a conflict within me. On the one hand, I do not think that what has happened was a good thing to happen. I do not like the way this government crisis was dealt with. I think it should have been dealt with in a very different and much better way. On the other hand, since I am now a member of this government, of course, I would like to

³⁵⁹ Reuters, printed press, 6 August 1998.

³⁶⁰ This was stated in al-Ayyam, 7 August 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summary, 7 August 1998.

*have a vote of confidence by the Legislative Council. But, still, I have my own criticism against the way things were done.*³⁶¹

Azmi Shu'aibi, a FIDA-affiliated Council member from the Ramallah constituency, explained more about Arafat's tactics in the Cabinet reshuffle and clarified to the researcher why he did not want to give the new Cabinet his vote of confidence:

*"I do not want the vote of confidence in the Cabinet. I think the principle of reform in the government depends on the reports of the Legislative Council and even the reports of the governmental committee, which said clearly that in order to re-organise the government, it is necessary to remove some of the persons who misused their public positions. ... The president looked at the Legislative Council as a problem and he wants to solve this problem. That is why he is bringing more members from the Legislative Council to the government, so that he can weaken the Council."*³⁶²

Eventually, on 9 August 1998, exactly one year after the corruption report first caused the Legislative Council to demand a Cabinet reshuffle, the Council members granted the new Cabinet their vote of confidence. 55 Council members were in favour of a vote of confidence, 28 voted against, and 3 Council members abstained from the vote. A few hours after receiving the vote of confidence from the Legislative Council, the new government was sworn in in Gaza.³⁶³

After the vote of confidence by the Legislative Council, many observers and analysts became pessimistic about the future prospects of the Legislative Council and feared that the Legislative Council, by granting the vote of confidence to the Executive Authority, risked

³⁶¹ The interview with Ziad abu Zayyad was conducted in Ramallah on Saturday 8 August 1998.

³⁶² The interview with Azmi Shu'aibi was conducted in Ramallah on Saturday 8 August 1998.

³⁶³ This was stated in al-Ayyam, 10 August 1998. The reference was taken from JMCC Daily Press Summary, 10 August 1998.

losing popular confidence. Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, commented in an article in Palestine Report:

*"The main danger posed by the Council's approval of the new Cabinet is that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible from now on, for the Council to gain the public's support in any future confrontation with the Executive Authority. So, by this vote, the Legislative Council has to a great extent undermined itself, its popularity and its present and future credibility."*³⁶⁴

Ghassan Khatib's fears may prove correct, but as far as the researcher of this thesis could gauge from the comments of several Council members after the vote of confidence in the Executive Authority, the Council members, despite the confidence vote, did not intend to be silent in any future confrontations with the Executive Authority.

On the contrary, despite some of the Council members' obvious disappointment, they seemed determined to continue their attempts to hold the government accountable in case of any shortcomings or mismanagement. Hussam Khader, a Council member from the Nablus area, was disappointed, but his harsh comments to the researcher suggested that he would not stop being critical. He commented as follows:

*"I believe that the only duty which the Legislative Council has been successful in implementing in its three year history was embodied today in legalising the corruption of the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, voting implies vindicating everyone whose name appeared in the report of the monitory committee and the special committee of the Council."*³⁶⁵

As a result of her resignation, Hanan Ashrawi's popularity was boosted, which was exemplified when an ordinary citizen approached her outside the Legislative Council premises and said: "I am a citizen of Bethlehem and I came here today especially because I

³⁶⁴ Khatib, G., "PLC Shoots Itself in the Foot", Palestine Report, 14 August 1998.

wanted to tell you that in my opinion you are the only man in Palestine!" Ashrawi, realising people's trust in her, also has no intention to be silenced as a Council member.

She commented to the researcher:

*"I had hoped that we would be able to form a corrective move to try and put the whole internal empowerment institution building process on track. But obviously there is a majority in the Council that wants to give this new government a chance. I will suspend judgement. I will give them a chance. I will do everything possible to help in internal empowerment institution building, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. If they meet the requirements of the people, we will give them a chance. If not, we will hold them accountable."*³⁶⁶

Hanan Ashrawi also had a word of warning about disappointing the expectations of the people and the potential loss of credibility of the Palestinian Authority in the eyes of the population. She stated in an interview with the researcher:

*"...I believe they [the Palestinian people] do not want to see political games being played, they do not want to see personal agendas. They want to see a national agenda and they want to see both legislative and executive branches that are receptive to their rights and needs, that would work in order to rectify whatever problems and ills we have internally. So, I hope this government and the Legislative Council pay very serious attention to the demands of the people, because I have a feeling that there is a pervasive sense of let down. We shall do our best to try not to allow a sense of let down to prevail, because that would be - I do not want to say destructive - but negative in terms of national interest."*³⁶⁷

7.1.3. Conclusion

The above, solidified the researcher's belief that there are both positive and negative aspects in the Palestinian democratisation process. On the one hand, there is room for criticism of the government within Palestinian society and within the Legislative Council.

³⁶⁵ The interview with Hussam Khader was conducted in Ramallah on Sunday 9 August 1998.

³⁶⁶ The interview with Hanan Ashrawi was conducted in Ramallah on Sunday 9 August 1998.

This is a positive democratic development, which is absent in most countries in the region. On the other hand, there are negative aspects to the democratisation process in the Palestinian autonomous areas as those criticisms are for the time being to no effect. This can be partly blamed on the Executive Authority's reluctance to cooperate with the Legislative Council, but some blame does also fall on the Legislative Council itself, because it often failed to act upon its strong verbal warnings. In this manner, the Legislative Council helped to create an impression that whatever they said, it would not be translated into actual actions.

This phenomenon, according to Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, turned the Legislative Council into a second "Hyde Park" rather than a true parliament. In one of his commentaries, Ghassan Khatib explained popular disappointment with the performance of the Legislative Council as follows:

*"The previous legislative sessions left the public feeling greatly disappointed with the Council, not because Council members failed to raise the right issues and wasted time on unimportant subjects, and definitely not because Council members weren't courageous enough to stand up and expose the poor performance and mistakes of the Executive branch and security forces. The public felt let down because, in practical terms, the Council failed to make a difference in any area, whether legislation, holding the Executive Authority accountable, or any of the other well-publicised tasks and objectives of the Council. In other words, while the Council and the Council members have been sincere in representing the public's needs and concerns, they have failed to serve the public in any practical way."*³⁶⁸

According to Council member and newly appointed Minister of Parliament Affairs Nabil Amr, however, the problems within the Palestinian Authority are just a matter of lack of

³⁶⁷ The interview with Hanan Ashrawi was conducted in Ramallah on Sunday 9 August 1998.

³⁶⁸ Khatib, G., "Hyde Park?", Palestine Report, 20 March 1998.

governmental experience. With patience things will improve. On 28 December 1997, he said in a radio interview on Palestine Radio:

"There is a problem of communication between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council. This is due to the fact that our experience is fresh. The conflict is a healthy one and should not be viewed negatively...Let us not be very judgmental and let us give this experience a chance."

President Yasser Arafat seemed to agree with Nabil Amr's analysis of the relationship between the Executive branch of the Palestinian Authority and the Legislative Council. In his speech in the Legislative Council on the occasion of the start of the third term of the Parliament, on 7 March 1998, Arafat stated:

*"We must not forget that we are still on the road to mature democracy, which we have not yet reached. ... No one can deny that mistakes have been made and will be made, but the true gauge for a society and its institutions is the number of mistakes. Are they constantly decreasing or continually increasing? The events of 1997 show that they are decreasing and that the [state] institution is on the path to greater growth. I hope that we can maintain this positive trend and build our system on stronger and firmer foundations, so that our institutions will be based on laws adhered to by all."*³⁶⁹

Despite Arafat's optimism and given the current situation in the Palestinian autonomous areas, the researcher has strong reservations about the possibility of further democratic development and this for mainly two reasons:

1. There is a strong Executive Authority presence in the Legislative Council that obstructs the expected performance of the Legislative Council. Not only is the Palestinian Cabinet large, but the number of parliamentarians in the Legislative Council is also relatively low compared to most other countries.

³⁶⁹ "President Arafat's Speech at the PLC's Third Term Opening", Palestine Report, 13 March 1998.

2. The interests and goals of the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council are not geared in the same direction. The Executive Authority is politically obliged by the peace accords to execute policies that contradict with the work of the Legislative Council. Indeed, whilst the Executive Authority seems to be increasingly concerned about Palestinian-Israeli relations, the efforts of the Legislative Council are more directed at internal Palestinian affairs. Whenever the Legislative Council attempts to hold the Executive Authority accountable for its mistakes and mismanagement, a more pressing issue in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process directs the attention away from the internal problems. It is, therefore, the firm belief of the researcher that the impasse in the peace process over the past few years has taken its toll on the Legislative Council and has left it isolated and ineffective.


As a result of the above-mentioned factors, the Legislative Council finds itself caught in a paradox. The potential for democratic development is present within the Legislative Council. However, the Legislative Council is unable to carry out its responsibilities under the current conditions. In order to be able to monitor the Executive Authority, the Legislative Council is in bad need of guidelines and powers that are in accordance with, *inter alia*, the rule of law, the principle of separation of power and a judicial review. Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the end of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might prove to be the only hope for the Legislative Council to be able to function as a true and effective institution.

7.2. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT

When examining the relation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, it is important to include the head of the Executive Authority, Ra'is Yasser Arafat. Arafat, as a non-voting member of the Legislative Council and from his strong position within the Executive Authority, has a major impact on the Legislative Council. When Council members were asked how they would evaluate the level of communication with the President, their views were about as negative as their earlier evaluation of the Executive Authority. Only 14.0% of the Council members who participated in the survey found the level of communication with the President good. Most surveyed Council members, 44.2%, rated the level of communication with the President as average, and 37.2% of the Council members thought that the level of communication with the President was bad.

Figure 82:


Evaluation by the Council Members of the Level of Communication with the President



As shown in figure 83, below, 69.8% of the surveyed Council members responded that the President affected the functioning of the Council negatively, whereas only 11.6% replied that the President affected the functioning of the Legislative Council positively and the same percentage felt he did not affect it at all.

Figure 83:

Evaluation by the Council Members of How the President Affects the Functioning of the Legislative Council



Part of the explanation for the negative evaluation by Council members of their relation with President Arafat may lie - in the eyes of the Council members - with Arafat's attempts to restrict the powers of the Legislative Council. To some of the Council members Arafat is an authoritarian leader as so many other leaders in neighbouring Arab countries, who does not want to share power and only wants a puppet parliament. As Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi commented to the researcher, in July 1997, at the time of the corruption debate in the Legislative Council:

*"I am sure there will be a serious debate and that the members will express their opinions strongly, but what will be the outcome of this? You see, in the absence of the Basic Law or the Interim Constitution, or even if there would be a Basic Law, I don't see that Arafat is going to comply. You have here the example of a real dictatorship, because Arafat has the Authority, he has the military, and so on. So he is not going to listen. He will say that decision-making is mine, to hell with everyone, the decision is mine."*³⁷⁰

Council member Marwan Bargouthi, from the Ramallah constituency, gave a similar opinion about President Arafat to the researcher, albeit more moderately:

³⁷⁰ The interview with Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi was conducted in Ramallah on Tuesday 29 July 1997.

'We have a special case of a President. We don't have a traditional president who was elected for four years and will leave after four years. We have a leader who started as a leader more than 30 years ago. Mr. Arafat is the chairman of the PLO since 30 years, and a leader of Fatah. He is a historical symbol for the Palestinian people. So, he is more than a usual president. These things give him some privileges and distinguished power, and he was also elected by the people. In my opinion, Mr. Arafat took a very important decision with the general elections in order to strengthen democracy, but it is not real democracy or full democracy as one would think. He has his own opinion about democracy as well. I think all the presidents in the world and all the governments in the world like to keep and strengthen their powers. It is not easy for anyone who has power to give it away. Also, for 30 years, Mr. Arafat used to work with the institutions of the PLO and he was the decision-maker. This is the fact. The arrival of new institutions in the political field that participate in the political decision-making, is not easy for him.'

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There might be a deeper, less forward reason for Arafat being unwilling to give too much power to the Legislative Council. At this stage in the peace process, Arafat might find it safer to maintain the strength of the PLO. All the Palestinian Authority institutions derive their existence, jurisdiction and legitimacy from the peace process and the peace agreements signed by Israel and the PLO. These same peace agreements, however, give the PLO more independence, because its powers are not limited by the interim period. The Palestinian leadership, and notably Arafat, is fearful of allowing Israel to determine the course of Palestinian politics, and is, therefore, unwilling to marginalise the PLO or its Executive Committee in favour of the Legislative Council whose jurisdiction is limited by the peace agreements with Israel. This view is based on the belief that the Legislative Council is merely a transitional body that is elected only for that purpose and by only a fraction of the Palestinian people. It stems from the belief that the PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that the Palestinian National Council (PNC) continues to be their true legislature. Therefore, accepting the Legislative Council as

³⁷¹ The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on Friday 19 September 1997.

the representative of the Palestinian people, or even giving it a larger role, is unacceptable, as it could ultimately lead to the marginalisation of the PLO and, consequently, undermine the principle goals of the PLO, namely the right of return and the right to self-determination. Burhan Dajani, in an article in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, explained this point as follows:

*"The concentration of the self-rule authority as the exclusive Palestinian negotiator, which could only come about through Israel's own legislation, would confirm, with Palestinian assent, Israeli law as supreme in all the territories, as has been de facto the case since 1967. Moreover, if the Palestinians agree to the self-rule authority as the negotiator, everything that the PLO, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, could ask with regard to a host of issues - including the refugees, now numbering in the millions, displaced by Israel - could be disqualified by virtue of the fact that the self-rule authority represents only the Palestinians of the occupied territories."*³⁷²

As a result of this line of thinking, the researcher believes that Arafat opted for a strategy whereby the real decision-making body consists of a combination of members of the Executive Committee of the PLO and the Cabinet of the Palestinian Authority. It is important to note here that until the Cabinet reshuffle of August 1998 not enough Council members were included in the Executive Authority. Indeed, in the Cabinet that lasted until the summer of 1998, Arafat had not included the number of Legislative Council members required according to Article V.4.c of the Interim Agreement, which read as follows:

*"The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council."*³⁷³

³⁷² Dajani, B., "An Alternative to Oslo", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (25), no. 4, Summer 1996, p. 14.

³⁷³ JMCC, *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement*, p. 13.

Consequently, according to the Interim Agreement, 80% of the Cabinet should consist of Council members and the remaining 20% of the Executive Authority could be chosen by Arafat from outside the Legislative Council. This option provided Arafat with two advantages. Firstly, it enabled Arafat to include some non-Fatah members in the Cabinet, thus, giving the Executive Authority a more pluralistic face. A possible example is Talal Sidr, who was Hamas-affiliated and received the portfolio of the Ministry of Youth. Secondly, it allowed Arafat to bring into the Executive Authority members of the PLO's Executive Committee. The prime example in this category was Yasser Abed Rabbo, a member of the PLO's Executive Committee, who was also the head of FIDA and became Minister of Information.

At this stage, it is important to point out that, concerning the previous Cabinet, Yasser Arafat did not follow Article V.4.c of the Interim Agreement to the letter, and that in a two-fold manner. Firstly, only 2/3 - instead of 80% - of the Cabinet members were also members of the Legislative Council. Since the Cabinet reshuffle in August 1998, this situation has been rectified. In fact, in the new Cabinet more than 80% of the Cabinet members are also Council members.³⁷⁴ Secondly, since the establishment of the Executive Authority, not one of its meetings has taken place with only the Cabinet members present. Instead, regular meetings were being held by members of the Executive Authority and different people of Arafat's choice. These were usually additional members of the PLO Executive Committee, negotiators in the peace talks with Israel, heads of the security services, and high-ranking Fatah officials. It is this group of people, not only the members

³⁷⁴ For more details, see table 38 on pp. 300-301 in this Chapter.

of the Executive Authority, who take the decisions, whilst the Legislative Council remains largely disregarded. It exemplifies the insistence of Arafat on keeping the PLO involved in the political decision-making.

From the above, it is clear that the interlinkages between the PLO, the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council deepen the ambiguity surrounding the Palestinian Authority and its jurisdiction. As Ahmad Khalidi noted in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*:

*"...the relationship between the PLO, the PNC, and the elected Council [is] a relationship that is still clouded with uncertainty and constitutional complexity."*³⁷⁵

Clearly, the Palestinian political system is complex and vague. It falls within the constraints of the agreements with Israel, and the fears of marginalising the Palestinian rights delineated by the Palestinian National Charter and as portrayed by the PLO and its institutions. Arafat, being the leader of both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority is, as such, susceptible to criticism from the proponents of both sides. On the one hand, he is accused of marginalising the Legislative Council; on the other hand, he is denounced for compromising Palestinian national rights. Facts, however, seem to lead to only one possible conclusion: Although, on the surface, Arafat seems to attempt to balance responsibilities between the different Palestinian institutions, in reality, he is unwilling to entrust the Legislative Council with major powers, because its mandate is only a transitional one and is restricted by the peace agreements with Israel. Moreover, by involving PLO institutions and PLO factions into the decision-making, Arafat is able to provide his rule with more legitimacy and is able to give his authority a more pluralistic image.

³⁷⁵ Khalidi, "The Palestinians' First Excursion...", p. 29.

7.3. CONCLUSION

From what has been discussed above, the following conclusions can be extracted.

Firstly, from the results of the survey and the interviews conducted by the author of this thesis, it is clear that the relationship between the Legislative Council and both the Executive Authority and its head, President Yasser Arafat has been strained.

Secondly, the main reasons for the strained relationship between those institutions can be explained by the political strategy of President Arafat. By forming a decision-making body, which places the weight of the PLO into the Executive Authority of the Palestinian Authority, Arafat created a problem of dual leadership, void of a legal framework. In doing so, Arafat marginalised the only elected institution, the Legislative Council, rendering it weak, if not ineffective. Although the current stalemate in democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas is, in part, resulting from an effort by the Palestinian leadership to avoid power-sharing, it is the researcher's belief that it is also caused by the political conditions, inherent to the Oslo agreements, that do not allow for substantive democratic nation-building to materialise at this point in time.

Thirdly, it is the contention of the researcher that Arafat's actions are related to the political risks involved in giving the Legislative Council too large a role in Palestinian political decision-making, thus threatening the very existence of the PLO and, consequently, the rights of the Palestinian people living in the Diaspora. Arafat's fears are a result of the persisting imbalances in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, in turn resulting in a halt in

the democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas and an ineffective performance by the Legislative Council. The impact of Israeli policies will be discussed in Chapter Eight of this study.

In short, although the findings in Chapter Seven clearly showed that the Palestinian autonomous areas may be classified as a partial democracy, given the current political situation, it is highly unlikely that the Palestinian regime will evolve into a full democracy any time soon. The Legislative Council, in spite of being the only elected institution and despite its honourable aims, is currently clearly the underdog amongst the Palestinian institutions and the elite. As long as the Palestinian autonomous areas do not become a sovereign state and as long as all issues at stake in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process are not settled, it is against Palestinian national interest to increase both the powers of the Legislative Council and the influence of the democratic and moderate elements amongst the elite. Unfortunately, the more time goes by, the less likely it becomes that the Palestinian autonomous areas will democratise further and the more the impact of the Legislative Council as a force in favour of further democratisation is weakened. Indeed, the inability of the Legislative Council to convince other sections of the Palestinian elite to subordinate their interests in favour of democracy, de-legitimises it as a viable, effective and scrutinising legislature.

CHAPTER EIGHT:

IMPACT OF ISRAELI POLICIES ON PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

In this last chapter, the researcher aims to demonstrate that the lack of progress in democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas and the weak performance of the Legislative Council can not only be blamed on the nature of the Palestinian authority, but is also obstructed by the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements and by Israeli policies and actions. As such, in this chapter the researcher intends to examine two major Israeli influences on the functioning of the Palestinian Authority:

1. The impact of the provisions of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements that oblige the Palestinian Authority to act contrary to both the democratic policies expected from it and the PLO's pledge to establish a democratic state as envisaged in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence.
2. The impact of Israeli unilateral actions in the areas outside the control of the Palestinian Authority.

In order to illustrate the Israeli factor, several examples in which Israeli policies influenced Palestinian internal politics since the first Palestinian general elections in January 1996, will be given. First, however, an overview of the perception of the Israeli impact will be provided.

8.1. PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISRAELI IMPACT

As briefly illustrated before in Chapter Five, part of public opinion blamed the lack of democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas on the undemocratic nature and “revolution” mentality of the Palestinian leadership, whilst the other part put the blame on the impact of Israeli policies, whereby the Palestinian leadership was pressured to act undemocratically. Also in Chapter Five³⁷⁴, it became clear that a total of 83.4% of the surveyed people thought that slow democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas is in one way or the other caused by Israeli policies and pressures. Perhaps Khalil Shikaki’s analysis reflects most closely the perceptions of the Palestinian public. He explained in the Journal of Palestine Studies:

“The peace process and the PA it engendered also had negative repercussions on the transition to democracy. Holding to the view that the requirements of democracy may contradict those of national reconstruction, and that in the early stages of state building it is more important to assert the state’s right to monopolise power and eliminate competitors for the people’s loyalty than to democratise the political system, the PA adopted undemocratic policies aimed at ‘protecting’ the peace process and the process of national reconstruction.”³⁷⁵


When the Council members were asked whether or not they felt that Israeli policies and practices had a negative effect upon the functioning of the Legislative Council, their evaluation of the Israeli impact was very harsh. An overwhelming majority of 88.4% of the Council members who completed the questionnaire felt that Israeli policies and practices have a negative effect upon the functioning of the Council.

³⁷⁴ See Figure 64 in Chapter Five

³⁷⁵ Shikaki, “The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and...”, p. 90.

Figure 84 below, further shows that only one Council member thought that Israeli policies and practices have a positive effect on the functioning of the Legislative Council, and only 4.7% said that Israeli policies and practices do not affect the functioning of the Legislative Council at all.

Figure 84:



In conclusion, whilst Shikaki's analysis seems to be in line with the public's attitude as explained in Chapter Five, it is the researcher's contention that the policies of the Palestinian Authority are not merely a result of its need to stabilise and strengthen its institutions. It is the belief of the researcher that two Israeli-related conditions further preclude the Palestinian Authority from being democratic. First, the Interim agreements themselves contain provisions that force the PA to be undemocratic. As Mustafa Barghouti, a prominent figure in the Palestinian NGO community and the director of the Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, pointedly stated:

"The Palestinians have a far greater ability to influence democratisation than the other conditions for a lasting peace. But here, too, Israel plays a heavy role. The terrible pressures being brought to bear on the PA to carry out acts that are totally contrary to respect for human rights and the law (including through threats regarding loss of international financial support and delaying implementation of aspects of the agreement) are, to say the least, unbecoming for a country that claims

*to be a democracy. They reflect Israel's contempt for the Palestinian side, its deeply held belief that Arabs can be controlled only by force. Certainly, one does not expect Israel to encourage Palestinian democracy, but a democratic country should at least refrain from encouraging and indeed insisting on undemocratic acts.*³⁷⁶

Secondly, Israeli unilateral actions in the areas still under its jurisdiction and the consequences of those measures on the Palestinian population further strain the PA and compels it to be undemocratic.

In the next section, it is the intention of the researcher to make these Israeli pressures clearer by concentrating upon the main examples in which Israeli policies influenced Palestinian internal politics since the first Palestinian general elections in January 1996.

8.2. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Only a few weeks after the elections of the first Legislative Council, in which the general public had rightfully or wrongly vested so much hope, events started to overturn the mood of celebration. On 25 February 1996, in response to the Jerusalem suicide bomb attack, Israel imposed a complete closure on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

One week later, following the Ashkelon attack, the closure was extended to an internal closure, i.e. a virtual Israeli siege of the major Palestinian towns and cities, making it impossible for anyone to move and paralysing all civic and economic life. The internal

³⁷⁶ Barghouti, M., "Posteuphoria in Palestine", Journal of Palestine Studies, (25) no. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 97-113.

closure, which was to be repeated several times, forced Palestinians to face the hard reality, that the peace agreements provided the basis for a full dependency relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and a reinforcement of Israel's grip over the situation. The mirage of equal partnership was shattered. Increasingly people started complaining that at least before the Oslo agreements, in case of closures, they could move between the different towns and villages within the West Bank and Gaza, whereas now they were besieged in their tiny islands of "liberated land", whenever Israel deemed this necessary for its "security".

The closures by Israel of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and even between different areas within the West Bank had become much more frequent since the signing of the peace agreements and increasingly began to affect the social and economic well-being of the Palestinians. Besides affecting people's right to move freely, the closures indirectly restricted many Palestinians' right to work. According to Radwan Shaban of MAS, the level of poverty inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip increased in the aftermath of the signing of the agreement. To Shaban, increased poverty was a direct result of continued Israeli measures, particularly in their frequent closures of the West Bank.

"One of the disturbing economic outcomes in the WBGS since 1993 is the high level of poverty. Mostly, this has occurred as a result of the worsening labour market conditions. Given a poverty level of \$650 per capita annually (less than \$2 per day), approximately one-fifth (19.1 percent) of the WBGS population was poor at the end of 1995. This is indeed large, and implies that about one-half million of the estimated 2.5 million Palestinians are poor. ... Since 1995, the situation seems to have deteriorated much more. The profile of poverty reveals the nature of hardship. An average family with a regularly employed person at the going wage rate should be able to avoid poverty. The incidence of poverty is

*very much tied to the softness in the labour market and the repeated and severe shocks from border closures.*³⁷⁷

The Israeli closure policies, the flooding of Palestinian markets with Israeli goods and the restrictions on movement, led to harsh economic realities that produced a level of frustration among Palestinians. Polls show that most Palestinians feel that the economic conditions worsened since the peace process. As Rose-Marie Barbeau wrote:

*"Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, regardless of whether or not they support the peace process, appear to feel that the current process, or perhaps the way in which it has been implemented, is 'bad for business'... In December 1997, 43.7 percent of people asked to compare their current personal economic situation with that before the peace process felt that their situation had got worse, while 38.1 percent felt that there had been no deterioration but also no improvement. ... The responses in 1997 indicate that by this time Palestinians were already seeing the effect of the closures and that other policies affecting the economy were adding up and taking a personal toll."*³⁷⁸

People looked to the Legislative Council to do something against the closure and its resulting economic and personal hardships, but found the Council powerless. What is more, the Israeli government even harassed the Council members moving from one place to another to meet their constituencies or attend their meetings. On several occasions the Gazan Council members were unable to attend Council meetings in the West Bank due to failure to receive a permit from the Israeli authorities, further exemplifying the dependency relation of the Palestinian Authority upon Israel. Public support for the Palestinian leadership decreased as there was growing realisation that even if the Palestinian Authority - at least on the surface - had all the characteristics of an independent state, complete with a

³⁷⁷ Shaban, R.A., "Palestinian Economic Development: Recent Experience and Strategic Consideration", p. 23. Paper presented at the Palestinian Ministry of Labour's International Conference on Employment, Ramallah, 13 May 1998.

President, ministries, a cabinet and a parliament, it was in fact powerless and left at the mercy of Israeli policies.

The Palestinian general public became even more desperate when the Labour Party with Shimon Peres as its candidate lost the general elections on 5 May 1996 against the Likud Party and Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu won the elections with his slogan of “security first”, and continued to use this term to exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority to ensure that they dealt with the Hamas threat. In this respect, the Netanyahu government often accused the Palestinian Authority of not adhering to Article 2.2 of the Interim Agreement.

This article reads as follows:

“2. Both sides will, in accordance with this agreement, act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will co-operate in the exchange of information and co-ordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.

3. With a view to implementing the above, each side shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, carry out the following functions in the areas under its security responsibility:

- a. protect all residents of, and all other persons present in, these areas;*
- b. actively prevent incitement to violence, including violence against the other side or persons under the authority of the other side;*
- c. apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement; and*
- d. prevent and deal with any attempt to cause damage or harm to infrastructure serving the other side, including, inter alia, roads, water, electricity, telecommunications and sewage infrastructure.’³⁷⁹*

³⁷⁸ Barbeau, R., Palestinian Support for the Peace Process, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, February 1999, p. 33-34.

³⁷⁹ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 30.

The demands required of the Palestinian Authority to suppress any opposition to the peace process in general and to the Israeli policies in particular were further elaborated in the Wye River Memorandum, signed in Washington, D.C. on 23 October 1998. Indeed, as shown below, the Palestinians were asked to issue a decree prohibiting incitement. The article reads as follows:

*"Drawing on the relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII (1) of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject."*³⁸⁰

Whilst accusing the Palestinians for not adhering to the peace agreements, Netanyahu was himself endangering the peace process with provocative decisions by his government. Indeed, Israel undertook many unilateral actions such as opening the tunnel in the old city of Jerusalem, building a settlement on Jabel Abu-Gneim (Har Homa), permitting the building of Jewish houses in the middle of the Arab neighbourhood of Ras al-Amoud in Jerusalem, delaying the further redeployment from part of the West Bank by trying to bypass the peace agreements, and many more fact-creating policies which are less publicised. It may be surprising to many, for example, that the settler population increased from 109,500 in 1993 to 169,339 in June 1998³⁸¹.

³⁸⁰ The Wye River Memorandum has been published by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre. References of this document are taken from the text as published by the JMCC, and page references, therefore, refer to that publication. See JMCC, The Wye River Memorandum, Jerusalem: Occasional Document Series, December 1998, p. 10.

³⁸¹ <http://www.fmep.org/charts/chart9811-10.gif>

This is an increase of more than 60,000 settlers in the West Bank alone, excluding the settlers around East Jerusalem. With regard to this increase, Geoffrey Aronson commented:

“The continuing expansion of settlements, facilitated by Oslo, is a reflection of Israel’s basic understanding of its continuing freedom of action during its diplomacy with the PLO.”³⁸²

Another less publicised example concerns the allocation of water. Israeli settlers are allotted almost five times the amount of water available to the average Palestinian. As stated in Miftah’s fact sheet:

“The amount of water at the disposal of the Palestinian territories is only one third of the amount required to meet basic survival and sanitation needs. Instead of the desired amount of 150 litres daily per person, Palestinians have to make do with only 50-85 litres and an ongoing severe shortage of running water. In contrast, in the surrounding Jewish settlements each settler is provided with 280 to 300 litres daily. The settlers’ unlimited quantity of running water has served to fill swimming pools and to water ornamental lawns.”³⁸³

All these unilateral actions are in contradiction with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and, later, with those of the Wye River Memorandum. As Article 31(7,8) of the Interim Agreement stipulates:

“7. Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

8. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity of which will be preserved during the interim period.”³⁸⁴

³⁸² Aronson, G., “Prospects for Palestinian Sovereignty sabotaged”, <http://www.fmep.org/reports/v9n3.html>. p.2.

³⁸³ <http://www.miftah.org/facts/sheets/water2.html>, p.2

³⁸⁴ JMCC, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, p. 24.

The Wye River Memorandum reiterated the prohibition for unilateral action from either side under section 5, which stipulates:

*"Recognising the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement."*³⁸⁵

Despite Israel's unilateral actions, the pressure on Arafat and his Palestinian Authority became even more intense when the US government started defining the concept of security in the same way as the Israelis. As Ghassan Khatib, Director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre and respected political analyst, noted in one of his editorials:

*"...the concept of security as understood by Israel and, consequently, as used by Dennis Ross, is limited to Israeli security only, while the Oslo agreement deals with security of both the parties involved in the conflict, i.e. Israelis and Palestinians."*³⁸⁶

The American and Israeli pressures on Arafat to strengthen security measures against Hamas were particularly effective. Whereas Israel pressured Arafat and the PA by intensifying the closure, the American Administration used the aid issue as a means to do so, at a time when the pro-Israel Congress was embarrassing the PA because of its human rights violations. It was through the strangling grip of the internal closures and the economic pressures that Arafat was forced to utilise undemocratic measures against his own people.

Left without alternatives, the Palestinian Authority did crackdown on Hamas, imprisoning many opposition leaders, activists and students on mere suspicion of sympathies to anti-

³⁸⁵ JMCC, The Wye River Memorandum, p. 16.

³⁸⁶ Khatib, G., "Security for Whom", Palestine Report, 22 August 1997.

Oslo groups, without trials or due process of law, and by closing several offices and institutions related to Hamas or Islamic Jihad. A report of Human Rights Watch affirms the impact of combined Israeli and American pressures on the actions of the Palestinian Authority as follows:

*"In responding to violence by militant groups, Israel has, with US support, exerted intense pressure on the PA to crack down on such groups, without making any reference, at least publicly, to the means employed. As the PA has indiscriminately rounded up hundreds of suspected militants in response to acts of violence against Israelis, both Israel and the US have signaled to Arafat that they are little concerned with abuses when they are committed in the name of Israeli security and saving the Israeli-PLO peace process...."*³⁸⁷

Meanwhile, the Palestinian public grew increasingly frustrated against their own Authority. Especially, when they saw that the Legislative Council was being completely ignored when issuing resolution after resolution urging the Executive Authority to comply with the internationally recognised human rights standards when dealing with its people. Increasingly, the Palestinian leadership was perceived by the Palestinian public as a surrogate to the Israelis. As Usher Graham wrote in an article in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*:

*"What the PA's policy of internal security actually betrays is a culture of defeat. This is not just due to the fact that the current Palestinian political leadership has and is lowering Palestinian's national claims to a series of desegregated parts of the West Bank and Gaza. More corrosively, it is born of an obsessive ethos of "national security" and "national interest" that, once their political and ideological content is unpacked, turn out to be no more than the practical implementation of Israel's territorial and security ambitions in the occupied territories."*³⁸⁸

³⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human Rights under the Palestinian Authority", A Human Rights/Middle East Report, (9), no. 10 September 1997, p.6.

³⁸⁸ Usher, G., *Journal of Palestine Studies*, (25) no. 2, Winter 1996, p.33.

Indeed, Israel's insistence on isolating the issue of security without implementing such outstanding clauses of the Interim Agreement as further redeployment and geographic contiguity of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank has greatly pressured Arafat into adopting measures that are domestically unpopular and internationally embarrassing. Consequently, the Palestinian people are caught between the harsh reality of an omni-present Israeli occupation, and a regime that is plagued by corruption, mismanagement, a certain degree of authoritarianism. In short, the Palestinian Authority constitutes a regime that is empowered to suppress its people, without being capable of delivering the promises it gave when it entered into agreements with Israel. In combination with the unilateral Israeli measures such as settlement building, closures, arrests, demolition of houses, and land confiscation, the Palestinian Authority becomes more helpless and acts increasingly in an undemocratic manner. According to Mustafa Bargouthi, this does not only damage democratic development within the Palestinian autonomous areas, but also puts the relation between the government and its people at risk.

*"With no democratic civil society³⁸⁹ to act as a moderating force, the PA is all the more vulnerable to pressures to violate human rights, including carrying out arbitrary arrests and trials, with the risk that these actions will not only undermine the building of democracy but even prevent normal relations between the PA and its own people."*³⁹⁰

It is also the researcher's belief that a continuation of the situation as is, with a stalemate in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the growing dissatisfaction, frustration and disappointment amongst the Palestinian public with their leaders, could eventually lead to a

³⁸⁹ It should be noted that the researcher does not subscribe to the view held by Mustafa Bargouthi that there is no democratic civil society to act as a moderating force in Palestine.

further deterioration in the democratic record of the Palestinian Authority and in the inability of the Legislative Council to properly execute its mandate.

8.3. CONCLUSION

From the above, it became clear that Israel's exaggerated, but tactical and advantageous security concerns have undeniably pressured the Palestinian Authority into adopting undemocratic measures and violating basic human rights. Indeed, whether the Palestinian Authority, as Sarraj or Khalidi argue³⁹¹, is inherently undemocratic, or whether it is run by one individual who believes that he has the mandate to act as suits him by virtue of being the chairman of the PLO and by his election victory, clearly does not undermine nor reduce the role of the Israelis in hampering political development and the democratisation process in the Palestinian autonomous areas. This supports, therefore, the contention of the author described at the beginning of the second part of this study, in that, unless the impact of Israeli pressures upon the Palestinian Authority is reduced, and unless the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is revived rapidly and in a more balanced manner, the chances for democratic development in the Palestinian autonomous areas are rapidly decreasing.

Without the necessary prerequisites, mentioned above, there is a risk that governance by the Palestinian Authority will increasingly resemble that of governments in neighbouring Arab countries as, in this scenario, the Palestinian Authority will not take any chances, and a more substantial role - and therefore, more effective role - for the Legislative Council

³⁹⁰ Barghouti, M., "Posteuphoria in Palestine...", p. 91.

becomes highly unlikely. As such, the possibility for the Palestinian regime to regress from a partial democracy into a non-democracy rather than evolving towards further democratisation is real. Indeed, a precarious and hollow role for the Legislative Council will gradually diminish accountability of the Palestinian government to its citizens and general elections might not be repeated. The regime might become increasingly authoritarian and suppress criticisms, thereby undermining freedom of expression, silencing political opposition and restricting the room to manoeuvre of independent organisations critical of the regime. In such a scenario, all characteristics that, according to Potter, describe a partial democracy will vanish from the Palestinian political scene.

³⁹¹ See Chapter Five.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the role of the Legislative Council in furthering democratisation in the Palestinian autonomous areas. In pursuing this analysis, the researcher divided the thesis into two main parts. Part One of the thesis, (which also includes a literature review on democratisation theories both in general and region-specific), addressed the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in its formation and its internal organisation. Part Two examined the extent to which the Legislative Council has played an effective role in the Palestinian political system. The researcher has aimed, thus, to provide a clear picture of the viability of the Legislative Council firstly as a democratic institution, and secondly, as an essential element in the Palestinian democratisation process.

Throughout the thesis, the researcher has argued and exemplified that the Legislative Council is a democratic institution in its formation, but that it is heavily constrained to be an effective actor in the process towards democratisation by several elements. These include: (1) less democratic members of the Palestinian elite and non-elected Palestinian institutions, (2) the impact of Israeli policies in a period of transition, and (3) the absence of sovereignty in the Palestinian autonomous areas. Despite the presence of these detrimental elements to democratisation on the Palestinian political scene, the researcher has shown that the Palestinian regime has evolved from a non-democracy to a partial democracy. In classifying the Palestinian autonomous areas as a partial democracy, the researcher has relied on David Potter's five characteristics of such a democracy, discussed in Chapter one of the thesis.

It should be noted that in dealing with the subject matter, the researcher has been reluctant to adopt any specific theory available on the process of democratisation. This reluctance stems from the absence of democratisation theories dealing with the process of democratisation in a non-sovereign "entity". However, keeping in mind the specific nature of the Palestinian autonomous areas, the researcher has found the emphasis by the transitionalist approach both on the role of the elite and the various stages that have to be passed in a transition to democracy, useful in reaching a better understanding of the viability of establishing democracies in both Palestine and the Arab world.

The methodology utilised in this thesis was based on the collection of material from four different sources. The first source centred on a review of the relevant literature. The second was constituted by extensive interviews conducted with a range of officials, academics and members of the Palestinian NGO community. The third was a survey conducted by the researcher on the views and attitudes of the Council members with regard to the prospects of democratisation and their understanding of the factors influencing this process. The fourth was a public opinion poll carried out by the researcher examining the level of public expectations with respect to democratic development in Palestine and their feelings about the role of the Legislative Council in this regard.

As observed from Chapter One of this thesis, there has been little quantitative work on democratisation in the Arab world. Moreover, the general literature on democratisation pays little attention to the Arab world. Perhaps the lack of data in most of those countries could explain why the focus has primarily been on Arab and Islamic culture.

In recent years, however, some scholars on the politics in the Middle East and the Arab World have included influences other than culture in their studies of democracy in the region. New ideas and explanations regarding the lack of democratic development in the various Arab countries included the role of oil and the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite that, their studies remained normative in nature.

Whilst survey research in undemocratic societies, particularly in Arab countries is rare, the situation in Palestine is different. Survey research can be easily conducted. As such, this thesis, by examining the Palestinian experience based on quantitative data, may be of relevance in understanding the impact of legislatures on the process of democratisation in other countries. In addition, the specific nature of the Palestinian Authority and the interim agreements that limit it, could be useful in understanding the obstacles to democratic development in other societies that do not enjoy full independence or full sovereignty and which are severely limited by external factors.

Chapter Two of this thesis concentrated on the first Palestinian elections, Palestinian voting behaviour and the Council members' perceptions thereof. In this chapter, it became clear that by holding elections, one of the pre-requisites to evolve to a partial democracy had been fulfilled. Although transitionlists would stress the role of the elite in deciding to hold elections, the researcher believes that the importance and role of Palestinian voting behaviour could not be ignored. After all, the voting pattern of the public has a major influence on the composition of the parliament and the competence of its members. From Chapter Two it became clear that, in general, the prospects for a mature and responsible Palestinian voting behaviour are strengthened by a set of variables which underlie democratic consciousness. However, it is the

researcher's belief that although, when voting, "rational" considerations prevailed over more traditional ones, the Palestinian electorate is still in a "habitation" phase. Indeed, it was clear that the older, the less educated and the Gaza residents remained more under the influence of traditional factors than the younger, the educated, and the West Bank residents. When asked about voting behaviour in future elections, this underlying split in society seems to be fading as an increasing number of interviewees stated that their future voting behaviour was going to be dictated by rational considerations rather than emotional or traditional sentiments. A possible explanation for the stated shift in future voting behaviour could be a result of the Council members' failure to live up to their promises and responsibilities. Perhaps this, in turn, encouraged the electorate to increasingly value the competence and reputation of the candidates rather than their old age, family relations or masculine gender. In this regard, it is important to note that the Council members overestimated the importance of traditional values in the voting behaviour of the Palestinian electorate in the first Palestinian elections. Potential candidates in future elections might want to take this into consideration. Moreover, future candidates might want to take into account that in future elections there might not be a conducive political environment allowing candidates to hide their incompetence behind their affiliation. Indeed, as will be recalled, the first elections took place immediately after a major Israeli redeployment from parts of the West Bank. As a result of these events, members of Arafat's Fatah party were often favoured over non-Fatah candidates. In short, in future elections, the candidates might not be able to take advantage of a conducive political environment and traditional support. Moreover, as a result of past experience, the electorate is likely to be more critical and sophisticated in their voting behaviour.

The changing political environment that followed the elections clearly introduced practical challenges to the Council members who were attempting to match their performances to the voters' expectations. The Hamas and Jihad bombings in February and March 1996 led to an increase in restrictions and imposed further hardship on the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. During this period, the Legislative Council was scrutinised by the public and its weaknesses were rapidly exposed. The public expectations of the Council members were high, but the capabilities of the Legislative Council were severely restricted. These findings were reflected in Chapter Three of this thesis. It became clear that both the public and the Council members recognised the weaknesses and deficiencies of the new-born parliament. However, despite the ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council in addressing the challenges it was confronted with, both the Council members and their constituents continued to cherish the democratic tendencies of the Legislative Council. This belief in the democratic nature of the Legislative Council might explain the optimism, discussed in Chapter Three, of both the public and the Council members regarding the future performance of the Legislative Council. This optimism is an indication that positive change in Palestinian society is feasible, provided that certain conditions are met. As discussed in Part Two of this thesis, those conditions, as David Apter argued, require political stability and most importantly sovereignty.

The political change needed to attain sovereignty requires and necessitates, *inter alia*, a strong belief and understanding by the representatives of basic democratic tenets and practices. As became clear in Chapter Four, this condition seems to be fulfilled. The Council members' understanding of the principles of democracy and their willingness to act accordingly convinces the researcher of the viability of a Palestinian democracy

and the potential for good governance as far as this institution is concerned. The assertion by the Council members not only of their understanding of democratic principles, but also of their deep belief and their willingness to act according to these principles, indicates that at least that part of the Palestinian elite is ready to move to Rustow's last phase on the path to democracy, which he referred to as the habituation phase.

Whilst the foundation for democracy seems to be strong and both the Council members and the Palestinian public are receptive to the idea of democracy, the efforts towards actual democratic transformation are obstructed by severe political circumstances that prevent substantive change. In Part Two of the thesis, the researcher examined more closely the possible impediments towards further democratisation. These were briefly addressed in Chapter Five where the structure and the nature of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO were discussed and the various limitations imposed on the Legislative Council were introduced.

Chapter Six of the thesis examined the effectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing its constituents. The researcher found that contrary to the views of such scholars as Huntington and Lewis, for example, who blame Islam for the deterioration of the Arab political systems, the basis for a strong and healthy relationship between the representatives and their constituents seems present. As became clear in Chapter Six, the ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council in representing the public is neither due to its elitist nature as could be suggested by Lucian Pye nor is it the result of its members' lack of understanding or inadequate knowledge of the needs of the public they represent. This led the researcher to conclude that the ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council

stems from the complex relationship between various other actors, including between: (1) the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, (2) the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, and (3) the overall Palestinian political institutional structure and Israel.

The relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, on the one hand, and between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, on the other hand, were examined in Chapter Seven. It is the contention of the researcher that the seemingly intentional ambiguous relationship between the PLO and the PA impeded a proper and effective functioning of the Legislative Council. It became clear in Chapter Seven that rightly or wrongly, its effectiveness is undermined by political and national considerations that steer the policies pursued by Arafat and the PLO leadership. In their vision, an effective Legislative Council could constitute a major threat, not only to the PLO as an institution, but to the Palestinian national cause. Being a product of the peace process, the Legislative Council is subject to the limitations and shortcomings stemming from that peace. In short, as a result of Arafat's balancing act in trying to keep all Palestinian institutions satisfied, but under his control, the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are caught in a complex web of arrangements that are neither legally framed nor structurally clear, but undoubtedly undermine the effectiveness of the Legislative Council. It is worth noting that the researcher in her endeavour to understand the confusing structure of the Palestinian elite and the role of the Council members within this elite, relied heavily on the transitionalist democratisation approach. As will be recalled from Chapter One of the thesis, transitionalists such as O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, when examining the process of democratisation, differentiated between different types of elites and stressed the role of the democratic camp within the elite in consolidating the transition to democracy.

Whilst, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the ambiguous nature of the Palestinian Authority and Arafat's national calculations had their toll on the Legislative Council, the impact of Israel on the functioning of this institution has been even more severe. To the researcher, the role of Israel in marginalising the Legislative Council and rendering it ineffective is very significant. As discussed in Chapter Eight, various stipulations in the peace agreements limit the powers of the Legislative Council. The most indicative example of such a limiting stipulation is that Arafat, in his capacity as President, is obliged to refuse ratification of any legislation that could be interpreted by Israel as a threat to its security or a violation of its interpretation of the agreements. Arafat's refusal of such demands would lead to severe Israeli measures and Israel's refusal or postponement of the fulfilment of its obligations under the signed agreements. Therefore, it seems to the researcher that Arafat was unwilling to sacrifice any potential progress in the peace process in favour of an active Legislative Council. Under such conditions, the Legislative Council was clearly paralysed. On the one hand, its jurisdiction was impeded by the Palestinian leadership due to Israeli demands. On the other hand, its inability to fulfil the promises it gave to the public rendered it weak and ineffective in the eyes of the people it supposedly represents.

In conclusion, on most accounts, the Legislative Council proved ineffective as a political institution. The expectations of the people when they cast their votes were undoubtedly shattered. On the one hand, the Legislative Council was not successful in passing any legislation necessary for good governance and, as such, the presidential decrees remain the "law of the land". On the other hand, the Legislative Council was incapable of having any major role in the process of "checks and balances".

Whilst this is indeed the case, the whole picture is not so negative. By its very existence, the Legislative Council made a difference. Through the elections, declared by most observers as fair and free, the Palestinians had their first democratic experience in choosing their representatives. Moreover, the public nature of the debates in the Legislative Council and the platforms it provided instigated public debate about issues that used to be swept under the carpet before the Legislative Council was established. Also, on many occasions, albeit without many results, the Legislative Council scrutinised, challenged and voiced its opposition to the Palestinian decision-making establishment in a manner unpractised before in most Arab countries.

To the researcher, the above examples are a testimony of the potential of the Legislative Council in furthering the Palestinian democratisation process. Up to date, however, the Legislative Council failed to deliver on its potential because an essential prerequisite has yet to be fulfilled.

The failure of the Legislative Council to function effectively is not a consequence of the Arab or Islamic culture as hinted by scholars such as Huntington and Kedourie. Neither is it due to economic and social conditions as Lipset would have argued. On the contrary, throughout this thesis, the researcher has found fertile grounds upon which Palestinian democracy could be based. The public is receptive and responsible and their electoral choices proved to be sensible and rational. The Council members seem to be equally responsible and aware of their democratic responsibilities. However, for an institution such as the Legislative Council to function properly, one major component is missing and that is sovereignty. As such, the researcher concludes that continuous presence of the Israeli occupation authority on Palestinian territory, the

control it has over movement and the usage of Palestinian resources, and its interference in and pressure on the Palestinian decision-making establishment, render any attempt for a democratically viable institution meaningless and absurd.

At the time of the completion of the thesis at the end of 1999, the researcher observed an increasing trend in Palestinian society of rejection of Western values and an increasing importance of religion as a base for argumentation. Although this observation was made in the post-1998 period and as such does not fall within the scope of this thesis, the researcher believed it was vital to mention this observation as it might be an element in causing a regression in the Palestinian autonomous areas from a partial democracy to a non-democracy and might impede other states in the region to move forward on the path towards democracy.

Since this researcher moved to the Palestinian autonomous areas, it became clear that although democratic principles and values continue to be appreciated by both the Palestinian public and their representatives, their importance in further development of society is increasingly threatened by a level of hostility to Western values. The researcher insists on pointing out the role of the media in this respect. On a daily basis, the Arab public is exposed through the media to harsh criticisms of Western values, symbols and policies. Palestinian and Arab media, including the widely viewed Arab satellite stations, constantly portray the West as being imperialist, immoral and materialistic. Although the hostility towards the West is to some degree understandable given the historic support offered by the West to Israel and the frequent double standards used by the West in its foreign policies, it seems regrettable to this researcher that democracy is dismissed as an instrument of the West rather than debated as a tool to attain Arab national interests.

It should be mentioned that issues such as corruption in the Arab world or authoritarianism in some Arab countries are discussed in many circles, but rarely are mechanisms suggested to address such practices and problems. Seldom is the Arab intellectual discourse able to universalise the positive attributes of democracy as practised in the West. Furthermore, the attempts to find a democratic theory specific to the Arab or Islamic environment keep failing as a result of the inability to arrive at a commonly agreed upon terms of reference for the interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna.

Democracy in the region can only succeed if it is considered objectively as a useful tool and a way of life, regardless of whether or not this system of governance is used in the West. The attainment and application of democracy may help Arab countries to fulfil their national interest. Calling for democracy without strong belief in, and support for its basic principles such as the judicial process, individual rights and freedoms, women empowerment, checks and balances, fair elections and freedom of speech renders democracy void of any meaning. Dismissing liberal democratic principles simply because they are applied in the West is both irrational and detrimental as it leaves the future of the Arab people in the hands of authoritarian or totalitarian leaders whose policies are not necessarily in the best interest of their citizens.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON THE ELECTIONS AND THE PLC

Question	Answer	Value	Code
1. Have you voted in the elections of January 1996?	1. Yes (if yes, go to question 1a) 2. No (if no, go to question 1b) 3. No answer	1 2 9	Q1
1a. For which political faction did you vote?	_____		Q2
1b. Why didn't you vote?	1. I didn't register on time. 2. I didn't believe that it would make a difference 3. I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote 4. Others _____ 5. No answer	1 2 3 4 9	Q3
2. Did the election results meet your expectations?	1. Met my expectations 2. Somewhat met my expectations 3. Did not meet my expectations 4. No opinion	1 2 3 9	Q4
3. When voting, did you know what was the agenda/campaign slogans of the candidates?	1. Yes (if yes, go to question 3a) 2. No 3. No answer	1 2 9	Q5
3a. Did the candidates live up to their promises?	1. Yes 2. No 3. No answer	1 2 9	Q6

4. I will read to you some categories of people, please tell me whether you have voted for them in general or not, whether you will vote for them again or not.

	voted	did not vote	will vote again	will not vote again	depends	
Returnees	1	2	3	4	5	Q7
Relatives	1	2	3	4	5	Q8
Females	1	2	3	4	5	Q9
Christians	1	2	3	4	5	Q10
People with struggle history	1	2	3	4	5	Q11

5. How important were the following factors, when you casted your vote? (Important to stress how you have voted, not how you will vote)

	very important	important	somewhat important	not important	absolutely not important	
Democratic values	1	2	3	4	5	Q12
Political affiliation	1	2	3	4	5	Q13
Religion	1	2	3	4	5	Q14
Religious values	1	2	3	4	5	Q15
Struggle history	1	2	3	4	5	Q16
Education	1	2	3	4	5	Q17
Residence	1	2	3	4	5	Q18
Socio-econ. status	1	2	3	4	5	Q19

Reputation	1	2	3	4	5	Q20
Family relations	1	2	3	4	5	Q21
Gender	1	2	3	4	5	Q22
Age	1	2	3	4	5	Q23
Campaign	1	2	3	4	5	Q24

Question	Answer	Value	Code
6. To what extent would you say that the Palestinian people were responsible for voting such Council?	1. The people are responsible 2. The people are somewhat responsible 3. The people are not responsible 4. No answer	1 2 3 9	Q25
7. Would you say that you would vote again in the next elections?	1. Yes (if yes, go to question 7a) 2. No (if no, go to question 7b) 3. No answer	1 2 3	Q26
7a. Would you vote according to the same criteria, not quite, or would you vote in a totally different way?	1. According to the same criteria 2. Not quite in the same way 3. Vote in a totally different way 4. No answer	1 2 3 9	Q27
7b. Why wouldn't you vote again?	1. It wouldn't make any difference 2. I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people 3. Other reasons _____ 4. No answer	1 2 3 9	Q28
8. Do you think that, in general, people know how to vote for the right candidate?	1. Yes 2. Some 3. No 4. No answer	1 2 3 9	Q29

9. How important would the following factors be for you when voting in the next elections?

	very important	important	somewhat important	not important	absolutely not important	
Democratic values	1	2	3	4	5	Q30
Political affiliation	1	2	3	4	5	Q31
Religion	1	2	3	4	5	Q32
Religious values	1	2	3	4	5	Q33
Struggle history	1	2	3	4	5	Q34
Education	1	2	3	4	5	Q35
Residence	1	2	3	4	5	Q36
Socio-econ. status	1	2	3	4	5	Q37
Reputation	1	2	3	4	5	Q38
Family relations	1	2	3	4	5	Q39
Gender	1	2	3	4	5	Q40
Age	1	2	3	4	5	Q41
Campaign	1	2	3	4	5	Q42

10. Do you think people voted rationally or irrationally, responsibly or irresponsibly. What about you, did you vote rationally or irrationally, responsibly or irresponsibly?

<i>people voted-</i>	rationality 1	irrationally 2	<i>you voted-</i>	rationality 5	irrationally 6	Q43
<i>people voted-</i>	responsibly 3	irresponsibly 4	<i>you voted-</i>	responsibly 7	irresponsibly 8	Q44

Question	Answer	Value	Code
11. Of those who made it to the Council and whom you yourself have voted for, are you satisfied with them, somewhat satisfied, or dissatisfied with them?	1. Satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. Dissatisfied 4. None made it to the PLC 5. No answer	1 2 3 4 9	Q45
12. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people?	1. Yes 2. To a certain extent 3. No 4. No answer	1 2 3 9	Q46
13. To what extent would you say the Council members know what the people want/need?	1. A lot 2. Not a lot 3. Not at all 4. No answer	1 2 3 9	Q47
14. Some people say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, others say there are only some restrictions by the EA, and others say there are no restrictions by the EA. What do you think?	1. Very restricted by the EA 2. Some restrictions by the EA 3. No restrictions by the EA 4. No answer	1 2 3 9	Q48

15. In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in the following? How about...

Democracy	<i>Is it...</i>	very democratic 1	democratic 2	not democratic 3	very undemocratic 4	Q49
Effectiveness		very effective 1	effective 2	not effective 3	very ineffective 4	Q50
Responsiveness		very responsive 1	responsive 2	not responsive 3	very unresponsive 4	Q51
Independence from the EA		very independent 1	independent 2	dependent 3	very dependent 4	Q52
Independence from the Judiciary		very independent 1	independent 2	dependent 3	very dependent 4	Q53
Pluralism		very pluralistic 1	pluralistic 2	not pluralistic 3	very unpluralistic 4	Q54

16. Do you believe in the importance of having women in the Legislative Council?	1. Yes 2. No 3. No answer	1 2 9	Q55
17. Why do you think there is a need for women in the Legislative Council?	1. Women need to demand their rights 2.	1 2	

	2. Better for democracy 3. Other reasons _____ 4. No answer	3 9	Q56
18. Why don't you believe in having women in the Legislative Council?	1. Men can represent women's needs 2. No difference between the needs of men and women 3. Not qualified for this position 4. Other reasons _____ 5. No answer	1 2 3 4 9	Q57

19. Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council has been elected, what is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?	1. Very satisfied (go to question 19a) 2. Satisfied (go to question 19a) 3. Dissatisfied (go to question 19b) 4. Very dissatisfied (go to quest. 19b) 5. No answer	1 2 3 4 9	Q58
20a. Which of the following are the 3 most important reasons for your satisfaction?	1. Responsiveness 2. Democracy 3. Effectiveness 4. Independence 5. Courage 6. Accessibility 7. Other reasons _____ 8. No answer	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9	Q59
20b. Which of the following are the 3 most important reasons for your dissatisfaction?	1. Lack of responsiveness 2. Lack of democracy 3. Lack of effectiveness 4. Lack of independence 5. Lack of courage 6. Lack of accessibility 7. Other reasons _____ 8. No answer	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9	Q60
21. In general, are you optimistic about the performance of the elected Legislative Council in the future?	1. Optimistic (if yes, go to q. 21a) 2. Pessimistic (if yes, go to q. 21b) 3. No answer	1 2 3	Q61
21a. Are you optimistic or very optimistic?	1. Optimistic 2. Very optimistic	1 2	Q62
21b. Are you pessimistic or very pessimistic?	1. Pessimistic 2. Very pessimistic	3 4	Q63

JMCC Public Opinion Polling Unit
POB 25047, East Jerusalem
Tel. 02-5819777

AUGUST 97

(لإستعمال المكتب)

رقم الاستمارة			

الرجاء تعبئتها من قبل الباحث/ة

رقم المنطقة		

رقم الباحث		

C3:_____ C2:_____ C1:_____

التاريخ					
السنة		الشهر		اليوم	

المعلومات ادناه تعباً من قبل الباحث/ة:

اسم الباحث: _____
القرية/المدينة/المخيم: _____
اسم الشارع المختار: _____
عنوان المنزل المختار: _____

متى بدأت المقابلة:

الدقيقة		الساعة	

ملاحظات للمركز (لإستعمال المكتب فقط)

امضاء: _____

تعليمات لاختيار المنزل

1. اذهب/ي الى المدرسة الثانوية للذكور (إن لم توجد فللإناث، فإن لم توجد، فالمدرسة الإعدادية) التي يحددها/تحددها لك المنسق/ة اذا كان ذلك في القرية.
2. أما في المدينة، فيجب الالتزام بالمنطقة التي يحددها لك مسؤول المنطقة.
3. خذ/ي ثالث شارع على يمين المدرسة (إذا كان هناك أقل من ثلاث شوارع، خذ/ي الشارع الثاني الخ....).
4. عند تحديد الشارع، اختار/ي المنزل الرابع على يمين الشارع.
5. إذا كانت البناية أكثر من طابق، اختار/ي الطابق الاول.
6. عند الانتهاء من المقابلة الاولى في هذا المنزل، انتقل/ي الى الجهة الثانية من الشارع واختار/ي المنزل الثالث على يسار الشارع، إذا كان المنزل أكثر من طابق، اختار/ي الطابق الثاني.
7. إذا انتهى الشارع، ابتداء/ي بالشارع الاقرب على يمين.
8. المحلات او المصانع التجارية يجب ان لا تشمل في هذا البحث.

تعليمات لاختيار الشخص في المنزل

إذا كان عدد سكان المنزل البالغين 3، اثنين منهم من النساء فيجب ان تقابل/ي المرأة الاكبر سنا كما هو موضح في الجدول ادناه.

إذا لم يكن الشخص موجود في المنزل، الرجاء عدم مقابلة أي شخص آخر، إنتقل/ي إلى المنزل الثاني، الا اذا كان هناك فرصة لتحديد موعد مع الشخص المختار في وقت لاحق على الا يتعدى ذلك اليوم الثاني من اجراء المقابلة.

عدد البالغين في البيت

4 فما فوق	بالغ 3	بالغ 2	بالغ 1		
ثاني اكبر رجل	متوسط العمر	اكبر سنا	بالغ	0	
10	6	3	1	نساء	
متوسط العمر	اصغر سنا	امراة او رجل	بالغ	1	
11	7	4	2	نساء	
أكبر، اصغر رجل	امراة اكبر سنا	امراة اصغر سنا		2	
12	8	5		نساء	عدد النساء
امراة متوسطة العمر	متوسط العمر			3	
13	9			نساء	
ثاني امراة اصغر سنا				4	
14				نساء	

مرحباً... أنا من مركز القدس للإعلام والاتصال ونحن نقوم ببحث حول آراء الفلسطينيين بخصوص بعض القضايا المتعلقة بالوضع الفلسطيني بشكل عام. لقد تم اختيارك بطريقة عشوائية. ستوضع أجابتك مع العديد من أجوبة أشخاص آخرين وبالتالي لن يتم التعرف عليك بأي شكل من الأشكال. ونؤكد مرة أخرى على ان كل ما يرد من معلومات في هذه الإستمارة سيحافظ على سرية المطلقة.

كم عدد الاشخاص الذين عمرهم من 18 عام فما فوق؟

كم من هؤلاء إناث؟

عدد البالغين في البيت

4 فما فوق	بالغ 3	بالغ 2	بالغ 1	
ثاني اكبر رجل	متوسط العمر	اكبر سنا	بالغ	0
10	6	3	1	نساء
متوسط العمر	اصغر سنا	امراة او رجل	بالغ	1
11	7	4	2	نساء
أكبر، اصغر رجل	امراة اكبر سنا	امراة اصغر سنا		2
12	8	5		نساء
امراة متوسطة العمر	متوسط العمر			3
13	9			نساء
ثاني امراة اصغر سنا				4
14				نساء

عدد النساء

C4:_____

يرجى من الباحث/ة تعبئة الاستمارة بنفسه/ها وعدم اعطاءها للمستفتي.

ANNEX 3

OPINION POLL WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

1. In your opinion, how important were the following factors when people cast their vote? Please note: (1)It is important to stress how people have voted, not how they will vote, (2)Important to state what in your opinion the people think, not what you think.

	very important	important	somewhat important	not important	absolutely not important	
Democratic values	1	2	3	4	5	Q1
Political affiliation	1	2	3	4	5	Q2
Religion	1	2	3	4	5	Q3
Religious values	1	2	3	4	5	Q4
Struggle history	1	2	3	4	5	Q5
Education	1	2	3	4	5	Q6
Residence	1	2	3	4	5	Q7
Socio-econ. status	1	2	3	4	5	Q8
Reputation	1	2	3	4	5	Q9
Family relations	1	2	3	4	5	Q10
Gender	1	2	3	4	5	Q11
Age	1	2	3	4	5	Q12
Campaign	1	2	3	4	5	Q13

Question	Answer	Value	Code
2. On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very rational, 10 being very irrational, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?	<div><div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div></div><div></div><div>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</div></div>		Q14
3. On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very responsibly, 10 being very irresponsibly, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?	<div><div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div></div><div></div><div>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</div></div>		Q15
4. Do you think, in the next elections, people would vote according to the same criteria, not quite, or would they vote in a totally different way?	<div><div>1. According to the same criteria</div><div>2. Not quite in the same way</div><div>3. Vote in a totally different way</div></div>	<div>1</div> <div>2</div> <div>3</div>	Q16
5. In general, do you think that people know how to vote for the right candidate?	<div><div>1. Yes</div><div>2. No</div><div>3. Only to a certain extent</div></div>	<div>1</div> <div>2</div> <div>3</div>	Q17
6. In general, would you say, when people voted, they knew the agenda/campaign slogans of the candidates?	<div><div>1. Yes</div><div>2. No</div><div>3. Only to a certain extent</div></div>	<div>1</div> <div>2</div> <div>3</div>	Q18
7. In your opinion, what are the two most important problems facing Palestinian society nowadays?	<div><div>Problem 1: _____</div><div>Problem 2: _____</div></div>	<div>1</div> <div>2</div>	Q19

Question	Answer	Value	Code
8. In general, would you say people are satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or dissatisfied with those who made it to the Council?	1. Satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. Dissatisfied	1 2 3	Q20
9. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people?	1. Yes 2. To a certain extent 3. No	1 2 3	Q21
10. To what extent would you say the Council members know what the people want/need?	1. A lot 2. Not a lot 3. Not at all	1 2 3	Q22
11. To what extent would you say that you know what the people want/need?	1. A lot 2. Not a lot 3. Not at all	1 2 3	Q23
11a. What are the tools you as Council member use to know the needs of the people you represent?			Q24
11b. What are in your opinion the three most important needs of the people?	1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____		Q25
11c. How do you make sure that they are the needs?			Q26
12. In your opinion, did the Council members, in general, live up to their promises/campaign slogans?	1. Yes 2. No 3. No answer	1 2 9	Q27
13. As a Council member, would you say you yourself are living up to your promises/campaign slogans?	1. Yes 2. No	1 2	Q28
14. Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council has been elected, what is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?	1. Very satisfied (go to quest. 14a) 2. Satisfied (go to question 14a) 3. Dissatisfied (go to question 14b) 4. Very dissatisfied (go to q. 14b)	1 2 3 4	Q29
14a. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your satisfaction?	1. Responsiveness 2. Democracy 3. Effectiveness 4. Independence 5. Courage 6. Accessibility 7. Other reasons _____	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Q30
14b. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your dissatisfaction?	1. Lack of responsiveness 2. lack of democracy 3. Lack of effectiveness 4. Lack of independence 5. Lack of courage 6. Lack of accessibility 7. Other reasons _____	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Q31

Question	Answer	Value	Code
15. Some people say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, others say there are only some restrictions by the EA, and others say there are no restrictions by the EA. What do you think?	1. Very restricted by the EA 2. Some restrictions by the EA 3. No restrictions by the EA	1 2 3	Q32
16. Most of the resolutions of the PLC were not implemented by the Executive Authority. In your opinion, why is that?	1. Attitude of the EA 2. Inefficiency of the EA 3. Resolutions are outside the scope of authority of the PNA 4. Others _____	1 2 3 4	Q33
17. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the performance of the elected Legislative Council in the future?	1. Optimistic (if yes, go to question 16a) 2. Pessimistic (if yes, go to questions 16b)	1 2	Q34
17a. Are you optimistic or very optimistic?	1. Optimistic 2. Very optimistic	1 2	Q35
17b Are pessimistic or very pessimistic?	1. Pessimistic 2. Very pessimistic	3 4	Q36

18. How do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in the following? How about...

Democracy	<i>Is it...</i>	very democratic 1	democratic 2	not democratic 3	very undemocratic 4	Q37
Effectiveness		very effective 1	effective 2	Not effective 3	very ineffective 4	Q38
Responsiveness		very responsive 1	responsive 2	not responsive 3	very unresponsive 4	Q39
Independence from the EA		very independent 1	independent 2	Dependent 3	very dependent 4	Q40
Independence from the Judiciary		very independent 1	independent 2	Dependent 3	very dependent 4	Q41
Pluralism		very pluralistic 1	pluralistic 2	not pluralistic 3	very unpluralistic 4	Q42

19. Of the following issues, could you please state how much it affects the functioning of the Council. Would you say it affects the functioning positively, negatively, or it doesn't affect it at all?

	positively	Negatively	doesn't affect	
Israeli policies and practices	1	2	3	Q43
The Executive Authority	1	2	3	Q44
The Judiciary	1	2	3	Q45
The President	1	2	3	Q46
The people	1	2	3	Q47
The media	1	2	3	Q48

20. How would you evaluate the level of communication with the following?

	good	average	bad	
The Executive Authority	1	2	3	Q49
The Judiciary	1	2	3	Q50
The President	1	2	3	Q51
The people	1	2	3	Q52

21. In your opinion, which country in the world is the most democratic? Please rate the following countries.

(Please circle where appropriate)

COUNTRY	very democratic	democratic	Undemocratic	very undemocratic	
Egypt	1	2	3	4	Q53
France	1	2	3	4	Q54
Jordan	1	2	3	4	Q55
Saudi Arabia	1	2	3	4	Q56
Tunisia	1	2	3	4	Q57
Turkey	1	2	3	4	Q58
United States	1	2	3	4	Q59
Yemen	1	2	3	4	Q60
Sweden	1	2	3	4	Q61

22. Being a representative of the people, how would you vote on a bill that is popular, yet regarded upon as being undemocratic according to democratic tenets?	1. I would vote for the bill 2. I would vote against the bill 3. I would abstain from voting	1 2 3	Q62
23. In principle, do you think that the constitution should be amended by:	1. A simple parliamentary majority 2. A 2/3 parliamentary majority 3. A referendum amongst the people 4. The president	1 2 3 4	Q63

24. Whom of the following must hold the President accountable? (You may choose more than one option)	1. The PLC 2. The Cabinet 3. The Courts of Law 4. President above accountability 5. The people 6. God/Islam	1 2 3 4 5 6	Q64
25. Whom of the following must hold them accountable? (You may choose more than one option)	1. The President 2. Law & Courts 3. The PLC 4. The people	1 2 3 4	Q65
26. Which in your opinion should be the highest source of interpretation?	1. The President 2. The Parliament 3. The High Court 4. The religious institutions 5. Other _____	1 2 3 4 5	Q66

27. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements. The ideal Council member should: (1: strongly agree, and 5: strongly disagree)

	Agree			Disagree			
Adhere to the Constitution	1	2	3	4	5		Q67
Be tough-minded	1	2	3	4	5		Q68
Rely on religious interpretation	1	2	3	4	5		Q69
Follow the principles on which he was elected	1	2	3	4	5		Q70

28. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1: *strongly agree*, and 5: *strongly disagree*)

	<i>Agree</i>			<i>Disagree</i>			
There are some situations in which the Authority is justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security.	1	2	3	4	5		Q71
If the President acts against the Constitution, he should be impeached.	1	2	3	4	5		Q72
The quota system is important to have representation for minorities.	1	2	3	4	5		Q73
Majority right is absolute	1	2	3	4	5		Q74
It is important to have women in the Council.	1	2	3	4	5		Q75
Using the threat of violence as a political weapon is never justified.	1	2	3	4	5		Q76
There is too much concern for law and order, and not enough for rights.	1	2	3	4	5		Q77
Alcohol drinking is a personal choice and should not be treated as a crime.	1	2	3	4	5		Q78

29. How strongly do you believe in the following: (1: *strongly believe*, and 5: *strongly do not believe*)

	<i>strongly</i>			<i>strongly not</i>			
Separation between religion and the state	1	2	3	4	5		Q79
Individual rights	1	2	3	4	5		Q80
Rule of the majority	1	2	3	4	5		Q81
Rights of minorities	1	2	3	4	5		Q82
Judicial review	1	2	3	4	5		Q83
Freedom of assembly	1	2	3	4	5		Q84
Rights of opposition	1	2	3	4	5		Q85

30. Which, in your opinion, shall be the terms of reference for the negotiations during the interim phase: the PLO or the PNA?	1. PLO 2. PNA 3. Other _____	1 2 3	Q86
31. The PLC has discussed many issues pertaining to Israeli practices such as settlements and closures, etc. To what extent would you say that discussing such issues falls within the jurisdiction of the PLC, or do you think that the PLC should not be involved?	1. Yes, PLC should be involved. Why? _____ 2. No, PLC should not be involved. Why? _____	1 2	Q87

ANNEX 4: OPINION POLL WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

استطلاع رأي أعضاء المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني

1. برأيك ما هي أهمية العوامل التالية عند قيام الشعب الفلسطيني بالتصويت لانتخابات المجلس؟ (الرجاء الأخذ بعين الاعتبار (1) من الأهمية بمكان التشديد على كيف قام الناس بالتصويت وليس كيف سوف يقوموا بالتصويت مستقبلاً؛ (2) من المهم التأكيد هنا أيضاً على ما هو رأيك حول كيف يفكر الناس وليس كما تفكر أنت).

CODE	مهم جداً	مهم	مهم نوعاً ما	غير مهم	غير مهم مطلقاً
C1					
C2					
C3					
C4					
C5					
C6					
C7					
C8					
C9					
C10					
C11					
C12					
C13					

C14	2. على سلم من 1 إلى 10، بحيث يكون الرقم 1 "عقلاني جداً"، والرقم 10 "غير عقلاني مطلقاً"، كيف تقيم الناخب الفلسطيني في الانتخابات الأخيرة للمجلس بشكل عام؟ (ضع × في المكان المناسب)									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
C15	3. على سلم من 1 إلى 10، بحيث يكون الرقم 1 "مسؤول جداً"، والرقم 10 "غير مسؤول مطلقاً"، كيف تقيم الناخب الفلسطيني في الانتخابات الأخيرة للمجلس بشكل عام؟									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
C16	1	4. هل تعتقد ان الشعب سيصوت في الانتخابات القادمة بناءاً على نفس الاسس								
	2	2. ليس تماماً								
	3	3. ليس على نفس الاسس								
C17	1	5. بشكل عام هل تعتقد ان الناس يعرفون كيف يصوتون للمرشح الصحيح؟								
	2	1. نعم								
	3	2. لا								
		3. فقط إلى حد ما								

السؤال	الجواب	CODE
6. بشكل عام، هل يمكن ان تقول ان الناس عندما قاموا بالتصويت كانوا على علم بالبرامج الانتخابية للمرشحين؟	1. نعم 2. لا 3. فقط إلى حد ما	C18
7. برأيك، ما هي اهم مشكلتين تواجه المجتمع الفلسطيني	المشكلة (1):	C19
	المشكلة (2):	C20
8. بشكل عام، هل يمكن القول أن الناس راضون عن المرشحين الذين نجحوا في انتخابات المجلس، ام راضون بعض الشيء، ام انهم غير راضون مطلقا؟	1. راضون 2. راضون بعض الشيء 3. غير راضون	C21
9. آخذين نتائج الانتخابات بعين الاعتبار، هل تعتقد ان اعضاء المجلس يمثلون وجهات نظر وقضايا الناس بشكل عام؟	1. نعم 2. لا إلى حد ما 3. لا	C22
10. إلى أي مدى يمكن القول أن اعضاء المجلس بشكل عام يعرفون ما هي احتياجات ومتطلبات الناس؟	1. يعرفونها جيدا 2. يعرفونها لكن ليس بشكل جيد 3. لا يعرفونها مطلقا	C23
11. إلى أي مدى يمكن القول انك انت بصفتك عضوا في المجلس تعرف/ي ما هي احتياجات ومتطلبات الناس بشكل عام؟	1. اعرفها جيدا 2. اعرفها، لكن ليس بشكل جيد 3. لا أعرفها مطلقا	C24
11-1 ما هي الآليات التي يستخدمها اعضاء المجلس لمعرفة احتياجات الناس الذين يمثلون؟	1.	C25
	2.	C26
	3.	C27
11-2 ما هي برأيك أهم ثلاث احتياجات للناس بشكل عام؟	1.	C28
	2.	C29
	3.	C30
11-3 كيف تتأكد من ان هذه هي احتياجات الناس؟	1.	C31
	2.	C32
	3.	C33
12. برأيك، هل تعتقد ان اعضاء المجلس يمثلون بشكل عام إلى البرامج والوعود الانتخابية؟	1. نعم 2. لا 3. إلى حد ما	C34

السؤال	الجواب	CODE
13. بصفتك/ي عضو/ة في المجلس، هل يمكن القول انك امتثلت إلى برامجك ووعودك الانتخابية؟	1. نعم 2. لا 3. إلى حد ما	C35
14. بالنظر إلى العام، والنصف العام الماضي منذ انتخابات المجلس، ما هو رأيك بأداء المجلس بشكل عام؟ هل يمكن القول انك راض جدا، راض، غير راض ام انك غير راضي مطلقا؟	1. راض جدا (انتقل إلى سؤال 1-14) 2. راض (انتقل إلى سؤال 1-14) 3. غير راض (انتقل إلى سؤال 2-14) 4. غير راض مطلقا (انتقل إلى سؤال 2-14)	C36
1-14 ما هي أهم الأسباب لرضاك عن المجلس؟ (الرجاء تحديد أهم سببين فقط)	1. سرعة تفاعله 2. الديمقراطية 3. التأثير 4. الإستقلالية 5. الشجاعة 6. سهولة الوصول 7. غير ذلك 8. (حدد) _____	C37 C38
2-14 ما هي أهم الأسباب لعدم رضاك عن المجلس؟ (الرجاء تحديد أهم سببين فقط)	1. سرعة تفاعله 2. الديمقراطية 3. التأثير 4. الإستقلالية 5. الشجاعة 6. سهولة الوصول 7. غير ذلك 8. (حدد) _____	C39 C40
15. يعتقد بعض الناس ان المجلس التشريعي مقيد جدا من قبل السلطة التنفيذية، البعض الآخر يعتقد ان المجلس مقيد بعض الشيء، والبعض يعتقد ان المجلس غير مقيد مطلقا من قبل السلطة التنفيذية. ما هو رأيك؟	1. مقيد جدا 2. مقيد بعض الشيء 3. غير مقيد مطلقا	C41
16. إلى أي مدى يمكن القول أنك متفائل او متشائم حول أداء المجلس التشريعي المنتخب في المستقبل؟	1. متفائل (انتقل إلى سؤال 1-16) 2. متشائم (انتقل إلى سؤال 2-16)	C42
1-16 هل أنت متفائل جدا ام فقط متفائل بحذر؟	1. متفائل جدا 2. متفائل بحذر	C43
2-16 هل أنت متشائم جدا أم متشائم بحذر؟	3. متشائم جدا 4. متشائم بحذر	C44

17. كيف تقيم المجلس التشريعي في الأمور التالية: ماذا عن.....

C45	الديمقراطية، هل هو	1 ديمقراطي جدا	2 ديمقراطي	3 غير ديمقراطي	4 غير ديمقراطي مطلقا
C46	التأثير	1 ديمقراطي جدا	2 ديمقراطي	3 غير ديمقراطي	4 غير ديمقراطي مطلقا
C47	التفاعل مع الناس	1 ديمقراطي جدا	2 ديمقراطي	3 غير ديمقراطي	4 غير ديمقراطي مطلقا
C48	الاستقلالية عن السلطة التنفيذية	1 ديمقراطي جدا	2 ديمقراطي	3 غير ديمقراطي	4 غير ديمقراطي مطلقا
C49	الاستقلالية عن القضاء	1 ديمقراطي جدا	2 ديمقراطي	3 غير ديمقراطي	4 غير ديمقراطي مطلقا
C50	التعددية	1 ديمقراطي جدا	2 ديمقراطي	3 غير ديمقراطي	4 غير ديمقراطي مطلقا

18. من الأمور التالية، الرجاء تحديد إلى أي مدى تؤثر على عمل المجلس. هل يمكن القول أنها تؤثر على عمل المجلس بشكل إيجابي، سلبي، أم أنها لا تؤثر على عمل المجلس؟

C51	السياسات والممارسات الإسرائيلية	1 بشكل إيجابي	2 بشكل سلبي	3 لا تؤثر
C52	السلطة التنفيذية	1 بشكل إيجابي	2 بشكل سلبي	3 لا تؤثر
C53	القضاء	1 بشكل إيجابي	2 بشكل سلبي	3 لا تؤثر
C54	الرئيس	1 بشكل إيجابي	2 بشكل سلبي	3 لا تؤثر
C55	الشعب	1 بشكل إيجابي	2 بشكل سلبي	3 لا تؤثر
C56	الإعلام	1 بشكل إيجابي	2 بشكل سلبي	3 لا تؤثر

19. كيف تقيم مستوى الاتصال مع التالي:

C57	السلطة التنفيذية	1 جيدة	2 متوسطة	3 سيئة
C58	القضاء	1 جيدة	2 متوسطة	3 سيئة
C59	الرئيس	1 جيدة	2 متوسطة	3 سيئة
C60	الشعب	1 جيدة	2 متوسطة	3 سيئة

20. برأيك من من دول العالم التالية هي أكثر ديمقراطية (الرجاء وضع دائرة حول المكان المناسب):

C61	مصر	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C62	فرنسا	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C63	الأردن	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C64	السعودية	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C65	تونس	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C66	تركيا	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C67	الولايات المتحدة	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C68	اليمن	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا
C69	السويد	1 ديمقراطية جدا	2 ديمقراطية	3 غير ديمقراطية	4 غير ديمقراطية مطلقا

C70	21. كونك احد ممثلي الشعب، كيف ستوصت على مشروع قانون له شعبية عالية حتى لو كان غير ديمقراطي حسب المعايير والأسس الديمقراطية؟	1. سأصوت على المشروع 2. سأصوت ضد المشروع 3. سأمتنع عن التصويت	1 2 3
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السؤال	الجواب	CODE
22. من ناحية المبدأ، هل تعتقد ان الدستور يجب ان يعدل من قبل...؟	1. أكثرية بسيطة في البرلمان 2. أكثرية ثلثي اعضاء البرلمان 3. إستفتاء شعبي 4. الرئيس	C71
23. من من التالية يجب ان يحاسب الرئيس؟ (الرجاء عدم اختيار اكثر من اجابتين)	1. المجلس التشريعي 2. مجلس الوزراء 3. المحاكم 4. الرئيس فوق المحاسبة 5. الشعب 6. الله	C72 C73
24. من من التالية يجب محاسبة مجلس الوزراء؟ (الرجاء عدم اختيار اكثر من اجابتين)	1. الرئيس 2. القضاء والمحاكم 3. المجلس التشريعي 4. الشعب	C74 C75
25. من برأيك/ي يجب أن يكون الهيئة العليا لتفسير القانون/الدستور؟	1. الرئيس 2. البرلمان 3. المحكمة العليا 4. المؤسسات الدينية 5. غير ذلك (حدد)	C76

26. من ناحية المبدأ، هل تؤيد ام تعارض الجمل التالية: عضو المجلس التشريعي الامثل يجب (1 اوافق جدا..... 5 لا اوافق مطلقا)؟

C77	5	4	3	2	1	التمسك بالدستور
C78	5	4	3	2	1	ان يكون متشددا
C79	5	4	3	2	1	الاعتماد على التفسير الديني

27. من ناحية المبدأ، هل تؤيد ام تعارض الجمل التالية: 1 "أؤيد بقوة"..... 5 "أعارض بقوة"؟

C80	5	4	3	2	1	هناك بعض الحالات التي تكون فيه السلطة محقة في مخالفة القانون من أجل حماية الأمن الوطني.
C81	5	4	3	2	1	اذا قام الرئيس بمخالفة الدستور يجب أن يتم ابعاده عن منصبه
C82	5	4	3	2	1	الكوتا مهمة لتمثيل الاقليات
C83	5	4	3	2	1	من المهم وجود نساء في المجلس
C84	5	4	3	2	1	استخدام العنف كسلاح سياسي لا يمكن القبول به في أي حال من الأحوال
C85	5	4	3	2	1	هناك الكثير من الاهتمام بالقانون والنظام والقليل من الاهتمام بالحقوق
C86	5	4	3	2	1	شرب الكحول هو خيار شخصي وعدم النظر إليه كجريمة

28. إلى أي مدى يمكن القول أنك تؤيد ما يلي: 1 "أؤيد بقوة"، 5 "أعارض بقوة"؟

C87	5	4	3	2	1	فصل الدين عن الدولة
C88	5	4	3	2	1	الحقوق الفردية
C89	5	4	3	2	1	حكم الأكثرية
C90	5	4	3	2	1	حقوق الاقلية
C91	5	4	3	2	1	المراجعة القضائية
C92	5	4	3	2	1	حرية الاجتماع
C93	5	4	3	2	1	حقوق المعارضة
C94	5	4	3	2	1	حرية الصحافة

ANNEX 5: Results of the Public Opinion Survey on the Elections and the PLC

Q1. Have you voted in the elections of January 1996? (c9)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes		64.6%	64.3%	64.8%	59.9%	72.7%	61.8%	68.9%
No		34.4%	34.9%	34.0%	38.9%	26.7%	37.2%	30.1%
No answer		1.0%	0.8%	1.2%	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	1.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	58.8%	64.3%	65.7%	65.3%	67.8%	63.6%	64.2%	71.4%	69.5%	45.5%
No	38.7%	34.8%	34.0%	33.1%	31.3%	35.6%	35.5%	28.1%	28.6%	50.0%
No answer	2.5%	0.9%	0.3%	1.6%	0.9%	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%	1.9%	4.5%

Q2. For which political faction did vote? (c10)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Fateh	63.1%	61.9%	64.1%	65.1%	60.2%	65.2%	62.0%
Hamas	2.6%	2.6%	2.7%	1.5%	4.1%	3.0%	2.0%
PFLP	0.9%	1.5%	0.3%	1.1%	0.6%	1.0%	0.8%
DFLP	0.1%	-	0.3%	-	0.3%	0.3%	-
Islamic Jihad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PPP	1.7%	2.0%	1.3%	2.6%	0.3%	2.5%	0.8%
FIDA	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	1.3%	-	1.3%	0.3%
Democratic Coalition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Islamic Org.	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	1.1%	0.3%	1.0%	0.6%
Secular pro-peace	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.4%	1.3%	1.0%	0.6%
Secular against peace	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PLO	0.3%	0.5%	-	0.2%	0.3%	-	0.3%
Persons and not factions	19.8%	20.7%	18.9%	21.2%	17.9%	19.1%	19.7%
Others	0.5%	0.8%	0.3%	0.9%	-	1.0%	-
No answer	8.7%	7.7%	9.8%	4.4%	14.7%	4.5%	13.0%

	Education						Age			
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Fateh	58.6%	68.3%	65.1%	61.5%	56.4%	69.7%	60.9%	64.1%	58.9%	66.7%
Hamas	2.9%	2.8%	2.7%	2.0%	3.8%	3.3%	2.6%	2.1%	2.7%	-
PFLP	-	0.7%	0.4%	2.0%	1.3%	0.8%	1.7%	0.7%	-	-
DFLP	-	-	-	0.5%	-	0.4%	-	-	-	-
Islamic Jihad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PPP	-	-	2.0%	2.9%	2.6%	1.2%	2.6%	2.8%	-	-
FIDA	-	0.7%	1.2%	1.0%	-	0.4%	0.9%	0.7%	2.7%	-
Democratic Coalition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Islamic Org.	-	0.7%	0.8%	0.5%	1.3%	0.4%	0.4%	1.4%	-	3.3%
Secular pro-peace	1.4%	-	0.8%	1.0%	-	1.2%	0.4%	0.7%	-	-
Secular against peace	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PLO	-	-	0.4%	-	1.3%	0.4%	-	0.7%	-	-
Persons and not factions	27.1%	18.3%	17.3%	19.5%	23.1%	14.1%	20.9%	17.2%	28.8%	23.3%
Others	1.4%	0.7%	0.4%	0.5%	-	-	1.3%	-	1.4%	-
No answer	8.6%	7.7%	9.0%	8.8%	10.3%	7.9%	8.5%	9.7%	5.5%	6.7%

Q3. Why didn't you vote? (c11)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=411	N=212	N=197	N=294	N=117	N=239	N=155
I didn't register on time	17.0%	17.5%	16.8%	16.7%	17.9%	14.6%	21.9%
I didn't believe that it would make a difference	13.4%	13.2%	13.7%	13.3%	13.7%	12.1%	13.5%
I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote	22.6%	20.3%	24.9%	21.8%	24.8%	21.8%	23.2%
Others	8.5%	8.0%	9.1%	8.55%	8.5%	10.0%	6.5%
I am opposition/against Oslo	3.4%	4.7%	2.0%	3.1%	4.3%	3.3%	3.9%
Not convinced	4.9%	4.2%	5.6%	5.8%	2.6%	5.9%	3.2%
I was out of the country	7.1%	7.1%	6.6%	6.8%	7.7%	7.5%	5.2%
Personal reasons	2.9%	3.8%	2.0%	2.7%	3.4%	3.3%	2.6%
Too young	5.1%	7.1%	3.0%	5.4%	4.3%	4.2%	7.1%
Old	1.5%	1.4%	1.5%	1.7%	0.9%	2.1%	0.6%
Sick	1.9%	0.9%	3.0%	2.4%	0.9%	2.5%	1.3%
Didn't have an idea	2.7%	3.8%	1.5%	1.4%	6.0%	2.5%	3.2%
No answer	9.0%	8.0%	10.1%	10.5%	5.1%	10.0%	7.8%

	Education				Age			
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45
	N=46	N=77	N=132	N=104	N=36	N=135	N=130	N=57
I didn't register on time	23.9%	14.3%	16.7%	20.2%	8.3%	20.0%	14.6%	10.5%
I didn't believe that it would make a difference	15.2%	13.0%	13.6%	14.4%	8.3%	11.1%	14.6%	14.0%
I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote	10.9%	28.6%	22.7%	21.2%	27.8%	24.4%	24.6%	21.1%
Others	17.4%	10.4%	7.6%	4.8%	8.3%	5.9%	8.5%	19.3%
I am opposition/against Oslo	-	-	2.3%	8.7%	5.6%	3.0%	4.6%	5.3%
Not convinced	-	6.5%	4.5%	7.7%	-	5.2%	7.7%	5.3%
I was out of the country	2.2%	1.3%	7.6%	9.6%	19.4%	6.7%	6.9%	7.0%
Personal reasons	2.2%	3.9%	2.3%	1.0%	5.6%	1.5%	4.6%	-
Too young	-	1.3%	9.8%	5.8%	-	12.6%	-	-
Old	8.7%	-	0.8%	-	-	0.7%	-	-
Sick	10.9%	1.3%	0.8%	-	-	0.7%	1.5%	-
Didn't have an idea	2.2%	5.2%	3.0%	-	5.6%	3.0%	2.3%	1.8%
No answer	6.5%	14.3%	8.3%	6.7%	11.2%	5.2%	10.0%	15.8%

Q6. Relatives (c14)

	Total		Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
	N=772		N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355	
Voted		28.4%	25.3%	31.6%	30.2%	25.7%	30.5%	25.4%	
Did not vote		59.3%	61.9%	56.4%	54.3%	66.5%	55.7%	64.8%	
No answer		12.3%	12.8%	12.0%	15.5%	7.8%	13.9%	9.9%	

		Education		Some College		College & above	Age		
Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.							
N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	35.7%	20.4%	36.5%	26.3%	15.4%	30.2%	33.8%	26.0%	20.0%
Did not vote	47.1%	68.3%	54.9%	61.5%	64.7%	57.0%	57.2%	57.5%	56.7%
No answer	17.1%	11.3%	8.6%	12.2%	17.9%	12.8%	9.0%	16.4%	23.3%

Q7. Females (c15)

	Total		Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
	N=772		N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355	
Voted		40.2%	36.8%	43.9%	39.3%	41.4%	41.3%	38.9%	
Did not vote		53.2%	55.0%	51.3%	53.2%	53.3%	51.9%	55.8%	
No answer		6.6%	8.2%	4.8%	7.5%	5.3%	6.8%	5.4%	

		Education		Some College		College & above	Age		
Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.							
N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	40.0%	33.8%	40.4%	45.4%	40.2%	42.6%	44.8%	35.6%	30.0%
Did not vote	54.3%	59.2%	54.1%	47.3%	53.5%	50.2%	52.4%	58.9%	63.3%
No answer	5.7%	7.0%	5.5%	7.3%	6.2%	7.2%	2.8%	5.5%	6.7%

Q8. Christians (c16)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
			N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Voted		21.2%	24.0%	18.6%	23.8%	17.6%	20.2%	21.4%
Did not vote		70.7%	68.0%	73.4%	68.7%	73.7%	72.8%	70.1%
No answer		8.0%	7.9%	8.0%	7.5%	8.8%	7.1%	8.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	15.7%	15.5%	22.7%	23.4%	23.1%	18.3%	21.7%	20.7%	27.4%	26.7%
Did not vote	78.6%	76.1%	72.2%	66.3%	64.1%	71.8%	71.9%	72.4%	68.5%	56.7%
No answer	5.7%	8.5%	5.1%	10.2%	12.8%	10.0%	6.4%	6.9%	4.1%	16.7%

Q9. People with struggle history (c17)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
			N=391	N=	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Voted		90.0%	91.8%	88.0%	92.7%	86.2%	91.9%	87.6%
Did not vote		7.3%	5.4%	9.3%	4.6%	11.0%	5.8%	9.3%
No answer		2.7%	2.8%	2.7%	2.6%	2.8%	2.3%	3.1%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	85.7%	85.9%	89.8%	96.1%	87.2%	88.4%	91.5%	92.4%	87.7%	90.0%
Did not vote	10.0%	10.6%	8.2%	1.5%	9.0%	7.1%	6.8%	5.5%	11.0%	6.7%
No answer	4.3%	3.5%	2.0%	2.4%	3.8%	4.6%	1.7%	2.1%	1.4%	3.3%

How important were the following factors, when you cast your vote?
Q10. Democratic values (c18)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	59.8%	63.2%	56.1%	56.5%	64.6%	60.7%	59.4%
Important	28.5%	28.4%	28.7%	34.7%	19.7%	29.0%	27.0%
Somewhat important	6.7%	5.1%	8.5%	4.6%	9.7%	5.3%	8.7%
Not important	2.2%	2.5%	2.4%	2.2%	2.2%	2.8%	1.7%
Absolutely not important	0.8%	0.3%	1.3%	0.7%	0.9%	1.0%	0.6%
No answer	1.9%	1.0%	2.9%	1.3%	2.8%	1.3%	2.5%

	Education				Age	
	Up to Elem. N=70	Up to Prep. N=142	Up to Sec. N=255	Some College N=205	College & above N=78	55+ N=30
Very important	41.4%	51.4%	60.8%	66.8%	57.7%	66.2%
Important	32.9%	39.4%	27.1%	24.9%	29.0%	23.4%
Somewhat important	10.0%	4.9%	8.2%	4.4%	7.5%	5.5%
Not important	7.1%	1.4%	2.0%	2.4%	2.9%	2.1%
Absolutely not important	-	1.4%	0.8%	1.0%	1.2%	-
No answer	8.6%	1.4%	1.2%	0.5%	2.6%	2.8%

Q11. Political affiliation (c19)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	41.8%	43.2%	39.9%	44.6%	37.9%	45.3%	38.3%
Important	28.6%	27.1%	30.6%	28.9%	28.2%	27.5%	30.4%
Somewhat important	9.8%	10.2%	9.6%	9.5%	10.3%	9.8%	9.6%
Not important	16.2%	16.6%	15.7%	14.6%	18.5%	14.4%	17.7%
Absolutely not important	1.7%	1.5%	1.9%	1.3%	2.2%	1.3%	2.0%
No answer	1.8%	1.3%	2.4%	1.1%	2.8%	1.8%	2.0%

	Education				Age	
	Up to Elem. N=70	Up to Prep. N=142	Up to Sec. N=255	Some College N=205	College & above N=78	55+ N=30
Very important	40.0%	38.7%	43.1%	42.9%	39.8%	45.5%
Important	20.0%	33.1%	30.2%	26.8%	36.1%	20.0%
Somewhat important	5.7%	11.3%	7.5%	14.1%	10.4%	11.0%
Not important	22.9%	14.8%	17.3%	13.2%	11.2%	18.6%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	0.7%	1.2%	2.0%	1.2%	2.1%
No answer	8.6%	1.4%	0.8%	1.0%	1.3%	-

Q12. Religion (c20)

	Total	Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355	
Very important	39.4%	32.0%	46.8%	29.4%	53.6%	33.2%	47.3%	
Important	25.3%	27.4%	23.4%	23.8%	27.3%	26.2%	24.2%	
Somewhat important	11.9%	14.3%	9.3%	14.6%	8.2%	13.9%	9.0%	
Not important	19.3%	22.0%	16.5%	26.3%	9.4%	22.2%	16.1%	
Absolutely not important	2.5%	2.8%	2.1%	4.0%	0.3%	2.8%	1.7%	
No answer	1.7%	1.5%	1.9%	2.0%	1.3%	1.8%	1.7%	

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Very important	48.6%	38.0%	42.4%	36.1%	32.1%	39.4%	40.4%	42.1%	38.4%	36.7%
Important	18.6%	28.2%	28.2%	23.9%	23.1%	27.0%	25.1%	21.4%	28.8%	20.0%
Somewhat important	4.3%	12.7%	9.8%	15.1%	12.8%	14.1%	11.9%	6.9%	11.0%	10.0%
Not important	17.1%	20.4%	18.0%	18.5%	24.4%	16.2%	17.9%	24.8%	19.2%	20.0%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	-	1.2%	4.9%	5.1%	2.5%	3.0%	1.4%	2.7%	6.7%
No answer	8.6%	0.7%	0.4%	1.5%	2.6%	0.8%	1.7%	3.4%	-	6.7%

Q13. Religious values (c21)

	Total	Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355	
Very important	34.2%	29.9%	38.6%	25.2%	47.0%	28.7%	41.1%	
Important	26.6%	24.3%	29.0%	23.6%	30.7%	27.7%	26.2%	
Somewhat important	16.3%	17.1%	15.4%	20.3%	10.7%	17.6%	14.4%	
Not important	18.1%	22.8%	13.3%	24.1%	9.7%	19.9%	15.5%	
Absolutely not important	2.3%	3.3%	1.3%	4.0%	-	2.8%	1.4%	
No answer	2.5%	2.6%	2.4%	2.9%	1.9%	3.3%	1.4%	

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=70	Up to Prep. N=142	Up to Sec. N=255	Some College N=205	College & above N=78	18-25 N=241	26-35 N=235	36-45 N=145	46-55 N=73	55+ N=30
Very important	44.3%	34.5%	36.5%	31.7%	23.1%	36.5%	34.0%	35.9%	27.4%	36.7%
Important	21.4%	33.1%	27.8%	23.4%	24.4%	24.1%	29.8%	25.5%	32.9%	20.0%
Somewhat important	8.6%	17.6%	17.3%	16.6%	16.7%	16.6%	15.7%	14.5%	17.8%	20.0%
Not important	12.9%	14.8%	16.5%	21.5%	25.6%	17.4%	16.6%	19.3%	17.8%	13.3%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	-	0.8%	4.9%	5.1%	2.5%	2.1%	2.8%	2.7%	3.3%
No answer	10.0%	-	1.2%	2.0%	5.1%	2.9%	1.7%	2.1%	1.4%	6.7%

Q14. Struggle history (c22)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	58.9%	59.3%	58.0%	60.9%	56.1%	58.4%	59.2%
Important	30.6%	29.9%	31.6%	31.6%	29.2%	31.5%	29.6%
Somewhat important	5.8%	6.1%	5.6%	4.2%	8.2%	6.3%	5.4%
Not important	2.8%	3.3%	2.4%	1.8%	4.4%	1.5%	4.5%
Absolutely not important	0.1%	-	0.3%	0.2%	-	0.3%	-
No answer	1.7%	1.3%	2.1%	1.3%	2.2%	2.0%	1.4%

	Education			Some College	College & above	Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			18-25	26-35
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235
Very important	52.9%	57.7%	59.6%	59.0%	59.0%	53.1%	60.0%
Important	30.0%	34.5%	30.6%	30.7%	26.9%	39.8%	30.6%
Somewhat important	4.3%	4.9%	5.1%	7.8%	7.7%	3.7%	6.0%
Not important	1.4%	2.8%	4.3%	1.5%	3.8%	2.1%	2.1%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	-	-	-	2.6%	-	-
No answer	10.0%	-	0.4%	1.0%	-	1.2%	1.3%

	Education			Some College	College & above	Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			18-25	26-35
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235
Very important	52.9%	57.7%	59.6%	59.0%	59.0%	53.1%	60.0%
Important	30.0%	34.5%	30.6%	30.7%	26.9%	39.8%	30.6%
Somewhat important	4.3%	4.9%	5.1%	7.8%	7.7%	3.7%	6.0%
Not important	1.4%	2.8%	4.3%	1.5%	3.8%	2.1%	2.1%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	-	-	-	2.6%	-	-
No answer	10.0%	-	0.4%	1.0%	-	1.2%	1.3%

Q15. Education (c23)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	59.3%	60.4%	57.7%	53.9%	67.1%	56.9%	63.4%
Important	33.5%	32.2%	35.4%	38.6%	26.3%	34.0%	31.5%
Somewhat important	3.0%	4.1%	1.9%	3.1%	2.8%	4.0%	2.0%
Not important	2.2%	2.3%	2.1%	2.6%	1.6%	2.8%	1.4%
Absolutely not important	0.4%	-	0.8%	0.4%	0.3%	0.8%	-
No answer	1.6%	1.0%	2.1%	1.3%	1.9%	1.5%	1.7%

	Education			Some College	College & above	Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			18-25	26-35
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235
Very important	51.4%	62.0%	55.3%	62.4%	67.9%	59.3%	60.4%
Important	31.4%	33.1%	37.6%	31.2%	26.9%	34.9%	34.5%
Somewhat important	2.9%	2.1%	5.1%	1.5%	2.6%	2.5%	1.7%
Not important	5.7%	2.8%	1.6%	2.0%	1.3%	2.1%	1.7%
Absolutely not important	8.6%	-	0.4%	1.0%	-	0.4%	-
No answer	-	-	-	2.0%	1.3%	0.8%	1.7%

	Education			Some College	College & above	Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			18-25	26-35
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235
Very important	51.4%	62.0%	55.3%	62.4%	67.9%	59.3%	60.4%
Important	31.4%	33.1%	37.6%	31.2%	26.9%	34.9%	34.5%
Somewhat important	2.9%	2.1%	5.1%	1.5%	2.6%	2.5%	1.7%
Not important	5.7%	2.8%	1.6%	2.0%	1.3%	2.1%	1.7%
Absolutely not important	8.6%	-	0.4%	1.0%	-	0.4%	-
No answer	-	-	-	2.0%	1.3%	0.8%	1.7%

400

Q16. Residence (c24)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	19.7%	17.1%	22.6%	17.0%	23.5%	15.1%	25.4%
Important	23.6%	21.2%	26.3%	25.2%	21.3%	24.2%	22.8%
Somewhat important	19.4%	19.9%	18.9%	19.6%	19.1%	23.2%	15.8%
Not important	32.5%	36.1%	28.5%	33.8%	30.7%	33.0%	31.3%
Absolutely not important	2.6%	3.3%	1.6%	2.6%	2.5%	2.3%	2.8%
No answer	2.2%	2.3%	2.1%	1.8%	2.8%	2.3%	2.0%

	Education			Age	Refugee or Not	R
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			
	N=70	N=142	N=255		N=73	N=30
Very important	12.9%	23.2%	21.6%	21.2%	17.9%	13.3%
Important	22.9%	24.6%	29.0%	23.2%	26.0%	23.3%
Somewhat important	22.9%	19.7%	18.4%	17.4%	14.0%	27.4%
Not important	30.0%	31.0%	33.2%	34.9%	28.3%	30.0%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	0.7%	1.6%	2.1%	3.0%	2.7%
No answer	8.6%	0.7%	1.2%	1.2%	2.1%	6.7%

	Education			Age	Refugee or Not	R
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			
	N=70	N=142	N=255		N=73	N=30
Very important	12.9%	23.2%	21.6%	21.2%	17.9%	13.3%
Important	22.9%	24.6%	29.0%	23.2%	26.0%	23.3%
Somewhat important	22.9%	19.7%	18.4%	17.4%	14.0%	27.4%
Not important	30.0%	31.0%	33.2%	34.9%	28.3%	30.0%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	0.7%	1.6%	2.1%	3.0%	2.7%
No answer	8.6%	0.7%	1.2%	1.2%	2.1%	6.7%

Q17. Socio-economic status (c25)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	R
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	17.7%	16.1%	18.1%	16.1%	18.2%	15.6%	18.9%
Important	28.9%	28.4%	29.8%	30.7%	26.3%	30.0%	27.9%
Somewhat important	21.0%	22.3%	19.7%	20.1%	22.3%	22.2%	19.4%
Not important	28.2%	28.4%	27.4%	27.8%	28.8%	27.2%	29.6%
Absolutely not important	2.2%	2.6%	1.9%	2.9%	1.3%	2.0%	2.0%
No answer	2.7%	2.3%	3.2%	2.4%	3.1%	3.0%	2.3%

	Education			Age	Refugee or Not	R
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			
	N=70	N=142	N=255		N=73	N=30
Very important	18.6%	17.6%	18.4%	12.9%	16.6%	13.3%
Important	21.4%	32.4%	32.9%	26.1%	29.0%	26.7%
Somewhat important	20.0%	21.1%	20.8%	23.7%	19.1%	27.4%
Not important	27.1%	26.1%	31.2%	31.5%	29.7%	26.7%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	2.1%	3.9%	2.5%	3.4%	-
No answer	10.0%	0.7%	2.9%	3.3%	2.8%	10.0%

Q18. Reputation (c26)

	Total N=772	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male N=391	Female N=376	West Bank N=453	Gaza N=319	Non-refugee N=397	Refugee N=355
Very important	63.9%	61.9%	65.4%	60.5%	68.7%	62.7%	65.9%
Important	27.6%	28.9%	26.6%	30.2%	23.8%	28.7%	25.6%
Somewhat important	4.0%	4.9%	3.2%	5.3%	2.2%	4.3%	3.7%
Not important	1.9%	2.3%	1.6%	2.0%	1.9%	1.8%	2.3%
Absolutely not important	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.5%	-
No answer	2.3%	1.8%	2.9%	1.8%	3.1%	2.0%	2.5%

Q19. Family relations (c27)

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Very important	58.6%	66.2%	63.1%	64.4%	65.4%	60.2%	65.5%	64.8%	69.9%	56.7%
Important	28.6%	26.8%	29.4%	25.9%	25.6%	30.3%	27.2%	25.5%	23.3%	30.0%
Somewhat important	4.3%	2.8%	5.1%	4.4%	2.6%	4.1%	3.4%	4.1%	4.1%	6.7%
Not important	-	2.1%	1.2%	3.4%	2.6%	3.3%	1.3%	1.4%	1.4%	-
Absolutely not important	-	-	0.4%	0.5%	-	0.8%	-	-	-	-
No answer	8.6%	2.1%	0.8%	1.5%	3.8%	1.2%	2.6%	4.1%	1.4%	6.7%

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	15.8%	15.6%	15.4%	13.0%	19.7%	12.6%	19.4%
Important	27.6%	26.6%	28.7%	28.9%	25.7%	29.0%	25.9%
Somewhat important	19.6%	20.5%	18.6%	19.9%	19.1%	23.2%	15.5%
Not important	31.3%	31.2%	31.9%	33.3%	28.5%	30.5%	33.0%
Absolutely not important	3.6%	4.3%	2.9%	2.9%	4.7%	3.0%	3.9%
No answer	2.1%	1.8%	2.4%	2.0%	2.2%	1.8%	2.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=70	Up to Prep. N=142	Up to Sec. N=255	Some College N=205	College & above N=78	18-25 N=241	26-35 N=235	36-45 N=145	46-55 N=73	55+ N=30
Very important	18.6%	17.6%	14.9%	16.1%	12.8%	14.1%	16.2%	15.2%	21.9%	20.0%
Important	18.6%	28.9%	32.9%	28.3%	16.7%	29.0%	29.8%	23.4%	26.0%	26.7%
Somewhat important	20.0%	21.8%	17.6%	19.0%	21.8%	18.7%	17.4%	22.1%	19.2%	20.0%
Not important	27.1%	29.6%	30.6%	30.7%	41.0%	32.8%	33.6%	29.7%	26.0%	23.3%
Absolutely not important	5.7%	2.1%	3.9%	3.9%	2.6%	3.7%	1.7%	7.6%	5.5%	-
No answer	10.0%	-	-	2.0%	5.1%	1.7%	1.3%	2.1%	1.4%	10.0%

Q20. Gender (c28)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	15.0%	13.8%	16.5%	12.1%	19.1%	14.1%	16.6%
Important	17.7%	15.9%	19.9%	15.7%	20.7%	18.6%	16.3%
Somewhat important	15.7%	17.4%	13.8%	16.6%	14.4%	17.9%	13.0%
Not important	44.3%	45.0%	43.1%	47.2%	40.1%	41.8%	47.3%
Absolutely not important	4.4%	5.6%	3.2%	5.5%	2.8%	3.8%	4.8%
No answer	2.8%	2.3%	3.5%	2.9%	2.8%	3.8%	2.0%

	Education				Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	
Very important	21.4%	14.1%	16.9%	14.1%	10.3%	15.4%
Important	12.9%	19.7%	18.4%	18.5%	12.8%	20.3%
Somewhat important	5.7%	18.3%	18.8%	13.2%	15.4%	14.5%
Not important	44.3%	43.7%	42.4%	44.4%	51.3%	43.6%
Absolutely not important	7.1%	2.1%	2.7%	6.8%	6.4%	4.6%
No answer	8.6%	2.1%	0.8%	2.9%	3.8%	1.7%

	Area				Age	
	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee		
	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355		
Very important	12.4%	10.7	11.8%	11.8%	12.4%	16.7%
Important	19.9%	17.6	21.7%	15.5%	15.9%	16.7%
Somewhat important	19.2%	20.1	18.6%	20.6%	18.6%	10.0%
Not important	44.6%	42.9	41.8%	46.2%	45.5%	43.3%
Absolutely not important	2.2%	6.0	3.5%	3.9%	3.4%	6.7%
No answer	1.85	2.8	2.5%	2.0%	4.1%	6.7%

Q21. Age (c29)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	11.7%	12.5%	10.4%	12.4%	10.7	11.8%	11.8%
Important	18.9%	17.4%	20.7%	19.9%	17.6	21.7%	15.5%
Somewhat important	19.6%	19.9%	19.4%	19.2%	20.1	18.6%	20.6%
Not important	43.9%	44.2%	43.6%	44.6%	42.9	41.8%	46.2%
Absolutely not important	3.8%	4.1%	3.2%	2.2%	6.0	3.5%	3.9%
No answer	2.2%	1.8%	2.7%	1.85	2.8	2.5%	2.0%

	Education				Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	
Very important	14.3%	8.5%	13.7%	12.2%	9.0%	11.6%
Important	12.9%	16.9%	25.1%	18.0%	11.5%	17.4%
Somewhat important	11.4%	26.1%	17.3%	20.5%	21.8%	20.3%
Not important	42.9%	45.8%	41.2%	42.9%	51.3%	46.1%
Absolutely not important	8.6%	1.4%	2.0%	4.9%	3.8%	2.9%
No answer	10.0%	1.4%	0.8%	1.5%	2.6%	1.7%

	Area				Age	
	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee		
	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355		
Very important	11.6%	13.2%	9.0%	13.3%	9.0%	13.3%
Important	17.4%	20.0%	19.3%	17.8%	17.4%	13.3%
Somewhat important	20.3%	19.1%	21.9%	21.9%	17.2%	13.3%
Not important	46.1%	43.0%	46.9%	41.1%	46.9%	36.7%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	3.0%	4.1%	4.1%	4.1%	13.3%
No answer	1.7%	1.7%	3.4%	1.4%	1.4%	10.0%

Q22. Campaign (c30)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	37.2%	40.9%	33.0%	37.5%	36.7%	36.8%	38.6%
Important	32.3%	30.9%	34.0%	33.6%	30.4%	36.0%	27.9%
Somewhat important	14.0%	14.8%	13.0%	14.1%	13.8%	13.1%	14.4%
Not important	13.2%	11.0%	15.4%	12.1%	14.7%	11.3%	15.5%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	1.5%	1.3%	1.3%	1.4%
No answer	1.9%	0.8%	3.2%	1.1%	3.1%	1.5%	2.3%

	Education			Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.							
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Very important	32.9%	29.6%	37.3%	42.4%	43.6%	36.5%	40.4%	37.2%	32.9%	36.7%
Important	20.0%	35.2%	35.3%	34.6%	25.6%	35.7%	31.5%	27.6%	30.1%	33.3%
Somewhat important	12.9%	18.3%	13.7%	10.2%	17.9%	15.8%	12.3%	13.1%	13.7%	6.7%
Not important	21.4%	15.5%	12.5%	8.8%	10.3%	9.1%	12.8%	18.6%	20.5%	13.3%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	1.4%	0.4%	3.4%	-	1.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.4%	-
No answer	11.4%	-	0.8%	0.5%	2.6%	1.7%	1.7%	2.1%	1.4%	10.0%

Q 23. Of those who made it to the Council and whom you yourself have voted for, are you satisfied with them, somewhat satisfied or dissatisfied with them? (c31)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Satisfied	15.9%	15.6%	16.2%	14.1%	18.5%	15.6%	15.5%
Somewhat satisfied	45.6%	44.2%	47.3%	47.9%	42.3%	47.9%	43.1%
Dissatisfied	27.7%	30.4%	24.7%	26.9%	28.8%	24.7%	31.8%
None made it to the PLC	7.9%	7.7%	8.0%	9.1%	6.3%	8.3%	7.3%
No answer	2.8%	2.0%	3.7%	2.0%	4.1%	3.5%	2.3%

	Education					Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	36-45
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=145
Satisfied	31.4%	16.2%	17.3%	9.8%	11.5%	14.9%	18.6%
Somewhat satisfied	32.9%	40.1%	45.1%	53.2%	48.7%	51.5%	44.1%
Dissatisfied	22.9%	34.5%	26.7%	25.9%	30.8%	22.8%	29.7%
None made it to the PLC	4.3%	7.7%	9.0%	7.8%	9.0%	7.1%	5.5%
No answer	8.6%	1.4%	2.0%	3.4%	-	3.7%	2.1%

Q24. Did the election results meet your expectations? (c32)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Met my expectations		19.5%	21.7%	17.1%	18.0%	22.1%	16.7%	23.1%
Somewhat met my expectations		37.7%	41.4%	34.1%	39.0%	35.5%	39.1%	36.3%
Did not meet my expectations		28.3%	26.3%	30.0%	27.6%	29.4%	28.7%	28.0%
No answer		14.5%	10.3%	18.8%	15.3%	13.0%	15.6%	12.6%

	Education		Some College		College & above		Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.				36-45	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203
Met my expectations	18.5%	16.7%	19.8%	20.1%	25.2%	17.9%	18.3%	23.6%
Somewhat mmy expectations	22.7%	29.0%	37.6%	47.8%	43.5%	41.7%	39.3%	30.0%
Did not meet my expectations	29.4%	37.1%	31.2%	22.0%	20.9%	26.4%	29.0%	36.9%
No answer	29.4%	17.2%	11.3%	10.2%	10.4%	14.0%	13.4%	9.4%

Q25. Did the candidates live up to their promises? (c33)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes		12.9%	14.6%	10.9%	11.9%	14.6%	12.3%	12.6%
No		62.2%	64.6%	59.7%	59.8%	66.3%	60.3%	66.0%
No answer		24.9%	20.7%	29.5%	28.3%	19.1%	27.4%	21.4%

	Education		Some College		College & above		Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.				36-45	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203
Yes	16.0%	10.9%	13.9%	10.5%	15.7%	14.5%	10.4%	14.8%
No	55.5%	57.9%	64.4%	66.2%	68.7%	62.5%	65.0%	50.5%
No answer	28.6%	31.2%	21.6%	23.2%	15.7%	23.0%	24.6%	20.2%

I will read to you some categories of people, please tell me whether you will vote for them in the future or not?

Q26. Returnees (c34)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Will vote			30.3%	40.3%	31.0%	42.1%	35.8%	34.0%
Will not vote			32.7%	24.7%	25.8%	33.7%	25.2%	33.2%
Depends			30.4%	26.6%	35.7%	16.6%	31.0%	26.2%
No answer			6.6%	8.4%	7.5%	7.5%	7.9%	6.6%

	Education		Some College		College & above		Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.					
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203
Will vote	37.8%	39.4%	34.8%	30.3%	33.0%	39.6%	34.7%	32.0%
Will not vote	16.0%	27.1%	32.2%	31.2%	32.2%	26.1%	31.1%	32.0%
Depends	33.6%	24.9%	26.5%	32.8%	28.7%	27.2%	27.6%	28.6%
No answer	12.6%	8.6%	6.4%	5.7%	6.1%	7.1%	6.6%	7.4%
								N=105
								N=66

Q27. Relatives (c35)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Will vote			19.4%	26.2%	22.0%	24.4%	22.1%	23.3%
Will not vote			33.4%	31.0%	25.7%	43.3%	29.1%	36.5%
Depends			39.5%	32.9%	43.5%	23.9%	39.7%	32.0%
No answer			7.7%	9.8%	8.9%	8.4%	9.0%	8.2%

	Education		Some College		College & above		Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.					
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203
Will vote	29.4%	21.7%	25.8%	21.0%	13.0%	24.0%	21.6%	20.2%
Will not vote	17.6%	37.6%	35.3%	31.5%	32.2%	32.5%	33.9%	35.5%
Depends	39.5%	32.6%	31.2%	40.8%	47.0%	35.4%	36.1%	35.5%
No answer	13.4%	8.1%	7.7%	6.7%	7.8%	8.2%	8.5%	8.9%
								N=105
								N=66

Q28. Females (c36)

	Total		Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
		N=1195	Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
Will vote		35.9%	29.3%	43.1%	32.9%	41.0%	37.9%	33.4%	
Will not vote		26.8%	29.9%	23.6%	23.0%	33.3%	24.5%	29.9%	
Depends		30.8%	34.9%	26.2%	37.6%	19.1%	31.0%	30.5%	
No answer		6.5%	5.9%	7.1%	6.5%	6.6%	6.7%	6.2%	

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Will vote	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
	40.3%	30.3%	36.1%	36.6%	35.7%	35.4%	35.2%	39.4%	40.0%	33.3%
Will not vote	19.3%	34.4%	27.8%	23.9%	27.8%	26.9%	28.1%	23.6%	23.8%	25.8%
Depends	29.4%	29.0%	29.6%	34.1%	32.2%	30.9%	30.9%	29.1%	32.4%	28.8%
No answer	10.9%	6.3%	6.4%	5.4%	4.3%	6.9%	5.7%	7.9%	3.8%	12.1%

Q29. Christians (c37)

	Total		Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
		N=1195	Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
Will vote		18.1%	20.1%	16.0%	16.0%	21.6%	15.7%	20.8%	
Will not vote		43.3%	40.3%	46.4%	40.5%	48.1%	43.8%	43.7%	
Depends		29.9%	32.2%	27.4%	34.9%	21.2%	31.6%	27.4%	
No answer		8.8%	7.4%	10.2%	8.6%	9.1%	8.9%	8.2%	

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Will vote	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
	15.1%	11.8%	19.6%	17.5%	30.4%	17.4%	18.0%	19.2%	20.0%	15.2%
Will not vote	37.8%	50.2%	44.8%	43.6%	33.0%	46.7%	43.7%	40.4%	39.0%	37.9%
Depends	36.1%	28.5%	26.8%	31.5%	29.6%	26.6%	30.1%	31.5%	36.2%	27.3%
No answer	10.9%	9.5%	8.8%	7.3%	7.0%	9.2%	8.2%	8.9%	4.8%	19.7%

Q30. People with struggle history (c38)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
	N=1195		Male N=608	Female N=580	West Bank N=756	Gaza N=439	Non-refugee N=642	Refugee N=515
Will vote	67.0%		64.3%	70.0%	60.8%	77.7%	65.0%	69.9%
Will not vote	9.4%		11.5%	7.1%	10.1%	8.2%	9.5%	8.9%
Depends	18.1%		19.7%	16.4%	23.7%	8.4%	19.6%	16.1%
No answer	5.5%		4.4%	6.6%	5.4%	5.7%	5.9%	5.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Will vote	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Will not vote	63.9%	66.1%	69.6%	66.2%	67.8%	69.4%	65.8%	63.5%	68.6%	65.2%
Depends	5.0%	15.4%	9.8%	6.7%	8.7%	8.7%	10.9%	8.4%	7.6%	9.1%
No answer	21.8%	13.1%	15.2%	22.3%	20.9%	15.8%	18.6%	22.2%	20.0%	15.2%
	9.2%	5.4%	5.4%	4.8%	2.6%	6.1%	4.6%	5.9%	3.8%	10.6%

Q31. To what extent would you say that the Palestinian people were responsible for voting such council? (c39)

	Total		Gender		Area			Refugee or Not		
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee		
		N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515		
The people are responsible		40.4%	37.5%	43.3%	39.6%	41.9%	41.1%	40.4%		
The people are somewhat responsible		39.2%	41.9%	36.4%	40.1%	37.6%	38.5%	38.8%		
The people are not responsible		14.8%	15.8%	13.8%	14.0%	16.2%	13.6%	16.5%		
No answer		5.6%	4.8%	6.6%	6.3%	4.3%	6.9%	4.3%		

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above					
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
The people are responsible	53.8%	42.5%	39.4%	34.7%	30.4%	34.0%	41.0%	46.3%	51.4%	56.1%
The people are somewhat responsible	21.8%	34.8%	40.7%	46.2%	51.3%	44.6%	38.0%	31.5%	34.3%	24.2%
The people are not responsible	12.6%	17.2%	15.5%	14.6%	15.7%	15.3%	16.7%	15.8%	11.4%	7.6%
No answer	11.8%	5.4%	4.4%	4.5%	2.6%	6.1%	4.4%	6.4%	2.9%	12.1%

Q32. Would you say that you would vote again in the next elections? (c40)

Q32. Would you say that you would vote again in the next elections. (crosstabs)										
	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not			
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee		
		N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515		
Yes		67.5%	67.9%	66.9%	64.7%	72.4%	67.1%	67.6%		
No		25.8%	26.0%	25.7%	27.9%	22.1%	25.5%	26.2%		
No answer		6.7%	6.1%	7.4%	7.4%	5.5%	7.3%	6.2%		

	Education						Age			
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Yes	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
	59.7%	62.0%	70.4%	69.4%	73.0%	70.4%	63.7%	68.0%	74.3%	54.5%
No	30.3%	31.7%	25.3%	22.9%	20.9%	23.2%	29.5%	25.1%	18.1%	33.3%
No answer	10.1%	6.3%	4.4%	7.6%	6.1%	6.3%	6.8%	6.9%	7.6%	12.1%

Q33. *Would you vote according to the same criteria, not quite, or would you vote in a totally different way? (41)*

	Total		Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
		N=807	Male N=413	Female N=388	West Bank N=489	Gaza N=318	Non-refugee N=431	Refugee N=348	
According to the same criteria		23.8%	24.0%	23.7%	24.1%	23.3%	26.0%	22.1%	
Not quite in the same way		27.9%	29.5%	26.3%	30.5%	23.9%	27.1%	27.3%	
Vote in totally different way		27.6%	25.9%	29.1%	24.7%	32.1%	27.1%	29.9%	
Didn't vote		17.2%	17.9%	16.8%	17.4%	17.0%	16.5%	17.0%	
No answer		3.5%	2.7%	4.1%	3.3%	3.8%	3.2%	3.7%	

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
According to the same criteria	29.6%	24.1%	21.6%	25.2%	20.2%	21.0%	26.2%	22.5%	28.2%	30.6%
Not quite in the same way	25.4%	26.3%	27.8%	29.8%	25.0%	32.2%	24.5%	26.1%	26.9%	25.0%
Vote in totally different way	22.5%	24.1%	33.0%	24.3%	32.1%	27.3%	28.3%	32.6%	24.4%	16.7%
Didn't vote	18.3%	19.7%	16.1%	16.5%	19.0%	16.9%	18.5%	13.0%	17.9%	19.4%
No answer	4.2%	5.8%	1.5%	4.1%	3.6%	2.6%	2.6%	5.8%	2.6%	8.3%

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Q34. Why wouldn't you vote again? (c42)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=308	N=158	N=149	N=211	N=97	N=164	N=135
It wouldn't make any difference	26.0%	24.7%	27.5%	24.2%	29.9%	23.2%	29.6%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	44.5%	44.9%	43.6%	40.3%	53.6%	39.6%	48.9%
Other reasons	15.9%	17.7%	14.1%	18.5%	10.3%	20.1%	11.1%
Don't believe in the PLC/ they're not going to fulfil their promises	1.0%	1.3%	0.7%	1.4%	-	1.2%	0.7%
No answer	12.7%	11.4%	14.1%	15.6%	6.2%	15.9%	9.6

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=36	N=70	N=98	N=72	N=24	N=88	N=108	N=51	N=19	N=22
It wouldn't make any difference	25.0%	31.4%	24.5%	23.6%	20.8%	23.9%	26.9%	23.5%	15.8%	27.3%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	19.4%	42.9%	49.0%	51.4%	54.2%	56.8%	42.6%	45.1%	42.1%	9.1%
Other reasons	27.8%	11.4%	12.2%	19.4%	16.7%	12.5%	14.8%	17.6%	31.6%	22.7%
Don't believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfil their promises	-	1.4%	2.0%	-	-	1.1%	1.9%	-	-	-
No answer	27.8%	12.9%	12.2%	5.6%	8.3%	5.7%	13.9%	13.7%	10.5%	40.9%

How important are the following factors when you will vote in the coming election?

Q35. Democratic values (c43)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	65.1%	66.6%	62.9%	59.9%	73.0%	65.2%	65.8%
Important	27.3%	25.7%	29.4%	33.3%	17.9%	28.8%	24.7%
Somewhat important	3.7%	4.1%	3.4%	3.9%	3.5%	2.8%	4.6%
Not important	1.2%	0.7%	1.8%	0.6%	2.2%	1.2%	1.4%
Absolutely not important	0.1%	-	0.3%	-	0.3%	-	0.3%
No answer	2.6%	2.9%	2.3%	2.2%	3.1%	2.1%	3.2%

	Education			Age	
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	53.5%	51.8%	68.9%	72.5%	70.2%
Important	31.0%	41.6%	26.0%	20.2%	21.4%
Somewhat important	5.6%	5.8%	3.3%	3.2%	2.4%
Not important	2.8%	-	1.1%	0.5%	1.2%
Absolutely not important	-	-	-	0.5%	-
No answer	7.0%	0.7%	0.7%	3.2%	4.8%

	18-25		26-35		36-45		46-55		55+	
	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36					
Very important	66.3%	64.8%	69.6%	64.1%	52.8%					
Important	26.6%	28.8%	24.6%	26.9%	33.3%					
Somewhat important	3.7%	2.6%	4.3%	5.1%	2.8%					
Not important	1.1%	1.3%	0.7%	2.6%	-					
Absolutely not important	0.4%	-	-	-	-					
No answer	1.9%	2.6%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%					

Q36. Political affiliation (c44)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807		N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	37.1%		38.3%	35.6%	39.1%	34.0%	41.1%	33.0%
Important	30.4%		27.4%	34.0%	30.1%	30.8%	29.5%	32.8%
Somewhat important	12.0%		13.1%	10.8%	12.9%	10.7%	11.8%	11.5%
Not important	15.6%		15.5%	15.7%	14.7%	17.0%	13.7%	17.0%
Absolutely not important	3.2%		4.4%	1.8%	2.0%	5.0%	2.8%	3.4%
No answer	1.7%		1.5%	2.1%	1.2%	2.5%	1.2%	2.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78	55+ N=36
Very important	32.4%	32.1%	38.8%	41.7%	31.0%	36.7%	36.9%	44.9%	30.8%	33.3%
Important	26.8%	32.8%	33.3%	28.4%	28.6%	35.2%	31.3%	25.4%	32.1%	22.2%
Somewhat important	7.0%	19.0%	8.4%	13.8%	11.9%	11.2%	12.0%	10.9%	16.7%	8.3%
Not important	25.4%	13.9%	16.1%	10.6%	20.2%	12.0%	16.3%	15.2%	14.1%	22.2%
Absolutely not important	4.2%	1.5%	2.6%	3.7%	6.0%	3.4%	1.7%	3.6%	5.1%	2.8%
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	1.8%	2.4%	1.5%	1.7%	-	1.3%	11.1%

Q37. Religion (c45)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	36.4%	30.0%	42.8%	29.7%	46.9%	32.0%	44.0%
Important	24.4%	24.7%	24.5%	23.3%	26.1%	24.4%	23.9%
Somewhat important	16.0%	17.7%	14.2%	18.2%	12.6%	18.1%	12.6%
Not important	18.2%	21.5%	14.7%	23.5%	10.1%	21.1%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.7%	3.9%	1.5%	3.5%	1.6%	2.6%	2.6%
No answer	2.2%	2.2%	2.3%	1.8%	2.8%	1.9%	2.6%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78	55+ N=36
Very important	49.3%	34.3%	39.9%	34.9%	21.4%	37.1%	37.3%	35.5%	37.2%	36.1%
Important	19.7%	28.5%	27.1%	19.7%	28.6%	24.7%	24.0%	26.8%	25.6%	13.9%
Somewhat important	11.3%	17.5%	13.2%	17.9%	19.0%	16.5%	16.7%	13.0%	17.9%	13.9%
Not important	11.3%	19.0%	16.5%	20.2%	23.8%	16.1%	18.9%	21.7%	12.8%	22.2%
Absolutely not important	4.2%	-	2.6%	4.1%	3.6%	3.0%	1.7%	2.2%	5.1%	2.8%
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	3.2%	3.6%	2.6%	1.3%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%

Q38. Religious values (c46)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		N=807	Male N=413	Female N=388	West Bank N=489	Gaza N=318	Non-refugee N=431	Refugee N=348
Very important	34.3%		30.0%	38.7%	24.5%	49.4%	28.1%	44.0%
Important	26.8%		26.6%	27.3%	24.7%	29.9%	28.5%	24.7%
Somewhat important	14.7%		15.5%	13.9%	17.6%	10.4%	16.5%	12.1%
Not important	19.0%		23.0%	14.4%	26.8%	6.9%	21.8%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.6%		2.7%	2.6%	4.1%	0.3%	3.0%	1.7%
No answer	2.6%		2.2%	3.1%	2.2%	3.1%	2.1%	3.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78	55+ N=36
Very important	47.9%	32.8%	35.2%	33.9%	22.6%	33.3%	36.5%	37.0%	25.6%	41.7%
Important	22.5%	28.5%	30.4%	21.6%	27.4%	27.0%	25.3%	30.4%	35.9%	13.9%
Somewhat important	8.5%	16.1%	12.8%	16.5%	20.2%	15.0%	14.2%	12.3%	20.5%	11.1%
Not important	14.1%	19.7%	16.8%	22.9%	21.4%	19.1%	19.3%	16.7%	14.1%	19.4%
Absolutely not important	2.8%	-	2.9%	3.2%	4.8%	3.0%	1.7%	2.9%	2.6%	2.8%
No answer	4.2%	2.9%	1.8%	1.8%	3.6%	2.6%	3.0%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%

Q39. Struggle history (c47)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		N=807	Male N=413	Female N=388	West Bank N=489	Gaza N=318	Non-refugee N=431	Refugee N=348
Very important	55.6%		57.6%	53.1%	55.0%	56.6%	55.5%	56.0%
Important	32.8%		29.3%	36.9%	32.9%	32.7%	32.5%	33.3%
Somewhat important	5.2%		6.3%	4.1%	5.7%	4.4%	5.6%	4.9%
Not important	3.7%		3.9%	3.6%	4.1%	3.1%	4.2%	3.2%
Absolutely not important	0.4%		0.5%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	0.7%	-
No answer	2.2%		2.4%	2.1%	1.8%	2.8%	1.6%	2.6%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78	55+ N=36
Very important	54.9%	46.0%	61.2%	61.0%	41.7%	59.2%	53.2%	55.8%	56.4%	58.3%
Important	29.6%	40.9%	31.1%	28.4%	38.1%	33.0%	32.6%	33.3%	33.3%	25.0%
Somewhat important	5.6%	6.6%	4.0%	5.0%	7.1%	4.1%	6.0%	5.8%	5.1%	2.8%
Not important	5.6%	4.4%	1.8%	2.8%	10.7%	1.9%	6.0%	5.1%	1.3%	2.8%
Absolutely not important	-	-	0.4%	0.9%	-	0.4%	-	-	-	-
No answer	4.2%	2.2%	1.5%	1.8%	2.4%	1.5%	2.1%	-	3.8%	11.1%

Q40. Education (c48)

	Total	Gender		West Bank	Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female		Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348	
Very important	58.6%	57.9%	58.8%	54.6%	64.8%	56.6%	61.2%	
Important	34.0%	34.1%	34.3%	37.6%	28.3%	35.5%	31.9%	
Somewhat important	4.5%	5.3%	3.6%	5.3%	3.1%	5.1%	3.7%	
Not important	1.1%	1.0%	1.3%	1.2%	0.9%	1.4%	0.9%	
Absolutely not important	0.1%	-	0.3%	-	0.3%	0.2%	-	
No	1.7%	1.7%	1.8%	1.2%	2.5%	1.2%	2.3%	

	Education				Age			
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78
Very important	57.7%	52.6%	59.0%	57.8%	59.2%	60.5%	62.3%	51.3%
Important	25.4%	40.1%	34.1%	36.7%	26.2%	33.5%	31.9%	37.2%
Somewhat important	7.0%	5.8%	5.5%	2.8%	4.5%	3.9%	4.3%	7.7%
Not important	5.6%	0.7%	1.1%	0.5%	1.1%	0.4%	1.4%	2.6%
Absolutely not important	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	2.4%	1.7%	-	1.3%

Q41. Residence (c49)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	16.9%	15.5%	18.6%	14.5%	20.4%	14.6%	20.4%
Important	26.8%	24.9%	29.1%	25.6%	28.6%	28.8%	24.7%
Somewhat important	18.8%	19.6%	17.8%	19.4%	17.9%	22.3%	15.2%
Not important	32.3%	34.4%	29.9%	36.6%	25.8%	31.1%	32.5%
Absolutely not important	2.4%	2.7%	1.8%	1.2%	4.1%	1.2%	3.4%
No answer	2.9%	2.9%	2.8%	2.7%	3.1%	2.1%	3.7%

	Education				Age			
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78
Very important	19.7%	17.5%	19.4%	15.6%	16.5%	16.3%	15.9%	16.7%
Important	19.7%	27.0%	29.7%	27.5%	25.0%	27.0%	30.4%	17.9%
Somewhat important	14.1%	19.0%	18.7%	19.3%	16.9%	17.6%	18.8%	30.8%
Not important	39.4%	35.0%	28.2%	30.7%	32.2%	34.8%	29.7%	28.2%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	0.7%	2.6%	3.2%	2.2%	1.7%	3.6%	2.6%
No answer	5.6%	0.7%	1.5%	3.7%	4.8%	2.6%	1.4%	3.8%

Q42. Socio-economic status (c50)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	15.9%	12.6%	19.3%	13.1%	20.1%	12.8%	19.5%
Important	32.7%	31.2%	34.5%	33.3%	31.8%	34.8%	30.7%
Somewhat important	18.6%	19.4%	17.5%	19.8%	16.7%	18.1%	19.3%
Not important	27.8%	30.8%	24.7%	29.0%	25.8%	29.9%	25.0%
Absolutely not important	2.7%	3.4%	1.8%	2.7%	2.8%	2.6%	2.6%
No answer	2.4%	2.7%	2.1%	2.0%	2.8%	1.9%	2.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78	55+ N=36
Very important	16.9%	16.1%	15.4%	17.0%	9.5%	12.7%	17.6%	17.4%	17.9%	11.1%
Important	35.2%	30.7%	35.2%	31.2%	28.6%	34.8%	32.6%	31.2%	26.9%	41.7%
Somewhat important	14.1%	24.1%	16.1%	19.3%	21.4%	16.9%	21.9%	14.5%	21.8%	11.1%
Not important	23.9%	26.3%	30.4%	25.7%	35.7%	30.7%	23.2%	34.8%	28.2%	16.7%
Absolutely not important	5.6%	1.5%	1.8%	4.1%	1.2%	2.2%	2.1%	2.2%	3.8%	8.3%
No answer	4.2%	1.5%	1.1%	2.8%	3.6%	2.6%	2.6%	-	1.3%	11.1%

Q43. Reputation (c51)					
	Total N=807	Gender		Area	
		Male N=413	Female N=388	West Bank N=489	Gaza N=318
Very important	61.5%	58.1%	64.9%	57.1%	68.2%
Important	28.9%	31.7%	26.0%	32.1%	23.9%
Somewhat important	4.6%	4.6%	4.6%	5.5%	3.1%
Not important	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	2.0%	0.6%
Absolutely not important	0.6%	1.0%	0.3%	0.8%	0.3%
No answer	3.0%	3.1%	2.6%	2.5%	3.8%

	Education			Some College	College & above	Age		
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.			18-25	26-35	36-45
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138
Very important	70.4%	59.9%	61.9%	54.1%	72.6%	58.8%	60.9%	63.8%
Important	22.5%	32.8%	30.0%	32.1%	19.0%	33.0%	28.3%	26.8%
Somewhat important	1.4%	4.4%	4.4%	7.3%	2.4%	3.7%	7.3%	3.6%
Not important	-	0.7%	1.5%	1.8%	2.4%	1.9%	1.7%	1.4%
Absolutely not important	-	-	-	1.4%	1.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%
No answer	5.6%	2.2%	2.2%	3.2%	2.4%	2.2%	1.3%	3.6%

	Refugee or Not	
	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=78	N=36
Very important	65.4%	63.9%
Important	25.6%	19.4%
Somewhat important	3.8%	2.8%
Not important	1.3%	-
Absolutely not important	-	-
No answer	3.8%	13.9%

Q44. Family relations (c52)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348	
Very important	12.8%	11.9%	13.7%	10.6%	16.0%	11.4%	14.9%	
Important	28.3%	26.2%	30.2%	26.8%	30.5%	27.1%	29.6%	
Somewhat important	23.4%	23.7%	23.2%	25.4%	20.4%	24.8%	21.6%	
Not important	30.0%	31.7%	28.4%	32.9%	25.5%	31.1%	27.9%	
Absolutely not important	3.2%	4.1%	2.3%	2.5%	4.4%	3.5%	3.2%	
No answer	2.4%	2.4%	2.3%	1.8%	3.1%	1.9%	2.9%	

	Education			Age		
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	
Very important	14.1%	11.7%	14.3%	11.0%	11.9%	8.3%
Important	25.4%	25.5%	31.5%	26.1%	28.6%	30.6%
Somewhat important	21.1%	24.8%	22.7%	26.1%	20.2%	27.8%
Not important	31.0%	35.8%	27.1%	29.4%	32.1%	22.2%
Absolutely not important	2.8%	1.5%	3.7%	4.6%	2.4%	-
No answer	5.6%	0.7%	0.7%	2.8%	4.8%	11.1%

Q45. Gender (c53)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348	
Very important	12.6%	11.9%	13.7%	10.4%	16.0%	12.3%	14.1%	
Important	21.3%	18.4%	24.5%	19.6%	23.9%	22.0%	20.7%	
Somewhat important	14.9%	16.0%	13.7%	14.3%	15.7%	16.0%	13.2%	
Not important	44.0%	45.5%	42.5%	49.1%	36.2%	43.6%	43.4%	
Absolutely not important	4.8%	6.1%	3.1%	4.5%	5.3%	3.9%	6.0%	
No answer	2.4%	2.2%	2.6%	2.0%	2.8%	2.1%	2.6%	

	Education			Age		
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	
Very important	12.7%	10.2%	17.2%	11.0%	7.1%	-
Important	21.1%	24.1%	20.1%	23.9%	14.3%	33.3%
Somewhat important	8.5%	11.7%	14.7%	17.0%	17.9%	2.8%
Not important	47.9%	48.9%	42.9%	39.4%	51.2%	41.7%
Absolutely not important	5.6%	3.6%	3.3%	6.9%	6.0%	11.1%
No answer	4.2%	1.5%	1.8%	1.8%	3.6%	

Q46. Age (c54)

	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not		
	Total N=807	Male N=413	Female N=388	West Bank N=489	Gaza N=318	Non-refugee N=431	Refugee N=348
Very important	12.9%	12.1%	13.4%	11.9%	14.5%	11.8%	14.7%
Important	22.8%	21.1%	24.7%	23.7%	21.4%	26.0%	18.7%
Somewhat important	19.5%	20.6%	18.6%	20.7%	17.6%	18.3%	20.7%
Not important	39.0%	39.5%	38.7%	39.1%	39.0%	38.3%	39.9%
Absolutely not important	4.0%	4.8%	2.8%	3.3%	5.0%	4.2%	3.7%
No answer	1.9%	1.9%	1.8%	1.4%	2.5%	1.4%	2.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78	55+ N=36
Very important	11.3%	9.5%	16.1%	15.1%	4.8%	11.6%	15.5%	8.7%	17.9%	5.6%
Important	16.9%	21.9%	25.3%	21.6%	22.6%	22.5%	23.6%	23.2%	21.8%	25.0%
Somewhat important	15.5%	24.8%	15.8%	22.9%	19.0%	20.2%	18.9%	18.1%	17.9%	8.3%
Not important	43.7%	40.1%	40.3%	33.5%	44.0%	40.1%	37.8%	46.4%	34.6%	38.9%
Absolutely not important	8.5%	2.9%	1.8%	5.0%	6.0%	3.4%	3.0%	3.6%	6.4%	11.1%
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	1.8%	3.6%	2.2%	1.3%	-	1.3%	11.1%

Q47. Campaign (c55)

	Total N=807	Gender		West Bank N=489	Area Gaza N=318	Refugee or Not	
		Male N=413	Female N=388			Non-refugee N=431	Refugee N=348
Very important	37.8%	42.6%	32.5%	39.3%	35.5%	40.4%	34.8%
Important	37.2%	33.7%	41.5%	37.8%	36.2%	38.3%	36.2%
Somewhat important	13.3%	12.3%	13.9%	13.7%	12.6%	10.0%	16.1%
Not important	9.2%	8.7%	9.8%	7.2%	12.3%	9.0%	10.1%
Absolutely not important	0.6%	0.7%	0.3%	0.6%	0.6%	0.9%	0.3%
No answer	2.0%	1.9%	2.1%	1.4%	2.8%	1.4%	2.6%

	Education									
	Up to Elem. N=71	Up to Prep. N=137	Up to Sec. N=273	Some College N=218	College & above N=84	18-25 N=267	26-35 N=233	Age 36-45 N=138	46-55 N=78	55+ N=36
Very important	29.6%	34.3%	38.1%	42.2%	40.5%	34.1%	40.8%	42.8%	42.3%	22.2%
Important	40.8%	43.1%	37.0%	34.9%	33.3%	41.2%	36.1%	34.1%	29.5%	41.7%
Somewhat important	8.5%	10.9%	13.9%	15.1%	13.1%	14.6%	11.6%	10.1%	15.4%	5.6%
Not important	14.1%	10.9%	10.6%	4.1%	8.3%	7.5%	9.0%	12.3%	11.5%	16.7%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	-	-	1.4%	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	-	-	2.8%
No answer	5.6%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	3.6%	1.9%	1.7%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%

Q48. Do you think, in g, people know how to vote for the right candidate? (c56)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes	23.5%	22.7%	24.3%	22.5%	25.3%	23.7%	23.1%
Some	51.8%	54.4%	49.1%	53.6%	48.7%	53.3%	49.9%
No	20.0%	19.9%	20.0%	20.6%	18.9%	18.1%	22.3%
No answer	4.7%	3.0%	6.6%	3.3%	7.1%	5.0%	4.7%

Do you think people voted rationally or irrationally? What about you?

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Yes	35.3%	27.6%	22.4%	18.8%	17.4%	20.8%	23.0%	25.6%	26.7%	33.3%
Some	44.5%	48.4%	54.1%	54.5%	54.8%	57.8%	48.9%	47.8%	47.6%	40.9%
No	13.4%	20.4%	20.1%	21.0%	24.3%	16.1%	23.2%	22.7%	22.9%	18.2%
No answer	6.7%	3.6%	3.4%	5.7%	3.5%	5.3%	4.9%	3.9%	2.9%	7.6%

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Rationally	44.6%	43.9%	45.3%	42.3%	48.5%	45.2%	43.3%
Irrationally	43.8%	46.1%	41.2%	45.1%	41.5%	43.1%	45.0%
No answer	11.6%	10.0%	13.4%	12.6%	10.0%	11.7%	11.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Rationally	53.8%	45.7%	46.1%	40.4%	39.1%	46.4%	42.1%	46.8%	47.6%	40.9%
Irrationally	34.5%	38.5%	44.3%	49.0%	48.7%	43.0%	47.0%	41.4%	42.9%	36.4%
No answer	11.8%	15.8%	9.5%	10.5%	12.2%	10.6%	10.9%	11.8%	9.5%	22.7%

Do you think people voted responsibly or irresponsibly? What about you?
Q51. people (c59)

	Total	Gender		Area	Refugee or Not		
		Male	Female		Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Rationally	50.1%	52.0%	48.1%	48.9%	52.2%	49.8%	51.1%
Irrationally	10.5%	9.2%	11.9%	8.3%	14.4%	8.3%	13.6%
I did not vote	28.7%	28.8%	28.8%	31.3%	24.1%	31.6%	24.5%
No answer	10.6%	10.0%	11.2%	11.4%	9.3%	10.3%	10.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Rationally	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
	43.7%	49.8%	52.8%	49.4%	53.9%	49.6%	48.9%	58.1%	56.2%	37.9%
Irrationally										
	9.2%	10.0%	12.6%	10.2%	7.0%	11.1%	12.3%	8.9%	9.5%	1.5%
I did not vote										
	32.8%	28.5%	26.3%	28.3%	28.7%	29.8%	28.7%	23.2%	27.6%	37.9%
No answer										
	14.3%	11.8%	8.2%	12.1%	10.4%	9.5%	10.1%	9.9%	6.7%	22.7%

Do you think people voted responsibly or irresponsibly? What about you?
Q51. people (c59)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Responsible	55.6%	54.4%	56.9%	52.9%	60.1%	53.6%	58.4%
Irresponsibly	33.2%	34.7%	31.6%	35.2%	29.8%	34.6%	31.1%
No answer	11.2%	10.9%	11.6%	11.9%	10.0%	11.8%	10.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Responsible	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
	57.1%	63.3%	59.0%	47.5%	47.5%	56.5%	54.4%	59.6%	52.4%	53.0%
Irresponsibly	30.3%	25.8%	31.7%	37.6%	45.2%	32.5%	35.0%	29.6%	37.1%	33.3%
No answer	12.6%	10.9%	9.3%	15.0%	7.0%	11.1%	10.7%	10.8%	10.5%	13.6%

Q52. You (c60)

Q32. How (too)

	Total	Gender		Area	Refugee or Not		
		Male	Female		West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Responsible	51.8%	53.1%	50.3%	50.0%	54.9%	50.3%	54.0%
Irresponsibly	8.5%	6.4%	10.5%	7.3%	10.5%	7.9%	9.5%
I did not vote	28.9%	28.5%	29.5%	31.9%	23.7%	31.6%	24.9%
No answer	10.9%	12.0%	9.7%	10.8%	10.9%	10.1%	11.7%

	Education				Age					
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College		College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Responsible	45.4%	52.0%	54.4%	50.3%	57.4%	51.2%	51.9%	59.6%	56.2%	36.4%
Irresponsibly	7.6%	10.4%	8.8%	8.3%	4.3%	7.9%	9.3%	9.9%	8.6%	1.5%
I did not vote	33.6%	28.5%	27.1%	28.3%	27.8%	30.9%	27.9%	23.6%	27.6%	36.4%
No answer	13.4%	9.0%	9.8%	13.1%	10.4%	10.0%	10.9%	6.9%	7.6%	25.8%

Q53. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people? (c61)

Q33. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people? (2017)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
		N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes			13.3%	13.3%	11.6%	15.9%	13.9%	12.6%
To a certain extent			54.3%	54.5%	57.4%	49.0%	53.9%	54.0%
No			27.2%	25.5%	25.8%	29.6%	26.5%	28.3%
No answer			5.3%	6.7%	5.2%	5.5%	5.8%	5.0%

	Education				Age					
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	23.5%	12.2%	13.4%	10.2%	11.3%	13.5%	12.3%	14.8%	15.2%	13.6%
To a certain extent	50.4%	52.0%	53.9%	57.0%	57.4%	56.2%	49.5%	55.2%	57.1%	57.6%
No	19.3%	26.2%	30.9%	27.7%	27.0%	25.6%	33.3%	24.6%	22.9%	16.7%
No answer	6.7%	9.5%	1.8%	5.1%	4.3%	4.7%	4.9%	5.4%	4.8%	12.1%

Q54. To what extent would you say the Council members know what the people want/need? (c62)

	Total	Gender		Area	Refugee or Not		
		Male	Female		West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
A lot	29.3%	29.4%	28.8%	29.9%	28.2%	30.4%	27.6%
Not a lot	50.5%	49.5%	51.6%	49.9%	51.5%	49.1%	51.7%
Not at all	16.2%	16.3%	16.2%	15.5%	17.3%	15.7%	17.5%
No answer	4.1%	4.8%	3.4%	4.8%	3.0%	4.8%	3.3%

Q55. Some people say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, others say there are only some restrictions by the EA, and others say there are no restrictions by the EA. What do you think? (c63)

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
A lot	28.6%	29.9%	28.6%	29.3%	30.4%	29.8%	27.6%	31.0%	33.3%	31.8%
Not a lot	42.0%	43.9%	55.2%	51.9%	53.0%	50.4%	53.3%	46.8%	52.4%	39.4%
Not at all	19.3%	19.9%	13.9%	15.6%	15.7%	15.3%	16.4%	18.2%	12.4%	15.2%
No answer	10.1%	6.3%	2.3%	3.2%	0.9%	4.5%	2.7%	3.9%	1.9%	13.6%

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very restricted by the EA	35.2%	37.5%	32.8%	33.5%	38.3%	34.4%	37.5%
Some restrictions by the EA	43.2%	43.8%	42.6%	45.6%	39.0%	44.9%	39.8%
No restrictions by the EA	11.0%	11.2%	10.7%	10.6%	11.6%	10.9%	10.7%
No answer	10.6%	7.6%	14.0%	10.3%	11.2%	9.8%	12.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Very restricted by the EA	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Some restrictions by the EA	32.8%	29.4%	35.8%	40.4%	35.7%	33.8%	38.5%	36.0%	27.6%	33.3%
No restrictions by the EA	35.3%	41.2%	44.6%	44.9%	44.3%	46.7%	38.8%	43.3%	44.8%	30.3%
No answer	13.4%	13.1%	10.8%	9.2%	13.0%	11.1%	11.7%	11.3%	12.4%	10.6%
	18.5%	16.3%	8.8%	5.4%	7.0%	8.4%	10.9%	9.4%	15.2%	25.8%

In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in the following? How about Q56. Democracy (c64)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very democratic	6.8%	5.4%	8.1%	5.6%	8.9%	7.9%	5.0%
Democratic	56.1%	56.3%	55.9%	56.0%	56.3%	55.8%	56.1%
Not democratic	27.4%	28.5%	26.4%	29.2%	24.1%	27.3%	28.0%
Very undemocratic	7.2%	8.7%	5.5%	7.5%	6.6%	7.0%	7.4%
No answer	2.6%	1.2%	4.1%	1.7%	4.1%	2.0%	3.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Very democratic	6.7%	6.3%	6.4%	6.4%	7.8%	6.1%	7.1%	8.4%	7.6%	3.0%
Democratic	58.8%	57.0%	55.9%	57.6%	49.6%	60.7%	51.4%	52.7%	64.8%	59.1%
Not democratic	21.8%	25.3%	29.4%	28.0%	32.2%	25.6%	30.9%	27.6%	18.1%	24.2%
Very undemocratic	5.9%	9.5%	6.2%	6.7%	9.6%	5.8%	7.9%	9.4%	5.7%	6.1%
No answer	6.7%	1.8%	2.1%	1.3%	0.9%	1.8%	2.7%	2.0%	3.8%	7.6%

Q57. Effectiveness (c65)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very effective	3.5%	2.3%	4.8%	2.8%	4.8%	3.7%	2.9%
Effective	35.5%	32.1%	38.6%	34.5%	37.1%	35.8%	34.6%
Not effective	49.2%	53.3%	45.3%	51.9%	4.6%	47.7%	51.7%
Very ineffective	9.7%	11.0%	8.3%	9.0%	10.9%	10.4%	8.9%
No answer	2.1%	1.3%	2.9%	1.9%	2.5%	2.3%	1.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Very effective	7.6%	4.1%	2.1%	2.9%	1.7%	3.2%	3.0%	4.4%	5.7%	4.5%
Effective	39.5%	32.1%	37.1%	34.4%	35.7%	35.9%	32.2%	37.9%	45.7%	33.3%
Not effective	39.5%	49.3%	50.3%	54.1%	50.4%	52.8%	52.7%	42.4%	39.0%	43.9%
Very ineffective	7.6%	12.7%	9.0%	8.3%	10.4%	6.6%	9.8%	13.8%	6.7%	12.1%
No answer	5.9%	1.8%	1.5%	0.3%	1.7%	1.6%	2.2%	1.5%	2.9%	6.1%

Q58. Responsiveness (c66)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not		
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515	
Very responsive			4.6%	3.3%	6.0%	3.2%	7.1%	4.8%	4.3%
Responsive			37.4%	35.2%	40.2%	40.5%	32.1%	39.3%	34.4%
Not responsive			45.4%	48.7%	42.4%	45.9%	45.3%	44.1%	48.2%
Very unresponsive			9.8%	10.7%	8.4%	8.2%	12.5%	9.7%	10.1%
No answer			2.5%	2.1%	2.9%	2.2%	3.0%	2.2%	3.1%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very responsive	7.6%	3.6%	4.6%	2.9%	6.1%	3.7%	3.8%	6.4%	6.7%	6.1%
Responsive	38.7%	34.8%	35.6%	40.8%	40.0%	41.7%	34.4%	36.9%	37.1%	31.8%
Not responsive	40.3%	47.5%	46.9%	48.4%	42.6%	45.6%	49.5%	41.4%	44.8%	40.9%
Very unresponsive	7.6%	12.7%	10.1%	7.6%	9.6%	7.1%	9.3%	12.8%	9.5%	15.2%
No answer	5.9%	1.4%	2.8%	0.3%	1.7%	1.8%	3.0%	2.5%	1.9%	6.1%

Q59. Independence from the EA (c67)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not		
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515	
Very independent			3.3%	3.4%	2.0%	5.7%	2.5%	4.3%	
Independent			24.2%	27.6%	22.5%	27.1%	24.0%	24.5%	
Dependent			54.7%	50.3%	58.3%	48.5%	55.9%	53.6%	
Very dependent			13.6%	12.1%	14.4%	12.1%	13.7%	13.0%	
No answer			4.2%	6.6%	2.8%	6.6%	3.9%	4.7%	

	Education				Age					
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very independent	5.9%	3.6%	3.9%	1.9%	2.6%	4.2%	2.5%	3.0%	5.7%	3.0%
Independent	28.6%	28.5%	23.5%	22.3%	22.6%	25.1%	25.4%	22.2%	26.7%	19.7%
Dependent	47.9%	48.0%	57.2%	59.2%	54.8%	55.1%	53.3%	56.2%	53.3%	57.6%
Very dependent	10.9%	15.4%	11.6%	15.0%	16.5%	10.6%	14.5%	15.3%	12.4%	12.1%
No answer	6.7%	4.5%	3.9%	1.6%	3.5%	5.0%	4.4%	3.4%	1.9%	7.6%

Q60. Independence from the Judiciary (c68)

	Total		Gender		Area				Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee		
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515		
Very independent		3.8%	3.3%	4.3%	2.5%	6.2%	3.0%	4.7%		
Independent		34.0%	31.6%	36.4%	32.7%	36.2%	33.0%	35.0%		
Dependent		48.9%	51.5%	46.4%	52.6%	42.4%	50.6%	47.8%		
Very dependent		8.7%	10.2%	7.1%	8.5%	9.1%	8.6%	8.2%		
No answer		4.6%	3.5%	5.9%	3.7%	6.2%	4.8%	4.5%		

	Education					Age					
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+	
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66	
Very independent	5.0%	2.7%	4.4%	3.8%	1.7%	3.7%	3.6%	4.4%	5.7%	1.5%	
Independent	40.3%	37.1%	33.5%	31.5%	34.8%	35.6%	33.9%	34.5%	33.3%	31.8%	
Dependent	42.9%	46.6%	49.5%	52.9%	49.6%	49.1%	47.5%	47.8%	52.4%	51.5%	
Very dependent	5.0%	9.5%	8.2%	9.2%	9.6%	7.4%	10.4%	8.4%	4.8%	7.6%	
No answer	6.7%	4.1%	4.4%	2.5%	4.3%	4.2%	4.6%	4.9%	3.8%	7.6%	

Q61. Pluralism (c69)

	Total		Gender		Area				Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee		
	N=1195		N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515		
Very pluralistic		5.9%	4.8%	7.2%	4.6%	8.2%	5.9%	5.8%		
Pluralistic		31.1%	30.8%	31.6%	29.5%	33.9%	31.6%	30.7%		
Not pluralistic		45.0%	47.5%	42.4%	47.5%	40.8%	42.8%	47.6%		
Very unpluralistic		13.1%	13.8%	12.1%	15.1%	9.6%	15.0%	10.7%		
No answer		4.9%	3.1%	6.7%	3.3%	7.5%	4.7%	5.2%		

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very pluralistic	6.7%	5.0%	7.0%	4.8%	2.6%	6.1%	5.2%	6.9%	7.6%	6.1%
Pluralistic	31.9%	34.8%	32.5%	31.2%	23.5%	34.8%	32.5%	27.6%	39.0%	18.2%
Not pluralistic	42.9%	39.8%	45.9%	45.5%	55.7%	44.6%	45.9%	42.4%	40.0%	48.5%
Very unpluralistic	10.9%	15.8%	10.8%	15.0%	14.8%	10.6%	12.3%	17.2%	8.6%	15.2%
No answer	7.6%	4.5%	3.9%	3.5%	3.5%	4.0%	4.1%	5.9%	4.8%	12.1%

Q62. Do you believe in the importance of having women in the Legislative Council? (c70)

	Total		Gender		Area			Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee	
			N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes			71.4%	67.8%	75.3%	70.2%	73.3%	71.2%	72.6%
No			22.4%	25.5%	19.1%	22.9%	21.6%	22.3%	22.1%
No answer			6.2%	6.7%	5.5%	6.9%	5.0%	6.5%	5.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Yes	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
	64.7%	67.0%	71.4%	75.5%	78.3%	72.3%	72.1%	75.9%	64.8%	66.7%
No	26.1%	26.2%	22.9%	19.4%	18.3%	22.4%	21.3%	19.2%	27.6%	24.2%
No answer	9.2%	6.8%	5.7%	5.1%	3.5%	5.3%	6.6%	4.9%	7.6%	9.1%

Q63. Why do you think there is a need for women in the Legislative Council? (c71)

Q20. Why do you think there is a need for women in the Legislative Council (172)											
	Total		Gender		Area				Refugee or Not		
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee			
		N=853	N=412	N=437	N=531	N=322	N=457	N=374			
Women need to demand their rights		63.4%	57.0%	68.9%	63.8%	61.8%	64.1%	61.8%			
Better for democracy		29.7%	34.0%	25.2%	27.3%	33.5%	28.2%	31.8%			
Women are 1/2 of society		0.9%	1.2%	0.7%	1.3%	0.3%	0.9%	1.0%			
Other reasons		5.7%	6.8%	4.6%	6.4%	4.0%	6.3%	5.3%			
No answer		0.2%	1.0%	0.7%	1.1%	0.3%	0.4%	-			
Education											
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+	
	N=77	N=148	N=277	N=237	N=90	N=274	N=264	N=154	N=68	N=44	
Women need to demand their rights	66.2%	70.3%	60.3%	59.5%	62.2%	59.9%	63.3%	70.1%	57.4%	65.9%	
Better for democracy	22.0%	25.0%	34.7%	31.6%	28.9%	34.3%	28.8%	24.7%	33.8%	20.5%	
Women are 1/2 of society	-	-	1.1%	2.1%	-	1.5%	0.8%	1.3%	-	-	
Other reasons	9.1%	4.1%	4.0%	6.3%	7.8%	4.4%	6.8%	3.2%	8.8%	9.1%	
No answer	2.6%	0.7%	-	0.4%	1.1%	-	0.4%	0.6%	-	4.6%	

Q64. Why don't you believe in having women in the Legislative Council? (c72)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=268		N=155	N=111	N=173	N=95	N=143	N=114
Men can represent women's needs	29.5%		32.3%	25.2%	29.5%	29.5%	26.6%	33.3%
No difference between the needs of men and women	19.4%		19.4%	19.8%	22.0%	12.6%	22.4%	15.8%
Not qualified for this position	39.6%		35.5%	45.0%	32.9%	47.4%	37.0%	43.9%
Other reasons	8.6%		9.7%	7.2%	9.8%	6.3%	9.8%	6.1%
No answer	3.0%		3.2%	2.7%	5.8%	4.2%	4.2%	0.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=31	Up to Prep. N=58	Up to Sec. N=89	Some College N=61	College & above N=21	18-25 N=85	26-35 N=78	36-45 N=39	46-55 N=29	55+ N=16
Men can represent women's needs	25.8%	25.9%	30.3%	29.5%	23.8%	27.1%	29.5%	20.5%	41.4%	43.7%
No difference between the needs of men and women	32.3%	24.1%	16.9%	16.4%	9.5%	22.4%	16.7%	17.9%	17.2%	25.0%
Not qualified for this position	32.3%	43.1%	40.4%	37.7%	52.4%	40.0%	46.2%	48.7%	24.1%	18.7%
Other reasons	9.7%	5.2%	10.1%	9.8%	9.5%	8.2%	7.7%	7.7%	13.8%	6.2%
No answer	-	1.7%	2.2%	6.6%	4.8%	2.4%	-	5.1%	3.4%	6.2%

Q65. Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council has been elected, What is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? (c73)

	Total		Gender		Area		Refugee or Not	
	N=1195	Male N=608	Female N=580	West Bank N=756	Gaza N=439	Non-refugee N=642	Refugee N=515	
Very satisfied	5.2%	5.6%	4.8%	4.0%	7.3%	4.5%	5.8%	
Satisfied	33.1%	30.3%	36.2%	33.9%	31.9%	35.0%	30.5%	
Dissatisfied	38.7%	41.9%	35.7%	39.4%	37.6%	37.7%	40.6%	
Very dissatisfied	17.1%	18.4%	15.3%	16.7%	17.8%	16.7%	17.9%	
No answer	5.9%	3.8%	7.9%	6.1%	5.5%	6.1%	5.2%	

	Education									
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Very satisfied	10.1%	4.1%	4.6%	3.5%	6.1%	2.9%	6.6%	5.4%	4.8%	12.1%
Satisfied	31.9%	33.9%	.5%	33.8%	29.6%	35.1%	29.2%	33.5%	42.9%	31.8%
Dissatisfied	30.3%	37.1%	38.1%	41.4%	49.6%	40.1%	41.5%	38.4%	29.5%	28.8%
Very dissatisfied	15.1%	15.4%	20.6%	16.9%	13.0%	16.4%	18.0%	16.7%	17.1%	16.7%
No answer	12.6%	9.5%	3.1%	4.5%	1.7%	5.5%	4.6%	5.9%	5.7%	10.6%

Q66. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your satisfaction? (c74)

	Total		Gender		Area				Refugee or Not	
	N=458		Male N=218	Female N=238	West Bank N=286	Gaza N=172	Non-refugee N=254	Refugee N=187		
Responsiveness			11.8%	13.9%	8.4%	17.4%	9.8%	15.0%		
Democracy			41.7%	40.3%	43.0%	39.5%	41.3%	42.2%		
Effectiveness			7.4%	7.1%	6.4%	8.7%	8.3%	5.9%		
Independence			7.6%	9.7%	8.7%	5.8%	8.7%	7.0%		
Courage			13.3%	14.3%	12.6%	14.5%	12.6%	14.4%		
Accessibility			6.1%	3.8%	6.4%	5.2%	4.7%	7.0%		
New experience			0.9%	0.8%	1.4%	-	0.8%	1.1%		
Other reasons			6.1%	3.8%	7.0%	4.7%	6.3%	5.3%		
No answer			5.0%	6.3%	5.6%	4.0%	7.5%	2.1%		

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem.	Up to Prep.	Up to Sec.	Some College	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
Responsiveness	N=50	N=84	N=148	N=117	N=41	N=144	N=131	N=79	N=50	N=29
Democracy	20.0%	8.3%	12.8%	10.3%	9.8%	11.1%	13.7%	12.7%	6.0%	13.8%
Effectiveness	18.0%	42.9%	43.9%	47.0%	41.5%	49.3%	38.9%	41.8%	38.0%	34.5%
Independence	6.0%	9.5%	6.8%	6.8%	9.8%	5.6%	9.2%	6.3%	8.0%	6.9%
Courage	4.0%	9.5%	8.1%	8.5%	4.9%	11.1%	6.9%	6.3%	8.0%	-
Accessibility	22.0%	9.5%	14.2%	12.8%	12.2%	8.3%	14.5%	15.2%	20.0%	13.8%
New experience	12.0%	8.3%	3.4%	6.0%	7.3%	4.9%	6.1%	6.3%	4.0%	13.8%
Other reasons	-	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	2.4%	1.4%	0.8%	1.3%	-	-
No answer	10.0%	3.6%	4.7%	6.8%	7.3%	4.9%	5.3%	3.8%	8.0%	6.9%
	8.0%	7.1%	5.4%	0.9%	4.9%	3.5%	4.6%	6.3%	8.0%	10.3%

Q. 67 Which of the following are the most important reasons for your dissatisfaction? (c75)

	Total		Gender		Area				Refugee or Not	
			Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee		
	N=653	N=367	N=296	N=424	N=243	N=349	N=301			
Lack of responsiveness	8.7%	7.1%	10.5%	9.0%	8.2%	9.2%	8.0%			
Lack of democracy	7.2%	6.8%	7.4%	7.8%	6.2%	7.4%	7.3%			
Lack of effectiveness	42.1%	42.8%	41.2%	43.9%	39.0%	43.6%	39.9%			
Lack of independence	21.0%	21.8%	19.9%	20.3%	22.2%	20.3%	21.3%			
Lack of courage	5.8%	7.4%	4.1%	5.0%	7.4%	6.0%	6.0%			
Lack of accessibility	4.5%	3.5%	5.7%	4.2%	4.9%	4.0%	5.0%			
Other reasons	8.5%	9.0%	8.1%	8.7%	8.2%	7.7%	9.3%			
No answer	2.1%	1.6%	2.7%	1.2%	3.7%	1.7%	3.3%			

	Education					Age				
	Up to Elem. N=54	Up to Prep. N=116	Up to Sec. N=228	Some College N=183	College & above N=72	18-25 N=214	26-35 N=218	36-45 N=112	46-55 N=49	55+ N=30
Lack of responsiveness	16.7%	7.8%	7.9%	7.7%	11.1%	8.4%	7.3%	8.9%	4.1%	23.3%
Lack of democracy	5.6%	8.6%	8.8%	6.0%	4.2%	5.6%	11.9%	4.5%	4.1%	6.7%
Lack of effectiveness	50.0%	38.8%	39.5%	40.4%	48.6%	41.1%	44.0%	40.2%	46.9%	43.3%
Lack of independence	9.3%	19.0%	21.5%	26.2%	19.4%	22.0%	19.7%	23.2%	20.4%	10.0%
Lack of courage	5.6%	3.4%	6.1%	7.1%	4.2%	7.0%	3.7%	6.2%	6.1%	3.3%
Lack of accessibility	3.7%	3.4%	7.0%	3.3%	2.8%	5.1%	6.0%	2.7%	-	-
Other reasons	7.4%	12.1%	6.6%	9.3%	9.7%	8.9%	7.3%	9.8%	12.2%	-
No answer	1.9%	6.9%	2.6%	-	-	1.9%	-	4.5%	6.1%	3.3%

Q68. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the performance of the elected Legislative Council in the future? (c76)

	Total		Gender		Area				Refugee or Not	
	N=1195		Male N=608	Female N=580	West Bank N=756	Gaza N=439	Non-refugee N=642	Refugee N=515		
Very optimistic	11.4%	10.2%	12.8%	9.4%	14.8%	11.1%	49.7%	11.5%		
Optimistic	47.7%	44.2%	51.0%	44.2%	53.8%	46.1%	11.7%	22.7%		
Very pessimistic	11.8%	13.8%	9.5%	12.8%	10.0%	11.7%	11.7%	4.5%		
Pessimistic	24.9%	28.0%	21.9%	29.4%	17.1%	26.9%	22.7%	4.5%		
No answer	4.3%	3.8%	4.8%	4.2%	4.3%	4.2%	4.5%	4.5%		

	Education							Age			
	Up to Elem. N=119	Up to Prep. N=221	Up to Sec. N=388	Some College N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66	
Very optimistic	21.0%	12.2%	8.8%	8.6%	11.3%	10.0%	7.9%	13.8%	19.0%	16.7%	
Optimistic	35.3%	43.9%	51.8%	48.7%	51.3%	53.3%	48.4%	45.3%	41.9%	34.8%	
Very pessimistic	11.8%	13.1%	11.1%	12.7%	8.7%	8.2%	14.2%	16.7%	6.7%	10.6%	
Pessimistic	25.2%	26.2%	24.7%	26.4%	25.2%	24.0%	25.7%	20.2%	29.5%	27.3%	
No answer	6.7%	4.5%	3.6%	3.5%	3.5%	4.5%	3.8%	3.9%	2.9%	10.6%	

ANNEX 6: Results of the Survey within the Legislative Council

1. In your opinion, how important were the following factors when people cast their votes? Please note: (1) It is important to stress how people have voted, not how they will vote. (2) Important to state what, in your opinion, the people think not what you think.

a. Democratic values

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	13	30.2%
Important	11	25.6%
Somewhat important	14	32.6%
Not important	3	7.0%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	2	4.7%

b. Political affiliation

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	11	25.6%
Important	15	34.9%
Somewhat important	14	32.6%
Not important	2	4.7%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%

c. Religion

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	6	14.0%
Important	10	23.3%
Somewhat important	11	25.6%
Not important	9	20.9%
Absolutely not important	5	11.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

d. Religious values

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	2	16.3%
Important	21	48.8%
Somewhat important	10	23.3%
Not important	3	7.0%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	2	4.7%

e. Struggle history

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	24	55.8%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	4	9.3%
Not important	1	2.3%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	-	-

f. Education		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	10	23.3%
Important	22	51.2%
Somewhat important	6	14.0%
Not important	2	4.7%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	3	7.0%
g. Residence		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	1	2.3%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	5	11.6%
Not important	18	41.9%
Absolutely not important	3	7.0%
Missing	2	4.7%
h. Socio-economic status		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	4	9.3%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	18	41.9%
Not important	4	9.3%
Absolutely not important	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%
i. Reputation		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	27	62.8%
Important	9	20.9%
Somewhat important	5	11.6%
Not important	1	2.3%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%
j. Family relations		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	8	18.6%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	16	37.2%
Not important	3	7.0%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	2	4.7%

k. Gender		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	6	14.0%
Important	15	34.9%
Somewhat important	10	23.3%
Not important	5	11.6%
Absolutely not important	4	9.3%
Missing	3	7.0%

l. Age		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	1	2.3%
Important	10	23.3%
Somewhat important	14	32.6%
Not important	13	30.2%
Absolutely not important	3	7.0%
Missing	2	4.7%

m. Campaign		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	7	16.3%
Important	15	34.9%
Somewhat important	19	44.2%
Not important	1	2.3%
Absolutely not important	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%

2. On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very rational, 10 being very irrational, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	5	11.6%
3	14	32.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	12	27.9%
6	-	-
7	3	7.0%
8	-	-
9	-	-
10	-	-

3. On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very responsible, 10 being very irresponsible, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	7	16.3%
3	10	23.3%
4	9	20.9%
5	4	9.3%
6	2	4.7%
7	6	14.0%
8	1	2.3%
9	-	-
10	-	-

4. Do you think, in the next elections, people would vote according to the same criteria, not quite, or would they vote in a totally different way?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
According to the same criteria	3	7.0%
Not quite in the same way	30	69.8%
Vote in a totally different way	9	20.9%
Missing	1	2.3%

5. In general, do you think people know how to vote for the right candidate?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	14	32.6%
No	1	2.3%
Only to a certain extent	28	65.1%
Missing	-	-

6. In general, would you say, when people voted, they knew the agenda/campaign slogans of the candidates?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	8	18.6%
No	9	20.9%
Only to a certain extent	24	55.8%
Missing	2	4.7%

7. In your opinion what are the two most important problems facing Palestinian society nowadays?

a. Problem 1:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Tribalism	5	11.6%
Factionalism	-	-
Loss of hope	1	2.3%
Absence rule of law	3	7.0%
Economic situation	9	20.9%
Social problems	-	-
Occupation	13	30.2%
Lack of comprehensive plan	1	2.3%
Political situation	7	16.3%
Closure	1	2.3%
Separation of powers	-	-
Election fraud	2	4.7%
Corruption	1	2.3%
Settlements	-	-

b. Problem 2:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Tribalism	1	2.3%
Factionalism	2	4.7%
Loss of hope	-	-
Absence rule of law	9	20.9%
Economic situation	13	30.2%
Social problems	3	7.0%
Occupation	-	-
Lack of comprehensive plan	1	2.3%
Political situation	8	18.6%
Closure	1	2.3%
Separation of powers	1	2.3%
Election fraud	-	-
Corruption	3	7.0%
Settlements	1	2.3%

8. In general, would you say people are satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or dissatisfied with those who made it to the Council?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Satisfied	5	11.6%
Somewhat satisfied	31	72.1%
Dissatisfied	5	11.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

9. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	18	41.9%
To a certain extent	22	51.2%
No	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

10. To what extent would you say the Council members know what the people want/need?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
A lot	24	55.8%
Not a lot	15	34.9%
Not at all	-	-
Missing	4	9.3%

11. To what extent would you say that you know what the people want/need?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
A lot	29	67.4%
Not a lot	12	27.9%
Not at all	-	-
Missing	2	4.7%

12. What are the tools you as a Council member use to know the needs of the people you represent?

a. First tool:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Meetings	36	83.7%
Follow-ups	-	-
newspapers	1	2.3%
Lectures/Workshops	1	2.3%
Complaints/letters	-	-
Field visits	2	4.7%
Polls	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

b. Second tool:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Meetings	2	4.7%
Follow-ups	8	18.6%
newspapers	2	4.7%
Lectures/Workshops	6	14.0%
Complaints/letters	13	30.2%
Field visits	7	16.3%
Polls	-	-
Missing	5	11.7%

c. Third tool:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Meetings	3	7.0%
Follow-ups	-	-
newspapers	7	16.3%
Lectures/Workshops	4	9.3%
Complaints/letters	11	25.6%
Field visits	2	4.7%
Polls	1	2.3%
Missing	15	35.0%

13. What are in your opinion the three most important needs of the people?

a. First need

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Infrastructure	6	14.0%
Democracy/law/justice	4	9.3%
Equal opportunities	1	2.3%
Public liberties	1	2.3%
Security	2	4.7%
Political situation/future	10	23.3%
Economy	13	30.2%
Cure for corruption	-	-
Unemployment	5	11.6%
Housing	-	-
Land and water	-	-
Accountability	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%

b. Second need:		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Infrastructure	3	7.0%
Democracy/law/justice	12	27.9%
Equal opportunities	1	2.3%
Public liberties	2	4.7%
Security	6	14.0%
Political situation/future	1	2.3%
Economy	8	18.6%
Cure for corruption	2	4.7%
Unemployment	7	16.3%
Housing	1	2.3%
Land and water	-	-
Accountability	-	-
Missing	-	-

c. Third need:		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Infrastructure	6	14.0%
Democracy/law/justice	12	27.9%
Equal opportunities	1	2.3%
Public liberties	1	2.3%
Security	2	4.7%
Political situation/future	4	9.3%
Economy	6	14.0%
Cure for corruption	1	2.3%
Unemployment	7	16.3%
Housing	1	2.3%
Land and water	-	-
Accountability	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

14. How do you make sure that they are the needs?

a. First way:		
Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Listen/communicate	25	58.1%
Field visits/meetings	2	4.7%
Closure	-	-
Incoming complaints	5	11.6%
Research/studies	1	2.3%
Newspapers	-	-
Personal sense	5	11.6%
Shortages	-	-
We are part of the people	4	9.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

b. Second way:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Listen/communicate	5	11.6%
Field visits/meetings	8	18.6%
Closure	1	2.3%
Incoming complaints	9	20.9%
Research/studies	5	11.6%
Newspapers	3	7.0%
Personal sense	-	-
Shortages	1	2.3%
We are part of the people	2	4.7%
Combination of the above	2	4.7%
Missing	7	16.3%

c. Third way

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Listen/communicate	-	-
Field visits/meetings	2	4.7%
Closure	-	-
Incoming complaints	6	14.0%
Research/studies	8	18.6%
Newspapers	3	7.0%
Personal sense	3	7.0%
Shortages	-	-
We are part of the people	8	18.6%
Combination of the above	2	4.7%
Missing	11	25.6%

15. In your opinion, did the Council members, in general, live up to their promises/campaign slogans?

Value labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	6	14.0%
No	10	23.3%
To some extent	25	58.1%
Missing	2	4.7%

16. As a Council member, would you say you yourself are living up to your promises/campaign slogans?

Value labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	18	41.9%
No	3	7.0%
To some extent	20	46.5%
Missing	2	4.7%

17. Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council has been elected, what is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

Value labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very satisfied	1	2.3%
Satisfied	28	65.1%
Dissatisfied	12	27.9%
Very dissatisfied	2	4.7%
Missing	-	-

18. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your satisfaction?

a. First reason:

Value label	Frequency = 29	Percent
Responsiveness	12	41.4%
Democracy	14	48.3%
Effectiveness	2	6.9%
Independence	1	3.4%
Courage	-	-
Accessibility	-	-
Other reasons	-	-
Missing	-	-

b. Second reason:

Value label	Frequency = 29	Percent
Responsiveness	-	-
Democracy	4	13.8%
Effectiveness	1	3.5%
Independence	13	44.8%
Courage	9	31.0%
Accessibility	-	-
Other reasons	1	3.5%
Missing	1	3.5%

19. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your dissatisfaction?

a. First reason:

Value label	Frequency = 14	Percent
Lack of responsiveness	-	-
Lack of democracy	1	7.1%
Lack of effectiveness	8	57.1%
Lack of independence	3	21.4%
Lack of courage	-	-
Lack of accessibility	-	-
Busy with personal issues	1	7.1%
Other reasons	-	-
Missing	1	7.1%

b. Second reason:

Value label	Frequency = 14	Percent
Lack of responsiveness	1	7.1%
Lack of democracy	-	-
Lack of effectiveness	2	14.3%
Lack of independence	4	28.6%
Lack of courage	1	7.1%
Lack of accessibility	-	-
Busy with personal issues	1	7.1%
Other reasons	2	14.3%
Missing	3	21.4%

20. Some people say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, others say there are only some restrictions by the EA, and others say there are no restrictions by the Executive Authority. What do you think?

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very restricted by the EA	12	27.9%
Some restrictions by the EA	25	58.1%
No restrictions by the EA	6	14.0%
Missing	-	-

21. Most of the resolutions of the PLC were not implemented by the Executive Authority. In your opinion, why is that?

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Attitude of the EA	16	37.2%
Inefficiency of the EA	9	20.9%
Resolutions are outside the scope of the PNA	2	4.7%
Combination of attitude and inefficiency of the EA	14	32.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

22. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the performance of the elected Legislative Council in the future?

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Optimistic	37	86.0%
Pessimistic	5	11.6%
Missing	1	2.3%

23. Are you optimistic or very optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic?

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very optimistic	8	18.6%
Cautiously optimistic	30	69.8%
Very pessimistic	1	2.3%
Cautiously pessimistic	4	9.3%
Missing	-	-

24. How do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in the following? How about...

a. Democracy

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	6	14.0%
Democratic	32	74.4%
Not democratic	3	7.0%
Very undemocratic	-	-
Missing	2	4.7%

b. Effectiveness

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very effective	1	2.3%
Effective	30	69.8%
Not effective	10	23.3%
Very ineffective	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

c. Responsiveness		
Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very responsive	4	9.3%
Responsive	31	72.1%
Not responsive	4	9.3%
Very unresponsive	1	2.3%
Missing	3	7.0%

d. Independence from the Executive Authority		
Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very independent	7	16.3%
Independent	25	58.1%
Dependent	9	20.9%
Very dependent	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

e. Independence from the Judiciary		
Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very independent	12	27.9%
Independent	25	58.1%
Dependent	2	4.7%
Very dependent	-	-
Missing	4	9.3%

f. Pluralism		
Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very pluralistic	4	9.3%
Pluralistic	6	14.0%
Not pluralistic	26	60.5%
Very unpluralistic	5	11.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

25. Of the following issues, could you please state how much it affects the functioning of the Council. Would you say it affects the functioning positively, negatively, or it doesn't affect it at all?

a. Israeli policies and practices		
Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	1	2.3%
Affects negatively	38	88.4%
Doesn't affect	2	4.7%
Missing	2	4.7%

b. The Executive Authority		
Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	2	4.7%
Affects negatively	34	79.1%
Doesn't affect	4	9.3%
Missing	3	7.0%

c. The Judiciary

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	6	14.0%
Affects negatively	14	32.6%
Doesn't affect	18	41.9%
Missing	5	11.6%

d. The President

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	5	11.6%
Affects negatively	30	69.8%
Doesn't affect	5	11.6%
Missing	3	7.0%

e. The people

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	37	86.0%
Affects negatively	2	4.7%
Doesn't affect	2	4.7%
Missing	2	4.7%

f. The media

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	16	37.2%
Affects negatively	24	55.8%
Doesn't affect	2	4.7%
Missing	1	2.3%

26. How would you evaluate the level of communication with the following?**a. The Executive Authority**

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	6	14.0%
Average	20	46.5%
Bad	16	37.2%
Missing	1	2.3%

b. The Judiciary

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	9	20.9%
Average	17	39.6%
Bad	14	32.6%
Missing	3	7.0%

c. The President

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	6	14.0%
Average	19	44.2%
Bad	16	37.2%
Missing	2	4.7%

d. The People

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	26	60.5%
Average	15	34.9%
Bad	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

27. In your opinion, which country in the world is the most democratic? Please rate the following countries.

a. Egypt

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	-	-
Democratic	11	25.6%
Undemocratic	21	48.8%
Very undemocratic	3	7.0%
Missing	8	18.6%

b. France

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	26	60.5%
Democratic	11	25.6%
Undemocratic	-	-
Very undemocratic	-	-
Missing	6	14.0%

c. Jordan

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	-	-
Democratic	5	11.6%
Undemocratic	22	51.2%
Very undemocratic	8	18.6%
Missing	8	18.6%

d. Saudi Arabia

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	-	-
Democratic	-	-
Undemocratic	6	14.0%
Very undemocratic	28	65.1%
Missing	9	20.9%

e. Tunisia

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	-	-
Democratic	16	37.2%
Undemocratic	15	34.9%
Very undemocratic	3	7.0%
Missing	9	20.9%

f. Turkey

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	1	2.3%
Democratic	11	25.6%
Undemocratic	18	41.9%
Very undemocratic	4	9.3%
Missing	9	20.9%

g. United States

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	13	30.2%
Democratic	21	48.8%
Undemocratic	1	2.3%
Very undemocratic	2	4.7%
Missing	6	14.0%

h. Yemen

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	-	-
Democratic	8	18.6%
Undemocratic	21	48.8%
Very undemocratic	5	11.6%
Missing	9	20.9%

i. Sweden

Label Value	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	36	83.7%
Democratic	4	9.3%
Undemocratic	-	-
Very undemocratic	-	-
Missing	3	7.0%

28. Being a representative of the people, how would you vote on a bill that is popular, yet regarded upon as being undemocratic according to democratic tenets?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
I would vote for the bill	7	16.3%
I would vote against the bill	25	58.1%
I would abstain from voting	9	20.9%
Missing	2	4.7%

29. In principle, do you think that the constitution should be amended by:

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
A simple parliamentary majority	2	4.7%
A 2/3 parliamentary majority	29	67.4%
A referendum amongst the people	11	25.6%
The president	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%

30. Whom of the following must hold the President accountable? (You may choose more than one option)

a.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
The PLC	38	88.4%
The Cabinet	-	-
The Courts of Law	1	2.3%
President above accountability	1	2.3%
The People	2	4.7%
God/Islam	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%

b.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
The PLC	-	-
The Cabinet	3	7.0%
The Courts of Law	9	20.9%
President above accountability	-	-
The People	14	32.6%
God/Islam	3	7.0%
Missing	14	32.6%

31. Whom of the following must hold the Cabinet accountable? (You may choose more than one option)

a.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
The President	20	46.5%
Law & Courts	11	25.6%
The PLC	11	25.6%
The People	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%

b.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
The President	-	-
Law & Courts	-	-
The PLC	28	65.1%
The People	3	7.0%
Missing	12	27.9%

32. Which in your opinion should be the highest source of interpretation?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
The President	-	-
The Parliament	10	23.3%
The High Court	20	46.5%
The religious institutions	-	-
Constitutional Court	7	16.3%
Parliament + High Court	5	11.6%
Missing	1	2.3%

33. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements. The ideal Council member should: (1: strongly agree, and 5: strongly disagree)

a. Adhere to the Constitution

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	37	86.0%
2	3	7.0%
3	-	-
4	-	-
5	-	-
Missing	3	7.0%

b. Be flexible

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	8	18.6%
2	6	14.0%
3	5	11.6%
4	3	7.0%
5	-	-
Missing	21	48.8%

c. Rely on religious interpretation

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	-	-
3	5	11.6%
4	3	7.0%
5	9	20.9%
Missing	22	51.2%

34. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1: strongly agree, and 5: strongly disagree)

a. There are some situations in which the Authority is justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	6	14.0%
2	6	14.0%
3	5	11.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	19	44.2%
Missing	2	4.7%

b. If the President acts against the Constitution, he should be impeached.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	15	34.9%
2	5	11.6%
3	14	32.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	3	7.0%
Missing	1	2.3%

c. The quota system is important to have representation for minorities.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	8	18.6%
2	8	18.6%
3	12	27.9%
4	2	4.7%
5	11	25.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

d. It is important to have women in the Council.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	32	74.4%
2	4	9.3%
3	2	4.7%
4	1	2.3%
5	2	4.7%
Missing	2	4.7%

e. Using the threat of violence as a political weapon is never justified.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	29	67.4%
2	-	-
3	1	2.3%
4	1	2.3%
5	10	23.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

f. There is too much concern for law and order, and not enough for rights.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	9	20.9%
2	8	18.6%
3	12	27.9%
4	1	2.3%
5	6	14.0%
Missing	7	16.3%

g. Alcohol drinking is a personal choice and should not be treated as a crime.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	19	44.2%
2	3	7.0%
3	5	11.6%
4	3	7.0%
5	9	20.9%
Missing	4	9.3%

35. Which, in your opinion, shall be the terms of reference for the negotiations during the interim phase: the PLO or the PNA?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
PLO	24	55.8%
PNA	5	11.6%
PLC	8	18.6%
PLO & PNA	5	11.6%
Missing	1	2.3%

36. How strongly do you believe in the following: (1: strongly believe, and 5: strongly do not believe)

a. Separation between religion and state

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	20	46.5%
2	5	11.6%
3	4	9.3%
4	3	7.0%
5	10	23.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

b. Individual rights

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	35	81.4%
2	5	11.6%
3	3	7.0%
4	-	-
5	-	-
Missing	-	-

c. Rule of majority

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	33	76.7%
2	7	16.3%
3	2	4.7%
4	-	-
5	1	2.3%
Missing	-	-

d. Rights of minorities

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	34	79.1%
2	4	9.3%
3	3	7.0%
4	-	-
5	2	4.7%
Missing	-	-

e. Judicial review		
Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	39	90.7%
2	2	4.7%
3	-	-
4	-	-
5	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

f. Freedom of assembly		
Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	41	95.3%
2	1	2.3%
3	-	-
4	-	-
5	1	2.3%
Missing	-	-

g. Rights of opposition		
Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	37	86.0%
2	2	4.7%
3	3	7.0%
4	-	-
5	1	2.3%
Missing	-	-

h. Freedom of press		
Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	38	88.4%
2	3	7.0%
3	1	2.3%
4	-	-
5	1	2.3%
Missing	-	-

37. The PLC has discussed many issues pertaining to Israeli practices such as settlements and closures, etc. To what extent would you say that discussing such issues falls within the jurisdiction of the PLC, or do you think that the PLC should not be involved?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes, PLC should be involved	43	100.0%
No, PLC should not be involved	-	-
Missing	-	-

38. Why is it the PLC's jurisdiction?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
People's representative	22	51.2%
PLC = part of PLO	1	2.3%
National responsibility	3	7.0%
Effect people represent	14	32.6%
Israeli practices (are on land in which PLC is responsible)	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

